By Ruggero Scaturro and Walter Kemp

Despite the prevalence of trade over land, South Eastern Europe (SEE) also contains more than a hundred ports and 12 container terminals, which are important entry and exit points for trade in the Adriatic, Aegean, Black and Ionian Seas, as well as along the Danube. This report reveals that there is also a maritime Balkan route bringing drugs into SEE through key commercial seaports: cocaine from Latin America and heroin via Türkiye and the Middle East. Other commodities being smuggled along this route include weapons, waste, counterfeit goods and cigarettes. In addition, it provides a glimpse of smuggling along the Danube. The case studies, which feature nine of the region’s commercial ports, are a central element of this report. The map below shows the ports (in Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Montenegro, Romania and Slovenia) that form the basis of the analysis in this study. These ports were chosen to provide an overview of different types of ports (based on size, ownership, location and history of seizures) and to assess their vulnerability to organized crime.

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2022. 111p.

By United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

This report shows that the total value of illicit heroin and opium trafficked from Afghanistan to Western Europe through the Balkans amounts to some $28 billion every year. Sixty-five per cent of this total ($18 billion) is generated in Western and Central Europe. The four largest European markets for heroin - France, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Italy - account for nearly half of the gross profits, as the major heroin benefits are made by traffickers on the retail markets. The report shows that the total value generated by Afghan heroin and opium trafficked in Europe and through the Balkan route is one third bigger than the entire GDP of Afghanistan itself, which, in 2014, amounted to some $21 billion. Other findings indicate that the negative economic impact of heroin and opium are actually greater in Europe and the Balkan route countries than in Afghanistan itself. The report also shows the Islamic Republic of Iran and Turkey as the two countries which interject the greater percentage of heroin and opium destined for Europe. Iran seizes about 30 per cent of the 155 tons of heroin and opium entering its territory every year, while Turkey seizes 17 per cent. All other countries in Europe interject an average of 6 per cent of heroin in their territory. Data show that the impact of illicit profits in the national licit economy across countries is significant, with heroin and opium traffickers gaining between 0.2 to 2 per cent of their country's GDP. For some countries this share is bigger than the public expenditures dedicated to drug policies - if all drugs, and not only heroin and opium, are considered. The large amounts of money generated through this illicit activity can distort the licit national economies in the region.

Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2015. 92p.

By Walter Kemp

The report “Crooked Kaleidoscope – Organized Crime in the Balkans” by the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime, urges countries and organizations that have invested so much economically and politically over the past 25 years to stay engaged in the region and help it avoid back-sliding. In particular, it calls for stronger measures to fight corruption, enhance justice, and go after the proceeds of crime rather than just focusing on police reform.

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2017. 44p.

By Lucia Bird

On 1 February 2022, gunshots at the governmental palace in Bissau signalled the beginning of a reported failed coup attempt in Guinea-Bissau, a country long known for its prominent role in international cocaine trafficking. Had the incident resulted in a military overthrow of power, it would have been the fifth successful coup in Guinea-Bissau’s history, and also the fifth coup in West Africa in the preceding 12 months, hot on the heels of the seizure of power in Burkina Faso in late January.1 Hours after the gunfire had begun, President Umaro Sissoco Embaló addressed the press, condemning the incident and declaring the perpetrators had failed. In press statements, he indicated that those behind the attack were involved in the drugs trade.2 This implication appeared to echo history: a 2012 coup in Guinea-Bissau was so clearly motivated by competition for control over the country’s lucrative cocaine markets that it has been dubbed the ‘cocaine coup’.3 The nature of the February attack, and the identity of the perpetrators, is still unclear – as explored further below. However, arrests announced by the government following the attack include individuals with known links to the cocaine trade – most prominently Admiral Bubo Na Tchuto – underscoring the drug connection implied by the president. Guinea-Bissau is a key entry point for cocaine into West Africa, a region that operates as a transit point on international cocaine trafficking routes between cultivation countries in Latin America and consumer end-markets in Europe. The country has played an important role in international cocaine trafficking dynamics since the late 1990s. The close involvement of Guinea-Bissau’s political-military elite in the cocaine market over the years has been a critical factor in Guinea-Bissau’s repeated cycles of political turmoil. In turn, profits from the cocaine market have bankrolled a remarkably resilient elite protection network composed of elements of the state infrastructure. Guinea-Bissau is at a critical juncture once again. The curious February incident has brought to the fore the country’s cyclical tendency towards political volatility, and the president has deemed the country to be in ‘political crisis’ and dissolved the National Assembly. This report explores the role, past and present, of the cocaine trade both as a driver of political instability in the country and as a source of resilience for elite power-sharing arrangements.

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2022. 50p.

By International Crisis Group

Coca stands at the heart of a fierce debate over Colombia’s worsening rural insecurity. The plant’s leaves are the sole raw material from which cocaine, an illegal drug that generates outlandish profits and finances armed and criminal groups, can be manufactured. Colombian President Iván Duque argues that the whole narcotic supply chain – from coca cultivation to global cocaine trafficking – is the scourge behind rising massacres, forced displacement and assassinations of community leaders in Colombia. With cultivation hitting new highs in recent years, Bogotá has vastly expanded campaigns that involve sending in the army and police to pull up or otherwise eradicate coca crops. It also threatens to restart aerial fumigation. Yet an approach based on forceful eradication of coca, which the U.S. has stoutly backed, tends to worsen rural violence, while failing to reduce drug supply. A new strategy is needed that persuades coca farmers to abandon a plant that offers a stable income and an attractive alternative to other legal crops.

Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2021. 44p.

Edited by Laura Y. Calderón, Kimberly Heinle, Rita E. Kuckertz, Octavio Rodríguez Ferreira, and David A. Shirk

This is the second edition of Organized Crime and Violence in Mexico. Like last year’s report, this study builds on 10 years of reports published by Justice in Mexico under the title Drug Violence in Mexico. The Drug Violence in Mexico series examined patterns of crime and violence attributable to organized crime, and particularly drug trafficking organizations, as well as other related issues, such as judicial sector reform and human rights in Mexico. At the 10 year mark, in 2019, this series of reports was retitled “Organized Crime and Violence in Mexico” to reflect the proliferation and diversification of organized crime groups over the last decade and the corresponding wave of violence. As in previous years, this report compiles the most recent data. and analysis of crime, violence, and rule of law in Mexico to help inform government officials, policy analysts, and the general public.

San Diego: Justice in Mexico, University of San Diego, 2021. 70p.

Edited by Eric L. Olson, Andrew Selee, and David A. Shirk

The clichés describing United States-Mexico relations are well known and well worn. Given the enormity of the geographic, historical, cultural, and economic ties between both countries it’s now a commonplace to say Mexico is the United States’ most important bilateral relationship, and vice-versa. The nature of this critical binational relationship has been dissected and probed from every conceivable angle. Yet as we began to research the security relationship between both countries we realized that there is still much that is not generally known amongst the public and policy communities about how Mexico and the United States are working together to deal with the threats posed by organized crime. For example, the unique nature of money laundering operations taking place across the U.S.-Mexico border; the extent to which high-powered firearms are finding their way from U.S. gun shops into the hands of organized crime and street gangs in Mexico; and the surprisingly limited information about the amount of illegal drugs consumed in the United States are not widely understood. Likewise, the deployment of Mexico’s armed forces is only one aspect of the country’s anti-drug strategy. Police agencies are being reorganized and efforts at professionalization are underway. A major reform of Mexico’s justice system was adopted in 2008 that, if fully implemented, should help greatly strengthen the rule of law and reduce the relative power and impunity of organized crime. Yet, while significant progress has already been made in some of Mexico’s 31 states, many questions remain about the efficacy and sustainability of these reforms. But despite these developments, the extreme violence brought on by conflicts amongst and between organized crime groups still garners the most attention. The horrifying and gruesome details of drug violence are plastered on the front pages of daily newspapers and videos of narco-violence are easily available on public websites and YouTube. In some cases, the criminals themselves are publicizing their actions for their own aggrandizement and to terrorize the public. While understanding the nature and extent of the violence afflicting Mexico in recent times is important, we also recognized that the violence itself is more symptom than cause of the underlying problem. For this reason, we thought it important to focus this project’s research on a series of key issues that are feeding the growth of organized crime and related violence in Mexico. We also found it important to examine several policy areas where reform and action by one or both governments could contribute to a long term sustainable approach to weakening the grip of organized crime and illegal drugs on both countries

Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center and San Diego: University of San Diego, Trans-Border Institute, 2011. 388p.

Edited by Laura Y. Calderón, Kimberly Heinle, Rita E. Kuckertz, Octavio Rodríguez Ferreira, and David A. Shirk

This is the second edition of Organized Crime and Violence in Mexico. Like last year’s report, this study builds on 10 years of reports published by Justice in Mexico under the title Drug Violence in Mexico. The Drug Violence in Mexico series examined patterns of crime and violence attributable to organized crime, and particularly drug trafficking organizations, as well as other related issues, such as judicial sector reform and human rights in Mexico. At the 10 year mark, in 2019, this series of reports was retitled “Organized Crime and Violence in Mexico” to reflect the proliferation and diversification of organized crime groups over the last decade and the corresponding wave of violence. As in previous years, this report compiles the most recent data. and analysis of crime, violence, and rule of law in Mexico to help inform government officials, policy analysts, and the general public.

San Diego: Justice in Mexico, University of San Diego, 2021. 70p.

By InSight Crime

CACIF is the de facto political party of Guatemala's economic elites. It unites the most important economic actors and is capable of integrating, via informal mechanisms, the heads of consortia and family groups with significant weight in a variety of economic sectors. Private security firms under the umbrella of the “Illegal Clandestine Security Apparatuses (Cuerpos Ilegales y Aparatos Clandestinos deSeguridad - CIACS) weave in and out of organized crime activity involving drug, arms and human trafficking, systematically blocking investigations and operating with impunity. The CIACS are what raised the alarm to spur creation of the United Nations-backed International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala.

Washington, DC: InSight Crime, 2016. 112p.

By InSight Crime

Guatemala, Honduras, Colombia and Nicaragua represent an illuminating cross section of criminal organizations and types of elites. Elite dynamics in each of these countries are different, but with important commonalities; the makeup, role and penetration of criminal groups into intellectual, societal, legal, government and economic circles is varied, but interrelated. The study findings show local and national dynamics that influence intersections between organized crime and elites, and enable inferences and conclusions about what unifies these examples. The case studies reach the upper echelons of government and impact how the state deals with organized crime.

Washington, DC: InSight Crime, 2016. 51p.

By Sight Crime

Colombia's elite has always been made up predominantly of Colombian nationals. The country's economic and political elites overlap to a large extent, and the wealthy exert political power. The lack of government presence in many parts of the country and a tradition of contraband smuggling created trafficking expertise and a tolerance for illicit activities. The mass purchase of land by drug traffickers was so substantial that it is known as the "counter-reform" -- skewing Colombia's land further into the hands of the few. The paper also traces the rise and fall of drug lord Pablo Escobar and the Medellín cartel.

Washington, DC: InSight Crime, 2016. 117p.

By InSight Crime

This detailed study traces connections between wealthy and political elites in Honduras, and organized crime. For Honduran transnational elites, the state’s role is simple: to create and enforce rules that favour their continued power over key industries and the capital accumulation that accompanies it. Currently, all the elites seem to be facing the same dilemma: align their interests with the narco-powers surging in the country, or stand by as they assume control of the country’s most important economic and political levers. The dirty money provided by illicit criminal groups and businesses has become the difference that makes the difference in survival for the elite classes

Washington, DC: InSight Crime, 2016. 95p.

By Steven Dudley and Matthew Taylor

There are three major types of criminal networks in the Americas, and each requires the United States government to take a substantially different approach towards mitigating their power and effect . State-embedded networks are embedded in elected bodies, law enforcement, judicial entities, regulatory agencies, and other parts of the government. They use state power to enrich themselves and their partners via corrupt and criminal schemes and to systematically undermine the rule of law and regulatory powers, so as to protect their activities and ensure impunity. These networks are the most difficult for the United States government to address because they are, by definition, the US government’s counterparts. They may also play a double game, employing their resources towards battling some criminal activities, which may correspond with US interests, even while they shelter and build out their own criminal portfolios. Battling state-embedded networks requires empowering international and local bodies, as well as supporting civil society organizations and media. Social-constituency networks draw from a constituency, built on shared circumstances, heritage, and/or political beliefs, and create criminal networks that advance the interests of the constituency. They may provide protection from rival criminal groups and a predatory state, while also providing tools for social and economic advancement. They draw from various criminal economies, but their power base is decidedly social and political in nature. Entrepreneurial networks are designed like a commercial enterprise with multiple layers and a loose structure, which allow them to maximize profit and minimize risk. They mostly provide goods and services, but they are sometimes predatory and often employ violence. While the core of these networks is often one or more tight-knit families – which provide them many built-in advantages in terms of trust, recruitment, and conflict resolution – these networks are governed by profit motives, and they derive their power from economic capital.

Washington, DC: InSight Crime and American University’s Center for Latin American & Latino Studies, 2022. 155p.

By InSight Crime

Drug traffickers today realize that their best protection is not a private army but anonymity. This is the story of “Memo Fantasma” or “Will the Ghost,” who started life in the Medellín Cartel, funded the bloody rise of a paramilitary army, and today lives the high life in Madrid. He has helped move hundreds of tons of cocaine yet has no arrest warrants, and nobody is looking for him.

Washington, DC: InSight Crime, 2020. 50p.

By Eric Przyswa

The combat against counterfeiting started during the 1980s and, at that time, was limited to sectors where it was frequently the consumer who asked for the product, and was even party to the purchase. Above all, it is only since the start of the 2000s that the situation expanded substantially particularly with the liberalisation of the World Trade Organization, technological developments, containerisation and the significance of China as the world's factory. On the other hand, it was only later that counterfeiting seemed to affect the pharmaceutical sector, at least from the industrial point of view. Studies and reports have covered the involvement of organised crime in 'traditional' counterfeiting, particularly in creative industries (luxury goods, audiovisual). Nevertheless, even if there are more and more discussions on the topics of 'counterfeit medicines' and 'organised crime', very few researchers have analysed the relationship between the two phenomena. Consequently, it appeared that such a report should be written and a dual objective was decided: - To take as objective and as rigorous a view as possible on the reality of the "counterfeiting - criminal organisations" combination in the area of medicines. - From a criminology and strategic standpoint, to give some consideration to what could be done to guide current actions. What about the reality of this phenomenon? How can criminal organisations be characterised in our area of study? Are these organisations transnational? Is the Internet a genuine Eldorado for criminal organisations dealing in medicines? The questions relating to our problems proved to be varied and complex. One of the interests in this research is to offer new food for thought on a potentially real, but still opaque threat for which an interpretation can only be made through a documented, pragmatic and also imaginative approach. In the first part, the framework of our new conceptual study will be explained. It is important to define the counterfeiting and falsification of medicines in a clear field of analysis, presenting the specific features of the Internet in particular. In the second part, we will analyse the reality of the relationship between counterfeit medicines and criminal organisations both in the physical world and on the Internet. Theoretical considerations will also supplement our own thoughts. Thirdly, we will go into detail on the criminological issues raised by our problems. Finally, we will analyse to what extent knowledge of the phenomenon can be improved and therefore eliminated with new forms of expertise.

IRCAM, 2013. 130p.

By Lavinia Piemontese

This paper proposes a new approach for quantifying the economic cost of hidden economies. I specifically apply the method to the case of mafia racketeering in Northern Italy, and in so doing, provide the first explicit estimate of the economic cost of mafia spread in this area. I show both theoretically and empirically that acts of extortion imposed on certain firms are linked to resource misallocation. I quantify the share of output that the mafia extorts from firms, which ranges between 0.5 and 5 percent of firm-level output for the taxed firms. I then consider what these estimates imply and find that between 2000 and 2012, the Northern Italian economy suffered an aggregate loss of approximately 2.5 billion Euros. Quite remarkably, only one-fourth of this cost consists of the aggregate transfer to the mafia. The remaining three-fourths corresponds to the contraction of production due to misallocation.

Lyon, France: University of Lyon, 2021. 56p.

By Julie Ayling

This article contributes to the growing literature on organised crime prevention by examining the approaches of two countries, Australia and the Netherlands. In many respects these countries are similar. They also have many organised crime problems in common. But their responses to those problems have been quite distinct. The Dutch administrative approach has been hailed as both unique and successful, while the Australian approach, primarily a reactive criminal law-based response, has encountered a storm of criticism. The article compares the two approaches and addresses the questions of whether and what Australia should learn from the Dutch approach.

Canberra: RegNet School of Regulation and Global Governance, Australian National University; European University Institute Dept of Law, 2013. 54p.

By United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

In The globalization of crime: a transnational organized crime threat assessment, UNODC analyses a range of key transnational crime threats, including human trafficking, migrant smuggling, the illicit heroin and cocaine trades, cybercrime, maritime piracy and trafficking in environmental resources, firearms and counterfeit goods. The report also examines a number of cases where transnational organized crime and instability amplify each other to create vicious circles in which countries or even subregions may become locked. Thus, the report offers a striking view of the global dimensions of organized crime today.

Vienna: UNODC, 2010. 314p.

By Lucia Bird and A. Gomes

The widespread devastation of Guinea-Bissau’s forests – a process coordinated by the military – was curtailed in April 2015 by the imposition of a five-year moratorium on logging exports. Now, the current government looks set to lift the ban – raising widespread concerns of a resurgence in illicit logging.

Drivers for lifting the moratorium may be linked to the powerful interests at play in the sector, both within Guinea-Bissau’s elite and those of the Chinese business community, which have long-standing links to the logging business in the country. These interests, and particularly those of Prime Minister Nuno Gomes Nabiam, were highlighted by a significant seizure of illicit logs by the Judicial Police in November 2020.

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. 2021, 17p.

By Rebecca Wing Yee Wong

The thesis is a study of how Chinese illegal tiger parts trading networks are organized. In particular, this thesis tests in a qualitative manner the causal relationship between three independent variables and the network organizations of these markets. The three independent variables are “ethnicity”, “level of enforcement” and “proximity to the source country”. The thesis also discusses the dynamics of the illegal transactions of tiger parts products. Legitimate meditators or dispute resolutions mechanisms are lacking in the underworld so the risks, which the parties undertake during trading, are far higher. This thesis explores how illegal transactions are enforced, carried out and honored in this trade. In order to map the organization of the tiger trade, I conducted fieldwork in three trading hubs across China: Lhasa. Kunming and Xining.

I discovered five tiger parts trading networks, three of which specialized in the trading of tiger skins and two in tiger bones. Within these networks, the level of perceived but not the actual level of risk influences the decisions of the actors in the network. Entry into the network is easy when the perceived level of enforcement is low. In these settings, there is no ethnic restriction for entering the network; the supplier is willing to trade with anyone with a trustworthy reputation. On the other hand, accessibility to the network is strictly controlled when actors perceive a high level of enforcement in their operating environment. Under this setting, the organization of the network becomes more exclusive and ethnically homogenous, as shown in the Tibetan tiger skin-trading network in Lhasa and the tiger bone-trading network in Kunming. The proximity of the tiger source country to the re-distribution sites (fieldwork cities) also influences the organization of the networks. When the level of enforcement is low and the tiger source country is far away from the re-distribution sites, a monetary deposit is required in order to show that the buyer is serious about his/her request, as shown by the tiger skin-trading network in Kunming.

Oxford, UK: St Hilda’s College, University of Oxford . 2013. 280p.