By  Grahame Allen, Matthew Burton and Alison Pratt

The beginning of the millennium saw an increased political focus on the threat from international terrorism, heightened by the attack on the Twin Towers on 11 September 2001. Only one year before 9/11, new counter-terrorism legislation had been passed in the UK. Designed to reform and extend state powers found in previous counter-terrorism legislation, the Terrorism Act 2000 gave increased powers to the Home Secretary and the police. It moved the focus of counter-terrorism to all forms of domestic and international terrorism, rather than just Northern Ireland-related terrorism. In 2003, the Government introduced its counter-terrorism strategy, CONTEST. Now in its fourth iteration, CONTEST aims to reduce the risk to the UK from terrorism with four objectives:

• Pursue: to stop terrorist attacks

• Prevent: to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism

• Protect: to strengthen protection against a terrorist attack

• Prepare: to mitigate the impact of a terrorist attack

Although statistics relating to terrorism and the use of counter-terrorism legislation have been collected by the Home Office since the 1970s, the publication (and consistent collection) of data was halted in 2001. This briefing examines the available statistics on terrorism in Great Britain including:

• Deaths due to terrorism

• The use of stop and search legislation

• Terrorism arrests

• Pre-charge detention periods

• Prosecutions and convictions for terrorism

• Terrorist prisoners

• The use of TPIMS

• The number of foreign fighters fighting in Syria

London: Home Office Library, 2022. 37p.

By Maaha Elahi and Julian Hargreaves  

This article presents a legal and public policy analysis of Shakeel Begg v British Broadcasting Corporation, a British libel case brought before the High Court in 2016. Begg v BBC provides a lens through which current debates on extremism and counter-extremism in the UK may be analysed. More specifically, the authors use their analysis of the case to address criticisms levied against the UK Government’s counter-extremism strategy, including the conceptualisation and definition of “Islamist extremism”. The article offers two main contentions. First, that the judgment in Begg v BBC has been undervalued by politicians and policymakers in the UK, as well as by scholars, journalists and other commentators. Second, that Lord Justice Haddon-Cave’s judgment in Begg v BBC provides a useful framework for those wishing to define, identify and tackle Islamist extremism, and extremism of any kind, in the UK and elsewhere.  

 The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT),  2022.  32p.

By The United States. Department of Justice. Office of the Inspector General

The objectives of this audit were to: (1) evaluate the Department of Justice’s (DOJ or Department) efforts to develop a comprehensive strategy to address domestic violent extremism (DVE) in the United States, and (2) determine if the Department is effectively coordinating among Department stakeholders on the implementation of its strategy. Our audit scope covered the period of fiscal year (FY) 2017 to FY 2022. Results in Brief DOJ has identified DVE, which it refers to interchangeably as domestic terrorism, as one of the most significant threats facing the country. DOJ has characterized its efforts to counter DVE as a whole-of-Department commitment that requires sustained attention and resources. Nonetheless, DOJ has not formalized a DVE strategy. DOJ has focused attention on investigating, prosecuting, and preventing acts of DVE, but it also has experienced challenges in ensuring that its various efforts are cohesive and used in a strategic way to better identify lessons learned and spread awareness of available resources. Moreover, although DOJ has issued some internal guidance relating to DVE investigations, additional clearer guidance across all law enforcement and litigating components could assist in promoting greater consistency about what qualifies as a DVE case and better coordination in the handling of cases with a DVE nexus. DOJ should also consider formalizing mechanisms to routinely evaluate the efficacy and impact of its DVE efforts and to maintain the continuous protection of civil liberties. Finally, DOJ should improve its coordination on data-driven efforts to consistently track DVE-related cases across the Department 

Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 2023. 43p.

By Anti-Defamation League

Every year, individuals with ties to different extreme causes and movements kill people in the United States; the ADL Center on Extremism (COE) tracks these murders. Extremists regularly commit murders in the service of their ideology, in the service of a group or gang they may belong to, or even while engaging in traditional, non-ideological criminal activities. In 2022, domestic extremists killed at least 25 people in the U.S., in 12 separate incidents. This represents a decrease from the 33 extremist-related murders documented in 2021 and is comparable to the 22 extremist-related murders in 2020. It continues the recent trend of fewer extremist-related killings after a five year span of 47-78 extremist-related murders per year (2015-2019). The 2022 murder totals would have been much lower if not for two high-casualty extremist-related shooting sprees. Only 10 of the 25 deaths occurred outside of those sprees—and one of those 10 deaths occurred in a less lethal mass shooting attempt. The issue of extremist-related mass killings is of growing concern and is the subject of a special section of this report. From the 1970s through the 2000s, domestic extremist-related mass killings were relatively uncommon. However, over the past 12 years, their number has greatly increased. Most of these mass killings were committed by right-wing extremists, but left-wing and domestic Islamist extremists were also responsible for incidents. The Center on Extremism has identified 62 extremist-connected mass killing incidents since 1970, with 46 of them being ideologically motivated. Disturbingly, more than half (26, or 57%) of the ideological mass killings have occurred within the past 12 years. Of particular concern in recent years are shootings inspired by white supremacist “accelerationist” propaganda urging such attacks. In 2022, 18 of the 25 extremist-related murders appear to have been committed in whole or part for ideological motives, while the remaining seven murders either have no clear motive or were committed for a non-ideological motive.....  

New York: ADL, 2023. 36p.

By The Financial Action Task Force (FATF)

Migrant smuggling is a global issue. Every year, millions of migrants seek to escape regional conflict, political instability, persecution and poverty in search of a better future. They can risk their lives at the hands of migrant smugglers who see them as an opportunity to make financial gains and often have little regard for the migrants’ safety. The proceeds generated by migrant smuggling are estimated to exceed USD10 billion per year.

This FATF report analyses the money laundering and terrorist financing risks associated with migrant smuggling. While there has been an increase in migrant smuggling, many countries do not consider it a high-risk crime for money laundering and the associated financial flows are rarely investigated. 

The report identifies the most common methods to transfer and launder the proceeds of migrant smuggling, from hawala, integration of proceeds into legitimate business such as shops, travel agencies and transport companies, and the increasing use of professional money launderers. Using countries’ experiences, the report provides several recommendations and good practices that allow authorities to better trace criminal proceeds and enhance the effectiveness of money laundering investigations.

The report highlights the need for countries to understand the money laundering risks they face from migrant smuggling and to proactively follow the money linked to this criminal activity, including through increased collaboration with national and international authorities and the private sector.

The FATF calls on countries to proactively follow the money linked to migrant smuggling. Strengthening institutional, international and regional cooperation is an important step. There should be particular focus on supporting countries directly affected by migrant smuggling.

Paris: FATF, 2022. 78p.

By The Financial Action Task Force (FATF)

This report focuses on the funding behind ethnically or racially motivated terrorism, also referred to as extreme right-wing terrorism. Extreme right-wing attacks have increased in recent years, highlighting the need to raise awareness about this complex phenomenon and its financing. While most of these attacks were carried out by self-funded lone actors, they can also involve small and medium organisations, as well as transnational extreme right-wing movements. Few countries have designated these groups or individuals as terrorists and there are differences in the countries’ legal regimes to addressing their activities. Extreme right-wing groups can obtain funding from criminal activity, but most funding comes from legal sources, such as donations, membership fees and commercial activities. These groups are becoming increasingly sophisticated in the way they move and use funds and there are growing transnational links between the groups.

The report highlights the challenges in tackling the financing of extreme right-wing terrorism and preventing attacks. These challenges include how countries view the threat, ranging from terrorism, to racially motivated violence. The report encourages countries to continue to develop their understanding of this increasingly transnational criminal activity, including by considering ethnically or racially motivated terrorism financing in their national risk assessments. It also encourages public, private and international partners to work together to identify the threats and exchange best practices on combating ethnically or racially motivated terrorism financing. The findings in this report are based on inputs from around 30 jurisdictions across the FATF Global Network, as well as expertise from the private sector and international bodies partnered with the FATF.

Paris: FATF, 2021. 48p.

Edited by Francesca Gaili and Anne Weyembergh

To several governments, modern international terrorism cannot be handled adequately within the ordinary criminal justice system. To fight terrorism (including the criminalization of certain “abstract danger”, preparatory activities such as terrorist training, membership in a terrorist organization) more effectively, criminal law had to be adapted.

Bruxelles: \ Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles ,2012. 320p.

Helmus, Todd C.; Brown, Ryan Andrew; Ramchand, Rajeev

From the document: "Policymakers and researchers are concerned that the U.S. veteran community is at increased risk of radicalization to violent extremism. Although subsequently revised downward, early reports suggested that as many as one in five Capitol Hill attackers was currently or had previously been affiliated with the U.S. military. Extremist groups actively target military members and veterans for recruitment because of their training and operational, logistic, and leadership skills. The unique and often lonely experience of leaving the military has been hypothesized to make veterans susceptible to such recruitment. To help address these concerns, the authors conducted a nationally representative survey of veterans to examine the prevalence of support for specific extremist groups and ideologies, including support for political violence. The authors compared their results with those from surveys of the general population. Among other findings, the veteran community, as a whole, did not manifest higher support than the general population. Interestingly, the majority of those who supported political violence were not also supporters of specific groups."

RAND Corporation. 2023. 26p.

By John Braithwaite and Bina D'Costa

War and crime are cascade phenomena. War cascades across space and time to more war; crime to more crime; crime cascades to war; and war to crime. As a result, war and crime become complex phenomena. That does not mean we cannot understand how to prevent crime and war simultaneously. This book shows, for example, how a cascade analysis leads to an understanding of how refugee camps are nodes of both targeted attack and targeted recruitment into violence. Hence, humanitarian prevention also must target such nodes of risk. This book shows how nonviolence and non-domination can also be made to cascade, shunting cascades of violence into reverse. Complexity theory implies a conclusion that the pursuit of strategies for preventing crime and war is less important than understanding meta strategies. These are meta strategies for how to sequence and escalate many redundant prevention strategies. These themes were explored across seven South Asian societies during eight years of fieldwork.

Canberra: ANU Press, 2018. 706p.

By Julia Jansson

Recent atrocities have insured that terrorism and how to deal with terrorists legally and politically has been the subject of much discussion and debate on the international stage. This book presents a study of changes in the legal treatment of those perpetrating crimes of a political character over several decades. It most centrally deals with the political offence exception and how it has come to have changed. The book looks at this change from an international perspective with a particular focus on the United States. Interdisciplinary in approach, it examines the fields of terrorism and political crime from legal, political science and criminological perspectives. It will be of interest to a broad range of academics and researchers, as well as to policy-makers involved in creating new anti-terrorist policies.

New York; London: Routledge, 2019. 300p.

By Tanja Dreher

Targeted researches experiences of racism in New South Wales after September 11, 2001. The monograph analyses data collected by the anti-racism hotline established by the Community Relations Commission For a Multicultural NSW (CRC). It details a significant increase in racially motivated violence and verbal abuse in NSW in the months following the US 2001 September 11 attacks and finds these incidents produced a climate of fear and insecurity, which continues to impact these communities, and denies them the chance to enjoy a true sense of Australian citizenship.

Broadway, AUS: UTS Press, 2006. 48p.

By Antonio Pigliaru

Prefazione:” Poco prima di morire, nel marzo 1969, a 46 anni, Antonio P-i gliaru aveva steso uno schematico «programma » per la pubblicazione di tutti i suoi scritti, editi ed inediti. In esso era compreso un volume dal titolo «Il banditismo in Sardegna», in cui sarebbero dovuti confluire, insieme, lo studio su «La vendetta barbaricina come ordinamento giuridico», pubbli- cato presso Giuffrè nel 1959, e gli scritti più interessanti fra quelli che, prima e dopo quell'anno, Pigliaru aveva dedicato al pro- blema della criminalità in Sardegna: scritti che, pur apparsi su riviste scientifiche non direttamente legate all'attualità, erano pu- re quelli nei quali veniva razionalizzata e resa più coerente alle ragioni di una metodologia autentica quella stessa scottante ma- teria di cronaca, in cui Pigliaru si trovava così spesso coinvolto nel suo esercizio di intellettuale impegnato direttamente e totalmente sui temi di fondo della condizione isolana…”

Varese. Giuffrè Editore. 1970. 477p.

By Rudiger Lohiker

Jihadism has been an important issue of public discussions since 9/11. Internet media have been used by Jihadis as means of communication, propaganda, recruitment, and even training purposes. In this volume, the processes of interaction on Jihadi internet sites are analysed. Particular attention lays on the mechanisms of spread of propaganda via the internet by diverse technical means. The process of transformation of Islamic knowledge into Jihadi knowledge, the rhetorics  of videos, the development of South Asian Jihadi organisations and some conceptual issues are discussed.

Gottingen: V&R unipress, 2012. 224p.

By Pietro Marongiu

From the cover: Tra i filoni di studi sul banditismo compiuti ni Sardegna ni questi ultimi anni uno dei più interessanti è quello della scuola cri- minologica cagliaritana che, a partire dagliAnni Sessanta, ha offerto alla riflessione dei sardi - e della stessa Commissione Parlamentare d'inchiesta - sui problemi della criminalità isolana una serie di contributi fondamentali, soprattutto attraverso le opere di Raffaello Camba, Nereide Rudas e Giuseppe Puggioni.

Da quegli studi parte questo libro di Pietro Marongiu, puntato ad indagare al storia del banditismo isolano in quella sua caratteristica facies pastorale che assume spesso i connotati di un vero e proprio «banditismo sociale», secondo i moduli che ne sono stati indicati anche dall'inglese E.J. Hobsbawm.

Nella prima parte li libro ripercorre le interpretazioni che dai testi dell'antropologia positivistica degli «italiani» Niceforo e Lom- broso arrivano sino alle opere fondamentali dei sardi Antonio Pigliaru e Michelangelo Pira, disegnando così un intelligente inventario della attenzione che gli studiosi hanno posto alla specificità del banditismo isolano, e nella seconda parte ricostruisce con precisione filologica date, tappe, eventi, cronache, profili di zigantes e di balentes, perso. naggi maggiori e minori della storia del banditismo sardo.

By Elise M. Roberts-Ingleson and Wesley S. McCann

Does misinformation lead to radicalisation? This Research Note explores the theoretical link between consumption of misinformation and radicalisation to violent extremism. Drawing from insights from communication studies, criminology, and psychology, it is argued that some unique characteristics of misinformation are likely to facilitate radicalisation among individuals with self-uncertainty, low cognitive flexibility, and grievances, who also experience social exclusion. This exploration concludes with a summary of findings and offers recommendations for both policy makers and practitioners.

Perspectives on Terrorism, Volume XVII, Issue I March 2023

By Colin Powers, Erik Skare, Georges Fahmi, Nouran Ahmed, Ahmad Mhidi, Myriam Ababsa and Olivier Roy

Conceptual and epistemological challenges have to date constrained the generation of scientific knowledge on violent extremism. This article inverts the field’s seminal research question with an eye on furnishing a sturdier foundation for inquiry and theory building. Rather than seeking generalisable truths on why violent extremism occurs, we induce tentative propositions on why it does not, particularly within the context of enabling environments. Based on original data gathered through case studies conducted in the Middle East and North Africa, our primary findings are that the probability of violent extremism in enabling environments is reduced by three variables: i) hard interventions by the state; ii) the availability of credible ideological alternatives; and iii) the opportunity to opt out of the economy of violent extremism. At the conceptual level, we also propose that violent extremism be considered as a modality of action practiced by discrete political actors—namely, terrorist organisations—rather than as a phenomenon more diffusely pervading societies, nations, or faiths.

Perspectives on Terrorism, Volume XVII, Issue I March 2023

Kaitlyn Robinson, Iris Malone, and Martha Crenshaw

The far-right anti-government extremist movement poses a significant threat in the United States. The January 6, 2021, attack on the US Capitol illustrates the capacity of this movement to plan and mount violent attacks against government targets and democratic institutions. In this article, we explore how the organisational and tactical characteristics of the far-right anti-government movement in the United States enable it to thrive despite the dangers it poses to the public. We argue that its deep-seated ideological roots, fluid organisational structure, and mix of violent and nonviolent tactics make the movement difficult for federal and state authorities to proscribe, prosecute, and ultimately eliminate. US policymakers need to develop an informed response that accounts for the fluid, decentralised, and public-facing nature of anti-government extremism, as well as the pervasive distrust of federal authority that it reflects. We suggest that this approach will likely differ from the modern counter-terrorism tools that were initially designed to combat terrorist threats emanating from abroad, such as those posed by Al Qaeda and the Islamic State. We ground our arguments in evidence from cases of anti-government extremist groups and followers active in the United States over the past three decades.

Perspectives on Terrorism, Volume XVII, Issue I March 2023.

By Neil Shortland and Matthew Crayne

Bottom Line Up Front (BLUF): Members of the DHS workforce and terrorism researchers are systematically exposed to the propaganda, ideologies, and psychologies of actors who seek to launch terrorist attacks. This content is inherently value-laden and possibly personally troubling, causing these individuals to confront potential violations of their “sacred” or “protected” values such as the preservation of life (e.g., Tetlock et al., 2000). Here we present the result of a Rapid Evidence Assessment (REA) which sought to review research across multiple fields of work in which individuals are exposed to traumatic imagery, or events. This REA found that there is a small body of extant research focused on a few key domains (namely digital forensic and Internet child sex abuse prevention) that has explored the significant psychological trauma caused by exposure to extreme content. This body of literature emphasizes the importance of gaining clarity on the nature of trauma that is caused and the role of different forms of media on traumatic outcomes (e.g., observing Reddit forums vs., watching beheading videos). However, this review also identifies a series of factors that can impact the degree of harm caused by exposure to this content. These factors include the nature of the content, individual traits, and the individual’s social and work environment. Overall, this REA has identified a range of immediate research needs to extend, or apply, this research to the DHS workforce. These include: 1. Disaggregating the relationship that exists between the various possible forms of trauma and the specific forms of media that are consumed. 2. Exploring the degree to which cognitive resilience strategies, such as those identified within Crime Scene Investigator (CSI) staff are effective. 3. Validate the degree to which organizational dynamics can negatively or positively impact the manifestation of trauma in the workforce. These include issues of culture and workload. The presence of these organizational barriers within DHS needs to be explored, and if present, mitigated. 4. While largely untested, several articles included suggestions for interventions that could increase resilience. These largely center on the importance of debriefing. Future research should investigate how effective debriefs can be structured and implemented within the DHS workforce to support the development of resilience by those who are exposed to such harmful content online. Impact on DHS capabilities: Research identified as part of this REA outlines the negative implications of individual trauma, and the important role of the organization in mitigating trauma. Specifically, factors at the organizational level such as workload management, job rotation, and organizational culture were identified as playing a potentially important role in protecting employees from trauma. Furthermore, some studies showed that experiences of secondary trauma stemming from exposure to traumatic imagery was correlated with turnover intentions. As such, to maintain a safe and effective workforce in the face of such extreme pressures, it is important that DHS emphasize the need to protect workers from the negative impacts of exposure to traumatic content and imagery.

Omaha: The National Counterterrorism Innovation, Technology, and Education Center, University of Omaha, 2023. 30p.

By Rajan Basra

Despite the importance of prisons to terrorist movements and the surge in the jihadist prison population in the Middle East, relatively little is understood about how the prison environment influences terrorists to become violent or peaceful. Prisons have been “centres of gravity” for virtually every terrorist group in the modern era. The strategies, goals, and operations of a variety of groups – from Egyptian Islamists to German Marxists and Irish Republicans – have all been heavily influenced by the imprisonment of their members. In many instances, the treatment of imprisoned comrades served as an important rallying cause, and the lives of extremists have been fundamentally shaped by their time in the jail cells of the state. The increase in the number of suspected and convicted terrorist inmates throughout the Middle East, particularly in Iraq and north-eastern Syria, has made prisons even greater focal points in countering Salafi-Jihadi movements. It is vitally important to continue to tailor policy according to the best available evidence in various contexts and to understand the dynamics and consequences of different types of prison management. Aims The aim of this rapid review of evidence (RoE) is to identify which interventions have been most effective in managing and rehabilitating violent extremists across the world. Its purpose is to help inform current and future FCDO policy debates about prison-related interventions for convicted or suspected violent extremists. Methods This review examines 34 studies (including academic articles, policy reports, programme evaluations, and the grey literature) published in English between 2000 and 2021. The systematic search generated 9,447 articles, of which 25 met the inclusion criteria. The hand search identified an additional nine studies for inclusion. Key findings: The evidence base for prison-based interventions targeting violent extremists, whether in fragile and conflict-affected states or in the developed world, is very poor. Many existing programmes are in their infancy, and so they have not yet been robustly evaluated. However, there are promising themes. The naming of programmes can affect attitudes towards them, whether of participants or wider society. Involving family members can be beneficial to participants, and relatives can be supportive of deradicalisation/disengagement measures. Using deradicalised/disengaged leaders of extremist groups in interventions can have a positive impact on low-level members. There are promising signs that rapport-building is an effective technique when interviewing terrorist detainees. The same is true of motivational interviewing (MI), especially when applied to detainees who are ambivalent about and resistant to change. These techniques encourage engagement and disclosure of information. There is also some evidence that conducting sessions in informal settings leads to greater engagement. Regarding wholesale programmes, the most effective programmes are ones with a comprehensive array of interventions, which include treating inmates with dignity and respect. The Sri Lankan programme has been most effective, and there are promising aspects of the Saudi Arabian and Pakistani initiatives. Those programmes are comprehensive and multifaceted in approach, including vocational training, psychological support, family support, religious counselling and education, and, in some cases, financial assistance.

London: Cross-Border Conflict Evidence, Policy and Trends (XCEPT), King's College London, 2022. 32p.

By James Barnett, Shiraz Maher, Charlie Winter

As intercommunal violence has intensified in many Western countries in recent years, members of the terrorism studies community have sought to better understand the commonalities and interplay between radical Islamists and extremists on the far‑right. One theory that has gained particular traction of late is that of “reciprocal radicalisation”, the notion that far‑right and Islamist extremists feed off each other’s words and actions in a “spiral of violence.” This theory entered the mainstream in the mid‑2000s and quickly attracted the attention of policymakers and counterterrorism practitioners, particularly in the United Kingdom (UK). In, for example, his 2007 speech on “bringing down the barriers to cohesion”, Prime Minister David Cameron appeared to allude to it when he described Islamist extremists as a “mirror image” of the far‑right British National Party (BNP).

The purpose of this review is to examine the extent to which reciprocal radicalisation plays out in reality and, if it does, whether there exists any operational or tactical exchange between far‑right and radical Islamist terrorists. To this end, our intent is to summarise and synthesise the literature on how and why terrorists across the ideological spectrum develop and deploy innovative practices, be they tactical, strategic, organisational, or doctrinal in nature. Beginning with an examination of how social scientists understand creative processes within “malevolent” organisations, we offer an overview of what factors have been identified as influencing the innovative and learning‑based practices of terrorist organisations. In the second section, we examine the existing literature on reciprocal radicalisation before turning to the limited scholarly work that covers what one might call “operational reciprocity” between far‑right and Islamist extremists – that is, an exchange of knowledge and/or material collaboration between groups.

There are important policy implications to each of these questions. If reciprocal radicalisation is indeed as widespread and consistent a phenomenon as some proponents of the theory claim, then it would mean that many Western societies are already trapped in a vicious cycle of violence where the far‑right and Islamist extremists act as self‑fulfilling influences on each other. Relatedly, it has been anecdotally established that far‑right extremists have borrowed from the jihadist playbook, which would potentially help them increase the efficacy of their tactics – both lethal (e.g. bombmaking) and non‑lethal (e.g. social media messaging). In short, were this to be the case, it would be a potentially grave mistake to treat the far‑right and jihadist threats in isolation rather than examining how they interact and influence one another.

London: International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR), King’s College London , 2021. 22p.