by Julia Stanyard

The development of transport infrastructure boosts trade and stimulates economic growth. However, this infrastructure can also benefit criminal networks, which use air transport to traffic illicit goods such as drugs, wildlife and gold. Their activities are disguised from regulatory bodies, and many act in collusion with corrupt officials. However, this can be countered by implementing effective oversight measures. This is crucial considering the substantial expansion of African air traffic in recent years, forecasts that Africa will continue to be one of the fastest-growing regions in the world for aviation, and the challenges that the aviation sector globally is facing due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

ENACT Africa, 2023. 18p.

By INTERPOL and ENACT Africa

Across the globe, the proliferation of new armed groups (including rebels, militias, criminal groups and gangs) has made conflict prevention and resolution even more complex . Armed groups are diversifying their revenues, which are increasingly based on organized crime activities . Organized Crime Groups (OCGs) often benefit from the turmoil of armed conflicts and violence. They can engage in violence to protect their illicit business, undermining national economic development and security. Furthermore, OCGs can team up with armed groups to access and control natural resources, competing with the state to provide public goods or even protection to their community. Different situations of violent conflict affect countries in the Eastern African region. Crime dynamics that emerge from instability in one country of the region can spill over into a neighbouring country, posing a threat to regional peace and security. The emergence of hybrid criminal groups engaged in transnational organized crime and in armed conflict most likely represents a relevant dimension of contemporary conflict in Eastern Africa. Yet, the knowledge on the multiple ways in which OCGs prey, or even amplify, local conflicts for their own benefit remains limited. In many instances, the scale of criminal activities in Eastern Africa contributes to an increase in the risk of conflict or in its prolongation. Organized crime thrives in conflict and other situations of violence in the region when goods and supplies are scarce, filling the demand often in association with armed groups. In some cases, revenue from criminal activities enables armed groups to finance their activities. The illicit circulation of weapons in the region from and into conflict-affected settings fuels violence and criminal activities. Information suggests that in some occasions, armed groups and OCGs collude to smuggle goods, migrants and drugs through the region and beyond. Moreover, the illicit extraction, control and taxation of natural resources in the region is often a source of revenue for armed groups and often links them with criminal actors. Information shows that livestock theft, or cattle rustling, poses a serious threat to many countries in the region and fuels the increase in the demand for small arms and light weapons in two aspects: for fighters to steal cattle and for ranchers to protect their livestock against such attacks. Higher levels of violence have been reported in cattle rustling cases affecting local economies and security. Organized violence for profit continues to affect Eastern Africa. Kidnapping for ransom, looting, threats and sexual gender-based violence are among the most reported incidents in the region. The driving factors for those crimes are sometimes difficult to discern and involve a combination of reasons such as economic gain, firearms sourcing (notably for cases of looting security forces), intention to control a community or territory. Illicit financial flows, and particularly, illicit taxation, allow OCGs and armed groups to generate revenue through commodity taxes, by imposing taxes on the community to move through certain areas or to run their business

Lyon, France: INTERPOL, 2021. 32p

By INTERPOL and ENACT Africa

In the last two decades the percentage of imprisoned women offenders is growing globally, at a faster rate than imprisoned male offenders. 1 Such global increase raises the question as to whether the same can be observed on the African continent . Information suggests that transnational organized crime (TOC) affects African women and girls differently than African men and boys. It is crucial to learn how and if men and women behave differently in TOC in Africa in order to uncover the main drivers of these differences and adapt policing methodology accordingly. While gendered data continues to be insufficiently reported upon by law enforcement authorities in Africa, the assessment suggests that African law enforcement authorities are possibly under -investigating and under -estimating the involvement of African women in TOC. African law enforcement authorities likely continue to perceive them as victims or accomplices only. They are possibly rarely seen as the criminals themselves and less so as being the organizers, leaders, traffickers or recruiters. This gap in police investigations is indeed known to be exploited to the benefit of organized crime as women are more likely to go under the radar . The assessment draws attention to the common features of African female offenders based on available data to share insights and encourage police forces to reconsider their approach.

Lyon, France: INTERPOL, 2021. 32p.

By The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime

The monitor draws on information provided by field researchers working in gang-affected communities of the Western Cape. This includes interviews with current and former gang members, civil society and members of the criminal justice system.

Over the past three months, our team has monitored and recorded almost a thousand instances of gang-related violence, which are unpacked here to provide a picture of some emerging trends in gang behaviour. The key findings analyzed here have been selected, as they would appear to be emblematic of broader trends in gang social dynamics, and because they have been under-reported elsewhere, or may have repercussions for how we understand developments in Western Cape gang violence.

In this first issue of the Gang Monitor, we also include a summary of key dynamics to watch, which draws on a longer-term view of how the gang landscape has changed in recent years. The analysis is based on the GI-TOC’s research over several years identifying how Western Cape gang dynamics have developed and to help us understand how they may continue to in future.

This quarter has been characterized by increased infighting between splinter groups within gangs. Conflict between Americans groups in Hanover Park provides a key example. The Fancy Boys are on an aggressive campaign to expand territorial control, including in Mitchells Plain and Manenberg. Pagad G-Force has become more vocal and visible in anti-gang campaigning. A shooting in Hanover Park may indicate that the group is taking a more militant stance. There has been an increase in young child gang recruits forming breakaway groups, as exemplified by KEY FINDINGS

ISSUE No. 1 | QUARTERLY OCTOBER 2023. Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime, 2023. 8p.

By Shehryar Fazli

This project addresses the complex issue of drug production in Afghanistan, which continues to fuel regional and global narcotics trade. Despite the Taliban's 2022 ban on poppy cultivation and narcotics trade, trafficking remains a major concern. The subsequent crackdown in 2023 resulted in reduced cultivation in specific provinces, but the ban's sustainability is uncertain due to poppy's significance in Afghanistan's rural economy and the fragile economic situation.

The project extends its focus to the Golden Crescent region, where Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran intersect, serving as a prominent drug smuggling hub. Pakistan and Iran, pivotal to the southern drug trafficking route, have consistently accounted for over 90% of global opium seizures since 2002. Central Asia, particularly Tajikistan, presents counter-narcotics challenges in the northern drug route to Russia and Europe.

Challenging the notion that state capacity alone can address the drug trade, the project advocates for a multifaceted approach, emphasising international cooperation beyond law enforcement. The punitive regimes in Pakistan, Iran, and Tajikistan, coupled with corruption, inadvertently protect high-level traffickers. In Afghanistan, the project raises the question of whether neighboring or Western governments are willing to end Kabul's isolation, providing economic assistance to reduce dependence on poppy cultivation. However, prospects are limited due to regressive Taliban policies.

The proposed counter-narcotics strategy expands beyond law enforcement, including building domestic public pressure for an accountable regime. This involves partnerships with local organisations, rehabilitation centers, health and education NGOs, and human rights groups. The goal is to foster domestic political ownership and public demand for humane and accountable national counter-narcotics policies. The project argues against relying solely on coercive state organs, offering a more comprehensive and sustainable solution to the core challenges posed by drug trafficking.

SOC ACE Research Paper 25. University of Birmingham. Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham, 2023. 30p.

By John Collins and Ian tennant

This paper charts the history of Afghanistan’s interaction with the international drug control system and the complex relationship between national–international policy formation. It tells the story of Afghanistan’s relationship with and impact on evolving global drug regulations from the birth of the League of Nations drug control system through the 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs and up to the present day. It draws on primary documentation from US and British archives and an extensive review of secondary literature, as well as a series of interviews conducted for the purposes of this paper. It argues for a more nuanced historical awareness of Afghanistan’s role within multilateral drug control as a way to understand its roles in the creation of the modern licit drug economy and its continued role in the modern illicit drug economy. Further, it argues that there is a need to engage broader society in discussions, to ensure more continuity is built into the system—as relationships built with the old regime in Afghanistan have collapsed. It calls for re-centring international capacity-building efforts on community-centred approaches, not simply law enforcement and traditional alternative development (AD) programmes. Moving away from the former enforcementfocused activities also reduces the risks of human rights violations.

SOC ACE Research Paper No. 6 . Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham, 2022. 34p.

By Maximilian Meyer, Jean N. Westenberg , Kerry L. Jang , Fiona Choi , Stefanie Schreiter , Nickie Mathew , Conor King, Undine. Lang , Marc Vogel and R. Michael Krausz

Understanding drug market dynamics and their underlying driving factors is paramount to developing effective responses to the overdose crisis in North America. This paper summarises the distinct drug market trends observed locally and internationally over the past decade to extrapolate future drug market trajectories. The emergence of fentanyl on North American street markets from 2014 onwards led to a shift of street drug use patterns. Previously perceived as contaminants, novel synthetic opioids became the drugs of choice and a trend towards higher potency was observed across various substance classes. The diversification of distribution strategies as well as the regionalisation and industrialisation of production followed basic economic principles that were heavily influenced by prosecution and policy makers. Particularly, the trend towards higher potency is likely most indicative of what to expect from future illicit drug market developments. Nitazenes and fentanyl-analogues, several times more potent than fentanyl itself, are increasingly detected in toxicological testing and have the potential of becoming the drugs of choice in the future. The dynamic of drug import and local production is less clear and influenced by a multitude of factors like precursor availability, know-how, infrastructure, and the success of local drug enforcement strategies. Drug market dynamics and the current trajectory towards ultrapotent opioids need to be recognised by legislation, enforcement, and the health care system to prepare effective responses. Without significant improvements in treatment access, the implementation of preventative approaches and early warning systems, the mortality rate will continue to increase. Furthermore, there is no mechanism in place preventing the currently North American focused overdose crisis to spread to other parts of the globe, particularly Europe. A system of oversight, research, and treatment is needed to address mortality rates of historic proportions and prevent further harm.

International Journal of Mental Health Systems (2023) 17:36

By Jonathan P. Caulkins and Keith Humphreys

If, in 2015, someone had told you that the number of overdose deaths caused solely by the two most historically lethal drugs—heroin and cocaine—would drop by more than half by 2021, you would likely have assumed that the overdose crisis in the U.S. was finally coming to an end. Instead, drug overdose deaths soared to more than 100,000 per year due to the rise of synthetic drugs, a truly disruptive innovation with which U.S. drug policy is only beginning to grapple.

To clarify the key term: synthetic drugs are substances that can be produced in a lab and are not from plant-derived components. In Canadian and U.S. illegal opioid markets, synthetic fentanyl and its analogues are outcompeting heroin, which is made from the poppy plant. These synthetics claimed the lives of more than 70,000 Americans in 2021 (out of 106,699 total drug-involved overdose deaths, or 66%), either by themselves or in combination with other drugs.[1] Methamphetamine, another synthetic, has attained a larger share of the stimulant market than cocaine, which is made from coca leaves.[2] The rapid expansion of synthetic tranquilizers—such as xylazine and benzodiazepines—has spread addiction and death, particularly when these drugs are used in combination with opioids. The U.S. is also facing a bevy of so-called new psychoactive substances (NPS), such as MDMA and mephedrone, that collectively attract more users than do older, “minor” drugs such as LSD, GHB, and PCP.

Drug policy analysts, including the authors of this brief, are swamped with requests from desperate policymakers, clinicians, parents, and activists to find solutions to the problem of synthetic drugs. This brief comprises our answer. Unfortunately, it is not particularly upbeat. All four traditional pillars of drug policy—enforcement, treatment, harm reduction, and prevention—have limits, and there is no simple solution for the synthetic drug market. Nonetheless, the nation can do some things better and should stop doing other things that are harmful. Policymakers must:

• Maintain prohibition of the production and sale of synthetic drugs

• Expect law enforcement to shrink market-related harms, such as violence, but not necessarily to shrink the supply of the drugs themselves

• Keep expanding medication-assisted treatment and access to naloxone

• Embrace the shunning of illegal drugs as a cultural norm

• Be generous toward those who are struggling, including those suffering from drug addiction

Unfortunately, the widespread availability of potentially lethal temptations in the U.S. may be the new normal, and overdose deaths will continue to remain higher than historical norms. Such realism is depressing but honest, and honesty is the best foundation for policy.

New York: Manhattan Institute, 2023. 13p.

By Kingsley Madueke | Lawan Danjuma Adamu Katja Lindskov Jacobsen | Lucia Bird

Political violence is a major obstacle to democratic processes worldwide. Violence perpetrated in pursuit of electoral victory has widespread consequences: the destruction of lives and property, the displacement of people, undermining the credibility of the electoral process, and the erosion of public trust in democratic institutions.1 In countries throughout Africa, including Nigeria, Kenya, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Sierra Leone, gangs play a pivotal role in political violence. When they are not perpetrating political violence, the same gangs often engage in a range of illicit markets.2 Yet, so far, analyses have not adequately scrutinized the link between gangs, political violence and illicit markets, predominantly understanding them as separate phenomena.3 The intersection between them has been understated, with important implications for response strategies. Background Since Nigeria’s return to democracy in 1999, criminal gangs have played an increasingly pivotal role in driving political violence in the country. These criminal actors engage in a broad spectrum of activities, including intimidation of voters and political opponents, assassinations and disruption of political rallies on behalf of political actors. Gangs are remunerated in cash, material gifts and other favours from political actors, including state appointments and protection. Despite the deployment of security forces, election periods in Nigeria have long been characterized by high levels of violence – the 2023 elections were no exception.4 Although data collated regarding political violence in Nigeria broadly demonstrates a decrease in lives lost compared to previous electoral cycles, the number of violent incidents recorded has grown. Furthermore, the research presented in this report underscores that number of incidents of political violence fails to capture the full impact of political violence in determining Nigeria’s most recent political outcomes. Disenfranchisement was a clear consequence of covert forms of threat and intimidation: the 2023 elections saw the lowest voter turnout in Nigeria’s history, with President Bola Tinubu’s mandate effectively granted by less than 10% of Nigeria’s electorate. Though electoral violence is a countrywide concern in Nigeria, Kano in the north and Rivers in the south are repeatedly among the states hit hardest by political violence. In 2023 both became flashpoints for election violence.5 Both states are highly politically competitive and have a strong presence of criminal gangs with links to politicians, which play a leading role in electoral violence. The long history of election violence, coupled with the incidents of attacks and clashes leading up to and during the 2023 elections, had a major impact on voter turnout, the voting process and, consequently, the outcome of the elections in these areas Criminal gangs are not the only actors that have been associated with violence in Nigeria. For example, different groups, including violent extremist organizations such as Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) and Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'adati wal-Jihad (JAS), armed bandits in the north, as well as secessionists such as the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) in the south-east have allegedly been involved in violence in different parts of the country. However, this report focuses on criminal gangs because they have featured more prominently in election-related violence and they have comparatively deeper roots in the country’s social and political landscape in the states under study. As case studies, the situations in Kano and Rivers demonstrate that political violence in Nigeria cannot be dismissed as a phenomenon limited to a particular geography or political party. The states are positioned in different regions, beset by different criminal and conflict dynamics, and have contrasting histories of political affiliation. Yet the centrality of political violence – and the pivotal interlinkages between crime and politics it reveals – is a common thread corroding democratic processes across both states, and Nigeria as a whole. In Kano and Rivers, the current dynamics of political violence emerged when political parties contracted elements of pre-existing groups (hunters’ associations and cult groups, respectively) to attack opponents, voters and election officials. The contracted groups benefited from this political alignment, and over time there emerged a mutually beneficial ecosystem between gangs and politicians. This ecosystem – the exact contours of which are shaped by complex local factors – is highly damaging for the Nigeria’s democracy. The two case studies presented in this report attempt to untangle this complex ecosystem and explore key questions: did gangs or political violence emerge first? What happens to gangs on the losing side of the political contest? Furthermore, elections are cyclical, and political gangs seem poised to service the demands of their political contractors at each four-year interlude. But what do these gangs do in the interim? This question – what do political thugs do when they are not doing political violence?6 – underpinned this research. Criminal markets provided the answer. This report argues that outside of election cycles, criminal gangs involved in political violence are engaged in a range of illicit markets for their sustainability and resilience. The link between political violence and illicit markets is a significant concern as it provides criminal actors with political cover and access to the means to perpetrate further acts of violence and criminality. Exploring the implications of such intersections for politics and governance, and identifying potential ways to disrupt such links, is therefore urgently required.

Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2023. 47p.

By United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Observatory on Smuggling of Migrants.

Our new snapshot, produced in the context of a partnership with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Observatory on Smuggling of Migrants, examines respondents’ reasons for leaving their country of origin, access to smuggling services, and protection incidents experienced en route, as well as the involvement of state officials in smuggling between Cambodia-Thailand and Lao PDR-Thailand.

Key findings include:

• Almost all Cambodian respondents (96%) and most Laotian respondents (84%) used smugglers to facilitate their migration to Thailand.

• Smuggling dynamics vary significantly between Cambodian and Laotian respondents: Cambodians primarily used smugglers due to a lack of knowledge of alternatives (79%), while most Laotians were motivated by the perception that using smugglers would be easier (63%).

• Cambodian respondents more often reported the involvement of state officials in smuggling (63%) than Laotian respondents (13%).

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Observatory on Smuggling of Migrants. 2023, 12p.

By Nagesh N. Borse, June Cha, Christina G. Chase, Raashi Gaur, et al.

Substandard and falsified medical products such as vaccines and medicines are a serious and growing global health issue1 . Other health products such as diagnostic kits and infection preventatives, including but not limited to masks and hand sanitizers, are also found on the market in substandard and falsified versions, as discussed below. In this article, the authors refer to all of these products as substandard and falsified health products (SFHP).* COVID-19, like previous pandemics, has increased the vulnerability of global supply chains to SFHP. This paper explores the basics of SFHP, reviews what we have learned from past pandemics, and offers a perspective on existing and needed tools to protect health products, and the people who use them, from the threat of SFHP.

Washington, DC: USP, 2021. 11p.

By The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

Restrictions on movement imposed by govern- ments across the world due to the COVID-19 pandemic have had an impact on the trafficking of substandard and falsified medical products. Interpol and the World Customs Organization (WCO) reported that seizures of substandard and falsified medical products, including person- al protective equipment (PPE), increased for the first time in March 2020. The emergence of trafficking in PPE signals a significant shift in organized criminal group behaviour that is directly attributable to the COVID-19 pandemic, which has brought huge demand for medical products such as PPE over a relatively short period of time. It is foreseeable that, with the evolution of COVID-19 and developments in medicinal treatments and/or the repurposing of existing medicines, criminal behaviour will shift from trafficking in PPE to the development and delivery of a COVID-19 vaccine. Furthermore, cyberattacks on critical infrastructure involved in addressing the pandemic are likely to continue in the form of online scams aimed at health procurement authorities. Challenges in pandemic preparedness, ranging from weak regulatory and legal frameworks to the prevention of the manufacturing and trafficking of substandard and falsified products and cyber security shortcomings, were evident before COVID-19, but the pandemic has exacerbated them and it will be difficult to make significant improvements in the immediate short term. The report concludes that crime targeting COVID-19 medical products will become more focused with significantly greater risks to pub- lic health as the containment phase of the pan- demic passes to the treatment and prevention stages.

Vienna: UNODC Research and Trend Analysis Branch. 2020. 31p

ByThe Financial Action Task Force

he COVID-19 pandemic has led to unprecedented global challenges, human suffering and economic disruption. It has also led to an increase in COVID-19-related crimes, including fraud, cybercrime, misdirection or exploitation of government funds or international financial assistance, which is creating new sources of proceeds for illicit actors. Using information provided to the members of the FATF Global Network on 7 and 23 April, this paper identifies challenges, good practices and policy responses to new money laundering and terrorist financing threats and vulnerabilities arising from the COVID-19 crisis.

As the world is focusing on responding to the COVID-19 pandemic, it is impacting on the ability of government and the private sector to implement anti-money laundering and counter terrorist financing (AML/CFT) obligations in areas including supervision, regulation and policy reform, suspicious transaction reporting and international cooperation. This could lead to emerging risks and vulnerabilities that could result in criminals finding ways to:

• Bypass customer due diligence measures;

• Increase misuse of online financial services and virtual assets to move and conceal illicit funds;

• Exploit economic stimulus measures and insolvency schemes as a means for natural and legal persons to conceal and launder illicit proceeds;

• Increase use of the unregulated financial sector, creating additional opportunities for criminals to launder illicit funds;

• Misuse and misappropriation of domestic and international financial aid and emergency funding;

• Exploit COVID-19 and the associated economic downturn to move into new cash-intensive and high-liquidity lines of business in developing countries.

AML/CFT policy responses can help support the swift and effective implementation of measures to respond to COVID-19, while managing new risks and vulnerabilities. This paper provides examples of such responses, which include:

• Domestic coordination to assess the impact of COVID-19 on AML/CFT risks and systems;

• Strengthened communication with the private sector;

• Encouraging the full use of a risk-based approach to customer due diligence;

• Supporting electronic and digital payment options.

Paris: FATF, 2020. 34p.

By The Financial Action Task Force (FATF)

The COVID-19 pandemic has led to unprecedented global challenges, human suffering and economic hardship. The pandemic has also spawned a range of COVID-19-related crimes, which are creating new sources of income for criminal networks. In May, the FATF highlighted the COVID-19-related money laundering and terrorist financing risks and policy responses.

Today, the FATF releases an Update-COVID-19-Related-Money-Laundering-and-Terrorist-Financing-Risks

The paper confirms the concerns expressed by the FATF in May, including:

• Changing financial behaviours - especially significant increases in online purchases due to widespread lockdowns and temporary closures of most physical bank branches, with services transitioning online.

• Increased financial volatility and economic contraction - largely caused by the losses of millions of jobs, closures of thousands of companies and a looming global economic crisis.

To respond to these evolving risks, authorities and the private sector need to take a risk-based approach, as required by the FATF Standards. This means mitigating the money laundering and terrorist financing risks without disrupting essential and legitimate financial services and without driving financial activities towards unregulated service providers.

Supervisors should also clearly communicate about the national risk situations and regulatory expectations. There is no one-size-fits-all approach. However, the FATF’s report on risks and policy responses provides guidance on how jurisdictions should address these issues.

Paris: FATF, 2020. 34;p.

By Marie Nougier, Adrià Cots Fernández & Dania Putri

April 2021 marks the five-year anniversary of the 2016 United Nations General Assembly Special Session (UNGASS) on drugs. This report aims to take stock of progress made on the implementation of the operational recommendations included in the UNGASS Outcome Document. Using desk-based research, and drawing on data and analysis from UN reports, academia, civil society and the community, the report focuses on six critical areas: public health, development, human rights, civil society engagement, UN agency collaboration and cooperation, and drug policy evaluation. While some progress has been undeniably made, the research gathered in this report shows that in the last five years the gap between policy commitments on paper and meaningful change on the ground has continued to widen.

London: International Drug Policy Consortium, 2021. 115p.

By Vanda Felbab-Brown

Colombia’s counternarcotics policy choices have profound impact on consolidating peace in the wake of the 2016 peace deal with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia — People’s Army (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia — Ejército del Pueblo, FARC) and on the building of an effective state. Strategies of forced or voluntary eradication of coca crops have proven ineffective. As evidence from around the world shows, a long-term comprehensive effort to promote alternative livelihoods for coca growers — integrated into rural development and supported by well-designed interdiction efforts, with eradication delayed until these alternative livelihoods are generating sustainable income — has the best prospects for producing peace and a capable state and for reducing drug production.

To achieve sustainable and robust reduction of illicit crop cultivation, Colombia must thus expand its timeline of drug policy and state-building intervention well beyond 15 years. To achieve any viable transformative effects, it will also have to concentrate resources to selected zones of strategic intervention and gradually connect them and expand them to encompass larger areas in state intervention efforts.

The alternative livelihoods approach requires a concerted effort to build international support, particularly with the United States. It also requires countering the objections of Colombia’s political right. Arguments can be framed around the ineffective and counterproductive outcomes of forced eradication, the demonstrated benefits of comprehensive alternatives livelihood combined with well-designed interdiction to reduce the power of criminal groups, and other counternarcotics priorities in the United States.

A zero-coca conceptualization that insists on eradication first and conditions development aid on prior eradication of coca jeopardizes peace-building and statebuilding. In Colombia and elsewhere in the world, it has consistently failed to produce a sustainable reduction of coca cultivation. Forced eradication undermines the peace deal with the FARC and the broader legitimacy and presence of the state by jeopardizing the state’s ability to establish meaningful presence in areas formerly dominated by nonstate armed groups and radicalizing communities and cocalero (coca cultivator) movements. Aerial spraying will only compound these problems; drones will not redress the negative political effects, even if somewhat increasing the precision of spraying.

Washington, DC: Brookings Foreign Policy , 2020. 30p.

By Enrico Lucca, et al.

In the wake of the Nazi regime’s policies, European Jewish cultural property was dispersed, dislocated, and destroyed. Books, manuscripts, and artworks were either taken by their fleeing owners and were transferred to different places worldwide, or they fell prey to systematic looting and destruction under German occupation. Until today, a significant amount of items can be found in private and public collections in Germany as well as abroad with an unclear or disputed provenance. Contested Heritage. Jewish Cultural Property after 1945 illuminates the political and cultural implications of Jewish cultural property looted and displaced during the Holocaust. The volume includes seventeen essays, accompanied by newly discovered archival material and illustrations, which address a wide range of topics: from the shifting meaning and character of the objects themselves, the so-called object biographies, their restitution processes after 1945, conflicting ideas about their appropriate location, political interests in their preservation, actors and networks involved in salvage operations, to questions of intellectual and cultural transfer processes revolving around the moving objects and their literary resonances. Thus, it offers a fascinating insight into lesser-known dimensions of the aftermath of the Holocaust and the history of Jews in postwar Europe.

Göttingen : Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, [2020]

By Jos van Beurden

The discussion about objects, human remains and archives from former colonial territories is becoming increasingly heated. Over the centuries, a multitude of items – including a cannon of the King of Kandy, power-objects from DR Congo, Benin bronzes, Javanese temple statues, M.ori heads and strategic documents – has ended up in museums and private collections in Belgium and the Netherlands by improper means. Since gaining independence, former colonies have been calling for the return of their lost heritage. As continued possession of these objects only grows more uncomfortable, governments and museums must decide what to do. How did these objects get here? Are they all looted, and how can we find out? How does restitution work in practice? Are there any appealing examples? How do other former colonial powers deal with restitution? Do former colonies trust their intentions? The answers to these questions are far from unambiguous, but indispensable for a balanced discussion.

Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2022. 249p.

By Jos van Beurden

This pioneering study charts the one-way traffic of cultural and historical objects during five centuries of European colonialism. It presents abundant examples of disappeared colonial objects and systematises these into war booty, confiscations by missionaries and contestable acquisitions by private persons and other categories. Former colonies consider this as a historical injustice that has not been undone. Former colonial powers have kept most of the objects in their custody. In the 1970s the Netherlands and Belgium returned objects to their former colonies Indonesia and DR Congo; but their number was considerably smaller than what had been asked for. Nigeria’s requests for the return of some Benin objects, confiscated by British soldiers in 1897, are rejected. As there is no consensus on how to deal with colonial objects, disputes about other categories of contestable objects are analysed. For Nazi-looted art-works, the 1998 Washington Conference Principles have been widely accepted. Although non-binding, they promote fair and just solutions and help people to reclaim art works that they lost involuntarily. To promote solutions for colonial objects, Principles for Dealing with Colonial Cultural and Historical Objects are presented, based on the 1998 Washington Conference Principles on Nazi-Confiscated Art. They are part of a model to facilitate mediation in disputes about them. Europe, the former colonisers, should do more pro-active provenance research into the acquisitions from the colonial era, both in public institutions and private collections.

Leiden: Sidestone Press Dissertations, 2017. 206[p.

By European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction and Europol

EU Drug Market: Amphetamine describes the European amphetamine market from production and trafficking, to distribution and use. It details the processes, materials and actors involved at different stages and levels of the market. Taking a threat assessment approach, the module identifies key issues and makes recommendations for action at EU and Member State level.

Amphetamine is the most common synthetic stimulant drug available on the European drug market and it competes with cocaine and a range of new psychoactive substances for a share of the profitable European Union (EU) stimulant drug market. The prevalence of amphetamine use is higher than methamphetamine in most EU Member States, with notable exceptions, such as Czechia and Slovakia. Illicit amphetamine products mostly consist of powders or pastes, usually mixed with other ingredients, such as lactose, dextrose or caffeine, but tablets containing amphetamine are also available. The estimated annual value of the retail market for amphetamine in the EU is at least EUR 1.1 billion, with a range of EUR 0.9 billion to EUR 1.4 billion.

The demand for amphetamine in the EU is met by European production concentrated largely in the Netherlands and Belgium, where production is complex, large-scale and based on the drug precursor BMK. BMK has some limited use in industry and can be diverted from legitimate sources or smuggled into the EU, but more frequently it is made from chemicals known as designer precursors imported from China. Some of the amphetamine produced in the EU is used to produce captagon tablets, which are mainly trafficked to consumer markets in the Middle East

Lisbon, Portugal: European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction and Europol, 2023. 8p.