By Saša Đorđević

Fuel smuggling is the illegal transport, sale or purchase of petroleum products such as crude oil, petrol, diesel and other refined petroleum products. It has been a persistent illicit trade in the Balkans for over three decades.

In 2022, police and customs of the seven Balkan countries seized more than 3 000 tonnes of illegal fuel, with a retail value of €4.3 million – almost four times more than the value of fuel seized in all of 2021. Fuels are goods subject to high excise and customs duties that smugglers try to avoid paying. Alternatively, smugglers seek to profit by evading embargoes on oil imports and exports. From this perspective, the Balkan countries’ public funds lost at least €1.2 million in 2022 as a result of fuel smuggling.

However, relying solely on seizure data to evaluate the illicit fuel market may lead to misleading conclusions because of law enforcement’s inherent challenge in substantiating the unlawful provenance of fuel. This discrepancy becomes more apparent when considering the estimated scale of the issue. In Bulgaria alone, for example, the projected value of illegal fuel in 2019 reached approximately €0.5 billion, resulting in significant budget losses of €250 million.

In the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the Libyan electoral crisis, both of which involved major oil-producing countries, the UN extended measures to combat illicit petroleum exports from Libya in July 2022. The EU also imposed bans on Russian oil in December 2022 and again in February 2023, as part of its response to the war in Ukraine. At the same time, the Balkans became the focus for licit and illicit fuel manoeuvres.This report analyzes the mechanisms of fuel smuggling during times of crisis and instability in the Balkans, considering both internal and external factors that contribute to the overall landscape. It identifies lessons learned from fuel smuggling in the early 1990s and then moves to explain the evolution of this activity with reference to trafficking methods, actors and routes through to 2022. The report also identifies countries in the Balkans at particular risk from fuel smuggling, as well as hotspots that allow illicit trade, particularly on rivers and seas. The report, furthermore, assesses the typical profile of criminal actors active in fuel smuggling. The research is limited to cross-border fuel smuggling operations rather than illegal distribution within a specific country.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. 2023. 34p.

By Kathii Lynn Austin and Brian Freskos

The U.S. and Mexico are grappling with daunting security crises stemming from the trafficking of hundreds of thousands of guns over the U.S. southern border every year. These weapons are empowering Mexican transnational criminal organizations and inflicting substantial suffering in both countries. This report underscores how reducing cross-border gun trafficking is crucial for achieving the goals of the U.S.-Mexico Bicentennial Framework for Security, Public Health, and Safe Communities — a bilateral security agreement announced nearly two years ago. By implementing our recommendations, the U.S. and Mexico can more effectively combat illicit gun flows, saving lives, and improving prosperity.

California: Pacific Council on International Policy, 2023. 85p.

By Kingsley L Madueke

Cattle rustling in Nigeria has evolved from a sustainable community practice into a significant illicit economy, delivering material profits to conflict actors and multiplying harms. Since 2011, the country has experienced a surge in the number of rustling incidents, resulting in thousands of deaths, loss of livelihoods, widespread destruction and displacement of people. This has had a debilitating impact on the country’s stability.

In Nigeria’s North-West and North-Central regions, in particular, cattle rustling has contributed to growing instability by increasing levels of violent crime. The Nigerian press is awash with stories of heavily armed groups raiding communities, killing people and stealing large herds of cattle. Also of note are the violent activities of the self-defense groups that have emerged in response. Additionally, in some of Nigeria’s most volatile regions, including Northern Plateau and Southern Kaduna, cattle rustling has fed into longstanding conflicts between farmers and herders, fuelling violence and deepening polarization.

Cattle rustling deserves attention because it is among the illicit economies most clearly driving instability in Nigeria, more so than others traditionally focused on as sources of instability, such as armed robbery and drug trafficking. The relationship between cattle rustling and instability is multifaceted: not only has the phenomenon been the cause of thousands of deaths, large-scale displacement of communities and destruction of livelihoods, but it has also repeatedly operated as a significant source of financing for armed groups, including regional insurgent groups operating in north-eastern Nigeria and northern and central Mali. Cattle rustling is also interwoven with longstanding tensions between ethnicities, amplifying these and catalyzing further conflict.

This report focuses on Zamfara and Plateau states, where cattle rustling has fuelled large-scale violence and instability over the past decade. The report also explores the concerning southward diffusion of cattle rustling, with an emphasis on Kwara and Oyo states. While some underlying causes of cattle rustling cut across regions, this research highlights that local drivers of cattle rustling and instability are often distinct and therefore require context-specific responses.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime,2023. 46p.

By Flore Berger

Cattle rustling in Mali surged in 2021 and continues at unprecedented levels, with the dominant perpetrators being violent extremist groups operating in the country. The scale of cattle rustling in Mali is the climax of a decade of growth of the practice, and cattle rustling is now a central and under-reported element of the country’s security crisis variously as a driver of conflict, as a governance and intimidation mechanism, and as a key source of revenue for non-state armed groups. This has dramatic humanitarian, social and economic effects on communities. Cattle rustling has since the very start of the crisis been at the heart of Mali’s war economy, with Tuareg rebel groups (since the 1990s) and violent extremist groups (since 2012) financing themselves by looting livestock and relying on a broader network to sell it, using its proceeds to finance their operations (e.g. buying fuel, vehicles and weapons). Cattle rustling, understood in this report to mean the whole range of livestock appropriation,1 has rarely been considered as a criminal economy, yet its impacts on communities and conflict dynamics across West Africa are arguably unrivalled by other more traditional organized markets, such as high-value narcotics. It is sustained by a complex network and supply chain, and perpetrated through ever-increasing violence. Furthermore, while a range of illicit economies have been used by violent extremist groups for resourcing – including trafficking of cigarettes, fuel and drugs; artisanal gold mining; and kidnapping for ransom – cattle rustling has proven to be a particularly resilient and broadly stable source of income. Cattle rustling also stands out regarding the degree to which it intersects with a long-standing history of frustration and resentment by pastoralist communities, and is therefore integral to understanding regional conflict. Cattle rustling, and reprisals for theft, spark cycles of violence as herders protect themselves by joining armed groups and arming themselves. Other communities then respond by creating more armed groups for self-protection, many of which become predatory. Cattle rustling also operates as a mechanism wielded by armed groups to terrorize the population and deprive them of a central element of livelihoods. Hundreds of villages have been pillaged and burnt down, and cattle looted.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2023. 54p.

By Shehryar Fazli

The Taliban’s 3 April 2022 edict prohibiting poppy cultivation and the use and trade of all types of narcotics across Afghanistan could have grave implications for a collapsing economy. Poppy is the country’s most valuable cash crop, and its labour-intensive cultivation employs several hundred thousand people, pushing up wages and living standards of those directly and indirectly involved. Requiring little water, the poppy’s resilience in adverse agricultural conditions makes it an attractive long-term investment, especially during one of the worst droughts in decades. The new ban would affect farmers in the rural southwest region, where many Taliban leaders are from, as well as influential players across the opium and heroin supply chain. In the absence of significant financial incentives to these constituencies, the risks of a major backlash probably outweigh any benefits of enforcing a poppy ban. Providing such financial incentives would be dependent on significant foreign assistance. Some prominent experts and commentators infer that international legitimacy and funding was the Taliban’s primary motivation in announcing the edict. If so, there are no signs yet that the move will generate the desired response. Afghanistan has been politically and economically isolated since the Taliban’s August 2021 forceful seizure of power. The freezing of around $9 billion in central bank foreign reserves, held mostly in the US, triggered a collapse of the local currency and major liquidity crisis, while aid cut-offs and sanctions triggered hyper-inflation and impeded trade and other business. There are indications that the international community, led by the US, is softening its position to prevent an economic collapse affecting millions of Afghans who face starvation. Without tangible Taliban commitments to basic rights and equality, however, especially of girls and women, deeper international engagement, including on counter-narcotics, is unlikely. How willing and able the Taliban will be to enforce its edict may remain unclear for several months. The ban came amid the poppy harvest in the southwestern provinces of Helmand and Kandahar, bastions of both poppy cultivation and Taliban support. Significant quantities, therefore, may have already been harvested. Transporting them up the supply chain, and to western destinations, will depend on resourceful transnational crime groups. The most important of these are arguably in Pakistan, which shares Afghanistan’s longest border and most of the routes for westward movement of illicit goods, people, and cash from Afghanistan. Criminal networks here traverse the Indian and Iranian borders, and also move their product by sea off the southern Makran coast and Karachi port, to European, African, Asian and Australian markets. These networks, and the geography in which they operate, also require close examination. By better understanding the context and trends, policy-makers will be better able to assess policy options and their implications, especially in Europe, the destination of significant volumes of heroin from Afghanistan

SOC ACE Research Paper No. 9.

Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham. 2022. 35p.

By Summer Walker I Mariana Botero Restrepo

The relationship between illicit economies, conflict and instability has been long debated in academic and practitioner circles, and part of the international policy agenda for some time. From the diamond trade in Sierra Leone to the heroin trade in Afghanistan, illicit economies have been shown to fund insurgencies and political actors, and to contribute to ongoing conflict.

The GI-TOC’s 2021 Global Organized Crime Index shows that of the ten highest-scoring countries for criminality, meaning those with the most pervasive criminal markets and influential criminal actors, the overwhelming majority are countries experiencing conflict or fragility.

This report considers three case studies at different stages of armed conflict to assess the dynamic relationship between criminal networks, illicit economies, and conflict actors and conditions. These three case studies offer unique perspectives in terms of duration, size of the conflict area and stage of the conflict:

• Armed insurgency in northern Mozambique

• Armed groups in Libya and Mali

• Armed groups in Colombia

While these conflicts present three distinct cases, they also share relevant similarities. In these cases, unrest is created after an armed group or groups counter the legitimacy of the state. The national response to the conflict is supplemented with regional and international responses. All situations lack a swift resolution, and the instability persists primarily in areas outside capitals, even after formal conflict resolution. In this way, these three cases are representative of sustained, localized instability deriving from armed conflict between the state and non-state armed groups.

All three conflict areas overlap with areas of established illicit economies. In these settings, the connections between armed conflict and illicit markets evolve over time. The impacts may be commodity-dependent, with different considerations for illegal mining as opposed to trafficked drugs. Illicit markets change over time, as do the power brokers and beneficiaries involved. Illicit economies contribute to long-term enabling environments for instability by prolonging conflict and eroding government responses to conflict. Through the case studies of northern Mozambique, the Sahel region and Colombia, this report identifies ten dynamics that influence illicit economies and conflict situations. These findings make a contribution to vital policy discussions for stabilization and conflict mediation in these – and other – re

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime., 2022. 74p.

By Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime

Before February 2022, Russian and Ukrainian organized crime formed the strongest criminal ecosystem in Europe. Having developed along similar lines in the 1990s, Russian and Ukrainian criminal groups and networks controlled a lucrative transnational smuggling highway between Russia and Western Europe that carried gold, timber, tobacco, coal, counterfeit/untaxed goods, humans and drugs. At the more politically connected end of the spectrum, corrupt officials and criminal bosses from both countries exploited Ukraine’s role as a transit country for Russian gas to siphon off millions of dollars, while Ukraine’s oligarch class exerted a strong grip over the country’s economic, political and information spheres.

Kyiv made serious efforts to tackle organized crime and corruption after the 2014 Maidan Revolution but results were mixed, especially in the case of judicial reform; meanwhile, the conflict in the Donbas region helped bolster an array of illicit economies and criminal actors. For organized crime, business was generally good.

The Russian invasion has inflicted a profound shock to this ecosystem. With the war, collaboration between Russian and Ukrainian organized crime interests became impossible due to the political situation (which led many criminals to break such ties) and the pragmatic challenge of smuggling across what was now a violently contested and dynamic front line. Many Ukrainian crime bosses chose to leave the country, as did many oligarchs, including several accused of pro-Russian sympathies. Martial law and the curfew also initially constrained criminal activity. According to senior sources in the Ukrainian police, incidents of armed robberies declined by a factor of between three and four, and the homicide rate dropped to almost zero at the beginning of the war (although this may partly reflect the impact of the war on reporting in the early days of the war). It may be that the impact of the invasion also whittled out some less robust and resilient organized crime groups: according to data from the general prosecutor’s office, the number of organized crime groups under investigation decreased from 499 in 2021 to 395 in 2022 (although this decline alternatively could reflect dimished investigative capacity).

This report explores the changing dynamics in the political economy of Ukrainian organized crime up till December 2022 and maps how the criminal landscape has adapted to the new situation. Given the complexity of the impact of the war in Ukraine on organized crime in both parties to the conflict, the GI-TOC is producing two reports. This report concentrates on developments within Ukraine’s internationally recognized borders – with the exception of the so-called Luhansk and Donetsk ‘people’s republics’ (LDNR) in the Donbas region, which broke away from Kyiv in 2014 with Russian backing and assistance, and Crimea, which Russia illegally annexed the same year. The impact of the conflict on organized crime in these areas and on Russian organized crime more generally will be discussed in a separate report, which will assess trends in sanctions busting and money laundering, changes in trafficking flows east of Ukraine and how Russian organized crime groups have responded to the conflict.

Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2023. 60p.

By Julia Stanyard | Thierry Vircoulon | Julian Rademeyer

Russia has rapidly increased its engagement in Africa in recent years, both politically and economically, as it seeks to expand its influence on the continent. However, Russia’s activities in Africa are subject to controversy. Our new report sheds light on the Wagner Group, a private military company rapidly becoming the most effective form of Russian engagement in Africa.

The group comprises a network of political influence operations and economic entities such as mining companies. It has been accused of using whatever means necessary to achieve its aims, including criminal activity. The US government recently designated Wagner as a ‘transnational criminal organization,’ allowing for broader sanctions against Wagner and its enablers.

The report argues that the Wagner Group is unique as an organization in the breadth, scale, and boldness of its activities. However, the study also shows that Wagner did not emerge in a vacuum: The group’s activities and characteristics reflect broader trends in the evolution of Russia’s oligarchs and organized crime groups, their respective relationships with the Russian state, and their activities in Africa.

By focusing on case studies in several African countries, the report helps to shed light on the complex dynamics between Russia, its oligarchs, and its criminal networks and how they interact with African governments, businesses, and populations. This report draws on research conducted since July 2022, as well as other sources from across the continent, providing a comprehensive overview of the Wagner Group’s operations in Africa. The report provides important insights into the evolving relationship between Russia and Africa and how this is shaping politics and economics on the continent, serving as a resource for journalists, policymakers, and researchers seeking to understand the complex dynamics of Russian engagement in Africa.

Center for the Study of Democracy; Global Initiative Against Organized Crime, 2023.92p.

By Robert A. Roks & James A. Densley

Based on ethnographic fieldwork and a content analysis of secondary sources, the current study presents an in-depth case study of gang evolution. We chart the history and development of the Dutch Crips, from playgroup origins in the 1980s to criminal endeavors in the 1990s, to its rebirth as an Outlaw Motorcycle Gang in the 2000s. At each evolutionary stage, we examine the identity of the group, its organization, the nature of its criminal activities, and branding. We highlight how, over 30 years, the Crips constantly reinvented themselves to meet their members’ age-defined needs and to attract future generations to the group.

April 2020 Deviant Behavior 41(4):525–542

By Ken Opala

Despite the August 2022 elections proceeding relatively smoothly, there is still a clear nexus between politics and crime in the country.

Election violence remains a major problem in Kenya despite attempts by the state and other actors to tackle it. Ahead of the country’s fifth general election, held on 9 August 2022, state agencies, the media and civil society predicted the re-emergence of gangs and militias keen to influence its outcome. Although the elections went off relatively smoothly there is still a clear nexus between politics and crime.

ENACT-Africa, 2023. 24p.

By Julia Yansura and Lakshmi Kumar

In this report, Global Financial Integrity (GFI) presents an analysis of narcotics-related illicit financial flows between the United States and the major narcotics production and transit countries of Mexico and Colombia. The report was commissioned by the Western Hemisphere Drug Policy Commission as part of its mandate to evaluate US drug policies and programs in Latin America and the Caribbean, assess current efforts to reduce the illicit drug supply and address the harms associated with trafficking and drug abuse. A variety of strategies can and have been used to address drug trafficking in the Western Hemisphere, from manual and aerial crop eradication, to interdiction, illicit crop substitution and other alternate development approaches. While existing strategies have resulted in temporary disruptions to narcotics cultivation and trafficking, they have not been successful in addressing these issues in a comprehensive, lasting manner. At the same time, history has shown that many of these policies have had unintended consequences and caused harm to people, their communities and the environment in very profound ways. Financial strategies from the anti-money laundering and counter financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) toolkit offer a different lens to view and address the problem of drug trafficking. In this report, GFI argues that AML/CFT is underutilized in current US and regional counter-narcotics efforts and needs to be reprioritized. Effectively responding to the challenges of drug trafficking and transnational organized crime will require a multi-pronged, multi-stakeholder and multi-disciplinary effort that includes AML/CFT, as well as a more comprehensive approach to drug policies that encompasses human rights, public health and development.

Washington, DC: Global Financial Integrity , 2020. 67p.

By PwC

What are the biggest external frauds on the rise, what should you be aware of and how can you mitigate against them? We are delighted to share the key results of PwC’s Global Economic Crime and Fraud Survey 2022. External threats are on the rise. Preventing fraud and other economic crimes is a complex challenge, complicated even further by today’s volatile risk landscape. As organisations act quickly to navigate change, bad actors look to exploit the potentially widening cracks in fraud defenses.

London: PwC, 2022. 15p.

By G. Herbert

This review provides a summary of the evidence on Illicit Financial Flows (IFFs) between China and developing countries in Africa and Asia. Specifically, it looks at the evidence on how IFFs to and from China impact on developing countries, as well as on the drivers of IFFs and of how flows are facilitated. The review draws upon a combination of academic and grey literature sources, though it is not exhaustive and only draws upon English language sources. IFFs involving China have attracted particular attention, due to estimates suggesting it is responsible for the largest IFFs by value globally. However, little has been published to date specifically on IFFs between China and developing countries. This paper attempts to help address this gap. Section 2 provides some background information on the debates and uncertainties around IFFs, including conceptual issues, difficulties in measuring these flows, and their potential impacts, as well as attempts to quantify China’s overall IFFs. Section 3 focuses on trade-related IFFs between China and developing countries in Asia and Africa. Discrepancies indicative of potential IFFs are identified using trade data from 2018 and an attempt is made to determine the scale of the revenue consequences of trade is-invoicing for China’s developing country partners. Section 4 considers IFFs-related to corrupt business practices, focusing largely on Chinese investment in Africa. Section 5 moves on to consider IFFs that relate to the trade in illegal products, including illegal narcotics, human trafficking, the illegal arms trade, the illegal wildlife trade, the illegal organ trade, and the trade-in counterfeit products. Finally, Section 6 discusses enabling environment factors relevant to IFFs between China and developing countries.

K4D Helpdesk Report.

Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies. 2020. 37p.

By INTERPOL

With the increase in Internet coverage, online trade of illicit goods is likely increasing on the African continent. In recent years, cyber-enabled crimes have increased on the African continent. This has been a result of a combination of factors, including, the improvement of Internet coverage, the wide availability of cyber-tools and the growing flexibility of cybercriminals. As a consequence, online crime nowadays represents a bigger security issue for law enforcement in African member countries than ever before. In this framework, INTERPOL, under the European Union funded ENACT Project, examines through this assessment the issue of cyber and cyber-enabled crimes in Africa in order to help drive a more strategic law enforcement response.

Lyon, France: INTERPOL, 2020. 79p.

By INTERPOL

The development of mobile money services in Africa offer criminals a substantial opportunity to utilize these services to target victims in a variety of crimes as well as to further enable other forms of criminality. This rapid service development combined with criminal opportunities represents a security issue of interest to all member countries in Africa and poses a significant challenge to law enforcement agencies in member countries. As a result, INTERPOL, under the European Union funded ENACT Project, has assessed this issue in order to help drive a more strategic law enforcement response. Criminals and criminal organizations will most probably continue to utilize mobile money services following the recent increase in their popularity and the prominent role such services now play in society across Africa. This prominent role in society has enabled criminals to exploit weaknesses in regulations and identification systems, further enabled by a lack of experience and resources in law enforcement. Crime types have been identified that exploit mobile money services across Africa. These primarily include various types of fraud that target the distinct stages of deployment for mobile money services. Whilst acquisitive crimes significantly impact the lives of victims, criminals have also identified further opportunities to exploit mobile money services to assist other criminal activities. These ‘mobile money enabled crimes’ include illicit commodities purchases, terrorism financing and firearm enabled crime. Such significant crimes pose a threat to stability and security across Africa if not addressed by member countries. The threat from criminality facilitated by mobile money services in Africa is substantial, yet there is sometimes limited capacity amongst law enforcement to manage this complex issue, especially concerning the technical expertise required to utilise relevant evidence in the criminal justice system. As mobile money services develop interoperability across Africa, stronger partnerships amongst all law enforcement agencies, greater awareness of the overall issue at a regional level and identification of best practice responses from such agencies will be required. INTERPOL is in a position to support member countries through coordinated, intelligence led support to law enforcement using a range of police databases and operational support techniques.

Lyon, France: INTERPOL, 2020. 63p.

By EUROPOL

Cybercrime, in its various forms, represents an increasing threat to the EU. Cyber-attacks, online child sexual exploitation, and online frauds are highly complex crimes and manifest in diverse typologies. Meanwhile the perpetrators behind these crimes are becoming increasingly agile, exploiting new situations created by geopolitical and technological changes. The Internet Organised Crime Assessment (IOCTA) is Europol’s assessment of the cybercrime landscape and how it has changed over the last 24 months. Accompanying this report will be a series of spotlight reports released later this year, each of which examines a specific crime area relating to cybercrime.

Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2023 14p.

By Juraj Sikra

I have explored how to improve cybercrime reporting in Scotland by conducting a systematic literature review. Due to the lack of data on Scotland, I have frequently extrapolated from both the UK and the West. The research questions were: 1. What is known about cybercrime in the UK to date? 2. What is known about cybercrime victims in the UK to date? 3. What is known about cybercrime reporting to date? The answers were retrieved by combining Boolean variables with keywords into Scopus, Web of Science and ProQuest. This resulted in the analysis of 100 peer-reviewed articles. This analysis revealed a common trend, a novel taxonomy, and an original conclusion. The common trend is that of responsibilisation, which is the shifting of responsibility for policing cybercrime from the government onto the citizens and private sector, which will inevitably responsibilise consumers. The novel taxonomy is for classifying cybercrime reporting systems according to three pillars, which I referred to as Human-ToHuman (H2H), Human-To-Machine (H2M) and Machine-To-Machine (M2M). The original conclusion is that to improve cybercrime reporting in Scotland, the process needs to be treated also as a social one rather than a purely mathematical one.

Glasgow: University of Strathclyde, 2022. 60p.

By Paul Michael Gilmour

Purpose – Money laundering poses significant challenges for policymakers and law-enforcement authorities. The money-laundering phenomenon is often acknowledged as a type of “serious and organised crime” yet has traditionally been described as a complicated three-stage process, involving the “placement, layering and integration” of criminal proceeds. This article aims to reexamine the money-laundering concept within the realm of organised crime and critique its legal underpinnings. Design/methodology/approach – This paper explores how criminal actors collude in organised money laundering schemes to circumvent laws and frustrate the efforts of officials, while advancing the regulatory-spatial paradigms of which organised money launderers operate. In doing so, it reframes the debate towards the “who” and “where” of money laundering. Findings – This paper argues that authorities’ efforts to combat money laundering relies on rigid legal definitions and flawed ideals that fail to address the money-laundering problem. Originality/value – There has been little scholarly debate that questions the fundamental approach to conceptualising money laundering. This paper proposes a new approach to combating money laundering that better incorporates the actors involved in money laundering and the spaces in which it occurs.

Journal of Financial Crime , 2022

By Michael Levi

Money laundering has ascended the enforcement and criminological agenda in the course of this century, and has been accompanied by an increased focus on legal professionals as ‘enablers’ of crime. This article explores the dynamics of this enforcement, media and political agenda, and how the legal profession has responded in the UK and elsewhere, within the context of ignoring the difficulties of judging the effectiveness of anti money laundering. It concludes that legal responses are a function of their lobbying power, the determination of governments to clamp down on the toxic impacts of legal structures, and different legal cultures. However, it remains unclear what the effects on the levels and organization of serious crimes for gain are of controls on the professions.

Trends in Organized Crime volume 24, pages96–110 (2021)

By the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

In 2021, America experienced an unprecedented increase in cyber attacks and malicious cyber activity. These cyber attacks compromised businesses in an extensive array of business sectors as well as the American public. As the cyber threat evolves and becomes increasingly intertwined with traditional foreign intelligence threats and emerging technologies, the FBI continues to leverage our unique authorities and partnerships to impose risks and consequences on our nation’s cyber adversaries. The FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) provides the American public with a direct outlet to report cyber crimes to the FBI. We analyze and investigate the reporting to track the trends and threats from cyber criminals and then share this data with our intelligence and law enforcement partners. The FBI, alongside our partners, recognizes how crucial information sharing of cyber activities is to prepare our partners to combat the cyber threat, through a whole-of-government approach. Critical to that approach is public reporting to IC3 - enabling us to fill in the missing pieces with this valuable information during the investigatory process. Not only does this reporting help to prevent additional crimes, it allows us to develop key insights on the ever-evolving trends and threats we face from malign cyber actors. In 2021, IC3 continued to receive a record number of complaints from the American public: 847,376 reported complaints, which was a 7% increase from 2020, with potential losses exceeding $6.9 billion. Among the 2021 complaints received, ransomware, business e-mail compromise (BEC) schemes, and the criminal use of cryptocurrency are among the top incidents reported. In 2021, BEC schemes resulted in 19,954 complaints with an adjusted loss of nearly $2.4 billion.

Washington, DC: FBI, 2022. 33p.