By Shehryar Fazli

The Taliban’s 3 April 2022 edict prohibiting poppy cultivation and the use and trade of all types of narcotics across Afghanistan could have grave implications for a collapsing economy. Poppy is the country’s most valuable cash crop, and its labour-intensive cultivation employs several hundred thousand people, pushing up wages and living standards of those directly and indirectly involved. Requiring little water, the poppy’s resilience in adverse agricultural conditions makes it an attractive long-term investment, especially during one of the worst droughts in decades. The new ban would affect farmers in the rural southwest region, where many Taliban leaders are from, as well as influential players across the opium and heroin supply chain. In the absence of significant financial incentives to these constituencies, the risks of a major backlash probably outweigh any benefits of enforcing a poppy ban. Providing such financial incentives would be dependent on significant foreign assistance. Some prominent experts and commentators infer that international legitimacy and funding was the Taliban’s primary motivation in announcing the edict. If so, there are no signs yet that the move will generate the desired response. Afghanistan has been politically and economically isolated since the Taliban’s August 2021 forceful seizure of power. The freezing of around $9 billion in central bank foreign reserves, held mostly in the US, triggered a collapse of the local currency and major liquidity crisis, while aid cut-offs and sanctions triggered hyper-inflation and impeded trade and other business. There are indications that the international community, led by the US, is softening its position to prevent an economic collapse affecting millions of Afghans who face starvation. Without tangible Taliban commitments to basic rights and equality, however, especially of girls and women, deeper international engagement, including on counter-narcotics, is unlikely. How willing and able the Taliban will be to enforce its edict may remain unclear for several months. The ban came amid the poppy harvest in the southwestern provinces of Helmand and Kandahar, bastions of both poppy cultivation and Taliban support. Significant quantities, therefore, may have already been harvested. Transporting them up the supply chain, and to western destinations, will depend on resourceful transnational crime groups. The most important of these are arguably in Pakistan, which shares Afghanistan’s longest border and most of the routes for westward movement of illicit goods, people, and cash from Afghanistan. Criminal networks here traverse the Indian and Iranian borders, and also move their product by sea off the southern Makran coast and Karachi port, to European, African, Asian and Australian markets. These networks, and the geography in which they operate, also require close examination. By better understanding the context and trends, policy-makers will be better able to assess policy options and their implications, especially in Europe, the destination of significant volumes of heroin from Afghanistan

SOC ACE Research Paper No. 9.

Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham. 2022. 35p.

By Summer Walker I Mariana Botero Restrepo

The relationship between illicit economies, conflict and instability has been long debated in academic and practitioner circles, and part of the international policy agenda for some time. From the diamond trade in Sierra Leone to the heroin trade in Afghanistan, illicit economies have been shown to fund insurgencies and political actors, and to contribute to ongoing conflict.

The GI-TOC’s 2021 Global Organized Crime Index shows that of the ten highest-scoring countries for criminality, meaning those with the most pervasive criminal markets and influential criminal actors, the overwhelming majority are countries experiencing conflict or fragility.

This report considers three case studies at different stages of armed conflict to assess the dynamic relationship between criminal networks, illicit economies, and conflict actors and conditions. These three case studies offer unique perspectives in terms of duration, size of the conflict area and stage of the conflict:

• Armed insurgency in northern Mozambique

• Armed groups in Libya and Mali

• Armed groups in Colombia

While these conflicts present three distinct cases, they also share relevant similarities. In these cases, unrest is created after an armed group or groups counter the legitimacy of the state. The national response to the conflict is supplemented with regional and international responses. All situations lack a swift resolution, and the instability persists primarily in areas outside capitals, even after formal conflict resolution. In this way, these three cases are representative of sustained, localized instability deriving from armed conflict between the state and non-state armed groups.

All three conflict areas overlap with areas of established illicit economies. In these settings, the connections between armed conflict and illicit markets evolve over time. The impacts may be commodity-dependent, with different considerations for illegal mining as opposed to trafficked drugs. Illicit markets change over time, as do the power brokers and beneficiaries involved. Illicit economies contribute to long-term enabling environments for instability by prolonging conflict and eroding government responses to conflict. Through the case studies of northern Mozambique, the Sahel region and Colombia, this report identifies ten dynamics that influence illicit economies and conflict situations. These findings make a contribution to vital policy discussions for stabilization and conflict mediation in these – and other – re

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime., 2022. 74p.

By Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime

Before February 2022, Russian and Ukrainian organized crime formed the strongest criminal ecosystem in Europe. Having developed along similar lines in the 1990s, Russian and Ukrainian criminal groups and networks controlled a lucrative transnational smuggling highway between Russia and Western Europe that carried gold, timber, tobacco, coal, counterfeit/untaxed goods, humans and drugs. At the more politically connected end of the spectrum, corrupt officials and criminal bosses from both countries exploited Ukraine’s role as a transit country for Russian gas to siphon off millions of dollars, while Ukraine’s oligarch class exerted a strong grip over the country’s economic, political and information spheres.

Kyiv made serious efforts to tackle organized crime and corruption after the 2014 Maidan Revolution but results were mixed, especially in the case of judicial reform; meanwhile, the conflict in the Donbas region helped bolster an array of illicit economies and criminal actors. For organized crime, business was generally good.

The Russian invasion has inflicted a profound shock to this ecosystem. With the war, collaboration between Russian and Ukrainian organized crime interests became impossible due to the political situation (which led many criminals to break such ties) and the pragmatic challenge of smuggling across what was now a violently contested and dynamic front line. Many Ukrainian crime bosses chose to leave the country, as did many oligarchs, including several accused of pro-Russian sympathies. Martial law and the curfew also initially constrained criminal activity. According to senior sources in the Ukrainian police, incidents of armed robberies declined by a factor of between three and four, and the homicide rate dropped to almost zero at the beginning of the war (although this may partly reflect the impact of the war on reporting in the early days of the war). It may be that the impact of the invasion also whittled out some less robust and resilient organized crime groups: according to data from the general prosecutor’s office, the number of organized crime groups under investigation decreased from 499 in 2021 to 395 in 2022 (although this decline alternatively could reflect dimished investigative capacity).

This report explores the changing dynamics in the political economy of Ukrainian organized crime up till December 2022 and maps how the criminal landscape has adapted to the new situation. Given the complexity of the impact of the war in Ukraine on organized crime in both parties to the conflict, the GI-TOC is producing two reports. This report concentrates on developments within Ukraine’s internationally recognized borders – with the exception of the so-called Luhansk and Donetsk ‘people’s republics’ (LDNR) in the Donbas region, which broke away from Kyiv in 2014 with Russian backing and assistance, and Crimea, which Russia illegally annexed the same year. The impact of the conflict on organized crime in these areas and on Russian organized crime more generally will be discussed in a separate report, which will assess trends in sanctions busting and money laundering, changes in trafficking flows east of Ukraine and how Russian organized crime groups have responded to the conflict.

Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2023. 60p.

By Julia Stanyard | Thierry Vircoulon | Julian Rademeyer

Russia has rapidly increased its engagement in Africa in recent years, both politically and economically, as it seeks to expand its influence on the continent. However, Russia’s activities in Africa are subject to controversy. Our new report sheds light on the Wagner Group, a private military company rapidly becoming the most effective form of Russian engagement in Africa.

The group comprises a network of political influence operations and economic entities such as mining companies. It has been accused of using whatever means necessary to achieve its aims, including criminal activity. The US government recently designated Wagner as a ‘transnational criminal organization,’ allowing for broader sanctions against Wagner and its enablers.

The report argues that the Wagner Group is unique as an organization in the breadth, scale, and boldness of its activities. However, the study also shows that Wagner did not emerge in a vacuum: The group’s activities and characteristics reflect broader trends in the evolution of Russia’s oligarchs and organized crime groups, their respective relationships with the Russian state, and their activities in Africa.

By focusing on case studies in several African countries, the report helps to shed light on the complex dynamics between Russia, its oligarchs, and its criminal networks and how they interact with African governments, businesses, and populations. This report draws on research conducted since July 2022, as well as other sources from across the continent, providing a comprehensive overview of the Wagner Group’s operations in Africa. The report provides important insights into the evolving relationship between Russia and Africa and how this is shaping politics and economics on the continent, serving as a resource for journalists, policymakers, and researchers seeking to understand the complex dynamics of Russian engagement in Africa.

Center for the Study of Democracy; Global Initiative Against Organized Crime, 2023.92p.

By Ruggero Scaturro

Recent studies conducted by the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC) and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) show that the war in Ukraine may displace existing drug trafficking routes from and through Ukraine and exacerbate the instability that enables drug trafficking and manufacturing, including in areas not directly connected or exposed to hostilities.

Trauma derived from the conflict might also have an impact on current and future drug use patterns in communities affected by the war, which could create new opportunities for both local and foreign drug traffickers to meet this growing demand. This becomes particularly relevant when analyzing flows of traditional opioids as well as new psychoactive substances (NPS), and stimulants used by both civilians and soldiers at the front line. Neighbouring Ukraine, the South Eastern Europe region represents a relatively small market for drug consumption and accounts for only a small amount of drug production and supply (primarily cannabis) to EU markets. However, its strategic location between East and West – and its proximity to the Ukraine conflict – might mean that it is particularly exposed to the effects of the war on traffickers’ modus operandi and trafficking routes through the region.

Since February 2022, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has caused the progressive displacement and movement of traditional drug production and trafficking hubs in southern and eastern Ukraine towards the west, around the borders with Poland, Slovakia and Romania. Similarly, in the context of criminal mobility, overwhelmed border security management between Ukraine and its neighbouring countries to the west leads to opportunities for both Ukrainian and Russian criminals to operate and manage their businesses from South Eastern Europe, thanks to the possibility to forge documents and receive ‘golden’ passports due to their investments in countries in the region.

This report assesses whether the war in Ukraine and its resulting disruption are having a significant impact on drug flows through South Eastern Europe. The research is based on the assumption that, because of an intensified military presence in Eastern Europe, traditional flows of drugs have been, at least temporarily, disrupted. This includes the northern route of opioids from Afghanistan, which supplies large markets across Central Asia, Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. Furthermore, other drug routes, such as for cocaine from Latin America to the port of Odesa, have atrophied. Conversely, flows along alternative routes, such as the Balkan route, appear to have intensified.

In view of these shifts, this report offers an assessment of emerging trends in drugs flows and provides an overview of data on seizures in South Eastern Europe. It also assesses the impact that the Ukraine war is having on wholesale and retail drug prices and, where assessment is possible, on levels of purity and the perceived quality of substances.

Center for the Study of Democracy; Global Initiative Against Organized Crime, 2023. 28p.

By Center for Strategic and International Studies; By Christopher Hernandez-Roy, Rubi Bledsoe & Andrea Michelle Cerén

In 2020, Western and Central Europe comprised 21 percent of the global demand of cocaine. The drug is now the second most consumed illicit drug on the entire continent behind cannabis. Europe has become an attractive destination for drug traffickers seeking higher profits and lower risks. This is due to higher market prices and lesser legal penalties for possession and consumption than in the United States. While a kilogram of cocaine is priced at around $28,000 in the United States, the same kilogram is priced at around $40,000 in places like France and Spain—and a staggering $219,454 in Estonia. Furthermore, European interdiction efforts in Europe and the Caribbean territories do not match U.S. disruption efforts in the Western Hemisphere. Available data suggests the European Union spends only $3-4 billion on supply-side reduction in comparison to $17.4 billion for the United States. According to European officials, this allows border security forces to interdict only around 10–12 percent of the total flow of cocaine into the continent. Without a multipronged approach to curb Europe’s cocaine demand through higher legal penalities and transatlantic interdiction efforts, the cocaine market there will continue to boom—and with it, drug violence and health threats.

Washington, DC: CSIS, 2023.

By Irwin, Véronique; Wang, Ke; Cui, Jiashan; Thompson, Alexandra (Statistician)

From the document: "'Report on Indicators of School Crime and Safety: 2022' provides the most recent national indicators on school crime and safety. The information presented in this report serves as a reference for policymakers and practitioners so that they can develop effective programs and policies aimed at violence and school crime prevention. Accurate information about the nature, extent, and scope of the problem being addressed is essential for developing effective programs and policies. This is the 25th edition of Indicators of School Crime and Safety, a joint effort of the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) and the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES). This report provides summary statistics to inform the nation about current aspects of crime and safety in schools. 'Report on Indicators of School Crime and Safety' includes the most recent available data at the time of its development, compiled from a number of statistical data sources supported by the federal government. Such sources include results from the School-Associated Violent Death Surveillance System, sponsored by the U.S. Department of Education, the U.S. Department of Justice, and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC); the National Vital Statistics System, sponsored by CDC; the School Shooting Safety Compendium, sponsored by the U.S. Department of Defense; the Studies of Active Shooter Incidents, sponsored by the Federal Bureau of Investigation; the National Crime Victimization Survey and School Crime Supplement to that survey, sponsored by BJS and NCES, respectively; the Youth Risk Behavior Surveillance System, sponsored by CDC; the School Survey on Crime and Safety, Fast Response Survey System, ED'Facts', and National Teacher and Principal Survey, all sponsored by NCES; and the Campus Safety and Security Survey, sponsored by the U.S. Department of Education. Some of these data are collected annually, while others are collected less frequently."

Washington D.D. National Center For Education Statistics; United States. Bureau Of Justice Statistics. 2023.. 38p.

Edited by Tzanetakis, Meropi and South, Nigel

The ebook edition of this title is Open Access and freely available to read online. Transnational illicit markets have been transformed by the digital revolution. They take advantage of encryption technologies, smartphones, social media applications and cryptocurrencies that protect the digital traces of buyers and sellers, posing new challenges to drug control policies and public health alike. Digital Transformations of Illicit Drug Markets: Reconfiguration and Continuity considers how the digital revolution has changed the selling and buying of illicit substances through increased convenience and anonymisation. Providing a uniquely interdisciplinary perspective, chapters show how the digital transformation of illicit drug markets combines a reconfiguration of how sellers and buyers interact in new markets. Emphasising that illicit digital markets are embedded in societal structures and power relations in general, contributors also recognise the importance of critical perspectives on inequalities between the Global North and South as well as issues of gender. Digital Transformations of Illicit Drug Markets: Reconfiguration and Continuity challenges the field of criminology to recognise the limits of its traditional knowledge and move beyond the preoccupations that restrict crime to certain fixed spaces in order to develop new explanations.

Bingley: Emerald, 2023. 198p.

Edited by Susanna Johansson · Kari Stefansen Elisiv Bakketeig · Anna Kaldal

This edited collection explores the background and implementation of the Nordic Barnahus (or 'Children's House') model - recognised as one of the most important reforms related to children who are the victims of crime in the Nordic region. This book discusses both its potential to affect change and the challenges facing it. The model was introduced as a response to a growing recognition of the need for more integrated and child-centred services for children exposed to violence and sexual abuse. In the Barnahus structure, different professions work together to ensure that victimized children receive help and treatment and that their legal rights are met. This original study is organised into four broad themes: child-friendliness, support and treatment; the forensic child investigative interview; children's rights perspectives; and interagency collaboration and professional autonomy. Each themed section includes in-depth chapters from different Nordic countries, outlining and analysing the practice and outcomes of the collaborative work engaged in by Barnahus from different perspectives. The introductory and concluding chapters offer a comparative lens useful for policy and practice implementation within the Nordic welfare state context and beyond, ensuring this book has global academic and practical appeal. This work was published by Saint Philip Street Press pursuant to

Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017. 402p.

Edited by Danilo Antonio Baltieri

This book covers some recent researches on the interface between drug misuse and crime and demonstrates that some types of violent crimes are more intimately related to alcohol and / or drug consumption. It is written for researchers, health and law professionals engaged in the evaluation, management and treatment of different types of offenders. It is organized by a number of phenomena that are known (or supposed) to link drugs and crime. This book shows that the application of punishment under the guise of deterrence, despite its ineffectiveness, is frequently preferred to a more adequate management for some types of offenders. This book provides ten manuscripts that describe different aspects of the relationship between drugs and crimes, always focusing on Brazilian reality. It shows that a partnership between specialized mental health professionals, lawyers and policy makers is urgent with respect to this subject in Brazil and other countries.

Bentham Books, 2009. 100p.

Edited by Gian Ege, Andreas Schloenhardt ,Christian Schwarzenegger and Monika Stempkowski

Debates about decriminalising or even legalising certain narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances have gained much momentum in recent years. On the surface, it appears that more and more jurisdictions are exploring the introduction of measures to permit, albeit in very controlled ways, the use of some narcotic drugs, if only for medical purposes. Others further agree that the so-called ‘war on drugs’ has failed to produce any meaningful success and that new ways to prevent the abuse of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances need to be explored. Nevertheless, most jurisdictions continue to impose near-complete bans on the production, manufacturing, trade, transport, supply, sale, and possession of illicit drugs. National authorities, along with international organisations, point out that any move to decriminalise narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances is inconsistent with international law.

Berlin: Carl Grossman Verlag 2023. 250p.

By Alexandra Thompson; Susannah N. Tapp

This report is the 50th in a series that began in 1973 and includes statistics on nonfatal violent crimes (rape or sexual assault, robbery, aggravated assault, and simple assault) and property crimes (burglary or trespassing, motor vehicle theft, and other types of household theft). The report also describes the characteristics of crimes and victims. See BJS's National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) Dashboard (N-DASH) Tool to access more NCVS data.

Highlights:

• The violent victimization rate increased from 16.5 victimizations per 1,000 persons in 2021 to 23.5 per 1,000 in 2022.

• From 1993 to 2022, the overall rate of violent victimization declined from 79.8 to 23.5 victimizations per 1,000 persons age 12 or older.

• In 2022, about 2 in 5 (42%) violent victimizations were reported to police.

• Motor vehicle theft victimization increased from a rate of 4.3 victimizations per 1,000 households in 2021 to 5.5 per 1,000 in 2022.

Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs Bureau of Justice Statistics , 2023. 34p.

By Véronique Irwin; Ke Wang; Jiashan Cui; and Alexandra Thompson

This report is the 25th in a series of annual publications produced jointly by the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) and the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES), Institute of Education Sciences, Department of Education. It provides official estimates of school crime and safety from a variety of data sources, including national surveys of students, teachers, principals, and post-secondary institutions. The report presents data on different types of student victimization, measures of school conditions, and student perceptions about their personal safety at school. Indicator 2: Incidence of Victimization at School and Away From School includes data from BJS’s National Crime Victimization Survey. Each of the 23 indicators is presented separately, and all indicators can be found in the Condition of Education at NCES.

Highlights:

• For students ages 12–18, the rate of nonfatal criminal victimization (including theft and violent victimization) at school in 2019 was not significantly different than the rate in 2010. From 2019 to 2021, the rate at school decreased from 30 to 7 victimizations per 1,000 students.

• Lower percentages of public school teachers in 2020–21 than in 2011–12 reported being threatened with injury by a student from their school (6 vs. 10 percent) and being physically attacked by a student from their school (4 vs. 6 percent).

• Higher percentages of public schools in 2019–20 than in 2009–10 reported problems with student cyberbullying (16 vs. 8 percent) at least once a week.

• Lower percentages of students in grades 9–12 in 2019 than in 2009 reported the following issues: having been in a physical fight on school property in the previous 12 months (8 vs. 11 percent); carrying a weapon on school property during the previous 30 days (3 vs. 6 percent); and using alcohol on at least 1 day during the previous 30 days (29 vs. 42 percent).

Washington, DC: The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) and National Center for Education Statistics (NCES), Institute of Education Sciences, and Department of Education , 2023,

By Felber J. Arroyave, Alexander M. Petersen, Jeffrey Jenkins & Rafael Hurtado

Illicit wildlife trafficking poses a threat to the conservation of species and ecosystems, and represents a fundamental source of biodiversity loss, alongside climate change and large-scale land degradation. Despite the seriousness of this issue, little is known about various socio-cultural demand sources underlying trafficking networks, for example the forthright consumption of endangered species in different cultural contexts. Our study illustrates how wildlife trafficking represents a wicked problem at the intersection of criminal enforcement, cultural heritage and environmental systems management. As with similar network-based crimes, institutions are frequently ineffective at curbing wildlife trafficking, partly due to the lack of information detailing activities within illicit trading networks. To address this shortcoming, we leverage official government records documenting the illegal trade of reptiles in Colombia. As such, our study contributes to the understanding of how and why wildlife trafficking persists across robust trafficking networks, which are conduits for a broader range of black-market goods. Leveraging geo-spatial data, we construct a multiplex representation of wildlife trafficking networks, which facilitates identifying network properties that are signatures of strategic trafficker behavior. In particular, our results indicate that traffickers’ actions are constrained by spatial and market customs, a result which is apparent only within an integrated multiplex representation. Characteristic levels of sub-network coupling further indicate that traffickers strategically leverage knowledge of the entire system. We argue that this multiplex representation is essential for prioritizing crime enforcement strategies aimed at disrupting robust trade networks, thereby enhancing the effectiveness and resources allocation of institutions charged with curbing illicit trafficking. We develop a generalizable model of multiplex criminal trade networks suitable for communicating with policy makers and practitioners, thereby facilitating rapid translation into public policy and environmental conservation efforts.

Applied Network Science volume 5, Article number: 20 (2020)

By Tanya Wyatt, Daan van Uhm & Angus Nurse

Historically, the poaching of wildlife was portrayed as a small-scale local activity in which only small numbers of wildlife would be smuggled illegally by collectors or opportunists. Nowadays, this image has changed: criminal networks are believed to be highly involved in wildlife trafficking, which has become a significant area of illicit activity. Even though wildlife trafficking has become accepted as a major area of crime and an important topic and criminologists have examined a variety of illegal wildlife markets, research that specifically focuses on the involvement of different criminal networks and their specific nature is lacking. The concept of a ‘criminal network’ or ‘serious organized crime’ is amorphous – getting used interchangeably and describes all crime that is structured rather than solely reflecting crime that fits within normative definitions of ‘organized’ crime. In reality, criminal networks are diverse. As such, we propose categories of criminal networks that are evidenced in the literature and within our own fieldwork: (1) organized crime groups (2) corporate crime groups and (3) disorganized criminal networks. Whereas there are instances when these groups act alone, this article will (also) discuss the overlap and interaction that occurs between our proposed categories and discuss the complicated nature of the involved criminal networks as well as predictions as to the future of these networks.

Trends in Organized Crime (2020) 23:350–366

By Meredith L. Gore , Robert Mwinyihali , Luc Mayet Gavinet Duclair, Makaya Baku-Bumb , etc.

Urban wildmeat consumption can contribute to significant declines in wildlife populations, ecosystem function, and food insecurity security. Describing types of individuals involved in illegal urban wildmeat trafficking can help distinguish ordinary citizens from members of criminal organizations and urban vs. rural dimensions of the activity. This research aimed to: (1) create and apply a typology for urban wildmeat traffickers and sellers; and (2) explore linkages between types of urban wildmeat traffickers and sellers. We used focus groups with experts in the Republic of the Congo, February 2019 (N = 2, n = 7–10) to achieve objectives and focused on pangolins, great apes, and dwarf crocodiles. Participants generated risk rankings for each species, typology and city; data was encoded and indexed. Results illustrate heterogeneity in actors involved in the illegal supply chain. Business sideliner and trading charity trafficker types were associated with the highest total risk to wildlife trafficking. A similar pattern of divergence was detected for seller typologies; hidden and casual sellers were associated with the greatest total risk in Pointe Noire and Brazzaville, respectively. Differentiating but not stove piping stakeholders involved in urban wildmeat trafficking will help clarify stages of illegal supply chains as well and promote thinking about new sectors to involve in interventions and solutions, particularly in urban ecosystems thought to be outside the scope to wildlife crime.

Global Ecology and Conservation. Volume 27, June 2021, e01557

By Michelle Anagnostou

The intensified illegal trade of wildlife has contributed to the unsustainable decline of wildlife populations, the destabilization of ecosystems, and threatens economic development and human security. Though often lacking empirical evidence, convergence theory has emerged recently as a topic of interest among researchers, practitioners, and the media to explain the growing overlap of criminal activities in an increasingly globalized world. In this paper, I explain the interdisciplinary theoretical foundations for the interconnectivity of criminal networks, including connections between illegal wildlife trade networks and non-state armed groups. I also outline and discuss various perspectives on the convergence of the illegal wildlife trade with other organized crime activities. I conclude by highlighting the urgent need for a better understanding of the role of the organized criminal groups involved in the illegal wildlife trade, and of how these groups converge with other types of criminal activities. The policy implications of filling in this knowledge gap are twofold: firstly, understanding how criminal networks converge can facilitate the implementation of more effective law enforcement and investigations that target high-profile offenders, as opposed to focusing on low-level poachers; and secondly, this understanding can foster more cooperation across agencies and jurisdictions to address multiple crime types and crime in convergence settings

Environmental Challenges. Volume 5, December 2021, 100222

By Earth League International and John Jay College of Criminal Justice

Environmental crime convergence, the focal point of this report, poses an imminent threat to our planet’s delicate ecosystems. To address this urgent issue, ELI, and John Jay College present ELI’s revolutionary 4-Type Environmental Crime Convergence paradigm to comprehensively understand and combat the intricate web of transnational organized crime operations that perpetuate environmental degradation.

The foundation of this report is built upon the fieldwork and intelligence analysis of ELI’s investigators and crime analysts, who have gathered first-hand evidence of Environmental Crime Convergence directly from some of the world’s most notorious environmental criminals and their networks. Drawing on years of investigative fieldwork in the Americas, Europe, Africa, and Asia, over two dozen case studies have emerged from ELI’s work as primary sources of data.

This report highlights five (5) case studies of the transnational criminal networks in Latin America identified by ELI that illustrate the convergence of environmental and wildlife crime with other serious crimes and expose the severity of the issue at a global scale.

Los Angeles: Earth League International, 2023. 83p.

By Alejandro Melgoza and Alex Papadovassilakis

We traveled over 300 kilometers through a trio of nature reserves to document how illegal loggers have ravaged some of the region’s most biodiverse forests and to chronicle the unlikely story of a small group of park rangers fighting back. This investigation, which used video and other multimedia elements to explain this complex criminal economy, is our most in-depth exploration of environmental crime yet..

Washington, DC: InSight Crime, 2022. 38p.

By Jack Norton, Stephen Jones, Bea Halbach-Singh, Jasmine Heiss

When people are arrested and charged for activities they are forced to engage in to survive—such as driving without a license or sleeping outside—poverty becomes criminalized. In these cases, being poor is essentially made illegal. In collaboration with Free Hearts—an organization led by formerly incarcerated women—Vera researchers explain how poverty has been criminalized across Tennessee and what this means for people who live in communities in the state. The effects of the criminalization of poverty are compounded through the collection of money bail; additional fines, fees, and costs; and barriers to housing, transportation, education, and employment. With deep dives into several counties across Tennessee, the report shows how incarceration and policing are related to other systems that both punish and exacerbate poverty in the state. The report outlines actionable steps that can be taken now to build toward a vision of safety that includes all Tennesseans.

New York: Vera Institute of Justice, 2022. 58p.