B/y Griffin Edwards and

Stephen Rushin

In 1981, the U.S. Supreme Court held in New York v. Belton that police officers could lawfully search virtually anywhere in a vehicle without a warrant after the arrest of any occupant in the vehicle. Then, in 2009, the Court reversed course in Arizona v. Gant, holding that police could only engage in vehicle searches after such arrests in a smaller number of extenuating circumstances. This series of cases became a flash point for the broader debate about the regulation of policing. Law enforcement groups argued that administratively complex rules, like those established in Gant, risk officer safety. But some scholars and civil rights activists worried that by giving police officers wider discretion to search vehicles incident to arrest, the Belton rule may have led to unjustified civil rights violations and racial profiling.

This Article argues that, by limiting vehicle searches incident to arrest, Gant may have disincentivized policing tactics that disproportionately target individuals of color without jeopardizing officer safety.

By utilizing a data set of traffic stops from thirteen law enforcement agencies in seven states, this Article presents an empirical study of the effects of shifting doctrines related to vehicle searches incident to arrest. This Article makes two findings. First, it finds no evidence that Gant endangered officer safety. Changes in state doctrines related to vehicle searches incident to arrest are not associated with increases in assaults of officers during traffic stops. Second, it hypothesizes that Gant may have reduced racial profiling. Gant may be linked to a somewhat larger decline in vehicle searches incident to arrest for nonwhite individuals relative to white individuals.

These findings are a reminder that seemingly neutral procedural choices by courts in regulating police behavior may have racially disparate effects. We conclude by arguing for the narrowing of the discretionary authority of police officers as a mechanism for reducing disparities in the criminal justice system.

91 Fordham L. Rev. 1 (2022).

By Jillian Long

Incidents of police-involved shootings resulting in the death of unarmed civilians, such as Andre Hill in 2020, Bijan Ghaisar in 2017, and Michael Brown in 2014, have raised concerns about law enforcement use of deadly force, particularly involving firearms. In light of these concerns, growing attention has been paid to less-than-lethal weapons (LLWs) and the role LLWs may play in providing law enforcement officers alternatives to the use of deadly force.

A multitude of weapons marketed as less-than-lethal alternatives to firearms are currently in use by federal, state, and local law enforcement, including batons, pepper sprays, and stun guns. There are also a number of LLWs in development, such as unmanned aircraft systems (drones) equipped with tear gas, rubber bullets, and TASERs.

Some observers contend that LLWs offer the possibility of minimizing risk of death and serious injury to citizens and officers while simultaneously providing law enforcement with effective tools to incapacitate violent or noncompliant persons. Nevertheless, there is evidence that LLWs may present a number of potential health risks, lending credence to arguments that LLWs are less-than-lethal in name, but, depending on the circumstances of their use, can be lethal in practice. For example, a team of journalists led by the Associated Press, in collaboration with the Howard Center for Investigative Journalism programs at the University of Maryland and Arizona State University, documented over 1,000 deaths that followed local and state police officers’ use of less-than-lethal force from 2012 to 2021. Similarly, a 2019 Reuters investigation of deaths related to law enforcement use of TASERs found that 1,081 individuals had died after being hit by a police TASER from 1983 to 2017.

Should policymakers consider examining ways to legislate on the use of LLWs, numerous issues may garner attention. Currently, there is no single, universally accepted definition of less-than-lethal weapon, and the use of the term varies greatly among U.S. federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. Conceptualizing a definition for LLWs raises a number of questions, including whether LLWs should be defined

• under a label other than less-than-lethal,

• according to a common capability,

• according to a common operational utility,

• according to an intended use to minimize risk of death and permanent injury, or

• according to a common application.

Policymakers could consider whether it is beneficial to establish a statutory definition of less-than-lethal weapon. Codifying the meaning of LLWs could be useful in terms of clarifying what weapons are (and are not) classified as less-than-lethal, which may help sharpen the focus and potential efficacy of policies. On the other hand, some may argue that law enforcement agencies and departments are better suited to define LLWs and, thereby, address LLWs in their individualized use-of-force policies, based on their organization’s specific needs, duties, and circumstances.

Moreover, there are relatively little federal data available on law enforcement officers’ use of LLWs and, consequently, few studies analyzing the health effects caused by law enforcement’s use of such weapons. Policymakers may wish to direct a federal agency or department to conduct research into LLW injury and mortality. Based on these findings, policymakers could consider legislative actions to influence law enforcement use of LLWs, such as (1) passing a bill encouraging or limiting federal law enforcement officers’ usage of LLWs and (2) placing provisions on or withholding funding from existing federal grant programs to incentivize or discourage state and local law enforcement usage of LLWs.

R48365

Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, January 23, 2025I

27p.

By Dick M. Carpenter II, Kyle Sweetland and Jennifer McDonald

Code enforcement is supposed to be about protecting the public by discouraging— via monetary sanctions—dangerous driving and other hazardous personal conduct or property conditions. But in practice, local governments may also—or instead—use their code enforcement powers to raise revenue. This is taxation by citation. It is not a new phenomenon, but only in the past few years has it become an object of national concern. Despite the fresh spotlight, little is known about cities that engage in taxation by citation, beyond a few particularly egregious examples. To gain a better understanding of taxation by citation, this study explores the phenomenon through the lens of three Georgia cities—Morrow, Riverdale and Clarkston—that have historically relied on fines and fees from traffic and other ordinance violations for large proportions of their revenues. Consistent with case study research methods, we drew upon public data, a survey of and interviews with residents, photo and video records, and direct observation of the three cities and their municipal courts, which process the cities’ citations. Our results show: Over a five-year period, Morrow, Riverdale and Clarkston generated on average 14% to 25% of their revenues from fines and fees, while similarly sized Georgia cities took in just 3%. Such high levels of fines and fees revenue account for the second largest proportion of the cities’ revenues and may indicate taxation by citation. The three cities’ fines and fees revenues peaked in 2012 before beginning to decline as tax revenues increased. These trends generally correspond to the recession of the late 2000s and early 2010s and the subsequent recovery. This suggests the cities—which are poorer than average, face uncertain economic futures and have few means of generating substantial revenues—may have seen

fines and fees as a way out of a budget crunch. The sample cities issued many of their citations for traffic and other ordinance violations that presented little threat to public health and safety. Traffic violations posed only moderate risk on average, while property code violations were primarily about aesthetics. This suggests the cities are using their code enforcement powers for ends other than public protection.

To process citations, Morrow, Riverdale and Clarkston have their own courts, which are created and funded by the cities. These courts function as highly efficient revenue collectors. They process more cases than courts in similarly sized cities, and nearly everyone coming before them pleads or is found guilty. The three cities have few legal provisions preventing them from using their code enforcement powers for reasons other than public protection—or from violating citizens’ rights in the process. Cities may pay a price for taxation by citation. Morrow, Riverdale and Clarkston residents with recent citations reported lower levels of trust in government officials and institutions than residents without, suggesting cities that use code enforcement for revenue or other non-public safety reasons may undermine trust and cooperation in their communities. Taken together, these findings suggest taxation by citation is a function of the perceived need for revenue and the ability to realize it through code enforcement. Moreover, the phenomenon may be a matter of systemic incentives. City leaders need not set out to pick the pockets of residents. Instead, they may see fines and fees revenue as the answer to their cities’ problems and, absent obstacles such as independent courts or robust legal protections for people accused of ordinance violations, find themselves able to pursue it. And once in effect, the mechanisms necessary for taxation by citation—such as supremely efficient court procedures—may stick, becoming business as usual and ensuring fines and fees remain a reliable source of revenue. Our findings also suggest taxation by citation is shortsighted. Cities may gain revenue, but they may also pay a price for it in the form of lower community trust and cooperation. To avoid this outcome, cities should find other ways of shoring up their finances and use their code enforcement powers only to protect the public—and then only with meaningful safeguards for citizens’ rights in place.

Arlington, VA: Institute for Justice, 2019. 60p.

By John A. Shjarback

Broader public, media, and scholarly interest in police shootings of residents in the United States has been a constant since 2014. This interest followed a number of high-profile deadly force incidents, including those leading to the deaths of Michael Brown in Ferguson, MO, and Tamir Rice in Cleveland, OH. In the decade since, researchers from a variety of academic disciplines have learned much about the scope and nature of police shootings. While US police as a whole use their firearms more than most other countries, rates of police shootings of residents vary across states.

The purpose of this report is to examine police shootings of residents—including both fatal and nonfatal, injurious incidents—using a comparative lens. More specifically, it explores rates of police shootings in the states comprising the Regional Gun Violence Research Consortium (RGVRC)—Connecticut, Delaware, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island—with the rest of the country. These comparisons suggest an association between levels of firearm prevalence/availability in the general population, as well as related laws and rates of police shootings per capita. The majority of RGVRC states possess the lowest rates of police shootings of residents, which appears to at least partially be a function of low levels of firearm prevalence/availability among residents and strong laws and legislation related to guns.

Albany, NY: Rockefeller Institute of Government, 2024. 20p.

By Taryn A. Merkl PUBLISHED APRIL 29, 2021 With a foreword by Eric H. Holder Jr

The protest movement sparked by George Floyd’s killing last year has forced a nationwide reckoning with a wide range of deep-rooted racial inequities — in our economy, in health care, in education, and even in our democracy — that undermine the American promise of freedom and justice for all. That tragic incident provoked widespread demonstrations and stirred strong emotions from people across our nation.

While our state and local governments wrestle with how to reimagine relationships between police and the communities they serve, the Justice Department has long been hamstrung in its ability to mete out justice when people’s civil rights are violated.

The Civil Rights Acts passed during Reconstruction made it a federal crime to deprive someone of their constitutional rights while acting in an official capacity, a provision now known as Section 242. Today, when state or local law enforcement are accused of misconduct, the federal government is often seen as the best avenue for justice — to conduct a neutral investigation and to serve as a backstop when state or local investigations falter. I’m proud that the Justice Department pursued more Section 242 cases under my leadership than under any other attorney general before or since.

But due to Section 242’s vague wording and a series of Supreme Court decisions that raised the standard of proof needed for a civil rights violation, it’s often difficult for federal prosecutors to hold law enforcement accountable using this statute.

This timely report outlines changes to Section 242 that would clarify its scope, making it easier to bring cases and win convictions for civil rights violations of these kinds. Changing the law would allow for charges in cases where prosecutors might currently conclude that the standard of proof cannot be met. Perhaps more important, it attempts to deter potential future misconduct by acting as a nationwide reminder to law enforcement and other public officials of the constitutional limits on their authority.

The statutory changes recommended in this proposal are carefully designed to better protect civil rights that are already recognized. And because Black, Latino, and Native Americans are disproportionately victimized by the kinds of official misconduct the proposal addresses, these changes would advance racial justice.

This proposal would also help ensure that law enforcement officers in every part of the United States live up to the same high standards of professionalism. I have immense regard for the vital role that police play in all of America’s communities and for the sacrifices that they and their families are too often called to make on behalf of their country. It is in great part for their sake — and for their safety — that we must seek to build trust in all communities.

We need to send a clear message that the Constitution and laws of the United States prohibit public officials from engaging in excessive force, sexual misconduct, and deprivation of needed medical care. This proposal will better allow the Justice Department to pursue justice in every appropriate case, across the country.

New York: Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law, 2021. 26p.

By The Virginia Advisory Committee to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights

On February 18, 2021, the Virginia Advisory Committee (Committee) to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights (Commission) adopted a proposal to undertake a study of police oversight and accountability in the Commonwealth. The focus of the Committee’s inquiry was to examine law enforcement accountability and oversight structures in Virginia to better understand their effectiveness and impact. From a civil rights perspective, the Committee sought to consider the role such accountability structures have in ensuring equal protection of the laws and in the administration of justice, and the impact they may have on any disparities in police contact and use of force based on race, color, sex, disability, and national origin. As part of this inquiry the Committee heard testimony via video conference held in a series of eight public meetings that took place between July 2021 and May 2022.1 The following report results from a review of testimony provided at these meetings, combined with written testimony submitted during this timeframe. It begins with a brief background of the issues to be considered by the Committee. It then identifies primary findings as they emerged from this testimony. Finally, it makes recommendations that address related civil rights concerns. This report focuses on civil rights and police accountability structures in Virginia. While other important topics may have surfaced throughout the Committee’s inquiry, matters that are outside the scope of this specific civil rights mandate are left for another discussion. This report and the recommendations included within it were adopted by a unanimous vote of the Committee members present at the Committee meeting on May 31, 2023. 2

Washington, DC: USCCR, 2023. 57p.

By the  U.S. Department of Justice Civil Rights Division 

 The United States has conducted an extensive investigation of the Orange County District Attorney’s Office (OCDA) and the Orange County Sheriff’s Department (OCSD), pursuant to our authority under the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 34 U.S.C. § 12601 (previously codified at 42 U.S.C. § 14141). We have determined that there is reasonable cause to believe that the Orange County District Attorney’s Office and the Orange County Sheriff’s Department engaged in a pattern or practice of conduct—the operation of a custodial informant program—that systematically violated criminal defendants’ right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment and right to due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment. While our review focused on custodial informant activity from 2007 through 2016, the informant controversy continues to undermine public confidence in the integrity of the Orange County criminal legal system. Neither agency has implemented sufficient remedial measures to identify criminal cases impacted by unlawful informant activities or prevent future constitutional violations. This report provides a public accounting of the scope and impact of the informant program on the Orange County criminal legal system. … We focused our investigation on: (1) whether OCDA and OCSD used custodial informants to elicit incriminating statements from individuals in the Orange County Jail, after those individuals had been charged with a crime, in violation of the Sixth Amendment; and (2) whether OCDA failed to disclose exculpatory evidence about those custodial informants to criminal defendants in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. We reviewed thousands of pages of documents, made  numerous site visits to OCDA and OCSD, and conducted dozens of interviews in the course of our investigation. In particular, we conducted 17 transcribed interviews with OCDA prosecutors about specific cases they personally handled involving custodial informants. The evidence reveals that custodial informants in the Orange County Jail system acted as agents of law enforcement to elicit incriminating statements from defendants represented by counsel, and that for years OCSD maintained and concealed systems to track, manage, and reward those custodial informants. The evidence also reveals that OCDA prosecutors failed to seek out and disclose to defense counsel exculpatory information regarding custodial informants. We therefore have reasonable cause to believe that this pattern or practice of conduct by both agencies resulted in systematic violations of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.     

Washington, DC: The Author, 2022. 63p.

By The United States Commission on Civil Rights,  Minnesota Advisory Committee 

The nature and scope of the problem. There will be no end to disparate policing, and the accompanying resentment in the community, until sufficient data can be collected to better inform both policymakers and the People who elect them. Disparate policing is abusive on many levels, affecting the individuals involved, reopening unhealed wounds left by historical injustices, and reminding entire communities that their lives don’t matter. The Committee found that the lack of political will at all levels of government to enforce the limits on police conduct is the major impediment to meaningful change that would address the Constitutional violations identified in this report.  

Minneapolis:: Minnesota Advisory Committee to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights ,2022. 62p.

By Jamein Cunningham, Donna Feir and Rob Gillezeau

Do collective bargaining rights for law enforcement result in more civilian deaths at the hands of the police? Using an event-study design, we find that the introduction of duty to bargain requirements with police unions has led to a significant increase in non-white civilian deaths at the hands of police during the late twentieth century. We find no impact on various crime rate measures and suggestive evidence of a decline in police employment, consistent with increasing compensation. Our results indicate that the adoption of collective bargaining rights for law enforcement can explain approximately 10 percent of the total non-white civilian deaths at the hands of law enforcement between 1959 and 1988. This effect is robust to a contiguous county approach, accounting for heterogeneity in treatment timing, and numerous other specifications. While the relationship between police unions and violence against civilians is not clear ex-ante, our results show that the popular notion that police unions exacerbate police violence is empirically grounded.

Bonn: IZA – Institute of Labor Economics , 2021. 75p.

By The U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division

There are more than 18,000 law enforcement agencies across the country. Law enforcement is a demanding, rigorous, and – at times – dangerous profession. The vast majority of men and women who police our communities do so with professionalism, respect, bravery, and integrity. But as we have seen around the country, when police departments engage in unconstitutional policing, their actions can severely undermine both community trust and public safety. Today, our country is engaged in a critically important conversation about community-police relations. This report describes one of the United States Department of Justice’s central tools for accomplishing police reform, restoring police-community trust, and strengthening officer and public safety – the Civil Rights Division’s enforcement of the civil prohibition on a “pattern or practice” of policing that violates the Constitution or other federal laws (the Department’s other tools are described later in this document).

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Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 2017. 55p.

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