By Anine Kriegler

Cannabis legalization has the potential to weaken organized crime, but it can just as easily strengthen it unless a balance is found between restriction and liberalization, coordinated across both the supply and demand sides of the market. South Africa’s current cannabis policy lacks coherence, with reforms driven more by legal challenges than by strategic policymaking, posing challenges in effectively countering organized crime.

This paper summarizes the history and status of cannabis decriminalization in South Africa and draws on a review of literature to identify a key set of variables that determine the impact of legalization on organized crime: the type and degree of restrictiveness of the new regulations; various cultural, socio-economic, and political factors; features of the criminal justice system; and the structure and nature of criminal organization in the illegal cannabis market.

Reflections are provided on what these suggest about the likely impact of South African cannabis legalization on organized crime, and potential lessons and recommendations are proposed for effective policy reform in South Africa, as well as guidance for similar decision-making in other contexts.

Effective reform requires integrating marginalized communities and black-market participants into the legal market, along with considerations for managing legal supply, strategic enforcement against criminal gangs, and public health education to ensure a comprehensive approach to reducing organized crime. A phased implementation of regulatory frameworks, ongoing monitoring, and investment in data collection are essential to assess and optimize the impact of legalization on organized crime. Geneva: SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime , 2024. 29p.

By Pascal Tanguay

Elections in 2023 have brought a new government to power, headed by Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin, who declared in late September that his government intends to achieve in the next six months a partial reversal of the reforms, recriminalizing recreational use and leaving the medical market as the sole legal arena.

Through a methodical data collection process involving key informant interviews and literature reviews, this report sheds light on the substantial impacts of such policy changes, especially on the illicit markets and organized crime networks. Informed by these insights, the GI-TOC has formulated preliminary policy recommendations to secure a resilient Thai cannabis market that is as balanced as it is sustainable.

Geneva, SWIT: The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC),  2024. 34p.

By Zenobia Ismail and Robin Richards

State capture occurs when a small number of elites in the public and private sectors collude to modify rules, policies and legislation for their own benefit at the expense of the public interest. The term emerged in the 1990s to describe relations between the state and the private sector in Eastern European states that were transitioning away from communism. In South Africa, state capture became a prominent topic in the media in 2016 following widespread allegations that several state-owned enterprises and other agencies, including South African Airways, Electricity Supply Commission of South Africa (ESKOM), South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC), Denel (arms manufacturer), South African Revenue Service (SARS) and the State Security Agency, were “captured” by individuals with close ties to the then president of South Africa, Jacob Zuma.

The literature on state capture tends to focus on the close relations and exchange of favours among key actors in the public and private sectors. It does not provide detailed accounts of how institutions are captured or the consequences of this for the functioning of the institution. In order to deepen the evidence on state capture, this study provides a detailed account of the impact of state capture on the capacity of one state agency, SARS. The research examines the capacity of SARS to detect, investigate and prevent tax and financial crime and how this changed as a result of state capture.

There were three key components of the so-called capture of SARS:

• Infiltration of the organisation by new employees aligned to politicians associated with state capture. This included Tom Moyane, appointed by Zuma as the new Commissioner of SARS in 2014;

• Allegations in the media which cast doubt on the integrity of the institution and its leaders. These included aspersions regarding an alleged ‘rogue unit’ in SARS which exceeded its legislative authority to investigate tax and financial crimes. These accusations undermined the integrity of some senior managers at SARS and enabled them to be suspended pending investigation;

• Organisational change and staff purges that further weakened the institution. Moyane, with the help of the local office of the consulting firm Bain International, introduced a sweeping restructuring of SARS. During the restructuring process, key units that were responsible for detecting and investigating financial crimes pertaining to the illicit economy were disbanded. There were staff purges and an organisational climate of intimidation, which contributed to widespread resignations. Consequently, SARS lost much of its human capacity to detect and investigate tax and financial crimes. Likewise, information technology systems that were used to detect or investigate tax or financial crimes were dismantled or altered under the guise of improvement.

This study contributes to the literature on state capture by providing evidence of the detrimental impact of state capture on institutions and the public interest. It suggests that the lack of similar detailed case studies may lead to an underestimation of the negative impact of state capture for institutions in the public sphere. The study illuminates the unintended consequences of state capture on institutions. The integrity of SARS as the receiver of revenue has been tarnished; this is expected to lead to taxpayer apathy and a decline in direct and indirect tax revenue. This prediction does not bode well for national development which is a critical function of the South African state. The study suggests that state capture will undermine economic development in South Africa.

SOC ACE Research Paper No. 12. Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham, 2023. 42p.

By Liam O’Shea, Gonzalo Saiz & Alexia Anna Hack (RUSI); and Olivia Allison (Independent).

The research highlights the correlation between a third country’s support for or opposition to sanctions and the extent of its geopolitical alignment with senders or targets. It finds that SEA is more likely when a third country is economically reliant on the target country, has interests in engaging in SEA and has the trade and commercial capacities to do so – particularly in professional advisory, financial services, shipping and logistics sectors. In these cases, there is likely to be a significant role for a range of private commercial actors within these sectors with economic interests in engaging in SEA. This suggests that policymakers combatting SEA should prioritise economies reliant on these sectors and promote improved sector regulation and enforcement measures.

More broadly, the research suggests that focusing on the role of third countries in SEA by industry sector, rather than just by country, may help to identify more tailored countermeasures. This approach, and the specific nuances and features of particular types of SEA, enables more focused follow-on analysis and potentially more targeted policy responses.

The report examines thirteen third countries (Armenia, Cyprus, Czechia, Georgia, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Malta, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, South Africa, Spain, Türkiye and the UAE), involved in SEA relating to sanctions imposed on Russia since the Ukraine invasion. It draws from literature, data analysis of media reports, blogs, forums and other open-source information as well as trade and shipping data, spanning from February 2022 to February 2023.

Sanctions are an important tool for exerting influence internationally yet understanding of the impact of sanctions evasion or avoidance (SEA) and third-country involvement remains limited. In this study, third countries are defined as distinct from ‘senders’ and ‘targets’ of sanctions regimes and aims to shed light on their role in SEA.

SOC ACE Research Paper No 21. Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham, 2023. 35p.

By: Dr Erica Marat (NDU) and Dr Alexander Kupatadze (KCL).

This paper examines the practices used to evade sanctions imposed on Russia after its invasion of Ukraine in 2022, focusing on the import–export operations of Russia, Belarus, Georgia, and Kazakhstan. The research finds that sanctions have not cut supplies to Russia but have instead empowered informal trade networks and intermediaries. Georgia and Kazakhstan have indirectly benefited from the increased transiting trade; however, the impact on the shadow economy and traditional organised crime has been minimal because sanctions-busting is not illegal in these countries. In the aftermath of Russia’s invasion in Ukraine, a conspicuous surge in trade anomalies and import- and export-related red flags has been observed. In many instances, these irregularities can be definitively attributed to strategies employed to circumvent sanctions. The Western focus has been on restricting the re-exports of sanctioned goods to undermine Russia’s military apparatus. However, third-party states, such as Georgia and Kazakhstan, play a significant role in enabling Russia to sustain its international trade activities, yielding substantial financial gains for the country’s military expenditure.

Our research underscores the complexity and challenges of enforcing international sanctions and preventing sanctions evasion. It shows that the sanctions have not been as effective as hoped in cutting off Russia from the global economy, and that Russia has been able to find ways to circumvent them. The paper highlights the need for more concerted efforts and cooperation among Western states, private companies based in the West, and third-party states, to mitigate and prevent sanctions-busting activities.

Future research could expand to include more countries and examine the broader implications of sanctions. It could also examine the extent to which organized crime, such as cybercrime and trade-based money laundering, are linked to sanctions evasion. This research would build on the recommendations of this paper by developing more specific strategies for detecting and preventing sanctions evasion, including the use of new technologies and data analysis techniques.

Research Paper No. 18 University of Birmingham. 2023. 47p.

By David Lewis and Tena Prelec

This paper provides an analytical overview of how Russian actors and proxies are using illicit financial flows (IFF) to support Russian foreign policy goals. It shows how Russia has used illicit finance to fund political interference campaigns, promote disinformation, and support military operations outside Russia, including the international activities of the Wagner network.

IFF includes a wide range of illicit and illegal cross-border financial activities, including high-level corruption, money-laundering, and sanctions evasion. Illicit finance played a significant role in Russian foreign policy pre-2022 invasion of Ukraine. Subsequent international sanctions against Russia have further amplified Moscow's reliance on illicit business and financial practices.

Russia has become increasingly reliant on IFF in three important areas:

• First, IFF facilitates sanctions evasion and is central to Russia’s efforts to source weapons and dual-use technology.

• Second, IFF is used to fund political interference and information operations globally, with an increasing trend towards activities in the Global South.

• Third, IFF supports Russia's involvement in armed conflicts, through the funding of paramilitary forces such as Wagner and commercial deals that accompany Russian military activities in the Middle East and in Africa.

Unless effectively countered, Russia's growing use of illicit financial and economic tools will give it an advantage in its war against Ukraine. The Wagner network demonstrates how illicit financial networks can support military proxies in ways that pose a serious threat to international security.

An effective response to illicit finance requires a holistic approach, combining effective sanctions with systematic efforts to tackle money-laundering and illicit finance in key financial and logistical hubs, including in the UK and other Western countries.

SOC ACE Research Paper No 17. University of Birmingham. 2022. 43p.

By Maria Nizzero

The imposition of sanctions against the ‘oligarchs’ following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has triggered a policy conversation about the potential to move ‘from freeze to seize’: achieving permanent confiscation of assets that are currently temporarily frozen under sanctions. Acting against the oligarchs’ assets represents a way for the UK government to both reaffirm its intention to support Ukraine, and to show that the UK is no longer a haven for the proceeds of patronage, bribery or corruption. However, the UK’s asset recovery mechanisms have previously fallen short when dealing with the challenges related to seizing such proceeds, such as the difficult nature of investigating alleged historical criminality and corruption at the root of the wealth, the vast resources available to those who to manage to hide their assets and, if needed, to prove their licit origin, and the provenance of wealth in uncooperative jurisdictions. In addition, while the intention to move ‘from freeze to seize’ is high on the government’s agenda and has been reflected in several parliamentary debates and the Economic Crime Bill presented in September 2022, there are concerns that such political interest and pressure to act quickly should, however, come with proposals that do not undermine the UK’s status as a rule-of-law jurisdiction and a supporter of fundamental human rights. This paper explores alternative asset recovery mechanisms that could help respond to the immediate policy goal surrounding Russian-linked sanctioned assets and contribute to strengthening the broader asset recovery framework in the UK for the longer term. It sets out the current challenges related to confiscation of proceeds of grand corruption and explores the limitations of UK civil recovery mechanisms when seeking to tackle such proceeds. Given these challenges, the research looks at examples of three alternative mechanisms across four jurisdictions – Australia, Switzerland, Ireland and Italy – weighing their potential and limitations in relation to issues such as a lower standard of proof or reversed burden of proof, as well as reframing around ‘societal danger’, and their legal applicability in UK legislation. With these factors and the broader findings of the research in mind, this paper concludes with a set of recommendations for UK policymakers, which apply equally to the global debate, when thinking about reforming the country’s asset recovery mechanisms. While it does not intend to categorically push for one model to be adopted over others, as developing legislative mechanisms to facilitate the permanent confiscation of kleptocratic proceeds is a challenge that goes well beyond the UK,1 the paper suggests considering amendments to the current asset recovery mechanisms that take account of the social damage and national security interests affected by criminals, and kleptocrats in particular. This is a key gap in UK legislation, and these concepts need to both be included in asset recovery legislation and have full buy-in from the government and law enforcement. Alongside this, some adjustments to existing legislation to include certain elements, such as a full reverse burden of proof and, most importantly, appropriate resourcing of law enforcement, will improve the odds of recovering proceeds of crime in the UK.

SOC ACE Research Paper No. 16. Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham.2023. 35p.

By Cathy Haenlein, Sasha Erskine, Elijah Glantz and Tom Keatinge

Sanctions are increasingly being used to tackle a range of specific issues. These include sanctions that respond to human rights abuses, combat corruption and address malicious cyber activity. As sanctions use has broadened, the question of their application to organised criminal activity is increasingly raised; yet the use of sanctions for this reason has remained limited to a specific set of issuers, notably the US, and more recently, the UN. In the UK, the government has advanced its vision of an ambitious post-Brexit independent sanctions regime, with the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 allowing sanctions use ‘in the interests of national security’ (HMG, 2018). New regimes addressing human rights and corruption have emerged. With serious and organised crime deemed a national security threat by the UK government, there is a case to add a sanctions regime to address this particular threat (HMG, 2018). The National Crime Agency itself has called for a legislative amendment to reference serious and organised crime as grounds for sanctions use (HMG, 2021). However, little research or evaluation has been undertaken to assess the impact of sanctions on organised crime. With US sanctions used over almost three decades to disrupt cross-border trafficking, the lack of a body of rigorous relevant research is a key shortcoming. Similarly, few past initiatives have sought to assess the lessons these experiences hold for future sanctions issuers in this space. With interest mounting in the potential use of organised crime-related sanctions, this represents a critical limitation. In seeking to address the gap, this paper reviews existing evidence on the use and impact of sanctions to disrupt organised criminal activity. It focuses on two case studies, Colombia and Libya, in differing regions of the world and with different exposure to organised crime-focused sanctions. While Colombia tops the list of states globally for organised crime-focused sanctions on individuals and entities in its territory (with the third-highest number of relevant listings since 2016), Libya’s exposure is more recent and limited. Libya nonetheless has experience of listings under UN and US country regimes relating to fuel smuggling, people smuggling and human trafficking. Here, it differs markedly from Colombia, which is the epitome of the historic US approach to narcotics-related sanctions. This paper analyses organised crime-related sanctions data, examines the current state of knowledge relating to the implementation and impact of these sanctions, and draws on the tw wo case studies. It identifies a number of factors that influence the effectiveness of organised crime-focused sanctions, including:

• The extent to which the host government of the sanction’s target is willing to cooperate with the sanction’s issuer.

• The extent to which the issuance of sanctions is embedded within a coherent broader strategic approach.

• The overarching focus of the regime within which relevant designations are made.

• The need for clear objectives when applying sanctions.

• Resourcing and engagement of key agencies in both the country of issuance and the target’s host country.

• Divergent levels of vulnerability of key actors across the related illicit trade chain. With these factors and the broader findings of the research in mind, this paper concludes with a set of ten considerations for those countries that may, in the future, consider introducing organized crime-focused sanctions.

SOC ACE Research Paper No. 1. Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham. . 2022. 51p.

Edited by: Melissa Demian

The introduction of village courts in Papua New Guinea in 1975 was an ambitious experiment in providing semi-formal legal access to the country’s overwhelmingly rural population. Nearly 50 years later, the enthusiastic adoption of these courts has had a number of ramifications, some of them unanticipated. Arguably, the village courts have developed and are working exactly as they were supposed to do, adapted by local communities to modes and styles consistent with their own dispute management sensibilities. But with little in the way of state oversight or support, most village courts have become, of necessity, nearly autonomous.

Village courts have also become the blueprint for other modes of dispute management. They overlap with other sources of authority, so the line between what does and does not constitute a ‘court’ is now indistinct in many parts of the country. Rather than casting this issue as a problem for legal development, the contributors to Grassroots Law in Papua New Guinea ask how, under conditions of state withdrawal, people seek to retain an understanding of law that holds out some promise of either keeping the attention of the state or reproducing the state’s authority.

Canberra: ANU Press, 2023. 210p.

By Michael McLaggan

Prominent throughout the world, illicit financial flows (IFFs) not only undermine the ability of states to collect revenue, but they also pose challenges to governance and the rule of law and provide avenues for the funding of further illicit activity. Although a global occurrence, IFFs may manifest differently at the regional level, making a uniform approach difficult. This calls for a model that is more inclusive of different types of flows than traditional understandings of IFFs, which tend to focus on financial flows within the formal system. In regions such as East and southern Africa, where informality is much higher than in the developed nations of the ‘global north’, the greater focus on formal systems does not find the same degree of applicability. This is not to downplay the necessity of observing and countering formal financial flows of an illicit nature but rather to emphasise the need to pay greater attention to informal and trade flows, which are prolific in less developed regions. This paper draws on extensive research by the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC) – in particular, the Observatory of Illicit Economies in East and Southern Africa – in addition to research by other international organisations, to analyse whether the ‘IFFs pyramid’ proposed by the GI-TOC (Reitano, 2022) is applicable to and useful for researchers seeking to understanding illicit financial flows in various settings around the world but especially in regions where greater levels of informality exists, such as East and southern Africa. The paper finds that the pervasive informality of markets in the East and southern African region, and their abuse by criminal actors, means that greater attention to IFFs is necessary in this sphere. Common also is the use of illicitly acquired, or otherwise illicitly traded commodities, in barter (that is, goods for goods) markets. Identified as particularly relevant is the pernicious influence of state-embedded actors, who often play substantial roles in the facilitation of IFFs and act as obstacles to policies to address them. Furthermore, vested interests of criminal actors in keeping certain industries and markets informal serve as barriers to formalisation and highlight the greater need to pay attention to informal financial flows especially. The due consideration to trade and informal flows is what makes the IFFs pyramid a useful model for understanding these flows in both global and regional settings. At the very least, the pyramid model highlights the need for holistic approaches and policy reform when considering IFFs in less developed regions.  

Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham. 2024, 33pg

Edited by Nick Gill and Anthony Good

Drawing on new research material from ten European countries, Asylum Determination in Europe: Ethnographic Perspectives brings together a range of detailed accounts of the legal and bureaucratic processes by which asylum claims are decided. The book includes a legal overview of European asylum determination procedures, followed by sections on the diverse actors involved, the means by which they communicate, and the ways in which they make life-and-death decisions on a daily basis. It offers a contextually rich account that moves beyond doctrinal law to uncover the gaps and variances between formal policy and legislation, and law as actually practiced. The contributors employ a variety of disciplinary perspectives – sociological, anthropological, geographical, and linguistic – but are united in their use of an ethnographic methodological approach. Through this lens, the book captures the confusion, improvisation, inconsistency, complexity, and emotional turmoil inherent to the process of claiming asylum in Europe.

Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019. 346p.

By Mark Galeotti

Time of Troubles is the first comprehensive assessment of the impact of the Ukraine war on the Russian underworld. The war’s human and economic costs, along with the political retrenchment of a regime under growing pressure, are all transforming illegal markets and organized crime in Russia with potentially destabilizing effects. The annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the subsequent undeclared conflict in the Donbas region had already begun to reshape the Russian underworld. The 2022 invasion of Ukraine, however, brought dramatic changes. An almost complete split between Ukrainian and Russian criminal groups has had a significant negative impact, not least because of their dominance over transnational narcotics flows. At the same time, new opportunities to smuggle sanctioned luxury goods for the rich and critical components for the defence–industrial complex have enriched and elevated other gangs, especially those able to exploit and control routes through Belarus, Armenia and Central Asia. All this is putting pressure on the underworld status quo – and the state’s capacity to manage and maintain it – and even reshaping the relationship between Russian criminal networks and their partners and subsidiaries abroad. Even when the war does end, some form of sanctions or trade and investment controls will almost certainly remain in place. The Kremlin will find it difficult to integrate large numbers of traumatized, impoverished and disillusioned veterans, many of whom risk drifting into organized and disorganized crime. Condemned to pariah status and looking for alternative ways to support itself, the state may turn its existing ad hoc relations with the underworld into something much more focused and institutionalized, creating new dangers for its neighbours and the global order as a whole. The stakes could hardly be higher.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. 2023. 72p.

By Vanda Felbab-Brown

Since 2007, negotiations with violent organised crime groups (hereafter, “criminal groups”) have been increasingly featured in government, church and NGO responses to violent criminality in Latin America and the Caribbean. They are enormously controversial, both politically and ethically. Many consider them unacceptable and counterproductive, as they may involve risks such as legitimising the criminal group or emboldening others to engage in criminal activities. The relative rarity with which such negotiations produce a deal and the great uncertainty as to their long-term outcomes are further sources of controversy. The sensitivity and risks are so large that some who have participated in the situations examined in this paper are wary of calling them “negotiations.” They may avoid the term even when they have bargained from a position of superiority or succeeded in striking a deal. In attempting to address the challenges criminal groups present, most countries understandably employ a tough-on-crime stance. Any other would be hard to justify to the public. Yet, where the activities of these groups have become especially pervasive and violent, there is often a lack of deterrence capacity, leading to public anger and desperation. Negotiation can thus sometimes become an option and may be pursued in conjunction with coercive tactics, institutional strengthening, legalisation measures and more. As a diplomat involved in the talks with criminal gangs in El Salvador and Honduras put it, by negotiating “we were not trying to get to heaven; we were just trying to avoid hell.” But if negotiation with criminal groups sometimes becomes necessary, which group characteristics and contextual factors must be taken into account? What end-goals are appropriate and realistic? What inducements, concessions and redlines must be contemplated? And how do such processes compare and contrast with negotiations conducted with politically-motivated insurgents? These are just some of the questions examined in this paper.   

Barcelona, Spain: The Institute for Integrated Transitions, 2021. 47p,

By Bodean Hedwards,, Lucia Bird, and Perkha Traxl 

This report analyzes recent trends in maritime people smuggling from South and South East Asia on journeys towards Asia-Pacific, focusing on four case study countries: Indonesia, Malaysia, India and Sri Lanka. These were chosen to provide a cross-section of source, transit and destination countries in the region, with Sri Lanka and Indonesia being well-established departure countries toward Oceania. The paper considers key trends, the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and intersections with human trafficking. It is important to note that maritime migration does not occur in isolation but typically forms part of what is usually a longer migration journey that involves land border crossings as well as air routes. This report examines trends in the smuggling of migrants across maritime pathways in South and South East Asia, with a particular focus on journeys towards the Asia-Pacific region. The paper provides insight into the conditions that compel migrants to choose people smuggling – and particularly maritime smuggling – as a means of migration and details the reasons that influence migrants’ decisions in relation to destination and migration routes. It explores the factors that make irregular migrants vulnerable to trafficking during their journey and examines the nature of maritime people-smuggling models and operations around the region, looking at, among other factors, recruitment, payment, and border crossing and immigration arrangements. Finally, drawing on what is known about people-smuggling dynamics and experiences across South and South East Asia, the report explores emerging responses identified during interviews that are thought to be having an impact on the various intersections of people smuggling and human trafficking.

Geneva, SWIT:  Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime., 2023. 60p.  

By Summer Walker

What happens in America often reverberates globally. The complex global emergency of COVID-19 has now met waves of uprising around anti-racism, inequality and the systems that perpetuate them. Many policing tactics deployed in communities around the world derive from policy responses to curb illicit markets. Some of the most persistent and militarized responses in communities are predicated upon fighting transnational organized crime. And these often occur in communities of colour, immigrant neighbourhoods, and marginalized and lower-income areas. These current debates about power, use of force and inequality provide a lens to examine responses to transnational organized crime. This brief uses the concept of illicit markets to examine organized crime as the systems and actors that make up these markets, including the government responses to them. Transnational illicit markets, such as the illicit drug or wildlife trade, connect a wide range of actors – from farmers and fishermen to hitmen and cartel bosses. Organized criminal groups, the most common manifestation of how organized crime is carried out, include cartels, armed militias and gangs. But they can also include members of political parties, corporations, businesses and local governments. By looking at the markets more broadly and then identifying where responses are targeted, one can see how transnational organized-crime responses create their own logic of power and exclusion, and are deployed to manage communities. This policy brief begins by discussing the current US context of BLM protests, then situates the debate within the transnational organized-crime agenda, and addresses the implications for responses that align with calls for social and economic justice.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime.2020. 21p.

By Gemma Dipoppa

The widespread presence of criminal organizations in strong states presents a theoretical and empirical puzzle. How do criminal organizations — widely believed to thrive in weak states — expand to states with strong capacity? I argue that criminal groups expand where they can strike agreements with local actors for the provision of illegal resources they control, and that this practice is particularly profitable in strong states where costs from prosecution are higher. Using a novel measure of organized crime presence, I show that (1) increases in demand for unskilled labor — and in criminals’ capacity to fill it by exploiting migrants — allowed southern Italian mafias to expand to the north, and that (2) mafia expansion gave a persistent electoral advantage to political parties collaborating with them. This suggests the need to reconceptualize criminal organizations not only as substitutes for weak states but as complements to strong states.

Preprint, 2021. 59p.

By David Lewis

Despite Ukraine's ongoing counter-offensive, in September 2023 Russia still controlled around 17% of Ukrainian territory, an area roughly the size of Denmark. Russia's occupation of these Ukrainian territories relied primarily on repression and violence, but economic levers also played an important role in consolidating Russian rule. This paper details Russia's illicit economic activity in the occupied territories and calls for more international attention to this aspect of Russia's invasion.

Since Russia occupied large parts of south-eastern Ukraine in March 2022, it has worked rapidly to incorporate these regions into Russia's economic and financial system. Key elements in this 'economic occupation' include:

• The seizure of many Ukrainian businesses and assets. The occupation authorities 'nationalised' many companies and reregistered them as Russian businesses with new management.

• The imposition of the Russian currency, financial and tax system, and the forced closure of Ukrainian banks.

• The forcible takeover of farms or pressure on farmers to cooperate with the occupation authorities. Russian officials oversaw the illegal export of Ukrainian grain from the occupied territories.

The reconstruction of cities such as Mariupol, the city destroyed by Russian forces in spring 2022, in a multi-billion-dollar government programme that is profiting well-connected Russian companies.

These acts were all illegal under Ukrainian law and some may constitute potential war crimes under international law.

Research Paper 20. Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham, 2023. 43p.

By Jirka Taylor, Shann Corbett, Fook Nederveen, Stijn Hoorens, Hana Ross, Emma Disley

The illicit tobacco trade is a global phenomenon with significant negative health, social and economic consequences. This study is intended to support efforts to better understand the scope and scale of the illicit tobacco market. The primary objective was to develop a reliable, robust, replicable and independent methodology to measure the illicit market that can be applied by the EU and its Member States. The key requirements were that the methodology would capture the total volume of the illicit trade and distinguish between the legal and illegal market, ideally distinguishing between types of tobacco products, and types of illicit trade. Based on in-depth literature reviews and interviews with key informants, we constructed a longlist of 11 methodologies that have been or could be used to measure the illicit tobacco market and assessed them against a standardised set of criteria. This resulted in a shortlist of five preferred methods (i.e. discarded pack survey, comparison of sales/tax paid and self-reported consumption, consumer survey with and without pack inspection/surrender, econometric modelling). As individual approaches, these shortlisted methods were not sufficient to meet the minimum criteria. Accordingly, these shortlisted methods were then used to formulate options for combination of methodologies corresponding to various levels of resource intensity.

Brussels: Publications Office of the European Union, 2021. 197p.

By Summer Walker

The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC) researches the political economy of organized crime in many countries, including those on the United Nations Security Council’s agenda. The GI-TOC also analyzes how the Security Council responds to illicit economies and organized crime through its agenda, including through an annual review of resolutions that tracks references to organized crime. We use the term ‘illicit economies’ here to include the markets and actors involved. This series, UN Security Council Illicit Economies Watch, draws on research produced by the GI-TOC regional observatories and the Global Organized Crime Index to provide insights into the impacts of illicit economies for Council-relevant countries through periodic country reports. As the United Nations develops its New Agenda for Peace, there is a need to consider the impacts of illicit economies in the search for sustainable peace and preventing conflict. The UN Secretary-General called for a New Agenda for Peace in his report Our Common Agenda, saying that to protect peace, ‘we need a peace continuum based on a better understanding of the underlying drivers and systems of influence that are sustaining conflict, a renewed effort to agree on more effective collective security responses and a meaningful set of steps to manage emerging risks’.1 One of these key underlying drivers is illicit economies and a more effective response will need to account for this. The Security Council will play a critical role in any renewed effort. This brief provides an overview of how the Council addresses illicit economies and offers ideas for advancing the agenda. It first examines how specific crimes are addressed by the Council, expands into a wider analysis of the dynamics of illicit economies and conflict, and offers thinking around how illicit economies can be considered in the context of the New Agenda for Peace.

UN Security Counci. 2023, 22p.

By Matt Herbert | Rupert Horsely | Emadeddin Badi

Libya has been a key focus of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) since the country’s 2011 revolution. A June 2023 UNSC meeting on Libya focused on the country’s political process, the need to hold elections and support work around the reunification of security and defence forces.1 That same month, the Council re-authorized its arms embargo on the country2 and in late 2023 it is set to renew the UN mission in Libya. The UNSC has sought to advance an effective political process, reunify the country’s divided institutions and address threats to peace and security, and human rights abuses. To effect this change, the UNSC authorized and draws on the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), a sanctions committee and linked Panel of Experts, and the European Union Naval Force Mediterranean Operations Sophia and IRINI.3 Despite these efforts, Libya remains a highly fragile country. Although large-scale violence has ebbed since the Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF)’s loss in the 2019–2020 war for Tripoli, the country remains divided. The Government of National Unity (GNU) – the internationally recognized government in Tripoli led by Abd al-Hamid Dabaiba – exerts direct influence over limited areas of the country’s territory, mainly in Tripolitania. Most territory, including Cyrenaica and the Fezzan, is held by the LAAF, led by Khalifa Haftar. Attempts to bridge these divides, hold elections and forge a broadly legitimate government have repeatedly failed, most recently in December 2021.4 Nonetheless, UNSC efforts in this regard continue, reflecting an international consensus that the way out of Libya’s protracted instability is likely to be found in the political track, through the establishment of a government capable of superseding the current divides and exercising sovereign control over the country.5 However, the distribution of power within Libya challenges efforts to stabilize the country through the political track alone. Belying the simple narrative of national bifurcation, the GNU and LAAF have limited and contingent control over their respective areas. Instead, armed groups rooted in municipal or tribal groupings dominate local power. Governance and security often hinge on deals and agreements continually being renegotiated between these groups and the GNU or the LAAF.

Libya’s thriving illicit economies, and their links to armed groups and political actors throughout the country, compound the challenges to the UNSC’s efforts to promote a stable peace and the rule of law.6 Profits from these markets provide a crucial funding source for armed groups, enabling and incentivizing pushback against state efforts to assert control, and drive conflicts between groups over control of key markets and routes.7 They also fuel petty and large-scale corruption, stymying efforts to rebuild rule of law and security-force effectiveness in the country.8 Efforts to prevent criminal penetration of the Libyan state have failed. Actors linked to illicit economies have increasingly become embedded within the security forces, while others seek opportunities for high-level positions and political influence. This raises the risk that criminal interests, predation and corruption will be fused into the state. Equally problematically, it risks poisoning citizen trust in and possible acceptance of future governance and security structures involving compromised actors. For these reasons, understanding how illicit economies function in Libya and their impacts, and how they are changing, is essential for the UNSC as it seeks to promote political solutions and stability in the country. This brief provides the UN and member states with a snapshot of how Libya’s illicit economies have developed over the last three years and the impact those shifts have had. In the interest of length, the brief does not detail all changes or offer a full description of the structural elements in all markets. Rather, it focuses on the most salient aspects for policymakers assessing the challenge of illicit markets. The brief begins by detailing the impact illicit economies have on armed groups and political dynamics. Next, it assesses the state of play of the main illicit markets in the country: fuel smuggling, drug trafficking, mercenaries, arms and ammunition smuggling, and migrant smuggling and trafficking. It ends with a brief set of recommendations.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime , 2023. 35p.