By Summer Walker, Walter Kemp, Mark Shaw and Tuesday Reitano.

Through stark images and charts, this report gives a graphic illustration of how the global illicit economy has boomed in the past 20 years and how it poses a serious threat to security, development and justice. With so many major challenges in our world today, it may seem that tackling transnational organized crime is a lower priority than addressing climate change, pandemics, inequality or migration. But organized crime is a common denominator to all of these challenges: it enables them, and it profits from them. As a result, organized crime is a driver of unsustainable development. This report is impressionistic. It is designed to show the inter-relationships and interdependence between global mega-trends and the trajectories of organized crime since 2000, the year the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC) was adopted. It is written from the perspective of civil society, drawing on consultations with the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime’s secretariat, its Network of Experts, and recipients of the Global Initiative Resilience Fund, including nine consultations held in five regions. It is based on data that is in the public domain that has been gathered through research and analysis. We hope this report can bring fresh approaches and different perspectives to intergovernmental processes. Furthermore, we hope it can stimulate new thinking and be a catalytic resource for more effective responses to organized crime. We appreciate the opportunities available for us to do this, for example through the review mechanism of the UNTOC Conference of Parties as well as the UN Crime Congress. As this report shows, organized crime is harming so many aspects of life on our planet. Left unchecked, the shadows of the future look even more sinister. We need to change the trajectory. We hope this report can raise awareness and provoke debate. Most importantly, we hope that it can stimulate action to strengthen local resilience and lead to a global strategy against organized crime.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2021. 118p.

Edited by Michael Milklaucic and Jacqueline Brewer

Illicit networks affect everyone in our modern, globalized world. From human trafficking in Eastern Europe to drug smuggling in East Asia, to the illicit arms trade in Africa, to terrorist cells in East Asia and insurgents in the Caucasus, transnational illicit networks have tentacles that reach everywhere. The trade in illegal narcotics is perhaps most worrisome, but of growing concern is the illicit trafficking of counterfeit items, weapons, natural resources, money, cultural property, and even people by shrewd, well-resourced, and nefarious adversaries

Acceleration. Magnification. Diffusion. Entropy. Empowerment. The global environment and the international system are evolving at hypervelocity. A consensus is emerging among policymakers, scholars, and practitioners that recent sweeping developments in information technology, communication, transportation, demographics, and conflict are making global governance more challenging. Some argue these developments have transformed our international system, making it more vulnerable than ever to the predations of terrorists and criminals. Others argue that despite this significant evolution, organized crime, transnational terrorism, and nonstate networks have been endemic if unpleasant features of human society throughout history, that they represent nothing new, and that our traditional means of countering them—primarily conventional law enforcement—are adequate. Even among those who perceive substantial differences in the contemporary manifestations of these persistent maladies, they are viewed as major nuisances not adding up to a significant national or international security threat, much less an existential threat.

Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2013. 304p.

By Jenni Irish-Qhobosheane

Since 2015, South Africa has witnessed the emergence of a new kind of criminality in the form of organized groups targeting the construction sector under the banner of ‘radical economic transformation’. Dubbed the ‘construction mafia’ in the media, these people have organized themselves into groups known as ‘local business forums’ and invaded construction sites across the country, demanding money or a stake in development projects in what can arguably be described as systemic extortion. While no country is immune to systemic extortion from criminal groups, the extent and impact of the activity depend on the abilities of state governance to address extortion economies as they arise. In South Africa, the activities of the so-called construction mafia have been fuelled by the weak response from the state, allowing them to expand their activities. In 2019, at least 183 infrastructure and construction projects worth more that R63 billion had been affected by these disruptions across the country. Since then, invasions have continued at construction sites across South Africa. In this context, this report by the GI-TOC focuses on understanding how these groups, widely referred to as the construction mafia, operate, their involvement in systemic extortion, and the long-term implications for the construction industry in South Africa and the country as a whole.

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2022. 51p.

By Jeremy McDermott, James Bargent, Douwe den Held, and Maria Fernanda Ramírez

Over the past few years, the cocaine trade has enjoyed an unprecedented boom, fuelled by soaring production. In 2018, the combined production for Colombia, Bolivia and Peru – the three main producers of cocaine – was more than double that of 2013 (Figure 1). While the rate of growth has slowed of late, there is still no sign of it hitting a peak. Coverage of this phenomenon has largely focused on the United States and its seemingly endless ‘war on drugs’. However, smarter traffickers have long preferred Europe, which has far more potential for growth than the more saturated US market, and higher profits. Cocaine to Europe has increased over the years, to the point where it is now beginning to rival that entering the US mainland. ‘For 2019 and the first months of 2020, the thinking was that the flow of drugs entering or passing through Europe was between 500 and 800 tonnes. We base these numbers in part on the notion that we are seizing 10% to 20% of the total,’ said one senior European police official and cocaine expert, who was not authorized to speak on the record. A significant percentage of that flow is in transit to other parts of the world. Traffickers are pushing eastwards from the more established markets in western Europe towards Russia and Asia – and feeding every country in between.

Washington DC: InSight Crime; Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2021. 78p.

By Fabian Zhilla Besfort and Besford Lamallar

This study focuses on the organized crime activities in Albania, as well as those conducted by Albanian criminal networks in the region and beyond. The study analyses organized crime activities such as trafficking in persons, illicit drugs and arms, smuggling of migrants, extortion, contract killings, organized cybercrime and money laundering.

Tirana: Open Society Foundation for Albania, 2015. 124p.

By Walter Kemp

While the Western Balkans is often portrayed as a hotspot of illicit activity, the region is a relatively small market for organized crime. The big money is made elsewhere. This report shows why and how groups from the Western Balkans have become engaged in organized crime abroad, particularly in South Africa, Turkey, Australia as well as in some countries of Latin America and Western Europe. The report shows that criminal groups from the Western Balkans operating abroad are modern, dynamic and entrepreneurial. They have demonstrated an ability to adapt and innovate and use technology to their advantage: for example, using encrypted forms of communication; exploring new routes and means of trafficking, such as ‘narco-jets’; and laundering their money through cryptocurrencies, offshore havens and into their home countries. The report suggests that there is not a ‘Balkan Cartel’ per se, although groups from the region sometimes work with each other, and there are also instances of multi-ethnic groups. The report calls for more effective law enforcement cooperation, tracking and seizing of assets, and the sharing of information, not least since perpetrators tend to use multiple identities. It also stresses the need to reduce demand for the goods and services provided by criminal groups from the Western Balkans.

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2020. 100p.

By Ruggero Scaturro and Walter Kemp

Despite the prevalence of trade over land, South Eastern Europe (SEE) also contains more than a hundred ports and 12 container terminals, which are important entry and exit points for trade in the Adriatic, Aegean, Black and Ionian Seas, as well as along the Danube. This report reveals that there is also a maritime Balkan route bringing drugs into SEE through key commercial seaports: cocaine from Latin America and heroin via Türkiye and the Middle East. Other commodities being smuggled along this route include weapons, waste, counterfeit goods and cigarettes. In addition, it provides a glimpse of smuggling along the Danube. The case studies, which feature nine of the region’s commercial ports, are a central element of this report. The map below shows the ports (in Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Montenegro, Romania and Slovenia) that form the basis of the analysis in this study. These ports were chosen to provide an overview of different types of ports (based on size, ownership, location and history of seizures) and to assess their vulnerability to organized crime.

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2022. 111p.

By United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

This report shows that the total value of illicit heroin and opium trafficked from Afghanistan to Western Europe through the Balkans amounts to some $28 billion every year. Sixty-five per cent of this total ($18 billion) is generated in Western and Central Europe. The four largest European markets for heroin - France, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Italy - account for nearly half of the gross profits, as the major heroin benefits are made by traffickers on the retail markets. The report shows that the total value generated by Afghan heroin and opium trafficked in Europe and through the Balkan route is one third bigger than the entire GDP of Afghanistan itself, which, in 2014, amounted to some $21 billion. Other findings indicate that the negative economic impact of heroin and opium are actually greater in Europe and the Balkan route countries than in Afghanistan itself. The report also shows the Islamic Republic of Iran and Turkey as the two countries which interject the greater percentage of heroin and opium destined for Europe. Iran seizes about 30 per cent of the 155 tons of heroin and opium entering its territory every year, while Turkey seizes 17 per cent. All other countries in Europe interject an average of 6 per cent of heroin in their territory. Data show that the impact of illicit profits in the national licit economy across countries is significant, with heroin and opium traffickers gaining between 0.2 to 2 per cent of their country's GDP. For some countries this share is bigger than the public expenditures dedicated to drug policies - if all drugs, and not only heroin and opium, are considered. The large amounts of money generated through this illicit activity can distort the licit national economies in the region.

Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2015. 92p.

By Walter Kemp

The report “Crooked Kaleidoscope – Organized Crime in the Balkans” by the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime, urges countries and organizations that have invested so much economically and politically over the past 25 years to stay engaged in the region and help it avoid back-sliding. In particular, it calls for stronger measures to fight corruption, enhance justice, and go after the proceeds of crime rather than just focusing on police reform.

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2017. 44p.

By Lucia Bird

On 1 February 2022, gunshots at the governmental palace in Bissau signalled the beginning of a reported failed coup attempt in Guinea-Bissau, a country long known for its prominent role in international cocaine trafficking. Had the incident resulted in a military overthrow of power, it would have been the fifth successful coup in Guinea-Bissau’s history, and also the fifth coup in West Africa in the preceding 12 months, hot on the heels of the seizure of power in Burkina Faso in late January.1 Hours after the gunfire had begun, President Umaro Sissoco Embaló addressed the press, condemning the incident and declaring the perpetrators had failed. In press statements, he indicated that those behind the attack were involved in the drugs trade.2 This implication appeared to echo history: a 2012 coup in Guinea-Bissau was so clearly motivated by competition for control over the country’s lucrative cocaine markets that it has been dubbed the ‘cocaine coup’.3 The nature of the February attack, and the identity of the perpetrators, is still unclear – as explored further below. However, arrests announced by the government following the attack include individuals with known links to the cocaine trade – most prominently Admiral Bubo Na Tchuto – underscoring the drug connection implied by the president. Guinea-Bissau is a key entry point for cocaine into West Africa, a region that operates as a transit point on international cocaine trafficking routes between cultivation countries in Latin America and consumer end-markets in Europe. The country has played an important role in international cocaine trafficking dynamics since the late 1990s. The close involvement of Guinea-Bissau’s political-military elite in the cocaine market over the years has been a critical factor in Guinea-Bissau’s repeated cycles of political turmoil. In turn, profits from the cocaine market have bankrolled a remarkably resilient elite protection network composed of elements of the state infrastructure. Guinea-Bissau is at a critical juncture once again. The curious February incident has brought to the fore the country’s cyclical tendency towards political volatility, and the president has deemed the country to be in ‘political crisis’ and dissolved the National Assembly. This report explores the role, past and present, of the cocaine trade both as a driver of political instability in the country and as a source of resilience for elite power-sharing arrangements.

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2022. 50p.

By International Crisis Group

Coca stands at the heart of a fierce debate over Colombia’s worsening rural insecurity. The plant’s leaves are the sole raw material from which cocaine, an illegal drug that generates outlandish profits and finances armed and criminal groups, can be manufactured. Colombian President Iván Duque argues that the whole narcotic supply chain – from coca cultivation to global cocaine trafficking – is the scourge behind rising massacres, forced displacement and assassinations of community leaders in Colombia. With cultivation hitting new highs in recent years, Bogotá has vastly expanded campaigns that involve sending in the army and police to pull up or otherwise eradicate coca crops. It also threatens to restart aerial fumigation. Yet an approach based on forceful eradication of coca, which the U.S. has stoutly backed, tends to worsen rural violence, while failing to reduce drug supply. A new strategy is needed that persuades coca farmers to abandon a plant that offers a stable income and an attractive alternative to other legal crops.

Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2021. 44p.

Edited by Laura Y. Calderón, Kimberly Heinle, Rita E. Kuckertz, Octavio Rodríguez Ferreira, and David A. Shirk

This is the second edition of Organized Crime and Violence in Mexico. Like last year’s report, this study builds on 10 years of reports published by Justice in Mexico under the title Drug Violence in Mexico. The Drug Violence in Mexico series examined patterns of crime and violence attributable to organized crime, and particularly drug trafficking organizations, as well as other related issues, such as judicial sector reform and human rights in Mexico. At the 10 year mark, in 2019, this series of reports was retitled “Organized Crime and Violence in Mexico” to reflect the proliferation and diversification of organized crime groups over the last decade and the corresponding wave of violence. As in previous years, this report compiles the most recent data. and analysis of crime, violence, and rule of law in Mexico to help inform government officials, policy analysts, and the general public.

San Diego: Justice in Mexico, University of San Diego, 2021. 70p.

Edited by Eric L. Olson, Andrew Selee, and David A. Shirk

The clichés describing United States-Mexico relations are well known and well worn. Given the enormity of the geographic, historical, cultural, and economic ties between both countries it’s now a commonplace to say Mexico is the United States’ most important bilateral relationship, and vice-versa. The nature of this critical binational relationship has been dissected and probed from every conceivable angle. Yet as we began to research the security relationship between both countries we realized that there is still much that is not generally known amongst the public and policy communities about how Mexico and the United States are working together to deal with the threats posed by organized crime. For example, the unique nature of money laundering operations taking place across the U.S.-Mexico border; the extent to which high-powered firearms are finding their way from U.S. gun shops into the hands of organized crime and street gangs in Mexico; and the surprisingly limited information about the amount of illegal drugs consumed in the United States are not widely understood. Likewise, the deployment of Mexico’s armed forces is only one aspect of the country’s anti-drug strategy. Police agencies are being reorganized and efforts at professionalization are underway. A major reform of Mexico’s justice system was adopted in 2008 that, if fully implemented, should help greatly strengthen the rule of law and reduce the relative power and impunity of organized crime. Yet, while significant progress has already been made in some of Mexico’s 31 states, many questions remain about the efficacy and sustainability of these reforms. But despite these developments, the extreme violence brought on by conflicts amongst and between organized crime groups still garners the most attention. The horrifying and gruesome details of drug violence are plastered on the front pages of daily newspapers and videos of narco-violence are easily available on public websites and YouTube. In some cases, the criminals themselves are publicizing their actions for their own aggrandizement and to terrorize the public. While understanding the nature and extent of the violence afflicting Mexico in recent times is important, we also recognized that the violence itself is more symptom than cause of the underlying problem. For this reason, we thought it important to focus this project’s research on a series of key issues that are feeding the growth of organized crime and related violence in Mexico. We also found it important to examine several policy areas where reform and action by one or both governments could contribute to a long term sustainable approach to weakening the grip of organized crime and illegal drugs on both countries

Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center and San Diego: University of San Diego, Trans-Border Institute, 2011. 388p.

Edited by Laura Y. Calderón, Kimberly Heinle, Rita E. Kuckertz, Octavio Rodríguez Ferreira, and David A. Shirk

This is the second edition of Organized Crime and Violence in Mexico. Like last year’s report, this study builds on 10 years of reports published by Justice in Mexico under the title Drug Violence in Mexico. The Drug Violence in Mexico series examined patterns of crime and violence attributable to organized crime, and particularly drug trafficking organizations, as well as other related issues, such as judicial sector reform and human rights in Mexico. At the 10 year mark, in 2019, this series of reports was retitled “Organized Crime and Violence in Mexico” to reflect the proliferation and diversification of organized crime groups over the last decade and the corresponding wave of violence. As in previous years, this report compiles the most recent data. and analysis of crime, violence, and rule of law in Mexico to help inform government officials, policy analysts, and the general public.

San Diego: Justice in Mexico, University of San Diego, 2021. 70p.

By InSight Crime

CACIF is the de facto political party of Guatemala's economic elites. It unites the most important economic actors and is capable of integrating, via informal mechanisms, the heads of consortia and family groups with significant weight in a variety of economic sectors. Private security firms under the umbrella of the “Illegal Clandestine Security Apparatuses (Cuerpos Ilegales y Aparatos Clandestinos deSeguridad - CIACS) weave in and out of organized crime activity involving drug, arms and human trafficking, systematically blocking investigations and operating with impunity. The CIACS are what raised the alarm to spur creation of the United Nations-backed International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala.

Washington, DC: InSight Crime, 2016. 112p.

By InSight Crime

Guatemala, Honduras, Colombia and Nicaragua represent an illuminating cross section of criminal organizations and types of elites. Elite dynamics in each of these countries are different, but with important commonalities; the makeup, role and penetration of criminal groups into intellectual, societal, legal, government and economic circles is varied, but interrelated. The study findings show local and national dynamics that influence intersections between organized crime and elites, and enable inferences and conclusions about what unifies these examples. The case studies reach the upper echelons of government and impact how the state deals with organized crime.

Washington, DC: InSight Crime, 2016. 51p.

By Sight Crime

Colombia's elite has always been made up predominantly of Colombian nationals. The country's economic and political elites overlap to a large extent, and the wealthy exert political power. The lack of government presence in many parts of the country and a tradition of contraband smuggling created trafficking expertise and a tolerance for illicit activities. The mass purchase of land by drug traffickers was so substantial that it is known as the "counter-reform" -- skewing Colombia's land further into the hands of the few. The paper also traces the rise and fall of drug lord Pablo Escobar and the Medellín cartel.

Washington, DC: InSight Crime, 2016. 117p.

By InSight Crime

This detailed study traces connections between wealthy and political elites in Honduras, and organized crime. For Honduran transnational elites, the state’s role is simple: to create and enforce rules that favour their continued power over key industries and the capital accumulation that accompanies it. Currently, all the elites seem to be facing the same dilemma: align their interests with the narco-powers surging in the country, or stand by as they assume control of the country’s most important economic and political levers. The dirty money provided by illicit criminal groups and businesses has become the difference that makes the difference in survival for the elite classes

Washington, DC: InSight Crime, 2016. 95p.

By Steven Dudley and Matthew Taylor

There are three major types of criminal networks in the Americas, and each requires the United States government to take a substantially different approach towards mitigating their power and effect . State-embedded networks are embedded in elected bodies, law enforcement, judicial entities, regulatory agencies, and other parts of the government. They use state power to enrich themselves and their partners via corrupt and criminal schemes and to systematically undermine the rule of law and regulatory powers, so as to protect their activities and ensure impunity. These networks are the most difficult for the United States government to address because they are, by definition, the US government’s counterparts. They may also play a double game, employing their resources towards battling some criminal activities, which may correspond with US interests, even while they shelter and build out their own criminal portfolios. Battling state-embedded networks requires empowering international and local bodies, as well as supporting civil society organizations and media. Social-constituency networks draw from a constituency, built on shared circumstances, heritage, and/or political beliefs, and create criminal networks that advance the interests of the constituency. They may provide protection from rival criminal groups and a predatory state, while also providing tools for social and economic advancement. They draw from various criminal economies, but their power base is decidedly social and political in nature. Entrepreneurial networks are designed like a commercial enterprise with multiple layers and a loose structure, which allow them to maximize profit and minimize risk. They mostly provide goods and services, but they are sometimes predatory and often employ violence. While the core of these networks is often one or more tight-knit families – which provide them many built-in advantages in terms of trust, recruitment, and conflict resolution – these networks are governed by profit motives, and they derive their power from economic capital.

Washington, DC: InSight Crime and American University’s Center for Latin American & Latino Studies, 2022. 155p.

By InSight Crime

Drug traffickers today realize that their best protection is not a private army but anonymity. This is the story of “Memo Fantasma” or “Will the Ghost,” who started life in the Medellín Cartel, funded the bloody rise of a paramilitary army, and today lives the high life in Madrid. He has helped move hundreds of tons of cocaine yet has no arrest warrants, and nobody is looking for him.

Washington, DC: InSight Crime, 2020. 50p.