By Hernando Zuleta González

The increase in the area cultivated with coca in Colombia has cast doubt on the country’s anti-drug strategy and has encouraged skepticism about the possibility of a complete and definitive peace. Furthermore, this perception of failure has given rise to policy proposals based on the idea that illicit crops are a criminal issue, not a development one. This paper is a complete review of the available evidence and aims at organizing the information related to this debate and shedding light on the convenience or inconvenience of certain policies. There are six highly relevant facts: (i) With respect to reducing cocaine supply, the efforts in seizures and destruction of infrastructure are more efficient than the efforts in eradication. (ii) Seizures and destruction of infrastructure may help in reducing coca plantations. (iii) There is no evidence to support the hypothesis that the consumption of cocaine in Colombia has increased. (iv) Most regions of the country have seen a decrease in the amount of coca crops. However, at least one armed group is present in the regions where the cultivated area has increased. (v) Coca growing municipalities are, on average, poorer than the rest of the country. These municipalities have a low tax revenue, and reduced levels of connectivity and institutional development. (vi) The increase in the consumption of cocaine in the United States is concentrated in a specific age group and in certain states. This fact makes it difficult to relate the increase in consumption to an exogenous increase in the supply.

Bogotá, Colombia: Universidad de los Andes–Facultad de Economía–CEDE, 2019. 40p.

By Philip Keefer, Norman V. Loayza, and Rodrigo R. Soares

This paper reviews the unintended consequences of the war on drugs, particularly for developing countries, and weighs them against the evidence regarding the efficacy of prohibition to curb drug use and trade. It reviews the available evidence and presents new results that indicate that prohibition has limited effects on drug prevalence and prices, most likely indicating a combination of inelastic drug demand (due to its addictive properties) and elastic supply responses (due to black markets). This should turn the focus to the unintended consequences of drug prohibition. First, the large demand for drugs, particularly in developed countries, generates the possibility of massive profits to potential drug providers. This leads to the formation of organized crime groups, which use violence and corruption as their means of survival and expansion and which, in severe cases, challenge the state and seriously compromise public stability and safety. Second, prohibition and its derived illegal market impose greater costs on farmers than on drug traffickers. In many instances, this entails the transfer of wealth from poor peasants to rich (and ruthless) traders. Third, criminalization can exacerbate the net health effects of drug use. These consequences are so pernicious that they call for a fundamental review of drug policy around the world.

Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2008. 36p.

By Peter Reuter

The production of cocaine and heroin, the two most important drugs economically, has been concentrated in a small number of poor nations for 25 years. A slightly larger number of developing nations have been affected by large-scale trafficking in these two drugs. This paper reviews what is known about drug control programs and considers non-traditional options. The usual array of programs for suppressing drug problems, enforcement, treatment, harm reduction and prevention have been assessed almost exclusively in wealthy nations. Although treatment has been shown to be cost-effective, it is of minimal relevance for reducing the drug problems of nations such as Afghanistan, Colombia, Mexico or Tajikistan, which are primarily harmed by production and trafficking rather than consumption. Efforts to reduce drug production and trafficking have not been subject to systematic evaluation but the best interpretation of the available evidence is that they have had minimal effect on the quantities produced or trafficked. It is reasonable to conclude that international drug control efforts can do more to affect where these drugs are produced rather than the quantity. If that is the case, and given that spreading a specific level of production or trafficking to more rather than fewer nations probably decreases global welfare, it may be appropriate to consider a less aggressive stance to current producers and to make strategic decisions about the location of an industry producing a global bad.

Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2008. 38p.

By Daniel Mejia and Carlos Esteban Posada

The main purpose of this paper is to summarize the information currently available on cocaine production and trafficking. The paper starts by describing the available data on cocaine production and trade, the collection methodologies (if available) used by different sources, the main biases in the data, and the accuracy of different data sources. Next, it states some of the key empirical questions and hypotheses regarding cocaine production and trade and takes a first look at how well the data match these hypotheses. The paper states some of the main puzzles in the cocaine market and studies some of the possible explanations. These puzzles and empirical questions should guide future research on the key determinants of illicit drug production and trafficking. Finally, the paper studies the different policies that producer countries have adopted to fight against cocaine production and the role consumer countries play in the implementation of anti-drug policies.

Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2008. 62p.

By Daniel Mejía and Pascual Restrepo

This paper provides a thorough economic evaluation of the anti-drug policies implemented in Colombia between 2000 and 2006 under the so-called Plan Colombia. The paper develops a game theory model of the war against illegal drugs in producer countries. We explicitly model illegal drug markets, which allows us to account for the feedback effects between policies and market outcomes that are potentially important when evaluating large scale policy interventions such as Plan Colombia. We use available data for the war on cocaine production and trafficking as well as outcomes from the cocaine markets to calibrate the parameters of the model. Using the results from the calibration we estimate important measures of the costs, effectiveness, and efficiency of the war on drugs in Colombia. Finally we carry out simulations in order to assess the impact of increases in the U.S. budget allocated to Plan Colombia, and find that a three-fold increase in the U.S. budget allocated to the war on drugs in Colombia would decrease the amount of cocaine that successfully reaches consumer countries by about 17%.

Bogotá, Colombia: Universidad de los Andes–Facultad de Economía–CEDE, 2008. 60p.

By Juan Camilo Castillo

Experience from the last decade in Colombia and Mexico suggests that violence increases when governments achieve their objective of beheading and fragmenting drug trafficking organizations (DTOs). In this paper I provide a theoretical framework to understand this behavior. Drawing elements from industrial organization, I model DTOs as firms that collude by not attacking each other in order to increase their profits. DTOs always collude when they interact repeatedly; thus, previous analyses focusing on a static Nash equilibrium miss an important part of the dynamics between DTOs. I show that a peaceful equilibrium arises if there are only a few DTOs that care enough about the future. Policies resulting either in a larger number of DTOs or in more impatient leaders increase violence between DTOs without reducing supply. On the other hand, policies that reduce the productivity of DTOs, without directly attacking their leaders and fragmenting them, are more desirable since they can curb supply, although this comes at the cost of increased violence if the elasticity of demand is below a certain threshold. I calculate this threshold, which is a refinement of the value suggested by Becker et al. (2006) for consumer markets.

Bogotá, Colombia: Universidad de los Andes–Facultad de Economía–CEDE2013. 52p.

By Marcel Boyer and Rachidi Kotchoni

Connor and Lande (2006) conducted a survey of cartel overcharge estimates and found an average in the range of 31% to 49%. By examining more sources, Connor (2010b) finds a median of 23.3% for all type of cartels and a mean of 50.4% for successful cartels. However, the data used in these studies are estimates rather than true observations, since the true illegal profits of cartels are rarely observable. Therefore, these data are subject to model error, estimation error and publication bias. A quick glance at the Connor database reveals that the universe of overcharge estimates is asymmetric, heterogenous and contains a number of influential observations. Beside the fact that overcharge estimates are potentially biased, fitting a linear OLS model to the data without providing a careful treatment of the problems raised by the publication bias, outliers, asymmetry, and heterogeneity will necessarily produce distorted results. We conduct a meta-analysis of cartel overcharge estimates in the spirit of Connor and Bolotova (2006), but providing a sound treatment of the matters raised above. We find for cartels with initial overcharge estimates lying between 0% and 50%.a bias-corrected mean overcharge estimate of 13.6% with a median of 13.6% and for all cartels of all types a bias-corrected mean of 17.5% with a median of 14.1%

Paris: Institut de Polytechnic Paris, Département d'Économie de l'École Polytechnique, 2011. 60p.

By Marie-Laure Allain, Marcel Boyer, Rachidi Kotchoni and Jean-Pierre Ponssard

The determination of optimal fines to deter the formation or continuation of cartels is a major objective of competition policy. We provide an analysis of static and dynamic frameworks to characterize the restitution and deterrence properties of fines: cartel stability depends on their ability to prevent deviation by firms, while the benefit of a deviation depends on the fines to be imposed in case of detection by the antitrust authority. We show that the proper consideration of the dynamics of competition has a major impact on the determination of optimal dissuasive fines: our results suggest that a clear majority of fines imposed by the European Commission in recent years meet the deterrence objective.

Paris: Ecole Polytechnique Centre National De La Recherche Scientifique, 2011. 38p.

By Thomas Friis Søgaard, Marie Højlund Bræmer, and Michael Mulbjerg Pedersen

This report provides an analysis of current drug supply models and the related violence and exploitation of vulnerable groups in Denmark. Recent years have seen a growth in criminals’ exploitation of vulnerable groups for drug-related crimes. This development appears to be driven by several structural factors, including increased drug market competition and a proliferation of more labour-intensive supply models. Based on the findings of this study, we identify some priorities for future research to understand the impact of digital developments in retail-level drug distribution on vulnerable individuals and to inform responses to reduce criminal exploitation.

Lisbon: European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA); Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2021. 55p.

By United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)

The report provides a regional analysis of the key trends and emerging developments of the synthetic drugs and NPS market as well as options for response in Latin America and the Caribbean. Over the past years, the synthetics drug market has experienced a massive expansion and diversification in the region and seen a rapid emergence of a wide range of NPS.

The latest developments include an expanding methamphetamine market, growing concerns around the non-medical use of ketamine, the emergence of fentanyl and MDMA manufacture, as well as new “ecstasy” trends such as higher dosed MDMA tablets and new forms of presentation such as crystalline MDMA. Moreover, the report sheds light on the comparatively high prevalence of use of hallucinogens in the region and the high prevalence of use of tranquilizers among women.

Vienna: UNODC, 2021. 56p.

By United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)

The present case digest contains an analysis of cases of cyber organized crime. The digest is global in scope and attempts, to the extent possible, to ensure an equitable representation of cases from different geographical regions and legal systems. On the basis of more than 100 cases from more than 20 jurisdictions, observations are made about the ways in which cyber organized crime is identified in case law and how this illicit activity is investigated, prosecuted and adjudicated across jurisdictions. The case digest examines the structure and organization of cyber organized criminal groups, tools used by perpetrators of cyber organized crime, types of cyber organized crime and procedural issues relating to the investigation, prosecution and adjudication of cyber organized crime cases. The case digest contains summaries of relevant judicial proceedings concerning cyber organized crime, organized according to theme. The ultimate goals of the digest are to identify cases involving cyber organized crime and the manner in which such crime has been investigated, prosecuted and adjudicated in different areas of the world. The digest concludes by identifying challenges to investigating, prosecuting and adjudicating cases involving cyber organized crime, as well as the lessons learned for criminal justice professionals, including some of the challenging aspects of criminal justice responses to such crime.

Vienna: UNODC, 2021.144p.

By Ana Paula Oliveira

Afghanistan experienced a marked rise in violent crimes, including kidnappings and armed robbery in 2021. The reported increase in targeted attacks against civilians in the country, specifically regarding women human rights defenders and media workers, had already raised concerns in the period preceding the Taliban takeover. These events and the changing nature of the killings—from widespread casualties to targeted violence— underscored the need for a nuanced examination of the different ways conflict and crime converge to create conditions that incentivise violent actors and instability. This paper looks at these issues through the lens of illicit market violence in Afghanistan. It explores its potential as a key proxy to project current and future trends of other illicit and criminal market development in the country. The paper suggests a framework for further research to examine the evolution of illicit markets in Afghanistan by using a methodologically sound proxy indicator of such violence. First, it draws on a literature review on violence related to illicit markets and presents the methodology developed by the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC) to research assassinations. Second, the paper undertakes a focused literature review on targeted violence in Afghanistan, focusing particularly on the 2020–2021 period.

Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham, 2022. 22p.

By United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)

Globalization and growing economic interdependence have encouraged and promoted the transformation of crime beyond borders in all parts of the world. Improved communications and information technologies, increased blurring of national borders, greater mobility of people, goods and services across countries, and the emergence of a globalized economy have moved crime further away from its domestic base. The nature of organized crime in the contemporary world then cannot be understood separately from the concept of globalization. In 1998, in recognition of these factors, the Member States of the United Nations decided to established an ad hoc Committee for the purpose of elaborating a comprehensive international Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (TOC). The ad hoc Committee succeeded in drafting four international legal instruments -- the Convention and three Protocols on Trafficking in Persons, Smuggling of Migrants and Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms -- that will facilitate the prevention and combating of transnational organized crime. Through the ratification of these instruments several new legal concepts and mechanisms will be adopted by the State Parties who ratify the Convention. Of importance in this regard, is the criminalizing of participation in the activities of a criminal group itself. Importantly too, the Convention will provide a basic framework of cooperation across a large number of countries in the fight against organized crime. Critical to the implementation and monitoring of the TOC Convention will be the ability to access reliable information on international organized crime trends. Adequate information on ongoing developments from a global perspective may provide a useful marker against which progress can be measured and changes in the nature of organized crime assessed. At the same time, an international effort to collect data on developments in organized crime around the globe would provide a platform for the work of a wide ranging number of individuals and governments who are increasingly adopting more systematic ways of acquiring information on organized criminal groups. Beyond the establishment of an overall measure to assess trends in organized crime, the development of a more comprehensive system of classification and the ongoing collection of data on criminal groups provides a useful tool for both law enforcement officials and prosecutors. Information on various criminal groups serves not only to inform counterparts in other countries what kind of criminal groups are being investigated in specific states, but allows information on the activities of similar groups to be compared.

New York: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2002. 123p.

By Blue Justice

The Large Ocean Nations Forum on Transnational Organised Fisheries Crime was launched at the UN City in Copenhagen on 15 October 2018. The forum was hosted by PescaDOLUS in cooperation with the Faroese Ministry of Fisheries, the Norwegian Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries and the Nordic Council of Ministers. The forum, which gathered more than 80 participants from Large Ocean Nations (LONs) as well as from other countries, intergovernmental organizations and civil society, was opened by the Ministers of Faroe Islands, Palau, and Kiribati alongside high-level participants from the Nordic Council of Ministers and Norway. The establishment of the Forum on Transnational Organised Fisheries Crime built on the Large Ocean Nations Forum on Blue Growth launched in Malta in 2017. The objective of the LON Forum on Fisheries Crime was to facilitate agreement between LON participants on the particular challenges posed by transnational organised fisheries crime to LONs and the importance of cooperatively fighting such crime. Presentations from Fiji, Indonesia, Jamaica, Mauritius, Sao Tome and Principe and Seychelles highlighted the common challenges and opportunities of Large Ocean Nations and the need for cooperative action to address transnational fisheries crime towards fulfilling the Sustainable Development Goals and Blue Growth. Drawing on the content of the speeches, presentations and discussion points at the Forum, suggested ways forward are highlighted at the end of the Report. The launching of the LON Forum on Transnational Organised Fisheries Crime is a concrete first step towards fostering such cooperation, as subsequently reflected in the joint ministerial declaration agreed by the LON government representatives present at the meeting

Oslo: Blue Justice, 2019. 53p.

By United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).

.The global fishing industry is made up of a complex net of activities, actors and authorities spread across multiple countries and jurisdictions. The sheer complexity brings with it regulatory and enforcement challenges, and provides numerous opportunities for criminals to break the law. Corruption strikes at the core of the fight against fisheries crime. It threatens effective regulation and crime prevention at every stage of the fisheries value chain, exposing it to a wide range of risks, from the preparation of forged licences and the underreporting of quantities of caught fish at landing, through to the sale of mislabeled fish, among others. Corruption also undercuts the efforts of law enforcement to investigate and prosecute fisheries crime when it does occur. All other efforts to regulate the fisheries sector and combat fisheries crime will fail unless the disease of corruption is addressed.

Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2019. 66p.

By Eve de Coning

The study posed the questions whether there is transnational organized crime and other criminal activity in the fishing industry and, if so, what the vulnerabilities of the fishing industry are to transnational organized crime or other criminal activity. The research took the form of a six-month desk review of available literature, supplemented by ad hoc consultations and a two-day expert consultation held in Vienna, Austria. Importantly the study did not set out to tarnish the fishing industry. Rather, the study sought to determine whether criminal activities take place within the fishing industry to the detriment of law-abiding fishers, the legitimate fishing industry, local fishing communities, and the general public alike. The study considered the involvement of the fishing industry or the use of fishing vessels in trafficking in persons (Chapter 2); smuggling of migrants (Chapter 3); illicit traffic in drugs (Chapter 4); and other forms of crime such as marine living resource crime, corruption, and piracy and other security related crimes (Chapter 5).

Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2011. 144p.

By Emma Witbooi, Kamal-Deen Ali and Mas Achmad Santosa

Organised crime in the fisheries sector is an often-overlooked barrier to securing a sustainable ocean economy, despite threatening coastal states’ food security, fostering human rights abuses and diverting government revenue to the shadow blue economy. This Blue Paper spotlights the problem and draws from current promising practices for addressing organised crime in the fisheries sector to present practical opportunities for action—globally, regionally and nationally. One of the key challenges in this space is the development of a joint understanding of the problem at hand—shedding light on the pervasive impact of this shadow industry. We feel this Blue Paper provides a solid foundation of experience and best practice that can be used to develop solutions to be implemented immediately in conjunction with sustainable fisheries management strategies.

Washington, DC: World Resource Institute, 2022. 38p.

By Summer Walker, Walter Kemp, Mark Shaw and Tuesday Reitano.

Through stark images and charts, this report gives a graphic illustration of how the global illicit economy has boomed in the past 20 years and how it poses a serious threat to security, development and justice. With so many major challenges in our world today, it may seem that tackling transnational organized crime is a lower priority than addressing climate change, pandemics, inequality or migration. But organized crime is a common denominator to all of these challenges: it enables them, and it profits from them. As a result, organized crime is a driver of unsustainable development. This report is impressionistic. It is designed to show the inter-relationships and interdependence between global mega-trends and the trajectories of organized crime since 2000, the year the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC) was adopted. It is written from the perspective of civil society, drawing on consultations with the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime’s secretariat, its Network of Experts, and recipients of the Global Initiative Resilience Fund, including nine consultations held in five regions. It is based on data that is in the public domain that has been gathered through research and analysis. We hope this report can bring fresh approaches and different perspectives to intergovernmental processes. Furthermore, we hope it can stimulate new thinking and be a catalytic resource for more effective responses to organized crime. We appreciate the opportunities available for us to do this, for example through the review mechanism of the UNTOC Conference of Parties as well as the UN Crime Congress. As this report shows, organized crime is harming so many aspects of life on our planet. Left unchecked, the shadows of the future look even more sinister. We need to change the trajectory. We hope this report can raise awareness and provoke debate. Most importantly, we hope that it can stimulate action to strengthen local resilience and lead to a global strategy against organized crime.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2021. 118p.

Edited by Michael Milklaucic and Jacqueline Brewer

Illicit networks affect everyone in our modern, globalized world. From human trafficking in Eastern Europe to drug smuggling in East Asia, to the illicit arms trade in Africa, to terrorist cells in East Asia and insurgents in the Caucasus, transnational illicit networks have tentacles that reach everywhere. The trade in illegal narcotics is perhaps most worrisome, but of growing concern is the illicit trafficking of counterfeit items, weapons, natural resources, money, cultural property, and even people by shrewd, well-resourced, and nefarious adversaries

Acceleration. Magnification. Diffusion. Entropy. Empowerment. The global environment and the international system are evolving at hypervelocity. A consensus is emerging among policymakers, scholars, and practitioners that recent sweeping developments in information technology, communication, transportation, demographics, and conflict are making global governance more challenging. Some argue these developments have transformed our international system, making it more vulnerable than ever to the predations of terrorists and criminals. Others argue that despite this significant evolution, organized crime, transnational terrorism, and nonstate networks have been endemic if unpleasant features of human society throughout history, that they represent nothing new, and that our traditional means of countering them—primarily conventional law enforcement—are adequate. Even among those who perceive substantial differences in the contemporary manifestations of these persistent maladies, they are viewed as major nuisances not adding up to a significant national or international security threat, much less an existential threat.

Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2013. 304p.

By Jenni Irish-Qhobosheane

Since 2015, South Africa has witnessed the emergence of a new kind of criminality in the form of organized groups targeting the construction sector under the banner of ‘radical economic transformation’. Dubbed the ‘construction mafia’ in the media, these people have organized themselves into groups known as ‘local business forums’ and invaded construction sites across the country, demanding money or a stake in development projects in what can arguably be described as systemic extortion. While no country is immune to systemic extortion from criminal groups, the extent and impact of the activity depend on the abilities of state governance to address extortion economies as they arise. In South Africa, the activities of the so-called construction mafia have been fuelled by the weak response from the state, allowing them to expand their activities. In 2019, at least 183 infrastructure and construction projects worth more that R63 billion had been affected by these disruptions across the country. Since then, invasions have continued at construction sites across South Africa. In this context, this report by the GI-TOC focuses on understanding how these groups, widely referred to as the construction mafia, operate, their involvement in systemic extortion, and the long-term implications for the construction industry in South Africa and the country as a whole.

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2022. 51p.