By David Lochhead, Tidiani Diakité, Roberto Sollazzo, Saikou Sow, Raoul Sumo Tayo, Leonard Tettey

The use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in West Africa expanded dramatically between 2014 and 2022. As of 2022, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Mali, Niger, and Nigeria were heavily affected by these weapons, while Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, and Togo suffered from their use as an emerging threat. IED-building networks have established material and training links across conflict theatres in West and Central Africa, including the Lake Chad Basin, where armed groups have used IEDs extensively. IED designs have remained constant and inexpensive throughout the West Africa region, making them attractive for use in attacks against domestic and international security forces, UN peacekeepers, and civilians. The Small Arms Survey collected data on more than 2,200 IED-related incidents between March 2013 and September 2022, including the type, date, and location of these events. Information on perpetrators, their targets, and more than 6,600 casualties from deaths and injuries was also collected (Small Arms Survey, 2022). The data was collected through research undertaken in Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, and Niger, as well as desk research and remote interviews concerning Benin, Chad, and Nigeria. Where relevant from a comparative perspective, discussion of other regions that have countries with IED incidents or components occurs throughout the Report, such as those in North Africa, Central Africa, East Africa, and the Middle East. Most IED incidents analysed during this study involved IEDs containing explosive components or precursors specifically manufactured for the commercial extractive and construction sectors. Chemical products such as ammonium nitrate (AN), manufactured and supplied for bulk mining explosive emulsions, have entered IED-building networks, and are sourced principally from Ghana and Nigeria. Commercial explosives in bulk, including their precursors and accessories such as electric initiators and detonating cords, are diverted from the legal to illicit markets. This diversion primarily fulfils demand from the largely unregulated artisanal gold mining sector across West and Central Africa. A small subset of this diverted material also provisions IED construction. Captured, stolen, and recovered explosive ordnance—including legacy anti-vehicle mines trafficked from Chad, Libya, and possibly Sudan—also constitutes a source of IED components. Coordinated action among affected, source, and transit states is required to prevent armed groups and criminals from accessing commercial explosive materials and other IED components. Such action can involve: national stocktaking exercises; the development of national and regional counter-IED (C-IED) strategies; monitoring, information-sharing, and coordination mechanisms; regulatory modernization and harmonization;  engagement with artisanal mining associations, the mining and explosives industry, states, and regional trade blocs in pursuit of regulatory reform; and efforts to establish minimum standards for bulk and individual traceability of commercial explosives. Reducing the recovery of explosive ordnance requires renewed programmatic investment in clearing minefields and explosive remnants of war across the Sahe   

Geneva, SWIT:  Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies , 2023.  124p.

By Anne-Séverine Fabre, Nicolas Florquin, and Matt Schroeder

The trafficking of firearms and their use in criminal violence in Europe has received significant attention from researchers and policymakers. Less is known, however, about the illicit proliferation of firearm ammunition and other explosive munitions. Currently, detailed data on illicit munitions in Europe can only be accessed through specialized law enforcement agencies. National seizure statistics often lack the necessary detail for policy-relevant analysis, as do the media reports, which often include incomplete or inaccurate information on the types and calibres of ammunition. 

KEY FINDINGS • Calibres typically associated with handguns and widely available commercial brands of ammunition usually represent the bulk of the illicit firearm ammunition seen in the countries studied. • Illicit firearms ammunition is not necessarily trafficked from abroad, as shown by the misuse of domestically produced cartridges in the five surveyed countries. Moreover, cartridges produced legally within the European Union (EU) have been recovered the same year at crime scenes. • A large percentage of illicit hand grenades and other factory-produced explosive munitions seized in the European countries under review were manufactured in the former Yugoslavia. The seizures are consistent with media reports and government statements indicating that the Balkans are a major source of illicit grenades acquired and used by criminals in the EU. • The number of illicit grenades documented in the Netherlands and Sweden has decreased significantly in recent years, possibly owing to Covid-19-related travel and shipping disruptions, an increased reliance on other types of explosives by criminals, and national and regional counter-trafficking efforts.

Geneva, SWIT: Small Arms Survey, 2023. 24p.

By The Small Arms Survey

The use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in West Africa expanded dramatically over the last decade. IED-building networks have established material and training links across conflict areas in West and Central Africa, and their designs have remained constant and inexpensive throughout the region—helping to increase their use in attacks against domestic and international security forces, UN peacekeepers, and civilians.

Out of Control: The Trafficking of Improvised Explosive Device Components and Commercial Explosives in West Africa—a new report from the Small Arms Survey’s Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) in West Africa project—analyses data from more than 2,200 IED-related incidents between March 2013 and September 2022, and stresses the importance of coordinated regional approaches in eliminating illegal IED use in West and Central Africa.

Geneva, SWIT: Small Arms Survey, 2023. 124p.

By André Desmarais

Forensic science institutions have a key role to play—not only in criminal investigations, but also in the broader fight against illicit arms proliferation. However, their ability to play this role depends on their capacities, which are not well understood. A new Briefing Paper on the forensic services in Guinea aims to fill this gap.

Building on previous case studies on forensic services in Chad, Mauritania, and Niger, Arms Monitoring in Guinea: A Survey of National Forensic Services by ballistics specialist André Desmarais—co-published by INTERPOL and the Small Arms Survey’s Security Assessment in North Africa (SANA) project—examines capabilities, limitations, and needs of Guinea’s forensic services. It finds that information on calibres, models, and ammunition types of seized weapons is limited, and that the country lacks a central firearms database. Based on this analysis, the study provides tailored suggestions for areas of improvement, as a way to support Guinea in significantly reducing illicit arms flows.

Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2020. 12p.

Edited by Gian Ege, Christian Schwarzenegger and Monika Stempkowski

Trafficking in arms and weapons material is, perhaps, one of the most notorious forms of organised crime. Fuelled by both the movie industry as well as real world examples, criminal organisations are widely believed to engage in the trafficking of firearms and weapons material, including nuclear material. This illicit trade is further facilitated by corruption and other forms of collusion with government entities as well as by links between the criminal elements and the arms industry. As part of a joint teaching programme on transnational organised crime, students from the Universities of Queensland, Vienna and Zurich researched the topic of arms trafficking in a year-long course. Some of their academic papers are compiled in this volume, addressing topics ranging from international and national legal frameworks to levels and characteristics of this phenomenon in selected places, and enforcement and industry measures adopted to prevent and suppress this illicit trade.

Berllin: Carl Grossman Verlag, 2022. 300p.

By Jenny Mouzos

Firearms can be important as instruments of crime. Their unauthorised movement across national borders constitutes a crime in its own right. Firearms posing the greatest threat are those that are easily concealable and less detectable, making them attractive for traffickers and criminals alike. In order to regulate the traffic of firearms at an international level, it is necessary to begin by regulating it at both a regional and a national level. This paper highlights international strategies aimed at curbing the proliferation of firearms into Australia. It also examines Australian government initiatives introduced to reduce the number of, and access to, illegal firearms in the community, and consequently to reduce firearm-related violence.

Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 1999. 6p.

By United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)

What is the relationship between violence, crime and arms trafficking in Colombia? This report aims to answer this question and provide an assessment of the arms situation in Colombia. The document provides an overview of violence with firearms in Colombia, the main violence-generating factors in the country, and the relationship between firearms and the different forms of violence. The author further examines the dynamics of the manufacturing, trafficking, illegal possession and carrying of small arms and light weapons, as well as the contraband routes, the groups involved, and the principal suppliers. Chapters of the book also consider different aspects of the institutional handling of firearms in Colombia and the different disarmament experiences that have taken place in the country, such as the disarmament experiences of rebel groups and those carried out voluntarily.

The document concludes by analysing the commitments, actions, and positions assumed by Colombia with respect to the different protocols, conventions, and cooperation agreements on small arms and light weapons. In this respect, the authors highlight the leadership and permanent initiative that Colombia has displayed in the international field, by promoting the signature and adoption of different instruments aimed at reducing illegal trafficking and strengthening controls of legal arms transfers at the international level. With the exception of the weak penalization for the illegal carrying of arms, the authors argue that Colombia has tried to adapt its internal legislation to international requirements and standards.

Bogota: UNODC, 2006. 127p.

By Kim Cragin and Bruce Hoffman

This report provides an analysis of black-market and gray-market sources of small arms, explosives, equipment, and material that are available to terrorist and insurgent organizations in Columbia with particular attention given to the sources and methods used by covert and/or illegal suppliers and purchasers to acquire, sell, buy, transfer, ship, and receive these items.

The extent and type of weaponry currently available to terrorists, insurgents, and other criminals are enormous. These groups have exploited and developed local, regional, and global supply channels to traffic in munitions and equipment worldwide. In the country of Columbia, the drug trade, a protracted insurgent conflict, nationwide corruption, and small arms proliferation have contributed to the political instability and violence in the country over the past century with small arms proliferation among the most serious of the problems.

Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003. 208p.

By David Pérez Esparza

This thesis aims to explain why, against the background of a fairly global crime drop, violence and crime increased in Mexico in the mid-2000s. Since most classical hypotheses from criminological research are unable to account satisfactorily for these trends, this study tests the explanatory power of a situational hypothesis as the main independent variable (i.e. the role of opportunity). In particular, this involves testing whether the rise in violence can be explained by an increase in the availability of illegal weapons in Mexico resulting from policy changes and rises in gun production in the bordering U.S. To conduct this study, the thesis develops and implements an ad hoc analytic strategy (composed of six steps) that helps to examine each gun market (i.e. pistols, revolvers, rifles, and shotguns) both in the supply (U.S.) and in the illegal demand for firearms (Mexico). Following this market approach, the study finds that patterns of gun production in the U.S. temporally and spatially coincide with the patterns of gun confiscation (and violent crime) in Mexico. More specifically, analyses suggest that changes in illegal gun availability (across time and space) provide a better explanation for the observed difference in state-level homicide in Mexico than traditional hypotheses. The thesis presents additional analyses in favour of the situational hypothesis (through triangulation) and reports the findings of novel interviews with law enforcement officers with experience on gun trafficking in the U.S.-Mexico context. The study concludes by reviewing the key findings concerning the illicit markets between Mexico and the U.S., their theoretical and policy implications, as well as possible avenues for future research.

London: University College London, 2019. 389p.

By Savannah de Tessières

Measuring Illicit Arms Flows: Niger examines the measurement of illicit arms flows in Niger in the context of the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), specifically SDG 16. Based on field research conducted in Niger, the Briefing Paper maps the national and international bodies that collect data relevant to monitoring the evolution of illicit arms flows in and through Niger. It also discusses the relevance of Indicator 16.4.2 and suggests ways to improve the monitoring of progress towards the achievement of SDG Target 16.4 in Niger, and more widely in Africa

Geneva: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, 2017. 12p.

By Savannah de Tessières

This Report from the Small Arms Survey’s Security Assessment in North Africa (SANA) project examines insecurity, terrorism, and trafficking in Niger.The Sahel hosts multiple conflicts with myriad armed actors destabilizing the entire region. Positioned at the heart of this region, Niger sits at the crossroads of terrorism, trafficking, and conflict. The Nigerien state has great difficulty in guaranteeing domestic security, which has a devastating impact on social and economic development, in addition to it reinforcing tensions and fueling local conflicts. Older tensions become locked into new insecurity dynamics, such as terrorism, further complicating any future resolutions. Armed banditry, trafficking of weapons and drugs, violent community disputes, and the rise in terrorist attacks are all symptomatic of the State’s struggles. At the Crossroads of Sahelian Conflicts: Insecurity, Terrorism, and Arms Trafficking in Niger, authored by Savannah de Tessières, a senior consultant to the Survey, draws on extensive fieldwork in the regions of Agadez, Diffa, and Niamey. This included examinations of arms and ammunition seized across the country, as well as dozens of interviews with national and international government and security officials, civil society representatives, gold diggers, former rebels, and other experts.

Geneva: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, 2008. 114p.

By Nicolas Florquin, Sigrid Lipott, Francis Wairagu

In the first-ever continental analysis of illicit arms flows in Africa, the African Union Commission and the Small Arms Survey identify the scale, availability, characteristics, and supply patterns of illicit small arms in Africa. The African Union (AU) Master Roadmap of Practical Steps to Silence the Guns in Africa by Year 2020 was adopted in January 2017 and sets out practical steps to address the underlying drivers of conflict as well as the tools and enablers of violence. Preventing the illicit flows of weapons within Africa, including to conflict zones, is a vital component of the AU Roadmap, and this report aims to provide AU member states with a synthesis of relevant information on the topic. Weapons Compass: Mapping Illicit Small Arms Flows in Africa finds that cross-border trafficking by land is the most prominent type of illicit arms flow affecting countries on the continent. The weapons trafficked comprise both those sourced from within the continent—such as legacy weapons recycled from earlier conflicts and weapons diverted from national stockpiles—as well as arms sourced from other parts of the world, including embargo-breaking transfers from the Middle East and Eastern Europe. The report provides practical recommendations for AU member states to tackle illicit arms flows by noting specific assessments that can be generated to fill knowledge gaps; practical guidance and tools to develop; and ways in which to support and coordinate the implementation of those recommended actions.

Geneva: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, 2019. 100[p.

By Matt Schroeder and Olena Shumska

Making the Rounds: Illicit Ammunition in Ukraine finds that thousands of hand grenades, rockets, mortar rounds, landmines, and tins of firearms cartridges have proliferated throughout Ukraine, including to areas located far from the conflict zone in the east. Presenting findings from a comprehensive review of imagery and information on illicit ammunition trafficked to, from, and within Ukraine, the report includes an analysis of markings on more than 1,600 seized hand grenades, shoulder-fired rockets, ammunition tins, and anti-personnel landmines. The report reveals the types and sources of illicit ammunition in the country, as well as the modes of transport and smuggling techniques used by Ukrainian arms traffickers and their co-conspirators abroad. The analysis shows that the overwhelming majority of the 1,600 items analyzed were Soviet-designed models produced in Eastern European and Soviet factories prior to the dissolution of the USSR. Curbing the threat to local and regional security posed by this ammunition requires a long-term, coordinated effort by Ukrainian authorities and the international community.

Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2021. 68p.

By Kate Buchanan

This publication identifies a number of areas where additional steps are needed to tackle the availability and misuse of small arms. It points to promising policy initiatives, draws on lessons learned, and sets out recommendations for action. The main themes addressed are:- Preventing misuse- Controlling supply- Providing assistance to survivors of gun violence- Focusing on gender- Taking guns and ammunition out of circulation- Addressing the demand for small arms- Justice and security sector governance. This publication is designed specifically for government representatives, to provide a compelling people-centred agenda for the next phase of multilateral small arms activity, and will be widely distributed in the lead-up to the UN Review Conference on small arms.

Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 162p.

By Topher McDougal, David A. Shirk, Robert Muggah and John H. Patterson

Mexico is experiencing a surge in gun-related violence since 2006. Yet Mexico does not manufacture small arms, light weapons or ammunition in sizeable quantity. Moreover, Mexico has some of the most restrictive gun legislation in the world. It is assumed that a considerable proportion of weapons in Mexico are illegal, most having been trafficked from the United States (U.S.). The volume of firearms sold in the United States and trafficked across the U.S.-Mexico border, however, is notoriously difficult to record. Previous attempts have involved multiplicative approximations based upon the quantity of arms confiscated at the border.

San Diego: Trans-Border Institute, University of San Diego; Rio de Janeiro, Brazil: Igarapé Institute, 2013. 31p.