By Jason Johnson and Sean Kennedy

Consent decrees are a blunt instrument for enacting police reform. The approach has proven ill-suited at enacting effective change in law enforcement agencies. These coercive reforms face institutional resistance from departments and their personnel and fall victim to mission creep from the unaccountable lawyers, judges, and bureaucrats who oversee the design and later the implementation of the reforms. The situation worsened significantly as the Obama Administration increased the use of consent decrees, a policy resumed under the Biden Department of Justice. Often built on limited and flimsy evidence, the Justice Department’s allegations against police agencies put local jurisdictions in a near impossible position to contest civil rights violations findings. Additionally, the Justice Department frequently injects its policy preferences into the required remedies that do not reflect urgent or even necessary changes, but policy agenda of the Civil Rights Division and the White House. Subject jurisdictions are often compelled to accept settlements with unachievable compliance goals and required to spend vast sums to remedy problems outside the scope of the statutory requirements. Consent decrees are not a quick, easy, or inexpensive fix. And this type of settlement can have consequences – higher crime, lower police morale, ballooning costs, drifting timelines, and dissatisfied residents. In many cases, consent decrees prove to be damaging boondoggles rather than bolstering effective and constitutional policing. Federal intervention for some agencies may still be necessary but less onerous and more effective tools exist for enacting necessary reforms. Those alternatives should be preferred where possible. The Justice Department’s interventions in law enforcement agencies should be precise in their methods and practicable in their goals. This paper examines:

• the origins and process of police consent decrees;

• the increasing use of consent decrees to enact police reform policies;

• the consequences of police reform by consent decree; and

• the alternative approaches to improving American policing.

Alexandria, VA: Law Enforcement Legal Defense Fund, 2023. 24p.

By Matthew Radburn, Leanne Savigar-Shaw, […], and Arabella Kyprianides

Despite widespread empirical support for Procedural Justice Theory, understanding the role of police psychology in shaping encounters with ‘citizens’ is relatively opaque. This article seeks to address this gap in the literature by exploring how officers talk about themselves and their colleagues and deploy social categories to understand their interactions with ‘the public’. The qualitative thematic analysis draws upon 22 semi-structured interviews conducted with officers in various roles and teams within a large metropolitan police force in England. Our thematic analysis demonstrates the centrality of procedural fairness in officers’ talk (in terms of internal relations with colleagues and external relations with ‘the public’). Interviewees described complex internalised theories of social relations, differentially positioning themselves in relation to other colleagues and multiple ‘publics’ often depicted along socioeconomic and geographical lines. Officers described their interactions with ‘the public’ in sequential and historical terms with complex and changing (often intergroup) power dynamics. Implications of the analysis for understanding the role of social identity processes among police officers and how this underlying conceptualisation might shape police–‘citizen’ encounters are discussed.

Criminology & Criminal Justice, Volume 22, Issue 1, February 2022, Pages 59-77

By Brittany Cunningham, James Coldren, Benjamin Carleton, Richard Berk & Vincent Bauer

Purpose

Police officers in the USA are often put in harm’s way when responding to calls for service. This paper provides a demonstration of concept for how machine learning procedures combined with conformal prediction inference can be properly used to forecast the amount of risk associated with each dispatch. Accurate forecasts of risk can help improve officer safety.

Methods

The unit of analysis is each of 1928 911 calls involving weapons offenses. Using data from the calls and other information, we develop a machine learning algorithm to forecast the risk that responding officers will face. Uncertainty in those forecasts is captured by nested conformal prediction sets.

Results

For approximately a quarter of a holdout sample of 100 calls, a forecast of high risk was correct with the odds of at least 3 to 1. For approximately another quarter of the holdout sample, a forecast of low risk was correct with an odds of at least 3 to 1. For remaining cases, insufficiently reliable forecasts were identified. A result of “can’t tell” is an appropriate assessment when the data are deficient.

Conclusions

Compared to current practice at the study site, we are able to forecast with a useful level of accuracy the risk for police officers responding to calls for service. With better data, such forecasts could be substantially improved. We provide examples.

Camb J Evid Based Polic 8, 4 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s41887-023-00094-1

By Josh Leung-Gagné

I use data linking counts of homicides by police to police department (PD) and jurisdiction characteristics to estimate benchmarked (i.e. risk-adjusted) police homicide rates in 2008–2017 among the 711 local PDs serving 50,000 or more residents, a sample with demographics resembling all mid-to-large Census places. The benchmarked rate estimates capture PD deadliness by comparing PDs to peers whose officers face similar risks while adjusting for access to trauma care centers to account for differential mortality from deadly force. Compared to existing estimates, differences in benchmarked estimates are more plausibly attributable to policing differences, speaking to whether the force currently used is necessary to maintain safety and public order. I find that the deadliest PDs kill at 6.91 times the benchmarked rate of the least deadly PDs. If the PDs with above-average deadliness instead killed at average rates for a PD facing similar risks, police homicides would decrease by 34.44%. Reducing deadliness to the lowest observed levels would decrease them by 70.04%. These estimates also indicate the percentage of excess police homicides—those unnecessary for maintaining safety —if the baseline agency is assumed to be optimally deadly. Moreover, PD deadliness has a strong, robust association with White/Black segregation and Western regions. Additionally, Black, Hispanic, foreign-born, lower-income, and less-educated people are disproportionately exposed to deadlier PDs due to the jurisdictions they reside in. Police violence is an important public health concern that is distributed unevenly across US places, contributing to social disparities that disproportionately harm already marginalized communities.

PNAS Nexus, 2024, 3, 1–10

By Mami Kajita; Daisuke Murakami, Seiji Kajita, Georgia Ribeiro, Genilson Zeferino, and Claudio Beato  

Optimizing urban resources, such as ride-sharing and logistics, improve efficiency by reducing waiting times and costs. Similarly, effective allocation of security resources enhances crime deterrence effect. However, measuring the net impact of security policy campaigns remains challenging due to the influence of various external factors. This study introduces a method using high-resolution GPS data from patrol activities to measure crime deterrence effects. We examined the impact of optimized patrol routes on crime prediction in Belo Horizonte, Brazil, over two months, observing a 68.5% reduction in crime compared to the previous period. Analysis of the GPS data revealed a spatial propagation of the deterrent effect to areas distant from the patrol locations. Our findings indicate that unique spatial-temporal patterns of the deterrent effects detected through sensor technology can be reduced into its net impact, potentially helping decision-makers to choose more informed options in security policies.

Unpublished paper. 2024, 17pg

By Simone Drake, Katrina Lee, Kevin Passino, and Hugo Gonzalez Villasanti

Over-use of force by law enforcement officers in the United States persists, along with a resulting state of crisis in Black communities. In 2021, the Authors launched a project, funded by a grant from The Ohio State University’s Seed Fund for Racial Justice, that sought to intervene in traditional diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) training at the Columbus Division of Police. Scholars of law, critical race and gender studies, and engineering, the Authors took a multidisciplinary-team problem-solving approach to the crisis, with a focus on police training. With the aim of developing an innovative software program that augments in-person police training related to DEI, the project’s methodology included using real-life policing scenarios, software design, site visits, and engagement by students in the “Antiracist Technology” engineering course at The Ohio State University. The Authors sought to explore how technology can enhance in-person instructional training related to DEI and cultural competency while simultaneously reducing resistance to and resentment of DEI training. The project featured a collaborative focus on negotiation and critical race and gender studies. Ultimately, the goal is to use technology, together with research on structural and institutional systems of oppression, to improve relations between law enforcement and Black civilians. This Article begins with an historical overview, in two parts: Race and Policing, and Police Training. It then outlines project methodology and describes the beginning stages of this antiracist-technology project.

 Ohio State Legal Studies Research Paper. 2023, 20pg

By David Weisburd, Clair V. Uding, Kiseong Kuen, and Beidi Dong 

Criminologists have long known that crime is highly concentrated—in most cities, approximately 50% of crime happens on only 5% of streets. As a result, many cities have effectively reduced crime by concentrating police resources in extremely high-crime “hot-spots.”

Despite calls for defunding the police, policing is necessary for public safety on hot-spot streets, and people who live on these streets recognize that. Indeed, in one survey in Phoenix, Arizona, the majority of residents of hot-spots streets said they wanted the amount of police on their block to be increased. But ultimately, the bedrock of social control of crime is not the police, but citizens who exercise informal social control.

The practice of community policing—which emphasizes building relationships with members of the community and allowing them to have a voice in defining which problems police should focus on—attempts to leverage this fact to enhance public safety. However, it is often assumed that high-crime hot spots are simply so chaotic and disordered that the residents are incapable of playing a key role in crime prevention.

We examined this assumption through a multiyear study of more than 300 hot-spot streets in Baltimore, Maryland (all of which were in the top 3% in rates of violent or drug crime in the city), as well as almost 50 “cold” streets, which had little to no crime, and 100 “cool” streets, which fell in the middle.

We found that common assumptions about hot spots—which we shared at the outset—are not accurate. Residents of hot-spot streets in Baltimore have strong social and network ties with their neighbors, and they exercise meaningful levels of informal social control. Even on the most crime-ridden blocks, there is potential for collaboration between residents and police.

Our findings suggest that it is time to think about how both informal and formal social control can work interactively to reduce crime. Hot-spots policing is an important first step, because the level of danger in these places can simply make it too dangerous for residents to exercise the type of informal social control that they would like. But residents of these streets, contrary to stereotypes of academics, policymakers, and practitioners, form an important resource for reducing crime on these streets through informal social control.

New York: Manhattan Institute 2024. 18p.

By The Violence Policy Center

Silencers are devices that are attached to the barrel of a firearm to reduce the amount of noise generated by the firing of the weapon. By providing a larger contained space for the gases generated by the discharge of the gun’s ammunition round to dissipate and cool before escaping, silencers reduce the sound generated by the weapon’s firing. Since 1934, silencers have been regulated under the National Firearms Act (NFA).1 The NFA requires that transferees of silencers submit fingerprints and a photograph, pay a special tax, and undergo a background check. It also requires a “Chief Law Enforcement Officer” or CLEO to sign a statement confirming that a certifying official is satisfied that the fingerprints and photograph accompanying the application are those of the applicant and that the certifying official has no information indicating that possession of the silencer by the applicant would be in violation of state or local law. In January 2016, however, the Obama administration finalized a new rule that eliminates the CLEO sign-off requirement and replaces it with a requirement that local law enforcement need only be notified of the transfer of a silencer Hiram Percy Maxim is credited with patenting the first silencer in 1908. But a short time later their utility in crime was demonstrated in a tragic murder-suicide on Central Park West in New York City in 1915. In the decades that followed, silencers were used by the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) during World War II for clandestine missions. Silenced handguns were also used in Vietnam for multiple purposes. According to a former Special Forces NCO, military units used suppressed pistols “for all sorts of sneaky ops, from dumping guards to out and out assassinations.”2 In 1967, a new generation of silencers was developed by Mitch WerBell for Sionics, a company that specialized in counterinsurgency equipment. The acronym Sionics stood for Studies in Operational Negation of Insurgency and Counter Subversion. The company supplied silencers and similar items for covert operations by military and “CIA-type” clandestine organizations.3 These next-generation silencers were more efficient than their turn-of-the century predecessors and could effectively be used on battle rifles and Carbines. Today’s military silencers are used by special operations units to reduce noise and muzzle flash. A relatively new priority for the gun lobby and firearms industry has been to expand the market for the legal use of silencers. In 42 states silencers are now legal. But the ultimate goal is to weaken federal law regulating the transfer and use of silencers. Legislation has been introduced in Congress to accomplish this goal. Misleadingly labeled the “Hearing Protection Act,” the bill would remove silencers from the list of NFAregulated firearms and accessories, making them subject only to the regulations that currently apply to hunting rifles. In their public statements, proponents of the bill would like the public and policymakers to believe that silencers are innocuous devices used merely to protect the hearing of shooters, including children. But in fact, the campaign to deregulate silencers is merely the latest attempt by the gun lobby and firearms industry, in the wake of declining household gun ownership, to market yet another military-bred product with little concern for its impact on public safety.4 In fact, because the “Hearing Protection Act” would allow silencers to be sold under the same standards as traditional hunting rifles, this would allow the gun industry to manufacture firearms with integral silencers, creating a whole new class of firearm that could be marketed to the general public. ,,,,, A ban on silencers for civilian use would enhance public safety. The explosion in the popularity of silencers has significantly increased the likelihood they will be used in crime. The advantages of using silencers, including reduced noise and increased accuracy, make them attractive to mass shooters, terrorists, and common criminals. In addition, the administrative burden placed on the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives diverts resources from the agency’s more important regulatory and law enforcement responsibilities. Conversely, silencers serve no sporting purpose.

Washington, DC: Violence Policy Institute, 2019.  16p.  

By Rafael A. Mangual

  After a long period of continuous violent-crime declines throughout the U.S.—spanning from the mid-1990s through the early 2010s—many American cities are now seeing significant increases in violence. Nationally, in 2015 and 2016, murders rose nearly 11% and 8%, respectively. The national homicide rate declined slightly in 2017 and 2018, before ticking upward in 2019. In 2020, the nation saw its largest single-year spike in homicides in at least 100 years—which was followed by another increase in murders in 2021, according to CDC data and FBI estimates. In the last few years, a number of cities have seen murders hit an all-time high. In addition to homicides, the risk of other types of violent victimizations rose significantly, as well. While various analyses estimated a slight decline in homicides for the country in 2022, many American cities still find themselves dealing with levels of violence far higher than they were a decade ago. While violent crime—particularly murder—is the most serious due in large part to its social costs, there have also been worrying increases in crimes such as retail theft, carjacking, and auto theft, as well as in other visible signs of disorder in public spaces (from open-air drug use and public urination to illegal street racing and large-scale looting and riots). Although several contributing factors are likely, this general deterioration in public safety and order was unquestionably preceded and accompanied by a virtually unidirectional shift toward leniency and away from accountability in the policing, prosecutorial, and criminal-justice policy spaces. That shift is evidenced by, among other things, three major trends in enforcement: • A 25% decline in the number of those imprisoned during 2011–2212 • A 15% decline in the number of those held in jail during 2010–211 • A 26% decline in the number of arrests effected by law-enforcement officers during 2009–1914 Notable contributing factors to the decline in enforcement include: • A sharp uptick in public scrutiny and interventions—in the form of investigations and legal action taken by state attorneys general and the federal Department of Justice—against local law-enforcement agencies • The worsening of an ongoing police recruitment and retention crisis, particularly in large urban departments • The electoral success of the so-called progressive prosecutor movement, which, by 2022, had won seats in 75 jurisdictions, representing more than 72 million U.S. residents • Perhaps most important, the adoption of a slew of criminal-justice and policing reform measures at all levels of government Those who are skeptical of the criminal-justice reform movement have devoted most of their efforts to arguing against the movement’s excesses and explaining why it would be unwise to enact certain measures. Less effort has been devoted to the extremely important task of articulating a positive agenda for regaining what has been lost on the safety and order front. This paper seeks to add to that positive agenda for safety by proposing three model policies that, if adopted, would help, directly and indirectly, stem the tide of rising crime and violence, primarily by maximizing the benefits that attend the incapacitation of serious criminals (especially repeat offenders) and by encouraging the collection and public reporting of data that can inform the public about the downside risks that are glossed over by decarceration and depolicing activists ....

New York: Manhattan Institute. 2023, 19pg

By Danilo Souza, Mateus Maciel

In the context of increasing violence, public security reforms are commonly advocated as a solution to the problem despite the lack of empirical evidence. We address this question by evaluating the effect of the Pacto pela Vida program, a comprehensive reform on the public security of the state of Pernambuco, Brazil. We document a reduction of 16 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants following the program implementation. We show that a reduction in crimes occurring on the streets and associated with young males and firearm availability are likely to have contributed to the program’s effect.

Unpublished paper. 2024, 11pg

By Josephine Wonsun Hahn, Ram Subramanian and Tiffany Sanabia

Minor offenses, including drug possession, shoplifting, disorderly conduct, vandalism, misdemeanor assault, and driving with a suspended license, make up the vast majority of cases in the American criminal justice system. Misdemeanors — the most common type of minor offense — amount to roughly three-quarters of cases filed each year. Enforcement consumes significant government resources, and the overall public safety benefit is questionable. For people charged with minor offenses, resolving cases requires months of court appearances. And minor offense charges have lifelong consequences: arrests alone restrict access to jobs, places to live, health care, and education. Low-income Black and Latino communities disproportionately bear these burdens. Brennan Center researchers examined minor criminal offense trends in New York City between 2016 to 2022. The resulting report highlights changes in enforcement, the prevalence of common offenses, and case outcomes, as well as racial disparities in minor offense case rates that persist despite reforms implemented over the last decade.

New York: Brennan Center for Justice, 2024.

By Anna Stenkamp and Michael Rempel

The purpose of this study is to assess recent trends in criminal summons practices by the New York City Police Department (NYPD), including if and how they disproportionately impact low income and/or Black and Brown communities.

Key Findings

Overall Summons Trends:

Steep Decline Until 2022: Criminal summonses plummeted by 90% from 2013 to 2022 (from 375,707 to 36,621). However, for the first time in a decade, criminal summonses increased by 62% in the most recent year from 2021 to 2022 (from 22,603 to 36,621).

Most Summonses Issued in Bronx and Brooklyn: The Bronx and Brooklyn emerged as hotspots for summonses, with over 60% issued in these boroughs from 2020 to 2022. The Bronx alone accounted for 30% across these years, despite Bronx residents comprising only 17% of NYC’s population.

Few Convictions: In 2022, just 9% of criminal summonses ended in a conviction. (Straight dismissals accounted for 63%, with 28% receiving an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal.) With less than one out of ten cases disposed as guilty, criminal summonses largely do not involve formal accountability but, rather, a “process is punishment” effect, including lost time, income or other challenges from people having to appear in court.

Racial and Socioeconomic Disparities:

Widening Racial Disparities: From 2020 to 2022, the NYPD issued over 85% of criminal summonses to Black or Hispanic people, who combine for 52% of NYC’s population. Relative to their numbers in the general population, police issued summonses at a rate 8.9 times higher for Black than white people in 2020, increasing to 11.4 times higher in 2022.

Income Disparities: The NYPD issued over 60% of summonses to people living in zip codes that fell below the median household income. Further, within communities of every income bracket, the NYPD disproportionately issued criminal summonses to their Black and Hispanic residents. For example, in zip codes with a median household income below $35,000, police issued 97% of summonses to Black and Hispanic people, though they made up just 44% of the population. And in affluent zip codes with a household income over $100,000, police issued 73% of summonses to Black and Hispanic people, though they comprise 24% of the population.

Neighborhood Disparities:

Disparities Based on Zip Code: Residents of 40 (22%) of the City’s 178 zip codes accounted for over half of criminal summonses in 2022. Thirty-four of these 40 zip codes (85%) were majority or plurality Black or Hispanic.

Racial Disparities Within Zip Codes: Across all 178 zip codes, 89% had a larger proportion of summonses issued to Black residents and 67% had a larger proportion issued to Hispanic residents than their respective shares of the zip code’s general population. Thus, NYC police are both disproportionately issuing summonses in predominantly Black and Hispanic neighborhoods; and within virtually all neighborhoods citywide, police are disproportionately issuing summonses to Black and Hispanic residents.

The disproportionate issuance of summonses targeting Black and Hispanic communities highlights systemic biases that perpetuate inequality within the criminal justice system. Addressing these disparities is crucial to fostering a fair and equitable approach to law enforcement, ensuring justice for all residents of New York City

New York: Data Collaborative for Justice, 2024. 45p.

By Justice Policy Institute

A nearly decade-long failure of the Bowser Administration to fund and implement evidence-based strategies to prevent violence and strengthen communities has contributed to the context for increased crime and violence. Missed Opportunities: Why Inaction on Preventative Measures Undermines Public Safety in Washington, DC uncovers recent trend of a lack of leadership on proactive public safety strategies, instability in key executive agencies, and little coordination of efforts by government officials that have left the District ill-prepared to respond to alarming increases in some crimes. The brief offers a series of recommendations for District leadership:

• Improve the coordination between agencies working to prevent and address violent crime;

• Focus comprehensive resources on the specific people at the center of violence;

• Implement a holistic public health approach to violence prevention and intervention and invest in supports and services in communities;

• Fund efforts to build community trust and efficacy in policing; and

• Evaluate and sustain effective programs and initiatives

Washington, DC: Justice Policy Institute, 2023. 16p.

By David Spencer

‘The Wicked and the Redeemable’ reveals that:

• Despite representing nine percent of the nearly six million people convicted of a criminal offence between 2000 and 2021 prolific offenders receive over half of all convictions.

• The Crown Prosecution Service is taking far longer to charge suspects than ever before. It now takes an average of nearly 44 days compared to 14 days seven years ago. These delays are putting vulnerable victims at risk of considerable harm as a result of wholly unnecessary bureaucracy.

• The number of cases that have been outstanding for more than 6 months (the expected standard) has quadrupled in the last four years to 30,384 cases. This is part of the biggest ever Crown Court backlog in history (with 64,709 cases now outstanding – double the number four years ago).

• Despite already having more than 45 previous convictions, ‘Hyper-Prolific Offenders’ are sent to prison on less than half of all occasions (47.3%) on conviction for an indictable or either-way offence. For ‘Prolific Offenders’, those with 16 previous convictions or more, the number falls to less than a quarter being sent to prison on conviction (24.4%) for an indictable or either-way offence.

London: Policy Exchange, 2023. 54p

By Jason Tan de Bibiana, Kerry Mulligan, Aaron Stagoff-Belfort, Daniela Gilbert

Communities across the country have been harmed by violence for decades, and government leaders have struggled to deliver impactful solutions. In particular, an overreliance on policing has not produced the safety that communities need and deserve. Community organizers working to address violence have long recognized that a different approach is needed—one that comes from a deep understanding of a community’s needs, uses data to guide strategies, and prioritizes prevention and intervention rather than punishment. One innovative way for governments to incorporate these tenets into policy and practice—and to provide better, more sustainable support to community-based efforts—is by building centralized local offices of violence prevention or neighborhood safety (OVP/ONS). These offices have the potential to radically transform governmental approaches to public safety. This report summarizes the current state of OVP/ONS nationally and identifies promising practices and recommendations to create and support these offices.

New York: Vera Institute of Justice, 2023. 73p.

By Aliza Hochman Bloom

In December of 2019, a woman was robbed in Jersey City, and she quickly reported it to a 911-dispatcher. When the dispatcher asked her whether the suspect was “Black, white or Hispanic,” she responded that she did not know. But when relaying the description to a police officer, the dispatcher improperly added to the woman’s account that the suspect was a “Black male.” This error appears to have been inadvertent, a mistake reflecting the pernicious implicit bias linking Blackness with criminality. William L. Scott subsequently challenged the constitutionality of the police stop leading to his arrest, arguing that the improper injection of race into the be-on-the-lookout (BOLO) description violated New Jersey’s constitutional guarantee of equal protection under the law. The appellate court agreed, emphasizing the importance of “deterring discriminatory policing in all of its permutations,” and suppressed all evidence obtained from the unlawful stop.

Though purporting to prohibit racial discrimination in policing, Equal Protection doctrine has not halted the racialized selection process funneling our criminal legal system. Meanwhile, the Fourth Amendment has been interpreted in a way that facilitates racially disproportionate policing. Scholars have hoped that courts could allow selective enforcement claims that include officers’ implicit racial bias. Within this treacherous doctrinal landscape, Sate v. Scott did just that.

Scott is the first court to hold that evidence of implicit racial bias in policing establishes a prima facie case of racial discrimination justifying the exclusion of evidence. But the remedy that it used to deter future police misconduct—suppression of evidence—is unlikely to deter implicit bias. And the court’s praiseworthy desire to halt racist policing rests on unproven assumptions—including that bias training could ameliorate implicit racial bias. Recognizing that present doctrine permits policing decisions that yield systemically racist outcomes, this article argues that courts should adopt an outcome focused approach, where discretionary policing decisions that result in consistently racialized results are scrutinized without requiring proof of discriminatory intent.

University of Illinois Law Review (forthcoming 2025), 50pg

By Robin S. Engel, Hannah D. McManus, and Gabrielle T. Isaza

In post-Ferguson America, police departments are being challenged to implement evidence-based changes in policies and training to reduce fatal police-citizen encounters. Of the litany of recommendations believed to reduce police shootings, five have garnered widespread support: body-worn cameras, de-escalation training, implicit bias training, early intervention systems, and civilian oversight. These highly endorsed interventions, however, are not supported by a strong body of empirical evidence that demonstrates their effectiveness. guided by the available research on evidence-based policing and informed by the firsthand experience of one of the authors in implementing departmental reforms that followed the fatal shooting of a civilian by an officer, this article highlights promising reform strategies and opportunities to build the evidence base for effective use-of-force reforms. We call upon police executives to engage in evidence-based policing by scientifically testing interventions, and we call on academics to engage in rapid research responses for critical issues in policing.

Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 687(1), 146–165. 2020

by Rafael A. Mangual

After a long period of continuous violent-crime declines throughout the U.S.—spanning from the mid-1990s through the early 2010s—many American cities are now seeing significant increases in violence. Nationally, in 2015 and 2016, murders rose nearly 11% and 8%, respectively.[1] The national homicide rate declined slightly in 2017 and 2018, before ticking upward in 2019.[2] In 2020, the nation saw its largest single-year spike in homicides in at least 100 years—which was followed by another increase in murders in 2021, according to CDC data and FBI estimates.[3] In the last few years, a number of cities have seen murders hit an all-time high.[4] In addition to homicides, the risk of other types of violent victimizations rose significantly, as well.[5] While various analyses estimated a slight decline in homicides for the country in 2022,[6] many American cities still find themselves dealing with levels of violence far higher than they were a decade ago. While violent crime—particularly murder—is the most serious due in large part to its social costs,[7] there have also been worrying increases in crimes such as retail theft,[8] carjacking,[9] and auto theft,[10] as well as in other visible signs of disorder in public spaces (from open-air drug use and public urination to illegal street racing and large-scale looting and riots).[11] Although several contributing factors are likely, this general deterioration in public safety and order was unquestionably preceded and accompanied by a virtually unidirectional shift toward leniency and away from accountability in the policing, prosecutorial, and criminal-justice policy spaces. That shift is evidenced by, among other things, three major trends in enforcement: A 25% decline in the number of those imprisoned during 2011–22[12], A 15% decline in the number of those held in jail during 2010–21[13], A 26% decline in the number of arrests effected by law-enforcement officers during 2009–19[14]. Notable contributing factors to the decline in enforcement include: A sharp uptick in public scrutiny and interventions—in the form of investigations and legal action taken by state attorneys general and the federal Department of Justice—against local law-enforcement agencies[15]. The worsening of an ongoing police recruitment and retention crisis, particularly in large urban departments[16]. The electoral success of the so-called progressive prosecutor movement, which, by 2022, had won seats in 75 jurisdictions, representing more than 72 million U.S. residents[17]. Perhaps most important, the adoption of a slew of criminal-justice and policing reform measures at all levels of government[18]. Those who are skeptical of the criminal-justice reform movement have devoted most of their efforts to arguing against the movement’s excesses and explaining why it would be unwise to enact certain measures.[19] Less effort has been devoted to the extremely important task of articulating a positive agenda for regaining what has been lost on the safety and order front.[20] This paper seeks to add to that positive agenda for safety by proposing three model policies that, if adopted, would help, directly and indirectly, stem the tide of rising crime and violence, primarily by maximizing the benefits that attend the incapacitation of serious criminals (especially repeat offenders) and by encouraging the collection and public reporting of data that can inform the public about the downside risks that are glossed over by decarceration and depolicing activists. The three policies proposed here, which draw on policies proposed and adopted throughout the country in recent history: Modified “Three Strikes”—Creating a points system for various offenses as well as a points threshold that will trigger a mandatory minimum sentencing enhancement, in order to improve deterrence for those beneath the threshold and to maximize incapacitation for those who step over it. “Truth in Sentencing”—Setting a floor for how much of a given sentence must be served before a convicted felon becomes eligible for initial release into community supervision, in order to maximize incapacitation for those who have been convicted of a serious offense and sentenced to a term of imprisonment. “Data Transparency”—Identifies several types of crime-related data that jurisdictions will be encouraged to collect and report in a standardized manner to address the problem of making and evaluating policing and criminal-justice policies without the benefit of reliable, relevant data. These model policies should be viewed flexibly; policymakers should see them as starting points, feeling free to make changes that reflect the various concerns and idiosyncrasies specific to their respective jurisdictions.

New York: Manhattan Institute, 2024. 19p.

By David Weisburd, Cody W. Telep , Heather Vovak , Taryn Zastrowa , Anthony A. Braga , and Brandon Turchan  

  Can police be trained to treat people in fair and respectful ways, and if so, will this influence evaluations of the police and crime? To answer these questions, we randomly allocated 120 crime hot spots to a procedural justice (PJ) and standard condition (SC) in three cities. Twenty-eight officers were randomly assigned to the conditions. The PJ condition officers received an intensive 5-d training course in the components of PJ (giving voice, showing neutrality, treating people with respect, and evidencing trustworthy motives). We used police self-report surveys to assess whether the training influenced attitudes, systematic social observations to examine impacts on police behavior in the field, and arrests to assess law enforcement actions. We conducted pre and post household surveys to assess resident attitudes toward the police. Impacts on crime were measured using crime incident and citizen-initiated crime call data. The training led to increased knowledge about PJ and more procedurally just behavior in the field as compared with the SC condition. At the same time, PJ officers made many fewer arrests than SC officers. Residents of the PJ hot spots were significantly less likely to perceive police as harassing or using unnecessary force, though we did not find significant differences between the PJ and SC hot spots in perceptions of PJ and police legitimacy. We found a significant relative 14% decline in crime incidents in the PJ hot spots during the experiment.  

Missouri: PNAS, 2022. 6p.

By Eugenia C. South,  John MacDonald,  Vincent Reina,

Importance  The root causes of violent crime in Black urban neighborhoods are structural, including residential racial segregation and concentrated poverty. Previous work suggests that simple and scalable place-based environmental interventions can overcome the legacies of neighborhood disinvestment and have implications for health broadly and crime specifically. Objective  To assess whether structural repairs to the homes of low-income owners are associated with a reduction in nearby crime. Design, Setting, and Participants  This cross-sectional study using difference-in-differences analysis included data from the City of Philadelphia Basic Systems Repair Program (BSRP) from January 1, 2006, through April 30, 2013. The unit of analysis was block faces (single street segments between 2 consecutive intersecting streets) with or without homes that received the BSRP intervention. The blocks of homes that received BSRP services were compared with the blocks of eligible homes that were still on the waiting list. Data were analyzed from December 1, 2019, to February 28, 2021. Exposures  The BSRP intervention includes a grant of up to $20 000 provided to low-income owners for structural repairs to electrical, plumbing, heating, and roofing damage. Eligible homeowners must meet income guidelines, which are set by the US Department of Housing and Urban Development and vary yearly. Main Outcomes and Measures  The main outcome was police-reported crime across 7 major categories of violent and nonviolent crimes (homicide, assault, burglary, theft, robbery, disorderly conduct, and public drunkenness). Results  A total of 13 632 houses on 6732 block faces received the BSRP intervention. Owners of these homes had a mean (range) age of 56.5 (18-98) years, were predominantly Black (10 952 [78.6%]) or Latino (1658 [11.9%]) individuals, and had a mean monthly income of $993. These census tracts compared with those without BSRP intervention had a substantially larger Black population (49.5% vs 12.2%; |D| = 0.406) and higher unemployment rate (17.3% vs 9.3%; |D| = 0.357). The main regression analysis demonstrated that the addition to a block face of a property that received a BSRP intervention was associated with a 21.9% decrease in the expected count of total crime (incidence rate ratio [IRR], 0.78; 95% CI, 0.76-0.80; P<.001), 19.0% decrease in assault (IRR, 0.81; 95% CI, 0.79-0.84; P<.001), 22.6% decrease in robbery (IRR, 0.77; 95% CI, 0.75-0.80; P<.001), and 21.9% decrease in homicide (IRR, 0.78; 95% CI, 0.71-0.86; P<.001). When restricting the analysis to blocks with properties that had ever received a BSRP intervention, a total crime reduction of 25.4% was observed for each additional property (IRR, 0.75; 95% CI, 0.73-0.77; P<.001). A significant dose-dependent decrease in total crime was found such that the magnitude of association increased with higher numbers of homes participating in the BSRP on a block. Conclusions and Relevance  This study found that the BSRP intervention was associated with a modest but significant reduction in crime. These findings suggest that intentional and targeted financial investment in structural, scalable, and sustainable place-based interventions in neighborhoods that are still experiencing the lasting consequences of structural racism and segregation is a vital step toward achieving health equity.

Pennsylvania: JAMA Network Open, 2021. 12p.