By INTERPOL and ENACT Africa

Across the globe, the proliferation of new armed groups (including rebels, militias, criminal groups and gangs) has made conflict prevention and resolution even more complex . Armed groups are diversifying their revenues, which are increasingly based on organized crime activities . Organized Crime Groups (OCGs) often benefit from the turmoil of armed conflicts and violence. They can engage in violence to protect their illicit business, undermining national economic development and security. Furthermore, OCGs can team up with armed groups to access and control natural resources, competing with the state to provide public goods or even protection to their community. Different situations of violent conflict affect countries in the Eastern African region. Crime dynamics that emerge from instability in one country of the region can spill over into a neighbouring country, posing a threat to regional peace and security. The emergence of hybrid criminal groups engaged in transnational organized crime and in armed conflict most likely represents a relevant dimension of contemporary conflict in Eastern Africa. Yet, the knowledge on the multiple ways in which OCGs prey, or even amplify, local conflicts for their own benefit remains limited. In many instances, the scale of criminal activities in Eastern Africa contributes to an increase in the risk of conflict or in its prolongation. Organized crime thrives in conflict and other situations of violence in the region when goods and supplies are scarce, filling the demand often in association with armed groups. In some cases, revenue from criminal activities enables armed groups to finance their activities. The illicit circulation of weapons in the region from and into conflict-affected settings fuels violence and criminal activities. Information suggests that in some occasions, armed groups and OCGs collude to smuggle goods, migrants and drugs through the region and beyond. Moreover, the illicit extraction, control and taxation of natural resources in the region is often a source of revenue for armed groups and often links them with criminal actors. Information shows that livestock theft, or cattle rustling, poses a serious threat to many countries in the region and fuels the increase in the demand for small arms and light weapons in two aspects: for fighters to steal cattle and for ranchers to protect their livestock against such attacks. Higher levels of violence have been reported in cattle rustling cases affecting local economies and security. Organized violence for profit continues to affect Eastern Africa. Kidnapping for ransom, looting, threats and sexual gender-based violence are among the most reported incidents in the region. The driving factors for those crimes are sometimes difficult to discern and involve a combination of reasons such as economic gain, firearms sourcing (notably for cases of looting security forces), intention to control a community or territory. Illicit financial flows, and particularly, illicit taxation, allow OCGs and armed groups to generate revenue through commodity taxes, by imposing taxes on the community to move through certain areas or to run their business

Lyon, France: INTERPOL, 2021. 32p

By INTERPOL and ENACT Africa

In the last two decades the percentage of imprisoned women offenders is growing globally, at a faster rate than imprisoned male offenders. 1 Such global increase raises the question as to whether the same can be observed on the African continent . Information suggests that transnational organized crime (TOC) affects African women and girls differently than African men and boys. It is crucial to learn how and if men and women behave differently in TOC in Africa in order to uncover the main drivers of these differences and adapt policing methodology accordingly. While gendered data continues to be insufficiently reported upon by law enforcement authorities in Africa, the assessment suggests that African law enforcement authorities are possibly under -investigating and under -estimating the involvement of African women in TOC. African law enforcement authorities likely continue to perceive them as victims or accomplices only. They are possibly rarely seen as the criminals themselves and less so as being the organizers, leaders, traffickers or recruiters. This gap in police investigations is indeed known to be exploited to the benefit of organized crime as women are more likely to go under the radar . The assessment draws attention to the common features of African female offenders based on available data to share insights and encourage police forces to reconsider their approach.

Lyon, France: INTERPOL, 2021. 32p.

By The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime

The monitor draws on information provided by field researchers working in gang-affected communities of the Western Cape. This includes interviews with current and former gang members, civil society and members of the criminal justice system.

Over the past three months, our team has monitored and recorded almost a thousand instances of gang-related violence, which are unpacked here to provide a picture of some emerging trends in gang behaviour. The key findings analyzed here have been selected, as they would appear to be emblematic of broader trends in gang social dynamics, and because they have been under-reported elsewhere, or may have repercussions for how we understand developments in Western Cape gang violence.

In this first issue of the Gang Monitor, we also include a summary of key dynamics to watch, which draws on a longer-term view of how the gang landscape has changed in recent years. The analysis is based on the GI-TOC’s research over several years identifying how Western Cape gang dynamics have developed and to help us understand how they may continue to in future.

This quarter has been characterized by increased infighting between splinter groups within gangs. Conflict between Americans groups in Hanover Park provides a key example. The Fancy Boys are on an aggressive campaign to expand territorial control, including in Mitchells Plain and Manenberg. Pagad G-Force has become more vocal and visible in anti-gang campaigning. A shooting in Hanover Park may indicate that the group is taking a more militant stance. There has been an increase in young child gang recruits forming breakaway groups, as exemplified by KEY FINDINGS

ISSUE No. 1 | QUARTERLY OCTOBER 2023. Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime, 2023. 8p.

By Shehryar Fazli

This project addresses the complex issue of drug production in Afghanistan, which continues to fuel regional and global narcotics trade. Despite the Taliban's 2022 ban on poppy cultivation and narcotics trade, trafficking remains a major concern. The subsequent crackdown in 2023 resulted in reduced cultivation in specific provinces, but the ban's sustainability is uncertain due to poppy's significance in Afghanistan's rural economy and the fragile economic situation.

The project extends its focus to the Golden Crescent region, where Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran intersect, serving as a prominent drug smuggling hub. Pakistan and Iran, pivotal to the southern drug trafficking route, have consistently accounted for over 90% of global opium seizures since 2002. Central Asia, particularly Tajikistan, presents counter-narcotics challenges in the northern drug route to Russia and Europe.

Challenging the notion that state capacity alone can address the drug trade, the project advocates for a multifaceted approach, emphasising international cooperation beyond law enforcement. The punitive regimes in Pakistan, Iran, and Tajikistan, coupled with corruption, inadvertently protect high-level traffickers. In Afghanistan, the project raises the question of whether neighboring or Western governments are willing to end Kabul's isolation, providing economic assistance to reduce dependence on poppy cultivation. However, prospects are limited due to regressive Taliban policies.

The proposed counter-narcotics strategy expands beyond law enforcement, including building domestic public pressure for an accountable regime. This involves partnerships with local organisations, rehabilitation centers, health and education NGOs, and human rights groups. The goal is to foster domestic political ownership and public demand for humane and accountable national counter-narcotics policies. The project argues against relying solely on coercive state organs, offering a more comprehensive and sustainable solution to the core challenges posed by drug trafficking.

SOC ACE Research Paper 25. University of Birmingham. Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham, 2023. 30p.

By John Collins and Ian tennant

This paper charts the history of Afghanistan’s interaction with the international drug control system and the complex relationship between national–international policy formation. It tells the story of Afghanistan’s relationship with and impact on evolving global drug regulations from the birth of the League of Nations drug control system through the 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs and up to the present day. It draws on primary documentation from US and British archives and an extensive review of secondary literature, as well as a series of interviews conducted for the purposes of this paper. It argues for a more nuanced historical awareness of Afghanistan’s role within multilateral drug control as a way to understand its roles in the creation of the modern licit drug economy and its continued role in the modern illicit drug economy. Further, it argues that there is a need to engage broader society in discussions, to ensure more continuity is built into the system—as relationships built with the old regime in Afghanistan have collapsed. It calls for re-centring international capacity-building efforts on community-centred approaches, not simply law enforcement and traditional alternative development (AD) programmes. Moving away from the former enforcementfocused activities also reduces the risks of human rights violations.

SOC ACE Research Paper No. 6 . Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham, 2022. 34p.

By Diana Kim andYuhki Tajima

This article analyzes the efficacy of border enforcement against smuggling. We argue that walls, fences, patrols, and other efforts to secure porous borders can reduce smuggling, but only in the absence of collusion between smugglers and state agents at official border crossings. When such corruption occurs, border enforcement merely diverts smuggling flows without reducing their overall volume. We also identify the conditions under which corruption occurs and characterize border enforcement as a sorting mechanism that allows high-skilled smugglers to forge alternative border-crossing routes while deterring low-skilled smugglers or driving them to bribe local border agents. Combining a formal model and an archival case study of opium smuggling in Southeast Asia, we demonstrate that border enforcement has conditional effects on the routes and volumes of smuggling, depending on the nature of interactions between smugglers and border agents. By drawing attention to the technological and organizational aspects of smuggling, this article brings scholarship on criminal governance into the study of international relations, and contributes to debates on the effects of border enforcement and border politics more generally.

International Organization , Volume 76 , Issue 4 , Fall 2022 , pp. 830 - 867

By Kaitlyn Sill and Paul A. Haskins.

This article originally appeared in Police Chief and is reposted here with permission from the International Association of Chiefs of Police.

Hate crimes harm whole communities. They are message crimes that tell all members of a group—not just the immediate victims—that they are unwelcome and at risk.

The damage that bias victimization causes multiplies when victims and justice agencies don’t recognize or report hate crimes as such. In addition, in cases for which law enforcement agencies fail to respond to or investigate hate crimes, relationships between law enforcement and affected communities can suffer, and public trust in police can erode.[1]

While it is known that hate crimes are underreported throughout the United States, there is not a clear understanding of exactly why reporting rates are low, to what extent, and what might be done to improve them. An even more elementary question, with no single answer, is: What constitutes a hate crime? Different state statutes and law enforcement agencies have different answers to that question, which further complicates the task of identifying hate crimes and harmonizing hate crime data collection and statistics.

By Carter, Sarah R.; Wheeler, Nicole E.; Chwalek, Sabrina; Isaac, Christopher R.; Yassif, Jaime

From the document: "Rapid scientific and technological advances are fueling a 21st-century biotechnology revolution. Accelerating developments in the life sciences and in technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI), automation, and robotics are enhancing scientists' abilities to engineer living systems for a broad range of purposes. These groundbreaking advances are critical to building a more productive, sustainable, and healthy future for humans, animals, and the environment. Significant advances in AI in recent years offer tremendous benefits for modern bioscience and bioengineering by supporting the rapid development of vaccines and therapeutics, enabling the development of new materials, fostering economic development, and helping fight climate change. However, AI-bio capabilities--AI tools and technologies that enable the engineering of living systems--also could be accidentally or deliberately misused to cause significant harm, with the potential to cause a global biological catastrophe. [...] To address the pressing need to govern AI-bio capabilities, this report explores three key questions: [1] What are current and anticipated AI capabilities for engineering living systems? [2] What are the biosecurity implications of these developments? [3] What are the most promising options for governing this important technology that will effectively guard against misuse while enabling beneficial applications? To answer these questions, this report presents key findings informed by interviews with more than 30 individuals with expertise in AI, biosecurity, bioscience research, biotechnology, and governance of emerging technologies."

Nuclear Threat Initiative. 2023. 88p.

By SLEDJESKI, CHRISTOPHER L.

From the document: "Artificial Intelligence (AI) brings many benefits, but disruption of AI could, in the future, generate impacts on scales and in ways not previously imagined. These impacts, at a societal level and in the context of critical infrastructure, include disruptions to National Critical Functions. A prioritized risk-based approach is essential in any attempt to apply cybersecurity requirements to AI used in critical infrastructure functions. The topics of critical infrastructure and AI are simply too vast to meaningfully address otherwise. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) defines cyber secure AI systems as those that can 'maintain confidentiality, integrity and availability through protection mechanisms that prevent unauthorized access and use.' Cybersecurity incidents that impact AI in critical infrastructure could impact the availability, reliability, and safety of these vital services. [...] This paper was prompted by questions presented to MITRE about to what extent the original NIST Cybersecurity Risk Framework, and the efforts that accompanied its release, enabled a regulatory approach that could serve as a model for AI regulation in critical infrastructure. The NIST Cybersecurity Risk Framework was created a decade ago as a requirement of Executive Order (EO) 13636. When this framework was paired with the list of cyber-dependent entities identified under the EO, it provided a voluntary approach for how Sector Risk Management Agencies (SRMAs) prioritize and enhance the cybersecurity of their respective sectors."

MITRE CORPORATION. 2023. 18p.

UNITED STATES. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION; UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING PROGRAM (U.S.)

From the document: "The FBI's Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program provides a nationwide view of crime based on data submissions voluntarily reported by non-federal law enforcement agencies throughout the country. The data submitted to the distinct collections detail criminal incidents and law enforcement workforce and operations. For decades, several of these compilations have been published annually. Though each collection presents details of crime data based on numbers provided by participating agencies, the reports vary in context, participation, and publication criteria. 'Crime in the Nation, 2022,' includes data received from 15,724 law enforcement agencies that provided either the National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS) or the Summary Reporting System (SRS) data. These agencies represent 83.3 percent of agencies actively enrolled in the UCR Program and covering a combined population of 311,628,976 (93.5 percent) inhabitants. Notably, every city agency covering a population of 1,000,000 or more inhabitants contributed a full 12 months of data to the UCR Program in 2022. In addition to the 'UCR Summary of Crime in the Nation, 2022,' which contains a synopsis of the data, 'Crime in the Nation, 2022' is comprised of the following components: [1] 'Crime in the United States (CIUS), 2022'; [2] 'NIBRS [National Incident-Based Reporting System], 2022'; [3] 'NIBRS Estimates, 2022'; [4] 'Hate Crime Statistics, 2022'; [and 5] 'Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted (LEOKA), 2022: Officers Assaulted'[.]"

United States. Federal Bureau of Investigation. Uniform Crime Reporting Program (U.S.). 2023. 37p.

By The Congressional Budget Office

The United States has been experiencing an opioid crisis since the mid-1990s, and opioids have had a significant effect on public health and on the nation’s economic and social outcomes. In this report, the Congressional Budget Office examines the consequences and timeline of the crisis, the contributing factors and federal responses to it, and the effects of the coronavirus pandemic on the crisis.

Deaths. More than 500,000 opioid-involved deaths have occurred since 2000, and the United States has the world’s highest number of opioid-involved deaths per capita. Although federal funding to address the opioid crisis has increased in recent years, opioid overdose mortality has increased as well. Deaths from opioid-involved overdoses were among the leading causes of death in 2020.

Health and Other Effects. The use and misuse of opioids can result in serious health effects: People with certain harmful behaviors that result from opioid misuse—such as an increase in the amount and frequency of opioid use or failure to fulfill major responsibilities at work, home, or school—have opioid use disorder (OUD), which can affect people’s participation in the labor force and their ability to care for their children. Treatment for OUD is used far less than behavioral health professionals recommend.

Changes Over Time. The opioid crisis has occurred in waves distinguished by the different types of opioids involved in overdose deaths and the use of opioids in combination with other drugs.

Contributing Factors. A rise in opioid prescribing, changes in illegal opioid markets, and greater demand for opioids due to worsening economic and social conditions for certain populations are key contributors to the crisis.

Federal Laws. Between 2016 and 2018, three laws enacted in response to the crisis aimed to lower the demand for and supply of opioids and to reduce their harm. The funding in those laws complemented annual appropriations to agencies tasked with responding to substance use disorder, including opioid use disorder.

The Crisis After the Enactment of the Laws and During the Pandemic. Opioid-involved deaths continued to increase after the laws were enacted—initially more slowly than in preceding years but then more rapidly during the pandemic. Opioid misuse increased during the pandemic as people experienced worsened mental health, more social isolation, greater job losses, and reduced access to treatment. In addition, the use of more potent synthetic opioids led to a sharp increase in overdose deaths. The pandemic and other factors have made it difficult to isolate the effect of the laws on the opioid crisis.

Washington, DC: CBO, 2022. 38p.

By Maximilian Meyer, Jean N. Westenberg , Kerry L. Jang , Fiona Choi , Stefanie Schreiter , Nickie Mathew , Conor King, Undine. Lang , Marc Vogel and R. Michael Krausz

Understanding drug market dynamics and their underlying driving factors is paramount to developing effective responses to the overdose crisis in North America. This paper summarises the distinct drug market trends observed locally and internationally over the past decade to extrapolate future drug market trajectories. The emergence of fentanyl on North American street markets from 2014 onwards led to a shift of street drug use patterns. Previously perceived as contaminants, novel synthetic opioids became the drugs of choice and a trend towards higher potency was observed across various substance classes. The diversification of distribution strategies as well as the regionalisation and industrialisation of production followed basic economic principles that were heavily influenced by prosecution and policy makers. Particularly, the trend towards higher potency is likely most indicative of what to expect from future illicit drug market developments. Nitazenes and fentanyl-analogues, several times more potent than fentanyl itself, are increasingly detected in toxicological testing and have the potential of becoming the drugs of choice in the future. The dynamic of drug import and local production is less clear and influenced by a multitude of factors like precursor availability, know-how, infrastructure, and the success of local drug enforcement strategies. Drug market dynamics and the current trajectory towards ultrapotent opioids need to be recognised by legislation, enforcement, and the health care system to prepare effective responses. Without significant improvements in treatment access, the implementation of preventative approaches and early warning systems, the mortality rate will continue to increase. Furthermore, there is no mechanism in place preventing the currently North American focused overdose crisis to spread to other parts of the globe, particularly Europe. A system of oversight, research, and treatment is needed to address mortality rates of historic proportions and prevent further harm.

International Journal of Mental Health Systems (2023) 17:36

By Jonathan P. Caulkins and Keith Humphreys

If, in 2015, someone had told you that the number of overdose deaths caused solely by the two most historically lethal drugs—heroin and cocaine—would drop by more than half by 2021, you would likely have assumed that the overdose crisis in the U.S. was finally coming to an end. Instead, drug overdose deaths soared to more than 100,000 per year due to the rise of synthetic drugs, a truly disruptive innovation with which U.S. drug policy is only beginning to grapple.

To clarify the key term: synthetic drugs are substances that can be produced in a lab and are not from plant-derived components. In Canadian and U.S. illegal opioid markets, synthetic fentanyl and its analogues are outcompeting heroin, which is made from the poppy plant. These synthetics claimed the lives of more than 70,000 Americans in 2021 (out of 106,699 total drug-involved overdose deaths, or 66%), either by themselves or in combination with other drugs.[1] Methamphetamine, another synthetic, has attained a larger share of the stimulant market than cocaine, which is made from coca leaves.[2] The rapid expansion of synthetic tranquilizers—such as xylazine and benzodiazepines—has spread addiction and death, particularly when these drugs are used in combination with opioids. The U.S. is also facing a bevy of so-called new psychoactive substances (NPS), such as MDMA and mephedrone, that collectively attract more users than do older, “minor” drugs such as LSD, GHB, and PCP.

Drug policy analysts, including the authors of this brief, are swamped with requests from desperate policymakers, clinicians, parents, and activists to find solutions to the problem of synthetic drugs. This brief comprises our answer. Unfortunately, it is not particularly upbeat. All four traditional pillars of drug policy—enforcement, treatment, harm reduction, and prevention—have limits, and there is no simple solution for the synthetic drug market. Nonetheless, the nation can do some things better and should stop doing other things that are harmful. Policymakers must:

• Maintain prohibition of the production and sale of synthetic drugs

• Expect law enforcement to shrink market-related harms, such as violence, but not necessarily to shrink the supply of the drugs themselves

• Keep expanding medication-assisted treatment and access to naloxone

• Embrace the shunning of illegal drugs as a cultural norm

• Be generous toward those who are struggling, including those suffering from drug addiction

Unfortunately, the widespread availability of potentially lethal temptations in the U.S. may be the new normal, and overdose deaths will continue to remain higher than historical norms. Such realism is depressing but honest, and honesty is the best foundation for policy.

New York: Manhattan Institute, 2023. 13p.

By The World Health Organization

This report focuses on the interpersonal violence that accounts for most acts of violence against children, and includes child maltreatment, bullying and other types of youth violence, and intimate partner violence (1). Although childhood exposure to interpersonal violence can increase the risk for subsequent selfdirected violence (including suicide and self-harm) (2) and the likelihood of collective violence (including war and terrorism) (3) – and similar root causes underlie all three forms of violence (3,4) – these forms of violence are not covered by the report.

Geneva, SWIT: WHO, 2020. 352p.

By Kingsley Madueke | Lawan Danjuma Adamu Katja Lindskov Jacobsen | Lucia Bird

Political violence is a major obstacle to democratic processes worldwide. Violence perpetrated in pursuit of electoral victory has widespread consequences: the destruction of lives and property, the displacement of people, undermining the credibility of the electoral process, and the erosion of public trust in democratic institutions.1 In countries throughout Africa, including Nigeria, Kenya, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Sierra Leone, gangs play a pivotal role in political violence. When they are not perpetrating political violence, the same gangs often engage in a range of illicit markets.2 Yet, so far, analyses have not adequately scrutinized the link between gangs, political violence and illicit markets, predominantly understanding them as separate phenomena.3 The intersection between them has been understated, with important implications for response strategies. Background Since Nigeria’s return to democracy in 1999, criminal gangs have played an increasingly pivotal role in driving political violence in the country. These criminal actors engage in a broad spectrum of activities, including intimidation of voters and political opponents, assassinations and disruption of political rallies on behalf of political actors. Gangs are remunerated in cash, material gifts and other favours from political actors, including state appointments and protection. Despite the deployment of security forces, election periods in Nigeria have long been characterized by high levels of violence – the 2023 elections were no exception.4 Although data collated regarding political violence in Nigeria broadly demonstrates a decrease in lives lost compared to previous electoral cycles, the number of violent incidents recorded has grown. Furthermore, the research presented in this report underscores that number of incidents of political violence fails to capture the full impact of political violence in determining Nigeria’s most recent political outcomes. Disenfranchisement was a clear consequence of covert forms of threat and intimidation: the 2023 elections saw the lowest voter turnout in Nigeria’s history, with President Bola Tinubu’s mandate effectively granted by less than 10% of Nigeria’s electorate. Though electoral violence is a countrywide concern in Nigeria, Kano in the north and Rivers in the south are repeatedly among the states hit hardest by political violence. In 2023 both became flashpoints for election violence.5 Both states are highly politically competitive and have a strong presence of criminal gangs with links to politicians, which play a leading role in electoral violence. The long history of election violence, coupled with the incidents of attacks and clashes leading up to and during the 2023 elections, had a major impact on voter turnout, the voting process and, consequently, the outcome of the elections in these areas Criminal gangs are not the only actors that have been associated with violence in Nigeria. For example, different groups, including violent extremist organizations such as Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) and Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'adati wal-Jihad (JAS), armed bandits in the north, as well as secessionists such as the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) in the south-east have allegedly been involved in violence in different parts of the country. However, this report focuses on criminal gangs because they have featured more prominently in election-related violence and they have comparatively deeper roots in the country’s social and political landscape in the states under study. As case studies, the situations in Kano and Rivers demonstrate that political violence in Nigeria cannot be dismissed as a phenomenon limited to a particular geography or political party. The states are positioned in different regions, beset by different criminal and conflict dynamics, and have contrasting histories of political affiliation. Yet the centrality of political violence – and the pivotal interlinkages between crime and politics it reveals – is a common thread corroding democratic processes across both states, and Nigeria as a whole. In Kano and Rivers, the current dynamics of political violence emerged when political parties contracted elements of pre-existing groups (hunters’ associations and cult groups, respectively) to attack opponents, voters and election officials. The contracted groups benefited from this political alignment, and over time there emerged a mutually beneficial ecosystem between gangs and politicians. This ecosystem – the exact contours of which are shaped by complex local factors – is highly damaging for the Nigeria’s democracy. The two case studies presented in this report attempt to untangle this complex ecosystem and explore key questions: did gangs or political violence emerge first? What happens to gangs on the losing side of the political contest? Furthermore, elections are cyclical, and political gangs seem poised to service the demands of their political contractors at each four-year interlude. But what do these gangs do in the interim? This question – what do political thugs do when they are not doing political violence?6 – underpinned this research. Criminal markets provided the answer. This report argues that outside of election cycles, criminal gangs involved in political violence are engaged in a range of illicit markets for their sustainability and resilience. The link between political violence and illicit markets is a significant concern as it provides criminal actors with political cover and access to the means to perpetrate further acts of violence and criminality. Exploring the implications of such intersections for politics and governance, and identifying potential ways to disrupt such links, is therefore urgently required.

Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2023. 47p.

By John Pitts

County Lines are criminal networks based mainly in cities that export illegal drugs to one or more out-of-town locations. The organisers use dedicated mobile phone lines to take orders from buyers, and children and vulnerable adults to transport, store and deliver the drugs. County Lines organisers may use coercion, intimidation and violence (including sexual violence) to control this workforce. Initially, the ‘Youngers’, the children involved, may be given money, phones or expensive trainers, but are then told they must repay this by working for the County Lines gang. Sometimes the ‘Elders’, the organisers, arrange for them to be robbed of the drugs they are carrying so that they become indebted. If they protest, they may be told to keep working to pay off the debt or they, and their families, will be subject to violent retribution. The ‘Youngers’, who deliver the drugs, risk being apprehended by the police, assaulted and robbed by their customers or by members of rival gangs (Andell and Pitts, 2018; Harding, 2020). This Academic Insights paper sets out how County Lines operations have developed and evolved over recent years. Focus is then given to multi-agency ways of tackling County Lines which involve probation and youth offending services.

Academic Insights, 2021.01. Manchester, UK: HM Inspectorate of Probation , 2021. 15p.

By Francesca Soliman

In this paper I examine authorities’ management of migrant boats on the island of Lampedusa, Italy, as an example of environmental border harm. A danger to trawlers, sunken wrecks are also hazardous to the environment, with pollutants such as oil and fuel seeping into the sea. Migrant boats that reach the island, whether independently or towed by rescuers, are left to accumulate in the harbour and eventually break up, scattering debris in bad weather. When boats are uplifted onto land, they are amassed in large dumps, leaking pollutants into the soil. Periodically, the resulting environmental crises trigger emergency tendering processes for the disposal of the boats, which allow for the environmental protections normally required in public bidding to be suspended for the sake of expediency. The disposal of migrant boats thus relies on a pattern of manufactured environmental emergencies, consistent with the intrinsically crisis-based management of the border itself.\

Critical Criminology 31(12):1-17, 2023.

By Malvina Bondy, Sefi Roth, and Lutz Sager

Many empirical studies have examined the various determinants of crime.However, the link between crime and air pollution has been largely overlooked. In this paper we study whether exposure to ambient air pollution affects crime using daily administrative data for London in 2004–5. For identification, we estimate models withward fixed effects and implement two instrumental variable strategies, using atmo-spheric inversions and wind direction as exogenous shocks to local pollution. We Find That air pollution has a positive and statistically significant impact on overall crime andon several major crime categories, including those with economic motives. Impor-tantly, the effect also occurs at pollution levels that are well below current regulatory standards and appears to be unevenly distributed across income groups. Our results suggest that reducing air pollution in urban areas may be an effective measure to reduce crime and that air pollution forecasts can be used to improve predictive policing

Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists. Volume 7, Number 3. May 2020

By Melina Risso, et al.

Environmental crime became the world’s third most lucrative illicit economy after drug trafficking and smuggling, with estimates of $110 to $281 billion in annual profits. Between 2006 and 2016, environmental crimes grew at a rate of 5% to 7% per year, a pace two or three times faster than that of global GDP growth. Money laundering is part of the criminal machinery that plunders the Amazon Rainforest.

The study “Follow the Money: connecting anti-money laundering systems to disrupt environmental crime in the amazon” reveals the need for systems, agencies, and institutions responsible for preventing money laundering to turn their attention to the connections between this illicit practice and environmental crimes.

The Igarapé study shows that the money laundering cycle follows three stages before the laundered funds can enter the financial system: placement, layering, and integration. However, not all proceeds from criminal activity are directly laundered into the formal financial system. Thus, informal diversification constitutes the process of moving illegal flows into the informal economy. It is estimated that 30% of the money to be laundered is used to pay the operating expenses of illicit economies. Cash transactions, divided into small amounts and deposited by “money mules,” are used to finance the hiring of precarious labor, accommodations, food, security, transportation, health services, leisure, and machinery, for example. The remaining 70% of illicit proceeds are formally inserted into the financial system.

Rio de Janeiro - RJ - Brasil ; Igarape Institute, 2023. 33p.

By Melina Risso, et al.

Environmental crime in the Amazon has become one of the largest illicit economies in the world, generating annual profits estimated at between $110 billion and $281 billion. However, only 6.3% of money laundering cases reported between 2017 and 2020 to the Financial Action Task Force of Latin America (Gafilat), the main body responsible for combating illicit financial flows in the region, were related to environmental crimes.

To assess the level of attention and priority given to environmental crimes at each stage of the anti-money laundering system, we are launching the second publication in the “Follow the Money” series. Focusing on the three key countries of the Amazon basin – Brazil, Colombia, and Peru – the study proposes an analytical approach to the legal and institutional capacities to combat money laundering in five dimensions: 1) strategic planning and preventive measures; 2) monitoring and detection – financial intelligence units; 3) mandatory reporting of suspicious transactions; 4) criminal investigation; and 5) Prosecution and sanctions.

Rio de Janeiro - RJ - Brasil , Igarape Institute, 2023. 43p.