By United States. Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency

The following passage from the document contains multiple links embedded in the text: "The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) conducts Risk and Vulnerability Assessments (RVAs) for the federal civilian executive branch (FCEB), high priority private and public sector critical infrastructure (CI) operators, and select state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) stakeholders. Concurrently, the United States Coast Guard (USCG) conducts RVAs on maritime CI operated by SLTT and private-sector organizations. The RVA is intended to assess the entity's network capabilities and network defenses against known threats. In Fiscal Year 2023 (FY23), CISA and the USCG conducted a combined total of '143' RVAs across multiple CI sectors. [...] The goal of the RVA analysis is to develop effective strategies to improve the security posture of FCEB, CI, maritime, and SLTT stakeholders. During each RVA, CISA and the USCG collect data through remote and onsite actions. This data is combined with national threat and vulnerability information to provide organizations with actionable remediation recommendations prioritized by risk of compromise. CISA designed RVAs to identify vulnerabilities threat actors could exploit to compromise network security controls. After completing an RVA, CISA and the USCG provide the assessed entity a final report that includes recommendations, specific findings, potential mitigations, and technical attack path details. The FY23 reports provided these general observations: [1] Assessors completed their most successful attacks via common methods, such as phishing, valid accounts, and default credentials. [2] Assessors used a variety of tools and techniques CISA has captured in previous RVA analyses to successfully conduct common attacks. [3] Many organizations across varying CI sectors exhibited the same vulnerabilities. [4] CISA assessment personnel used common vulnerabilities facilitated by shortcomings in secure by design and default principles and other misconfigurations to compromise systems."

UNITED STATES. Government. Washington DC. SEP, 2024. 24p.

By Joanna Shapland, Jamie Buchan, Steve Kirkwood and Estelle Zinsstag

This report summarises key findings from our project which was funded by the Scottish Government, in support of the Scottish Government’s Restorative Justice Action Plan (Scottish Government 2019). In particular, we seek to support the expansion of restorative justice in Scotland to include its use in response to more serious offending and more difficult cases.

Our objectives were to develop a sense of what factors were perceived by facilitators as risky in any restorative justice process, how they assessed risks, and what measures have been used to prevent and mitigate these risks, with a view to informing the development of practice and policy in Scotland. By ‘risk’ we mean not (just) risks to safety but any factors that might jeopardise the success of the process, i.e. the participants being able to communicate safely. To this end, we interviewed 30 restorative justice facilitators in 11 European jurisdictions. The extent to which restorative justice was ‘established’, and how it was organised, varied considerably between these. Our questions roughly followed the timeline of a restorative justice process: we began by talking about the referral process and how facilitators decide to move forward (or not), before considering facilitators’ definitions of ‘risk’, approaches to assessment, and measures they used to mitigate specific risks in restorative justice. Finally, we asked them about their training and measures for capacity building, including co-facilitation, mentoring and reflective practice.

Key Findings

• The restorative justice risks described by our interviewees attach to individual people and cases. Some cases are risky, but this is because of individual factors, not because of the type of case or person. This is essentially different to the actuarial/statistical mode of risk assessment found in many criminal justice settings.

• It is impossible to predict the risks of a case before engaging with the individuals involved, because different people experience ‘risk’ factors in very different ways. Furthermore, the seriousness of the harm in a given case may not tally with the legal categories imposed on it by the criminal justice system.

• Aside from unwillingness to engage or attempts to coerce others on the part of either party, only two types of risk were seen as ruling out restorative justice entirely: where the person responsible is unable or unwilling to acknowledge the harm (which does not necessarily entail admitting criminal guilt), and where either party is unable to comprehend the proceedings, usually because of substance use or severe mental disorder. Even these may be amenable to change over time. 

• Most facilitators agreed that certain difficult cases, particularly those involving sexual offending and domestic/intimate partner abuse, presented particular challenges related to trauma and power imbalance. There was no sense however of them being qualitatively different to other cases in terms of how they were approached from a practice perspective - they just require additional care and preparation.

• Capacity to facilitate more challenging cases comes with experience. In Scotland, many facilitators are less experienced with these types of case, so are more concerned about risk and their capacity to facilitate these; facilitators in other jurisdictions with experience around facilitating in cases involving more severe harm are much more confident taking on more difficult cases. 

• Facilitators rarely used formal risk assessment processes, and none appeared to use, or have, validated risk assessment tools in relation to restorative justice, although some may use informal ‘checklists’ of factors. Professional judgment and a case-by-case approach, sometimes with advice and support from other professionals, was the key element in assessing and mitigating risks. Given this, and the individual nature of ‘risk’, it was usual to consider risks and mitigating measures simultaneously, not sequentially. In assessing risk, they focus on risks related to the restorative justice process itself, rather than more general risks, such as risk of re-offending. They would also adopt a restorative approach to assessing risk, such as through raising and discussing potential risks and their mitigation with participants. 

• Facilitators valued the advice of other professionals, such as prison officers, social workers and psychiatrists, and (in some cases) these professionals’ work supporting parties in restorative justice meetings. However, in making decisions about restorative justice, facilitators’ own judgment and the views and needs of the parties (principally the person harmed) were seen as more important. 

• Facilitators use a range of measures to mitigate potential risks. The single most important measure is simply preparation with the people involved, through a series of ‘pre-meetings’. All facilitators used these meetings to prepare each party for the restorative justice process, and identify and mitigate particular risks; more difficult cases were generally seen as requiring more pre-meetings. 

• Communication difficulties which could affect the process included language barriers as well as those related to mental illness or the youth of the parties. Facilitators used a range of methods to overcome these, including interpreters and supporters as well as non-verbal communication techniques. 

• While some types of case, such as those involving young people, communication difficulties or large groups, might require extra preparation, these cases (like more difficult cases) were not seen as fundamentally different to any others. 

• Many participants want supporters present at face-to-face meetings, and so facilitators invited these people into the restorative justice process as ‘supporters’. These could be friends and family of the participants or sometimes professionals (e.g. therapists or social workers). While this was seen as useful, care was needed in order to avoid power imbalances or inappropriate interventions from supporters. 

• There was varied evidence on the practice of using follow-up measures after the meeting, though this was seen as very desirable. While some facilitators iv check in with the participants afterwards, others are content simply to provide contact information and solicit feedback. 

• It was common for facilitators to work in pairs on a given case, particularly where the case is risky, complex or involves many people. This ‘co facilitation’ is particularly valuable for gaining complementary perspectives as well as for training newer or less experienced facilitators, who can ‘shadow’ a senior colleague. 

• The physical space in which a meeting occurs is very important. Preferably this would be an accessible and neutral space with no links to criminal justice or to either of the parties, and conducive to an atmosphere of safety and calm. It should have at least one ‘breakout room’ for parties to prepare and take breaks. 

• Facilitators generally felt that their training had prepared them adequately for facilitating restorative justice, but this training had not always been well evaluated. 

• Restorative justice is not suitable for all people or all cases. However, it is worth remembering that for some people harmed by offences, the risks of not engaging in restorative justice may outweigh the risks of doing so.

Suggestions 

• We do not advise the adoption of formal risk assessment processes in restorative justice. This would risk compromising the individual-focused ethos of restorative justice, and could have harmful consequences by imposing risk categories ‘top down’ on cases. Tools should particularly not be imported from other criminal justice processes, where the aims and purposes are likely to be different. There must be an acknowledgement that every case is different - the most serious offences may be relatively straightforward in restorative justice terms, while apparently minor crimes may hide unexpected risks. However, checklists, tailored to the specific restorative justice services, may function as a useful aide memoire for practitioners in considering the types of issues and factors that should be considered when assessing and mitigating risks. 

• ‘Pre-meetings’ are the key measure for identifying and mitigating risks. Without introducing undue delay, adequate time must be allowed for a preparatory meeting or meetings ahead of the restorative justice process. This is particularly true for more difficult cases. 

• Restorative justice services will need to be flexible in accepting referrals at different stages of the criminal justice process and afterwards, to allow for cases of serious offending where the person responsible is serving or has served a custodial sentence. 

• Where necessary, resources should be made available for communication support in restorative justice (interpreters and/or supporters). Non-verbal tools such as picture cards may also be helpful for supporting communication.

Edinburgh: Edinburgh University, 2022. 98p.

By Scottish Government, Cabinet Secretary for Justice and Home Affairs

Although many countries have now introduced domestic homicide reviews, there remains little evidence on their effectiveness in creating system change and improving organisational practice. Taking the learning forward from reviews and ensuring recommendations are implemented is of crucial importance and at the very core of the purpose of the process, yet there is little evidence of how and whether this works in practice. A lack of evaluation of the effectiveness of domestic homicide reviews internationally makes it difficult to establish a consensus for best practice and develop a model with this in mind (Scottish Government, 2023). Still, where problems have been identified and mechanisms have been introduced to attempt to overcome these issues, we can consider these when developing a domestic homicide and suicide review (DHSR) model for Scotland. This will help to ensure that the process created does not repeat the same mistakes, and instead is constructed in a way that will enable lessons to be learned effectively from reviews. In doing so, Scotland’s model will facilitate the system changes and improvements that are the core purpose of conducting reviews, and will ensure that practitioners and victims’ families can have faith in the process and see value in their participation. This report builds on a working paper by Professor John Devaney, which introduces key points to consider for the implementation of learning from reviews to generate service improvement. This report outlines 15 aspects of good practice to be considered in the development of a domestic homicide and suicide review model for Scotland. The report then discusses the rationale behind these points in more detail, identifying existing challenges with implementing recommendations from reviews, exploring examples of good practice, and considering how to define and measure success and impact. This report was prepared by Justice Analytical Services for the DHSR Model Development Sub-Group. As the key points presented in this report have been generated at an early stage of development of the model, they are designed to be considered as general principles of good practice, and may require further refinement and deliberation as the details of the model are established. The information presented in this report is drawn from academic literature on domestic homicide reviews and other similar review processes, consideration of responses to the Scottish Government’s targeted engagement consultation, and consultation with British and international DHR experts (see Annex 1 for a description of the methodology).

Edinburgh: Scottish Government, Justice Directorate, 2024. 27p.

By Jason Wagner

Fare evasion and license plate fraud are costly and growing problems for New York City, the Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA), the New York State Thruway Authority, and the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey. In 2023, the cost to the MTA alone was more than $700 million—an amount equal to the amount of funding that would be raised through two rounds of fare hikes; and the evidence suggests the cost is growing.1 Increasing fare and toll compliance is critical to funding the region’s transit agencies and providing reliable, high-quality, affordable public transit services. While much of the lost revenue is from fares, license plate fraud is increasingly chipping away at the bottom line of entities that collect tolls, as evaders become more brazen and sophisticated. This trend presents a risk to the success of the Central Business District Tolling Program (congestion pricing), which is set to begin in June 2024. Congestion pricing revenues are critical for the MTA; they will fund more than a quarter of the MTA’s 2020 2024 Capital Program and support numerous capital projects that modernize the system and bring it to a state of good repair. The State, the City, and affected public entities need more tools and should take additional steps to lower the fiscal risk from revenue loss. The Citizens Budget Commission (CBC) supports Governor Kathy Hochul’s Executive Budget for Fiscal Year 2025 proposed policies, which would strengthen laws and efforts to enforce fare and toll compliance.

New York: Citizens Budget Committee, 2024.yp.

By SHEYLA A. DELGADO, GINA MORENO, FIDEL OSORIO, RICHARD ESPINOBARROS, JEFFREY A. BUTTS JOHN JAY COLLEGE RESEARCH AND EVALUATION CENTER

Researchers at the John Jay College Research and Evaluation Center (JohnJayREC) investigated transit fare evasion in subway stations and station complexes throughout New York City between 2018 and 2023. The study was conducted as part of the New York City Police Reform and Reinvention Collaborative Plan, overseen by the New York City Mayor's Office of Criminal Justice (MOCJ). The research team analyzed associations between fare evasion and arrests reported by the New York City Police Department (NYPD) and considered the social and economic characteristics of the neighborhoods surrounding each transit station. The study found no statistically significant associations between fare evasion enforcements and total arrests for felonies and misdemeanors. Fare evasion enforcement, however, was most prevalent in stations whose neighborhoods were characterized by high socioeconomic disadvantage. The statistical interaction of crime rates, fare evasion enforcement, and socioeconomic disadvantage underscores the role of social factors in public safety.

New York: JOHN JAY COLLEGE RESEARCH AND EVALUATION CENTER, 2024. 15p.

By Nick Sawhney

Fare Evasion and its enforcement is an ever-more relevant issue in New York City. In this paper, a data set of fare evasion arrests and weighted census data is created and analyzed using a difference-in-differences regression model in order to understand the impact of the Manhattan District Attorney’s 2018 policy to curtail the prosecution of those arrested for fare evasion in the New York City Subway. Results suggest that, despite an overall reduction in arrests, Black and Hispanic communities still saw an increase in fare evasion policing. Income inequality is suggested as an indicator of the number of arrests as well. Furthermore, the proportion of Black arrests was found to increase following the implementation of the policy, especially in areas which contain greater Black and Hispanic populations.

Published 2020.

By Anthony Petrosino, Trevor Fronius and Trent Baskerville

School-based policing programs started as far back in the USA as the 1950s and became more popular in part as concerns about school safety increased. After the murder of George Floyd in May 2020, the scrutiny of municipal police extended to school policing, and the concerns that policing exacerbates the school-to-prison pipeline, particularly for Black and Brown children, led several districts to remove officers from their schools. However, some of these same districts have reinstated police following widespread reports of fighting and behavioural issues among students after nearly 2 years of sporadic education due to the COVID-19 pandemic. This paper discusses some of the recent trends and high lights evidence from several systematic reviews of evidence on the efforts of school policing, including a large-scale effort for the Campbell Collaboration. A more recent evaluation published since the reviews were done is also discussed. Finally, the article highlights a report to Congress by the National Institute of Justice and concludes with policy implications and a future agenda for research.

Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice, Volume 18, 2024, 

By Barak Ariel, Alex Sutherland, David Weisburd, Yonatan Ilan and Matt Bland

Substantial evidence suggests that focussing police resources on hotspots of crime has a discernable crime-re duction effect. However, little is known about the efficacy of proactively policing areas with higher concentrations of more common low-harm problems in society. This study evaluates the first national double-blind randomized controlled trial in which clearly identifiable hotspots (n = 488) of low-harm ‘quality-of-life’ incidents nested in 31 participating police stations were randomized to be either actively policed by any available police officer or by ‘business-as-usual’ reactive policing over a 12-month period. A series of count-based regression models show a moderate and statistically significant reduction in the number of quality-of-life incidents in treatment versus control hotspots, with more than 2,000 quality-of-life incidents prevented, without evidence of spatial displacement to street segments nearby. However, we find no diffusion of benefits in terms of other crime types within the same hotspots, which may suggest that either low- and high-harm crime hotspots are not spatially aligned with each other, that focusing police officers on one type of crime does not produce a suppression effect on other types of crime, or both. We discuss the implications of these results for crime policy and future research.

Policing, Volume 17, pp. 1–23, 2023. doi: https://doi.org/10.1093/police/paad040

By Philipp M. Dau, Christophe Vandeviver, Maite Dewinter, Frank Witlox, Tom Vander Beken

We systematically review the effectiveness of police presence. In doing so, we investigate concepts of police presence and differences between reported effects. Using the PRISMA (Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses) guidelines and protocols, we systematically identify and review eligible studies on police presence. Further, quality assessment and findings synthesis are used to map limitations of current research as well as grounds for future avenues. The systematic search strategies yielded 49 studies focusing on testing the effects of police presence or evaluating its measurement. We find evidence that police presence has mostly crime reduction effects on crimes related to motor theft, property, violence, and guns. Police presence also reduces calls for service and improves traffic behaviour. Police presence focused on specific areas, times, and types of crime achieves maximum effectiveness. The reviewed studies show a high degree of heterogeneity in reporting, however, which limits comparability of findings across studies. Research on police presence presents evidence for significant crime preventative effects of focused police actions. Police presence shows the strongest effects when focused on certain areas, times, or types of crimes. We encourage future research to focus on police presence en route and its effects, including crime prevention, traffic regulation, and fear of crime.

Unpublished paper, 2021.

By David Spencer, Sir Stephen Laws KCB KC (Hon) and Niamh Webb

We have entered a new era of increasingly disruptive protests. This report shows how decisions made by the police, prosecutors, courts, Parliament and Government mean that undue weight is being placed on the rights and interests of disruptive (and, at times, criminal) activists at the expense of the rights, wellbeing and interests of ordinary members of the public.

This report addresses two central questions:

• Do the police, and other authorities, use their existing powers effectively to deal with disruptive protest?

• Is the existing legal regime fit for purpose?

The answer to both questions, as we show in this report, is no.

As the new Government will soon commence their review of the legislation relating to protest and the Home Office continues their appeal in a high-profile protest-related court case this report is highly relevant to the contemporary policy making and legal context.

The report argues that the new Government must prioritise the rights, wellbeing and interests of ordinary members of the public – otherwise they risk finding themselves in the same difficulties as their predecessors.

In addition to a detailed analysis of the police approach to protest, this report also contains recent polling on the public mood and a detailed review of the current legal regime. The report has 26 recommendations for Government, police forces, the Crown Prosecution Service and the Mayor of London.

London: Policy Exchange, 2024. 157p.

By Hunter M. Boehme, Scott M. Mourtgos

On March 1, 2022, correspondence from the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) headquarters stated that officers can no longer use minor infractions (e.g., equipment violations) as a pretextual reason to further investigate drivers for criminal behavior. If LAPD officers are to execute a discretionary stop, they must activate their body-worn cameras and reasonably articulate to the civilian why they are being investigated. The intent is to reduce racial/ethnic disparities in stops and build trust of the police within the community. Critics of the policy argue that elevated crime rates will result due to the crime suppression effect of such stops. This study examines racial differences in stops before and after the policy change, as well as whether Part 1 violent and property crimes increased. Descriptive findings show that while the counts of stops, arrests, and contraband seizures during stops decreased, the percentage of non-White civilians stopped decreased only minimally following the intervention. Results from using Bayesian synthetic control methods indicate an increase in both violent and property crimes post-intervention compared with the synthetic counterfactual. The increase in violent crimes has a low probability of being different from the counterfactual, whereas the increase in property crimes has a high probability, suggesting that the intervention led to a real change in property crimes compared with what would have been expected under the counterfactual.

Policy Implications: This study provides preliminary evidence that emerging policies intended to restrict discretionary stops may not have the intended effect on racial disparities in police traffic stops. Instead, agencies passing similar policies may expect to see the potential unintended consequence of a spike in jurisdictional property crimes. We argue that such types of stops across a jurisdiction may have a general deterrent effect on more common and calculative crimes such as property crimes. To combat violent crimes, agencies should consider focusing discretionary stops in known hot spots. Further, our findings offer implications for research on the effects of de-policing on crime. Police agencies should monitor potential unintended impacts of these policies if enacted and be prepared to deal with such consequences.

Criminology & Public Policy Volume 23, Issue 3: Special Issue: Policing Practice and Policy Aug 2024 Pages 515-799

By Andrew Eichen

Sanctioned by the courts and taught in police manuals, deceptive tactics are employed by virtually every police department across the country. Officers seeking to elicit a confession will routinely lie to suspects about the evidence and make statements that imply leniency. While effective at times, deception is ethically dubious and can result in severe consequences for suspects. The United States is an outlier in allowing police to deceive suspects, as the practice is prohibited or highly restricted in most peer nations, including England, France, Germany, and Japan. First, deceptive interrogation tactics frequently induce false confessions, which are a leading cause of wrongful convictions in the United States. Further, the acceptability of lying to suspects during interrogations seems to encourage deception in other, more troubling contexts. Research shows that testimonial lies, such as perjury in court and falsifying police reports, are commonly employed by officers to secure convictions and circumvent constitutional protections. While such practices remain illegal, testimonial lies are rarely identified or punished. As a result, the justifications and skills cultivated through deceiving suspects in interrogations naturally bleed over into other police work. Ultimately, the pervasiveness of police deception undermines the integrity and legitimacy of the criminal justice system. It leads to wrongful convictions, weakens civil liberties, and erodes public trust in law enforcement. While there are difficult trade-offs in regulating police deception, its negative consequences require policy responses. Contrary to contentions that deceit is a necessary tool of law enforcement, experiences in other nations suggest that restricting police deception does not hamper criminal investigations. Policymakers should consider measures to curtail police deception, such as requiring that interrogations be recorded, banning or limiting certain deceptive tactics, and increasing judicial scrutiny of interrogation practices

Cato Policy Analysis, no. 979, Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 2024. 32p.

By Brenden Beck,  Joseph Antonelli,  Angela LaScala-Gruenewald

Research Summary: Following high-profile police killings, many U.S. cities banned officers from using chokeholds and other neck restraints. The evidence for such bans, however, is limited. To test whether use-of-force policies prohibiting neck restraints are related to fewer police killings, we use three modeling approaches to analyze 2183 U.S. cities between 2009 and 2021. Police killings were lower in places that adopted neck-restraint bans and the bans were associated with less crime and fewer assaults on officers, net of controls. Because officer labor unions can affect use-of-force policies and the frequency of police killings, we also analyzed them, finding unionization increased the likelihood a city had a neck-restraint ban and had a null or negative association with police killings.

Policy Implications: Adopting a neck-restraint ban is likely an effective way to reduce deaths due to police use of force with minimal collateral consequences. The bans operate through a diffuse discouragement of many types of lethal force or as a part of an array of use-of-force policies. Their direct relationship to asphyxiation deaths remains unclear. Officer unionization is unlikely to change the frequency of police killings, except through its association with stricter use-of-force policies.

Criminology & Public PolicyVolume 23, Issue 3: Special Issue: Policing Practice and Policy Aug 2024 Pages 515-799

By Greg Midgette,  Peter Reuter

Research Summary: Two perceptions drive interesting finding ways of diverting more 911 calls from police to civilian first responders: (1) police responses can result in inadvertent harm to citizens and (2) many calls to which police respond require services that police often cannot provide. Thus, using other personnel may improve police–citizen relations and strengthen crime fighting by reducing extraneous police burden. Using a case study design, we conducted formative evaluations of programs that have developed beyond pilots in three large U.S. cities: Albuquerque, Atlanta, and Houston. In Each city, we interviewed officials, program operators,and other stakeholders and reviewed program docu-ments and statistics. We detail the events and forces that led to the establishment of each program, the way in which the programs have been institutionalized, and the way they interact with the police department. We then discuss key lessons learned for these jurisdictions.Policy Implications: Many U.S. cities are consider-ing diverting some emergency calls for service from police to civilian first responders. This analysis provides evidence to aid policy makers, researchers, and other stakeholders in the development and evaluation of com-munity responder programs. In all respects, we believe that cities’ unique experiences inform program design.For example, in Albuquerque, a City Hall-driven initia-tive established a new city agency parallel to the police department. In Atlanta, decarceration activists drove the initiative; the program is a city/county-funded non-profit, more fragile in its funding. Risk aversion among call takers and dispatchers has led to low call diversion rates across all sites, but training and collaboration haves hown promise to resolve this problem. Public safety officials external to the diversion programs commonly expressed concerns about first responder safety and per-ceptions that police are expected when 911 is called. Thisrisk aversion has led to slower-than-expected expansion of the program within each city.

Criminology & Public Policy: Volume 23, Issue 3, 2024.

By  Alexander Marion,  Syracuse City Auditor 

Police staffing and overtime costs have become a routine matter of concern for the Syracuse Common Council and City Administration leaders as they carry out the budget process each year. In 2022, the Syracuse Common Council amended Mayor Walsh’s Fiscal Year 2022-23 (FY23) budget to authorize funding for the Office of the City Auditor to conduct a staffing study of the Syracuse Police Department. The Office of Budget and Management, along with the Department of Audit, developed a request for proposals and selected Matrix Consulting Group (Matrix) of San Francisco, CA to produce a report which could improve workload balance, management, and operations. The Matrix report identified four district bureaus within the department and categorizes their recommendations based on those divisions of labor. In total, the Matrix team makes 87 specific recommendations. The final Matrix report, agreed to and approved by the Syracuse Police Department (SPD), is attached as Appendix 1. Grouping recommendations based on those four bureaus an excellent way for the SPD to understand and implement changes but it is not particularly useful for the public. For ease of public consumption, the Office of the City Auditor re-categorized the Matrix recommendations into eight (8) categories which better help explain the types of changes suggested. The chart below identifies the number of Matrix recommendations by category. Matrix conducted a thorough and meaningful review of the SPD. Their recommendations touch on thematic areas that need to be addressed, and that the SPD has agreed to pursue as part of their own evolution. Some recommendations from the Matrix report could be implemented quickly, while others require a longer time horizon, understanding capacity within the department and other city agencies or external partners. Other recommendations are subject to union bargaining agreements. To further aid the public and lawmakers in understanding and implementing the recommendations, the Office of the City Auditor has identified ten (10) areas where SPD and the City should focus their attention to deliver the most efficient and effective improvements to the department and their delivery of service for the residents of Syracuse   

Syracuse, NY: Office of the Syracuse City Auditor , 2024. 192p.

By His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services - HMICFRS 

In September 2023, the then Home Secretary commissioned us to inspect police involvement in politically contested matters. We examined several things: the police’s policies, processes and decision-making; how officers are trained; the police’s work with external advisory groups; how police deal with non-crime hate incidents; the police’s communication with the public; and whether there are any systemic problems that interfere with police impartiality. We reviewed over 4,000 documents and held interviews and focus groups with over 400 officers, staff and members of other organisations. We examined the records of 120 non-crime hate incidents. We surveyed the police and the public, for which we received over 4,000 responses. And we analysed over 857,000 police social media posts. This has been one of the most challenging inspections we have carried out. It deals with complex legislation and regulations. It deals with policing’s sometimes invidious role in keeping the peace, meeting the needs of individuals or groups who have opposing views and simultaneously upholding everyone’s rights. And it involves contentious, emotive issues. We found three systemic problems. First, there is a near-total absence of any definition, guidance or judicial consideration of impartiality insofar as it relates to policing. Second, legal application of the Equality Act 2010 is now too complicated. Third, the legislation doesn’t clearly define the boundary between police operational independence and appropriate external influence or accountability. Most chief officers told us that they experience what they believe to be improper pressure or interference from significant political figures. Chief constables and police and crime commissioners don’t always understand the delineation of their roles and responsibilities. Chief constables need more guidance to help them maintain operational independence. To improve public trust and confidence, it is important for the police to communicate effectively with communities. We found forces sometimes overestimate the effectiveness of their communications using social media and rely too much on this communication channel. And there is a lack of guidance to help forces communicate on contentious issues, including by using visible representations such as badges and lanyards, which officers often wear on their police uniform. Many interviewees told us they felt demoralised and let down by forces often not doing enough to respond to inaccurate or unfair media coverage when they are the subject of critical reporting and social media comment. Some described political commentary as being overwhelmingly negative and therefore at risk of distorting public opinion. Many officers and staff were disappointed by the absence of commentary on the good work they do every day. Since 1999, responding to a recommendation in the report of the inquiry into the racist murder of Stephen Lawrence, forces have brought people together into external advisory groups. These groups help inform police decision-making. There is no up-to-date guidance about how advisory groups should work or how they should be formed. And forces use and run these groups in different ways. The Stephen Lawrence report also recommended police forces record non-crime hate incidents (NCHIs). All forces recognise the important value of this information. But forces haven’t consistently applied the guidance concerning how they should deal with NCHIs. They record and attend more of these incidents than they need to. Police staff networks have existed since the founding of the Christian Police Association in 1883. And staff networks have played an important role in policing’s response to concerns about racism, homophobia and misogyny. There is a perception among police officers and staff that some networks are a higher priority in their force than others. Networks can help forces navigate challenging problems. But when networks become involved in politicised or contentious issues, it can have a negative effect on public trust and confidence. Having reviewed the evidence, we believe that the lack of clarity within the complex legal and regulatory framework that informs the police approach to politicised or contentious issues is damaging public trust and confidence. In this report, we make 22 recommendations. Our recommendations are designed to provide the clarity needed for police forces to be, and appear to be, impartial by: • clarifying the impartiality duty and operational independence, and updating associated training and guidance; • reviewing and updating the Equality Act 2010 and associated training and guidance; • introducing guidance about police attendance and conduct at events; • improving communication with the public about politicised and contested issues, including using social media and visible representations; • updating guidance relating to the use of external advisory groups; • updating policies and reviewing the governance arrangements for non-crime hate incidents; and • strengthening the governance arrangements for police staff networks. We were due to publish our report in July 2024, but the announcement of a general election caused us to delay reporting our findings. 2 Summary 

Birmingham UK: HMICFRS 2024 2024. 132p.

By Kathleen Patterson, District of Columbia Auditor and PFM Group Consulting

Over 18 months, PFM collected the most reliable data available to form its conclusions. This involved benchmarking reported crime, levels and types of agency staffing, specialized functions, and unique responsibilities with six other police agencies. The PFM team also engaged with MPD and Department of Forensics Sciences (DFS) personnel, conducted numerous interviews, and led group discussions throughout MPD to ensure a comprehensive understanding of MPD operations. The PFM team included experts in police staffing and organization with substantial experience working with other departments to develop workforce strategies, improve operations and increase department efficiencies. To review the findings, please consider the context of MPD’s staffing as of October 1, 2023. At that time, MPD had 4,000 filled and vacant sworn positions. Of these: 47.3% (2,257) of the positions were allocated to Patrol Services (PS). 11.5% (547) of the positions were allocated to the Investigations Services Bureau (ISB). The remaining 41.2% (1,196) positions were allocated to other, primarily support, sections of the Department, including Professional Development (652), Homeland Security (244), Executive Office of the Chief (60), Technical and Analytical Services (19), Youth and Family Engagement (161), and Internal Affairs (60). The study’s primary focus was on patrol services and investigations, the backbone of MPD’s operations and crucial to every community. Other sections of the Department were examined primarily for the impact of their work on PS and ISB. We found that MPD data were insufficient for a robust analysis of current and historical staffing levels by bureau, division, rank, and positions. The Study concluded that the department’s Patrol Services is adequately staffed at its current level of 1,340 officers. However, it also identified ways in which patrol personnel’s current placement and shift assignments do not align with the study’s workload-based staffing model. Additionally, the study found a shortage of 65 Investigators (primarily District Detectives) based on the workload of the Investigations Bureau. Patrol Services and Investigation Services Bureau staffing and personnel placement recommendations used PFM’s workload-based staffing model, which is based on analytical methods and peer-reviewed research developed for the U.S. Department of Justice. Additional findings include: MPD urgently needs to gather more comprehensive data on how PS and ISB personnel spend their time. Better understanding time consumed by activities such as guarding arrestees and prisoners at hospitals, performing homeland security-related duties, and engaging in various proactive policing activities could significantly improve future staffing needs assessments. MPD’s proportion of professional (non-sworn) personnel is less than that of the benchmarked agencies and comparably sized agencies tracked in the FBI data tables. Better success with civilianization could free sworn personnel to do more work that explicitly requires their skills. The Department’s time and attendance system needs improved functionality to collect, monitor, and report comprehensive information to track and analyze overtime use. This information impacts the agency’s ability to make timely and thoughtful staffing decisions. MPD’s use of officers from patrol and non-patrol assignments to fulfill special details, such as large scale events and the movement of dignitaries, impedes these personnel’s ability to do their primary jobs and merits a data-based analysis of long-term Homeland Security Bureau staffing needs. A key conclusion is that staffing decisions will inevitably change as work requirements tied to Department goals and community expectations evolve. This dynamic nature of staffing decisions underscores the need for adaptability and flexibility. In responding to the draft report MPD states that in the last five years use of overtime indicated the need for “500 or more officers to meet community needs” but included no data to support that assertion. This underscores the need for accurate and comprehensive data collection to inform future studies and to more critically assess staffing adequacy, policing effectiveness, and community satisfaction. As a result, workload-based data should be regularly reviewed and incorporated into short-, medium-, and long-term strategies and staffing plans

Washington, DC:Office of the District of Columbia Auditor , 2024. 459p.

By Melissa Young & Nia West-Bey

On January 4, 2022, the U.S. Department of Labor issued a Training and Employment Notice providing local workforce boards, American Job Centers (AJCs), workforce development partners, and grantees with information on supporting community violence intervention (CVI) strategies that include an employment or workforce component. In this brief, the Center for Law and Social Policy offers recommendations for supporting the design and implementation of community violence interventions based on research and practice evidence. Background on Community Violence Community violence (sometimes called group violence) is interpersonal and can include shootings, stabbings, and other aggravated assaults between individuals not involved in familial or intimate relationships. Community violence differs from other forms of violence where weapons may be used. It often includes young people and is frequently conducted in a public setting. Roughly half of all gun homicides in the United States occur in just 127 cities— comprising less than a quarter of the total U.S. population. Black and brown Americans make up less than a third of the total population, but account for nearly three-quarters of all gun homicide victims in the United States. Gun violence overwhelmingly harms people in communities that have been economically marginalized. Community violence should be understood in the context of a community or neighborhood ecosystem. Neighborhoods with high levels of violence routinely face multiple compounding challenges arising from, and exacerbated by, structural inequity and racist policies, such as segregation; limited availability or access to quality jobs; a lack of safe and affordable housing; lack of affordable, quality health and mental health services; and histories of divestment. Moreover, significant research on the interactions of place and violence, along with a robust body of evidence, demonstrates the connection between state-sponsored racial segregation and rates of violence today. For example, an analysis of historically red-lined areas has found that, even after adjusting for the socio-demographic factors, “the same places that were imagined to be areas unworthy of economic investment by virtue of the races, ethnicities, and religions of their residents are more likely to be the places where violence and violent injury are most common almost a century later.” Often today, these communities are over-policed. The overreach of the criminal legal system, particularly in Black and brown urban communities, results in many people being barred from education, employment, and housing (sometimes for life) as a result of the collateral consequences—sometimes called “permanent punishments”—that follow criminal legal system involvement. Behind every act of community violence there are families, friends, and communities left to grapple with the aftermath of trauma and, all too often, injury or loss of life. Exposure to violence and the ripple effects of trauma and grief puts enormous strain on families, children, schools, employers, hospitals, government systems, and entire communities. In particular, being a victim of violence in adolescence is associated with a “chain of adversity,” which can compromise academic performance, educational attainment, labor force participation, occupations, and earnings into adulthood

Washington DC: CLASP, 2022. 18P.

By Maureen O’Hara

This report addresses the impact of policies and practices within the criminal justice system in England and Wales which classify and treat suspects, defendants in criminal trials, and convicted offenders on the basis of their ‘gender identity’ rather than their biological sex. In recent years, self-declaration of ‘gender identity’ has been adopted as policy by all of the key criminal justice institutions, despite the fact that this is not aligned with the law. This change appears to have come about largely as the result of policy capture, as it is a widely contested belief and has been adopted without public scrutiny. Current criminal justice policy prioritises the wishes and feelings of those who identify as transgender over the rights of others, and particularly over the sex-based rights of women, such as rights to single-sex facilities. This publication examines the detrimental effects of this approach and makes recommendations about the development of policies which are based on acknowledgment of the significance of biological sex in the field of criminal justice.

London: Policy Exchange, 2022. 73p.

By Patricio Domínguez and Carlos Scartascini 

Crime levels are a perennial development problem in Latin America and a renewed concern in the United States. At the same time, trust in the police has been falling, and questions abound about citizens' willingness to support government efforts to fight crime. We conducted a survey experiment to elicit willingness to contribute toward reducing crime across five Latin American countries and the United States. We compare homicide, robbery, and theft estimates and find a higher willingness to contribute for more severe crimes and for higher crime reductions. In addition, we examine the role of information on the willingness to contribute by conducting two experiments. First, we show that exposing respondents to crime-related news increases their willingness to pay by 5 percent. Furthermore, while we document a 7 percent gap in willingness to pay for crime reduction between people who under- and over-estimate the murder rate, we find that this gap can be wholly eliminated by informing them about the actual level of crime. On average, our estimates suggest that households are willing to contribute around $140 per year for a 20 percent reduction in homicide. This individual-level predisposition would translate into additional investment in public security efforts of up to 0.5 percent of GDP.

Washington DC: IDB, 2022.  38p.