By N.R. Jenzen-Jones and Ian McCollum

Access to arms and munitions in Libya continues to be critical to both non-state and state-supported armed groups across the ideological spectrum, as well as to individuals. Firearms play an important role in everyday life for many Libyans, often serving a dual-purpose role for those associated with militia units. Regardless of their affiliation, many Libyans keep firearms to defend their homes and businesses, and for personal protection outside the home. Distrust of the rival governments; their militias; the police and armed forces; and various tribal, ethnic, and other groups is widely expressed.1 These sentiments are echoed in mainstream media reporting and academic research from 2012 to the present.

Geneva: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, 2017. 112p.

By Savannah de Tessières

This Report from the Small Arms Survey’s Security Assessment in North Africa (SANA) project examines insecurity, terrorism, and trafficking in Niger.The Sahel hosts multiple conflicts with myriad armed actors destabilizing the entire region. Positioned at the heart of this region, Niger sits at the crossroads of terrorism, trafficking, and conflict. The Nigerien state has great difficulty in guaranteeing domestic security, which has a devastating impact on social and economic development, in addition to it reinforcing tensions and fueling local conflicts. Older tensions become locked into new insecurity dynamics, such as terrorism, further complicating any future resolutions. Armed banditry, trafficking of weapons and drugs, violent community disputes, and the rise in terrorist attacks are all symptomatic of the State’s struggles. At the Crossroads of Sahelian Conflicts: Insecurity, Terrorism, and Arms Trafficking in Niger, authored by Savannah de Tessières, a senior consultant to the Survey, draws on extensive fieldwork in the regions of Agadez, Diffa, and Niamey. This included examinations of arms and ammunition seized across the country, as well as dozens of interviews with national and international government and security officials, civil society representatives, gold diggers, former rebels, and other experts.

Geneva: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, 2008. 114p.

By Nicolas Florquin and Benjamin King

Criminals purchase weapons unable to fire live ammunition legally and at low costs across Europe, converting them into lethal firearms with little to no training or expertise. The Small Arms Survey report From Legal to Lethal: Converted Firearms in Europe provides a detailed examination on the topic. Users of converted firearms include petty criminals, organized crime groups, and terrorist actors. Certain conversion techniques require some level of technical skills, but converters also make use of online, open-source tutorials to convert weapons relatively easily. While Europe has faced a range of converted weapons over the past decades, two main types of readily convertible firearms have entered into the illicit arms market in recent years: Slovak-origin acoustic expansion weapons (AEWs)—as used by Amedy Coulibaly in the Montrouge and Hypercacher Paris attacks in 2015; and Turkish-manufactured alarm pistols—currently the most prevalent converted firearm in Europe.

Geneva: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, 2018. 70p.

By Nicolas Florquin, Sigrid Lipott, Francis Wairagu

In the first-ever continental analysis of illicit arms flows in Africa, the African Union Commission and the Small Arms Survey identify the scale, availability, characteristics, and supply patterns of illicit small arms in Africa. The African Union (AU) Master Roadmap of Practical Steps to Silence the Guns in Africa by Year 2020 was adopted in January 2017 and sets out practical steps to address the underlying drivers of conflict as well as the tools and enablers of violence. Preventing the illicit flows of weapons within Africa, including to conflict zones, is a vital component of the AU Roadmap, and this report aims to provide AU member states with a synthesis of relevant information on the topic. Weapons Compass: Mapping Illicit Small Arms Flows in Africa finds that cross-border trafficking by land is the most prominent type of illicit arms flow affecting countries on the continent. The weapons trafficked comprise both those sourced from within the continent—such as legacy weapons recycled from earlier conflicts and weapons diverted from national stockpiles—as well as arms sourced from other parts of the world, including embargo-breaking transfers from the Middle East and Eastern Europe. The report provides practical recommendations for AU member states to tackle illicit arms flows by noting specific assessments that can be generated to fill knowledge gaps; practical guidance and tools to develop; and ways in which to support and coordinate the implementation of those recommended actions.

Geneva: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, 2019. 100[p.

By Matt Schroeder and Olena Shumska

Making the Rounds: Illicit Ammunition in Ukraine finds that thousands of hand grenades, rockets, mortar rounds, landmines, and tins of firearms cartridges have proliferated throughout Ukraine, including to areas located far from the conflict zone in the east. Presenting findings from a comprehensive review of imagery and information on illicit ammunition trafficked to, from, and within Ukraine, the report includes an analysis of markings on more than 1,600 seized hand grenades, shoulder-fired rockets, ammunition tins, and anti-personnel landmines. The report reveals the types and sources of illicit ammunition in the country, as well as the modes of transport and smuggling techniques used by Ukrainian arms traffickers and their co-conspirators abroad. The analysis shows that the overwhelming majority of the 1,600 items analyzed were Soviet-designed models produced in Eastern European and Soviet factories prior to the dissolution of the USSR. Curbing the threat to local and regional security posed by this ammunition requires a long-term, coordinated effort by Ukrainian authorities and the international community.

Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2021. 68p.

ByFiona Mangan and Matthias Nowak

This Briefing Paper from the Small Arms Survey maps cross-border arms trafficking in West Africa and the Sahel through case studies on Niger, Mali, Guinea-Bissau, and the two tri-border areas of Burkina Faso–Côte d’Ivoire–Mali, and Ghana–Côte d’Ivoire–Burkina Faso. The study reveals that highly organized trafficking networks move sizable arms quantities across large areas of land north of the Niger River. Arms trafficking south of the river is more characterized by lower-level arms flows and local intermediaries engaging in so-called ‘ant trade’. Actors range from long-established criminals, corrupt officials, and organized trafficking rings, to tribal networks and low-level transporters. Based on field research, The West Africa–Sahel Connection: Mapping Cross-border Arms Trafficking analyzes the links between illicit arms trafficking and other forms of trafficking and organized crime in the region. The study also looks into the impacts of such arms trafficking as well as the responses to it.

Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2019. 24p.

By William Godnick, with Robert Muggah and Camilla Waszink

This paper provides a review of the impact of small arms and light weapons in Central America in the years following the end of the armed hostilities of the 1980s and early 1990s. In this instance, ‘Central America’ refers to the Spanish-speaking countries of the isthmus—Costa Rica, Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Panama. The definition of small arms and light weapons used here is the one set out by the UN (1997), and covers a wide range of weaponry, including commercial firearms and military weapons that can be used by an individual soldier or small crew.1 ‘Small arms’, ‘firearms’, and ‘weapons’ are used more or less interchangeably in the paper. Military and civilian firearms are the principal focus, but because of the type of violence affecting present-day Central America, other weapons such as hand grenades and home-made pistols are also discussed. Homicide rates, and more specifically firearm-related homicide rates, are the primary indicators used to gauge the impact of weapons on Central American societies. Other indicators given more anecdotal consideration here include armed crime and injury rates, the growth in the private security industry, the costs of firearm-related violence to the public health system, the impact of such crimes on the economy and the effects of armed violence on governance in remote rural areas.

Geneva: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International Studies, 2002. 51p.

Edited by Emilia Dungel and Anne-Séverine Fabre

Researchers and policymakers have studied the roles of women in arms offences from the perspectives of violent extremism prevention, women offenders, political activism, and transnational crime in relation to drug trafficking and human trafficking. From a small arms control perspective, though, knowledge is limited. In order to begin filling this research gap, this Report examines the extent to which well established small arms research methods—general population surveys, key informant interviews, and court documentation reviews—can be used to explore arms trafficking through a gender lens. In doing so, it seeks to go beyond the victim paradigm to better understand the types of roles that women play, if any, in arms trafficking and, similarly, their motivations. Focused around three case studies—in Niger, Ukraine, and the United States—the Report finds that the combined use of the aforementioned methods was fruitful, with each approach highlighting specific aspects. Although it is important not to extrapolate the findings beyond the contexts in which they were gathered, the data revealed women to be involved in varied roles in arms trafficking, including high-risk activities and, in a few instances, leadership positions. Similar to research findings on other types of trafficking and criminal activities, the study identified economic necessity, financial gain, and familial ties, including intimate partners, as factors that drive women to participate in arms trafficking schemes. An additional motivation to engage in these types of activities stemmed from grievances over lack of public policy and services.

Geneva: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, 2022. 68p.

By Kate Buchanan

This publication identifies a number of areas where additional steps are needed to tackle the availability and misuse of small arms. It points to promising policy initiatives, draws on lessons learned, and sets out recommendations for action. The main themes addressed are:- Preventing misuse- Controlling supply- Providing assistance to survivors of gun violence- Focusing on gender- Taking guns and ammunition out of circulation- Addressing the demand for small arms- Justice and security sector governance. This publication is designed specifically for government representatives, to provide a compelling people-centred agenda for the next phase of multilateral small arms activity, and will be widely distributed in the lead-up to the UN Review Conference on small arms.

Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 162p.

By Philip Alpers

This field study focuses on PNG's Southern Highlands Province, a conspicuous hot spot for armed violence and gun-related injury. It provides a preliminary tally of illegal high-powered guns in parts of the province seen as particularly vulnerable to armed violence, and documents the profound disruption wrought by their misuse. Tribal fighters, mercenary gunmen, and criminals provide details of their illicit firearms and ammunition, trafficking routes, and prices paid. The most common illegal assault weapon is the Australian-made self-loading rifle, followed by the US-made M16, both of which are sourced primarily from PNG Defence Force stocks. Many of the remainder are AR-15s obtained from the PNG police.

Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2005. 138p.

By William J. Krouse

Congress has debated the efficacy and constitutionality of federal regulation of firearms and ammunition, with strong advocates arguing for and against greater gun control. In the wake of the July 20, 2012, Aurora, CO, theater mass shooting, in which 12 people were shot to death and 58 wounded (7 of them critically) by a lone gunman, it is likely that there will be calls in the 112th Congress to reconsider a 1994 ban on semiautomatic assault weapons and large capacity ammunition feeding devices that expired in September 2004. There were similar calls to ban such feeding devices (see S. 436/H.R. 1781) following the January 8, 2011, Tucson, AZ, mass shooting, in which 6 people were killed and 14 wounded, including Representative Gabrielle Giffords, who was grievously wounded. These calls could be amplified by the August 5, 2012, Sikh temple shooting in Milwaukee, WI, in which six worshipers were shot to death and three wounded by a lone gunman. The 112th Congress continues to consider the implications of Operation Fast and Furious and allegations that the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) mishandled that Phoenix, AZ-based gun trafficking investigation. On June 28, 2012, the House passed a resolution (H.Res. 711) citing Attorney General Eric Holder with contempt for his failure to produce additional, subpoenaed documents related to Operation Fast and Furious to the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform. On May 18, 2012, the House passed the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2013 (H.R. 4310), which would amend a limitation on the Secretary of Defense’s authority to regulate firearms privately held by members of the Armed Forces off-base. On May 10, 2012, the House passed a Commerce-Justice-State appropriations bill (H.R. 5326) that would fund ATF for FY2013, and on April 19, 2012, the Senate Committee on Appropriations reported a similar bill (S. 2323)

Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2012. 118p.

By Philip Alpers and Amélie Rossetti

Four consecutive formal reports have now found that no Australian State or Territory has at any stage fully complied with the 1996 or 2002 firearm resolutions which collectively formed the National Firearms Agreement. In important areas, State and Territory legislation has been blocked or revised to dilute the effect of the NFA. This report, commissioned and funded by Gun Control Australia, finds that on balance, both non-compliance from day one and two decades of political pressure have steadily reduced restrictions and undermined the NFA’s original intent.

Sydney: Gun Control Australia, 1997. 102p.

By Philp Alpers

In a typical year 99 New Zealanders are shot to death: one for every 88 hours.12 Of these, 75% are suicides, 12% homicides, and 11% accidents.13 In an average year, 13 children and youths aged 19 or younger die from gunshot wounds and another 89 people are admitted to hospital with nonfatal wounds. Our gun death toll is 15% higher than the toll from cervical cancer. For every ten New Zealanders who die from HIV/AIDS, sixteen die by gunshot. Gun death is three times more common than death by fire. Of all victims of gun homicide in this country during 1992-94, most (52.5%) were shot by a licensed gun owner. Almost all victims (95%) were killed by a familiar male. Half were shot by their partner, an estranged partner or a member of their own family. Previously law-abiding, licensed gun owners shoot between four and ten times as many victims as do people with a previous history of mental illness. Self defence is not an acceptable reason for gun ownership in New Zealand. The great majority of private firearms are held for pest control, agricultural and sporting purposes. While most gun owners are licensed every ten years, 97% of their firearms (shotguns and rifles) have not been registered to their owners since 1984. The remaining 3% – military-style semi-automatic rifles (MSSAs), handguns (pistols & revolvers), and restricted weapons (mainly fully automatic “machine guns”) – are individually registered to each owner and much more carefully controlled. As a result, crime with registered firearms is rare.

Wellington, ZN: New Zealand Police Association, 1997. 48p.

By Philp Alpers

In New Zealand, 250,000 licensed shooters own an estimated 1.1 million firearms, enough for one in each occupied dwelling and sufficient to outnumber the combined small-arms of the police and armed forces by a ratio of 30 to 1. We own 11 times as many guns per capita as the English and the Welsh, 60% more than the Australians but less than half as many as the residents of the United States. An additional 14,000 guns are imported to New Zealand in a typical year. Any New Zealander with a basic firearms licence may legally buy and keep any number of sporting rifles and shotguns in any home without any official records of the guns being kept anywhere. Police have no statutory authority to monitor the size and content of such a gun owner’s collection. Each day an average of seven firearm offences involving danger to life are reported to the police, while one in five homicides are committed with a firearm. In a typical year 91 New Zealanders are shot to death: one for every four days. Of these, 75% are suicides, 12% accidents, 11% homicides, while in 2% of cases the cause is undetermined. In an average year, 13 children aged 15 or younger die from gunshot wounds. Our gun death toll is 10% higher than the toll from cervical cancer. For every ten New Zealanders who die from HIV/AIDS, fifteen die by gunshot. Gun death is three times more common than death by fire. In addition to gun killings, non-fatal gun injuries result in one New Zealander being hospitalised on average every four days. Of all victims of gun homicide in this country during 1992-94, most (52.5%) were shot by a licensed gun owner. Almost all victims (95%) were killed by a familiar male. Half were shot by their partner, an estranged partner or a member of their own family. Of the perpetrators, 82% had no previous history of violent crime, while none had a history of mental illness.

Wellington, NZ: New Zealand Police Association, 1996. 38p.

By Philip Alpers

In New Zealand, 250,000 licensed shooters own an estimated 1.1 million firearms, enough for one in each occupied dwelling and sufficient to outnumber the combined small-arms of the police and armed forces by a ratio of 30 to 1. We own 16 times as many guns per capita as the English and the Welsh, 60% more than the Australians but less than half as many as the residents of the United States. An additional 14,000 guns are imported to New Zealand in a typical year. Each day an average of seven firearm offences involving danger to life are reported to the police, while one in five homicides are committed with a firearm. On average, one person dies by gunshot in New Zealand every four days. Despite a common certainty that firearms are increasingly misused, there has been little local research. Although critical data on the misuse of firearms are collected by police, these are not made available.

Wellington NZ: New Zealand Police Association, 1996. 33p.

Edited by Nils Duquet

This edited volume offers an in-depth and detailed insight into Project SAFTE’s research findings. In-depth country studies were conducted in eight EU member states by research teams from the Flemish Peace Institute, SIPRI, SSSA, Arquebus Solutions, Small Arms Survey and Bureau Bruinsma. The in-depth qualitative research methodology involved desk research and semi-structured interviews with key international actors and stakeholders such as Europol, EMPACT Firearms, Interpol, SEESAC and the Office of the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator. The volume sheds light on how illegal firearms markets are structured in the EU and shows how terrorists access these.

Brussels: Flemish Peace Institute, 2018. 484p.

By James Silver; Andre Simons; and Sarah Craun

"In 2017 there were 30 separate active shootings in the United States, the largest number ever recorded by the FBI during a one-year period. With so many attacks occurring, it can become easy to believe that nothing can stop an active shooter determined to commit violence. [...] Faced with so many tragedies, society routinely wrestles with a fundamental question: can anything be done to prevent attacks on our loved ones, our children, our schools, our churches, concerts, and communities? There is cause for hope because there is something that can be done. In the weeks and months before an attack, many active shooters engage in behaviors that may signal impending violence. While some of these behaviors are intentionally concealed, others are observable and -- if recognized and reported -- may lead to a disruption prior to an attack. Unfortunately, well-meaning bystanders (often friends and family members of the active shooter) may struggle to appropriately categorize the observed behavior as malevolent. [...] Once reported to law enforcement, those in authority may also struggle to decide how best to assess and intervene, particularly if no crime has yet been committed. By articulating the concrete, observable pre-attack behaviors of many active shooters, the FBI hopes to make these warning signs more visible and easily identifiable. This information is intended to be used not only by law enforcement officials, mental health care practitioners, and threat assessment professionals, but also by parents, friends, teachers, employers and anyone who suspects that a person is moving towards violence."

Washington, DC: U.S.. Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2018. 30p.

By Columbine Review Commission

The Commission conducted 15 meetings open to members of the public. The Commission received statements from an extensive list of State and local officials and private persons who had experience with or information concerning the event; Commission staff reviewed thousands of pages of official and unofficial documents, reports, and studies. Two recommendations related to crisis response actions. First, law enforcement policy and training should emphasize that the highest priority of law enforcement officers, after arriving at the scene of a crisis, is to stop any ongoing assault. Second, there should be an increased emphasis on training appropriate personnel in preparation for and responding to large-scale emergencies. Two recommendations pertained to improved communications for critical emergencies. First, law enforcement agencies should plan their communications systems to facilitate crisis communication with other agencies with whom they might reasonably be expected to interface in emergencies. Second, Colorado should continue to develop a single statewide digital trunked communications system. Other categories of recommendations pertained to advance planning for critical emergencies; interaction with media representatives; tasks of school resource officers; detection by school administrators of potential perpetrators of school-based violence and administrative countermeasures; medical treatment for attack victims; reuniting attack victims and their families; identification of victims' bodies and family access to bodies; and suicide prevention in the aftermath of traumatic incidents.

Denver, Colo. : Columbine Review Commission, 2001. 174p.

By The Office of the Child Advocate

In January, 2013, the Office of the Child Advocate was directed by the Connecticut Child Fatality Review Panel to prepare a report that would focus on Adam Lanza (hereinafter referred to as AL), and include a review of the circumstances that pre-dated his commission of mass murder at Sandy Hook Elementary School. The charge was to develop any recommendations for public health system improvement that emanated from the review. Authors of this report focused on AL’s developmental, educational, and mental health profile over time, the services he received from various community providers, and ultimately his condition prior to his actions on December 14, 2012. Authors looked for any warning signs, red flags, or other lessons that could be learned from a review of AL’s life. It was not the primary purpose of this investigation to explicitly examine the role of guns in the Sandy Hook shootings. However, the conclusion cannot be avoided that access to guns is relevant to an examination of ways to improve the public health. Access to assault weapons with high capacity magazines did play a major role in this and other mass shootings in recent history. Our emphasis on AL’s developmental trajectory and issues of mental illness should not be understood to mean that these issues were considered more important than access to these weapons or that we do not consider such access to be a critical public health issue.

Hartford, CT : State of Connecticut, Office of the Child Advocate, 2014. 114p.

By William S. Pollack, William.; Modzeleski, and Rooney, Georgeann

In the wake of several high-profile shootings at schools in the United States, most notably the shootings that occurred at Columbine High School on April 20, 1999, the United States Secret Service (Secret Service) and the United States Department of Education (ED) embarked on a collaborative endeavor to study incidents of planned (or "targeted") violence in the nation's schools. Initiated in 1999, the study, termed the Safe School Initiative (SSI), examined several issues, most notably whether past school-based attacks were planned, and what could be done to prevent future attacks. The SSI findings highlight that in most targeted school-based attacks, individuals, referred to as "bystanders" in this report, had some type of advanced knowledge about planned school violence. Despite this advanced knowledge, the attacks still occurred. This study aimed to further the prevention of targeted school-based attacks by exploring how students with prior knowledge of attacks made decisions regarding what steps, if any, to take after learning the information. The study sought to identify what might be done to encourage more students to share information they learn about potential targeted school-based violence with one or more adults. Six key findings were identified. Given the small sample size and the exploratory nature of the study, generalization from these findings may be limited. The findings are: (1) The relationships between the bystanders and the attackers, as well as when and how the bystanders came upon information about the planned attacks, varied; (2) Bystanders shared information related to a threat along a continuum that ranged from bystanders who took no action to those who actively conveyed the information; (3) School climate affected whether bystanders came forward with information related to the threats; (4) Some bystanders disbelieved that the attacks would occur and thus did not report them; (5) Bystanders often misjudged the likelihood and immediacy of the planned attack; and (6) In some situations, parents and parental figures influenced whether the bystander reported the information related to the potential attack to school staff or other adults in positions of authority,

Washington, DC: United States Secret Service and United States Department of Education, 2008. 15p.