By Tena Prelec

Information manipulation has been a growing concern in recent years, particularly in relation to the disinformation tactics employed by authoritarian regimes. However, the role of non-state actors, such as organized crime (OC) groups, in information manipulation has been largely overlooked. This research aims to fill this gap by examining the various ways in which OC groups manipulate information to achieve their objectives and those of actors connected to them. Drawing on Nicholas Barnes’ concept of ‘political criminality’ (2017), this study examines the varying degrees of proximity between criminal actors and the state, which is essential in exploring the complex interplay between OC and information manipulation. Empirical data was collected from several geographies, with a particular focus on Eastern Europe and the post-Soviet space, including Ukraine, Russia, Moldova (Transnistria), and Albania. The research highlights several dimensions of interest, including: the changing opportunities that technology gives to OC groups to shape facts and narratives; media ownership by organised crime groups and criminal actors; and the ways in which this interplay is situated within the global political economy of offshore finance – including the wider networks of enablers these actors rely on. By shedding light on these aspects, the research seeks to contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of the threat posed by the misuse of information, situates it within the literatures on non-state actors and transnational kleptocracy, and puts forward a framework for analysis that can be tested in future work.

Birmingham, UK: SOC ACE Research Paper 22. University of Birmingham 2023. 44p,

By Alex Papadovassilakis, et al

El Salvador’s gangs are in disarray.

For decades, the Mara Salvatrucha (MS13) and two factions of the 18th Street (Barrio 18) dominated the small Central American nation’s criminal landscape. The gangs embedded themselves in poor communities, terrorizing urban dwellers with extortion and murders. Successive governments tried and failed to dismantle the gangs with aggressive security policies, known as mano dura (iron fist).

In March 2022, the government of El Salvador President Nayib Bukele enacted a state of emergency (régimen de excepción) in response to a brutal gang massacre that left 87 dead. Buoyed by emergency powers, security forces tore through the gangs, arresting tens of thousands of suspected gang members and collaborators. Those who escaped arrest went underground or into exile. In a flash, the MS13 and Barrio 18 all but vanished from the streets of El Salvador.

But though battered and bruised, a surprising number of gang members remain at large. The country’s prisons, once incubators for the gangs, have never been so full.

This six-part investigation looks at how the Bukele government’s crackdown succeeded in overpowering the MS13 and Barrio 18. We assess what remains of the gangs in El Salvador, and contemplate whether these structures could one day return or mutate.

Washington, DC; Medellin, Columbia: InSight Crime, 2023.56p.

By: Bryan Avelar, Juan José Martínez

Moskitia is dying. And it is organized crime that is killing it.

First came the drugs, as traffickers turned the region’s coasts and forests into a cocaine corridor. Then came the traffickers themselves, financing invaders that are clear-cutting thousands of hectares of forest and fencing off vast tracts of land with barbed wire and armed guards.

The region’s Indigenous Miskito people have been left trapped in desperate poverty, and are caught between the traffickers and an indifferent state. But some are now preparing to fight back.

Washington, DC, Columbia: InSight Crime, 2023. 64p..

By Jenni Irish-Qhobosheane

Our new report focuses on the pervasive issue of copper theft in South Africa. This socio-economic challenge has severe consequences on the country's already strained infrastructure, affecting the capacity and operations of state-owned entities and municipalities.

Our 2022 South Africa Strategic Organized Crime Risk Assessment revealed that the nation's critical infrastructure is 'at a tipping point after years of chronic mismanagement and rampant theft,' noting the role of copper theft as an exacerbating factor. In light of this alarming situation, our latest report delves into the repercussions of copper theft on South Africa's infrastructure and its links to organized crime networks.

This comprehensive study examines the value chain and market dynamics for stolen copper, a familiar yet often overlooked area where criminal enterprises have become deeply entrenched. With a focus on solutions, the report outlines measures taken to combat copper theft and explores possible future strategies for addressing this growing concern.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2023. 60p.

By Lyes Tagziria and Lucia Bird Ruiz Benitez de Lugo

West Africa is one of the world’s most vibrant and diverse regions; home to over 400 million people, around 1 200 languages and many different religious and ethnic identities. The region’s economic growth since the turn of the century has been impressive, resulting in a significant reduction in absolute levels of poverty. Nevertheless, with rampant insecurity at the hands of violent extremists, armed groups and criminal bandits, political instability, limited economic opportunities for the region’s burgeoning youth population and the worsening impact of climate change, West Africa faces many complex challenges.

With over 20 000 conflict fatalities across the region in 2022 alone, violence in West Africa, especially in the Sahel region, is at unprecedented levels. According to the ACLED Conflict Severity Index, three countries in West Africa – Mali, Burkina Faso and Nigeria – have extreme or high levels of conflict. Illicit economies play an important role in sustaining instability across the region.

The security and well-being of citizens across the ECOWAS region is affected not only by violent conflict, but by myriad, interwoven factors from economic prosperity to political representation, justice and security, social cohesion, freedom and much more. In this context the concept of human security, as opposed to the narrower concept of state security, has increasingly become the focus of policymakers across West Africa.

As set out in the ECOWAS Country Risk and Vulnerability Assessments (CRVAs), ‘the human security framework provides a holistic approach to understanding different threats that affect individuals’ lives, whether this is through conflict, health, food, environment, or other social, political or economic factors’.

A key component of this human-centric approach to security, focused on reducing harm to the people of West Africa, is prevention. This requires comprehensive, accurate and timely data on existing and future threats and is therefore one of the main rationales behind the work of the ECOWAS Commission, through both the Early Warning Directorate and the ENACT Organized Crime Index. While the objectives of the index are manifold, its principal aim is to build an evidence base to underpin responses to organized crime.

The 2021 ENACT Organized Crime Index identified the West Africa region as having the second-highest level of criminality on the African continent, with human trafficking, drugs and the illicit trade in non-renewable resources forming the most prevalent criminal markets. The region placed in second once again in the latest iteration of the index, the 2023 Global Organized Crime Index.

In 2023, West Africa overtook Southern Africa as the region with the highest resilience score on the continent, pointing to comparatively high levels of resilience even in areas affected by significant criminal markets. The index highlighted legislative frameworks, civil society actors and the region’s international collaboration in the fight against organized crime as relative regional strengths. Overall levels of resilience, however, both objectively and within the global context, are weak.

The index’s findings provides a statistical underpinning for the relationship between illicit markets, security and stability, demonstrating a strong negative correlation between criminality and peacefulness. In other words, the less peaceful a country, the more likely it is to be afflicted by high levels of organized crime. In other words, the less peaceful a country, the more likely it is to be afflicted by high levels of organized crime. Responding to illicit economies which pose a threat to these goals must be a central element of programming. In line with this, the Organized Crime Resilience Framework (OCRF) examines the major organized-crime threats facing the West African region, as identified by the index and the CRVAs published by the ECOWAS Early Warning Directorate.

While the index is devoted to organized crime, the CRVAs focus on conflict and human security more broadly. Drawing on both these datasets engenders a conflict-sensitive and human-security-focused assessment of organized crime in West Africa, encompassing threats and vulnerabilities, as well as potential sources of resilience.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against International Organized Crime, Ecowas Commission, 2023.

By Marina Caparini

This SIPRI Report examines how organized crime is intertwined with armed conflict and hybrid governance systems in three states that currently host United Nations stabilization missions. It surveys the conflict/crime/governance nexus in the Central African Republic (CAR), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and Mali, and how UN stabilization missions, in particular the UN Police, have engaged with the challenge of organized crime.

The report argues that improving how UN stabilization interventions engage with organized crime will require a frank assessment of the significance of organized crime in systems of governance and patronage, of the role of organized crime as a driver and enabler of armed conflict by non-state armed groups, and of the involvement of state-embedded actors in illicit markets. The complex links between conflict and governance actors and organized crime in the settings examined raise fundamental questions about the assumptions underlying peace operations. The report concludes with a set of recommendations on how to move to more realistic analyses and bases for peace operations.

Solna: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2022. 57p.

By Mark Freeman and Barney Afako

Co-authored by Mark Freeman and Barney Afako, the publication offers simplified technical guidance directed to any good-faith promoter of formal negotiation with one or more violent criminal groups when the proposed endgame of the negotiation is to reduce or end the criminal violence in question. In doing so, the paper draws on key ideas developed in IFIT’s ground-breaking report, Negotiating with Violent Criminal Groups: Lessons and Guidelines from Global Practice (Freeman & Velbab-Brown, 2021), which covers the most diverse set of negotiations with criminal groups ever examined in one place.

The first part of Freeman and Afako's practice note examines threshold questions a good-faith promoter would be wise to consider before outwardly exploring or proposing any negotiation involving a criminal group; the second part discusses internal and external actions a good-faith promoter ought to contemplate as part of any initial phase of formal engagement or negotiation with members of a criminal group.

Barcelona: Institute for Integrated Transitions (IFIT) , 2024. 3p.

By The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

This report offers empirical evidence and case studies from across the OSCE area on how women are recruited into organized crime groups, their roles within them, and how and why they exit these groups. It demonstrates that the role of women in organized crime is nuanced. Evidence shows that while women are often exploited and victimized by organized crime groups, they can also be important actors. Yet persistent gender stereotypes mean that women’s agency in organized crime is often not recognized by criminal justice practitioners. Failing to recognize women’s agency in organized crime impedes the understanding in participating States of the complexity of the organized crime landscape, and hampers their ability to combat transnational organized crime or support women to leave organized crime groups.

Vienna: OSCE, 2023. 72p.

By World Economic Forum

The Global Risks Report explores some of the most severe risks we may face over the next decade, against a backdrop of rapid technological change, economic uncertainty, a warming planet and conflict. As cooperation comes under pressure, weakened economies and societies may only require the smallest shock to edge past the tipping point of resilience.

Geneva, SWIT: World Economic Forum, 2024. 124p

By International Crisis Group

What’s new? Mexico’s criminal groups use social media to garner popular support, denigrate rivals, glorify narco-culture and coordinate violence. Social media is also crucial for providing timely information about flare-ups of violence, particularly since journalists face major threats to their safety, which heavily circumscribes their ability to report from many crime-affected municipalities.

Why does it matter? These criminal groups are recruiting and spreading disinformation online, making them stronger and creating a glut of unverified information that puts civilians at greater risk. Platforms have struggled to respond appropriately.

What should be done? Platforms should boost resources for online monitoring, especially when violence is spiking. Given social media’s importance in disseminating information, platforms should modify their algorithms to demote posts supporting criminal groups and work with civil society to identify trusted accounts, including anonymous ones. Mexico’s government should also invest in protecting journalists.

Brussels: Crisis Group, 2024

By Abigail Weitzman, Mónica Caudillo, and Eldad J. Levy

In this review, we argue that to understand patterns and causes of violence in contemporary Latin America, we must explicitly consider when violence takes on interpersonal qualities. We begin by reviewing prominent definitions and measurements of interpersonal violence. We then detail the proliferation of interlocking sources of regional insecurity, including gender-based violence, gangs, narcotrafficking, vigilantism, and political corruption. Throughout this description, we highlight when and how each source of insecurity can become interpersonal. Next, we outline mutually reinforcing macro and micro conditions underlying interpersonal violence in its many hybrid forms. To conclude, we call for more multifaceted conceptualizations of interpersonal violence that embrace the complexities of Latin American security situations and discuss the opportunities and challenges that lie ahead in this area.

Annual Review of Criminology, Volume 7, Page 163 - 186

By The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Research and Trend Analysis Branch

Preventing and reducing homicide means sparing hundreds of thousands of lives lost to violence every year. To do that, we must understand the complex and highly diverse range of threats and phenomena that drive and intersect with such lethal violence – from interpersonal dynamics to organized crime and rule of law to climate change, poverty and inequality to demographics, and much more – and how they differ across national and regional contexts. This Global Study on Homicide is an effort to reveal and delve into the facts behind the violence, to try and identify notable trends and to inform policies and solutions. The Study shows that 2021 was an exceptionally lethal year, with an estimated 458,000 intentional homicides worldwide, averaging 52 killings every hour. The global homicide rate was at 5.8 for every 100,000 persons, a number that sadly reflects little progress in reducing lethal violence worldwide since the launch of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development in 2015. The biggest share of the victims were killed with firearms, which accounted for 47 per cent of homicides committed with a known mechanism worldwide. That number rises to 75 per cent in the Americas, which has the highest homicide rate in the world, and where organized crime is responsible for at least half of all homicides. In different parts of the world, organized crime can lead to spikes in homicide, particularly as criminal groups compete for control. Organized crime has also had an impact on homicide rates in Europe. While the regional homicide rate has decreased over the last six years, there are signs of increased lethal violence connected to organized crime in various countries of the continent. Such organized crime-related killing – and all homicidal violence, in all parts of the world – is far more likely to be committed by, and against, men. Men account for 81 per cent of the victims of intentional homicide globally, and around 90 per cent of the suspects. Women, on the other hand, are more likely to be killed because of their gender, and more likely to lose their lives to violence at home. Women account for the victims in 54 per cent of killings in the home, and 66 per cent of intimate partner killings. Many people are also killed because of what they do, including human rights defenders, humanitarian workers, journalists, and environmental activists. The current global situation, characterized by growing conflicts and rule of law challenges, is fuelling such sociopolitical homicides, which in many cases happen with impunity. Given the broad and diverse factors driving lethal violence around the world, effective responses to homicide must cover a wide spectrum of context-specific interventions. Some interventions will be designed to reduce genderbased violence against women and girls, others will be geared towards reducing organized crime and gang violence, and others still may focus on firearm laws and regulations, vocational training to at-risk demographics, or mental health interventions. But all responses must share common threads, namely the need to be based on evidence, the need to prioritize prevention and address root causes, and the need to invest significantly. Investing in homicide prevention and responses is of particular priority in Africa, which this Global Study projects to be the most at-risk region over the coming decades, in large part due to its younger population, economic inequality levels, climate vulnerability, and weaker response capabilities. This study also highlights the significant limitations in the information available across regions, and the need to invest in better data collection. It is highly important to understand the types of homicide in any given context, whether family-related, gang-related, or any of the other identified typologies, yet more than a third of all detected homicides are classified as “unknown”. Similarly, four out of every ten killings of women and girls do not have information on the victim-perpetrator relationship, despite the prevalence of intimate partner killings against women and girls.

Vienna/New York: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime; Research and Trend Analysis Branch, 2023. 155pp; December 2023

Edited By Melchior Powell, Dina Wafa, Tim A. Mau

This book provides an important survey of the causes and current state of corruption across a range of nations and regions. Delving into the diverse ways in which corruption is being combatted, the book explores and describes efforts to inculcate principles of ethical conduct in citizens, private sector actors and public sector personnel and institutions. Corruption is a global condition that effects every type of government, at every level, and has bewitched scholars of governance from ancient times to the present day. The book brings together chapters on a range of state and regional corruption experiences, framing them in terms of efforts to enhance ethical conduct and achieve integrity in government practices and operations. In addition, the book addresses and analyses the theoretical and practical bases of ethics that form the background and historical precepts of efforts to create integrity in government practices, and finally assesses recent international efforts to address corruption on an international scale. This book will be perfect for researchers and upper level students of public administration, comparative government, international development, criminal justice, and corruption.

London: Routledge; New York: 2020. 352p.

By Elizabeth R. Baer

The first genocide of the twentieth century, though not well known, was committed by Germans between 1904–1907 in the country we know today as Namibia, where they exterminated hundreds of Herero and Nama people and subjected the surviving indigenous men, women, and children to forced labor. The perception of Africans as subhuman—lacking any kind of civilization, history, or meaningful religion—and the resulting justification for the violence against them is what author Elizabeth R. Baer refers to as the “genocidal gaze,” an attitude that was later perpetuated by the Nazis. In The Genocidal Gaze: From German Southwest Africa to the Third Reich, Baer uses the metaphor of the gaze to trace linkages between the genocide of the Herero and Nama and that of the victims of the Holocaust. Significantly, Baer also considers the African gaze of resistance returned by the indigenous people and their leaders upon the German imperialists.

Detroit, MI: Wayne State University Press, 2017.

Edited by Nick Gill and Anthony Good

Drawing on new research material from ten European countries, Asylum Determination in Europe: Ethnographic Perspectives brings together a range of detailed accounts of the legal and bureaucratic processes by which asylum claims are decided. The book includes a legal overview of European asylum determination procedures, followed by sections on the diverse actors involved, the means by which they communicate, and the ways in which they make life-and-death decisions on a daily basis. It offers a contextually rich account that moves beyond doctrinal law to uncover the gaps and variances between formal policy and legislation, and law as actually practiced. The contributors employ a variety of disciplinary perspectives – sociological, anthropological, geographical, and linguistic – but are united in their use of an ethnographic methodological approach. Through this lens, the book captures the confusion, improvisation, inconsistency, complexity, and emotional turmoil inherent to the process of claiming asylum in Europe.

Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019. 346p.

Edited by Frank Jacob

The series Genocide and Mass Violence in the Age of Extremes wants to provide an interdisciplinary forum for research on mass violence and genocide during the "short" 20th century. It will highlight the role of state and non-state actors, the perspectives of perpetrators, victims, and bystanders, and put violent events of the Age of Extremes in a larger political, social, and most important, cultural context. Anthologies and monographs will provide academic and non-academic readers with a deep insight into and a better understanding for the reasons, the acts, and the consequences or mass violence and genocide from a global perspective. The late Nobel Peace Prize laureate and former General Secretary of the UN Kofi Annan (1938–2018) emphasized in his Nobel Lecture in 2001 that the “crime of all crimes” often begins with a single murder. This violent act does not only physically destroy a human being, but, as French philosopher Michel Foucault (1926–1984) highlighted, power relations are established and new mechanisms of power are eventually installed or fortified within a society.2 The 20th century in particular witnessed countless attempts to restructure such power relations and, as a whole, the years between the First World War and the end of the Cold War, i.e. the period Eric Hobsbawm (1917–2012) called the “Age of Extremes,”3 were perhaps, as Kofi Annan correctly further remarked, “the deadliest in human history, devastated by innumerable conflicts, untold suffering, and unimaginable crimes.”4 The century was determined by imperial wars, two World Wars, the Cold War, and new wars at its end.5 These were often accompanied by forms of mass violence, i.e. mass killings or genocides.6 German historian Christian Gerlach consequently speaks of “extremely violent societies” that determined the course of this “Age of Extremes.” Gerlach describes these “extremely violent societies” as formations where various population groups become victims of massive physical violence, in which, acting together with organs of the state, diverse social groups participate for a multitude of reasons. Simply put, the occurrence and the thrust of mass violence depends on broad and diverse support, but this is based on a variety of motives and interests that cause violence to spread in different directions and varying intensities and forms

Berlin ; Boston : De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2019, 220p.

By Mark Galeotti

Time of Troubles is the first comprehensive assessment of the impact of the Ukraine war on the Russian underworld. The war’s human and economic costs, along with the political retrenchment of a regime under growing pressure, are all transforming illegal markets and organized crime in Russia with potentially destabilizing effects. The annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the subsequent undeclared conflict in the Donbas region had already begun to reshape the Russian underworld. The 2022 invasion of Ukraine, however, brought dramatic changes. An almost complete split between Ukrainian and Russian criminal groups has had a significant negative impact, not least because of their dominance over transnational narcotics flows. At the same time, new opportunities to smuggle sanctioned luxury goods for the rich and critical components for the defence–industrial complex have enriched and elevated other gangs, especially those able to exploit and control routes through Belarus, Armenia and Central Asia. All this is putting pressure on the underworld status quo – and the state’s capacity to manage and maintain it – and even reshaping the relationship between Russian criminal networks and their partners and subsidiaries abroad. Even when the war does end, some form of sanctions or trade and investment controls will almost certainly remain in place. The Kremlin will find it difficult to integrate large numbers of traumatized, impoverished and disillusioned veterans, many of whom risk drifting into organized and disorganized crime. Condemned to pariah status and looking for alternative ways to support itself, the state may turn its existing ad hoc relations with the underworld into something much more focused and institutionalized, creating new dangers for its neighbours and the global order as a whole. The stakes could hardly be higher.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. 2023. 72p.

By InfoAmazonia, Armando.Info and La Liga Contra el Silencio), Amazon Watch and the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC).

The Amazon, the world’s largest rainforest, covering some 7 million square kilometres and linking nine countries, has become one of the main sources and transit points for criminal economies in Latin America. From shipments of cocaine, gold and timber moving down its hundreds of rivers, to the makeshift airstrips that facilitate the nightly movement of small contraband planes, the Amazon is now home to a complex underground economy that feeds growing global demand but also fuels violence and deforestation. The unchecked actions of increasingly powerful criminal organizations pose an existential threat to the planet’s most biodiverse region and the communities it shelters. Over the past decade, the Amazon has become one of the most dangerous regions in Latin America, with marginalized communities bearing the brunt of the violence. In Brazil, for example, indigenous communities have been systematically subjected to violent invasions by armed garimpeiros (miners), while in Colombia’s nine Amazon departments, where 43 massacres have been documented since 2020, non-state armed groups terrorize rural communities. In Peru, drug traffickers are increasingly recruiting indigenous children to work on coca plantations, and guerrilla groups are sending entire families to work in illegal gold mines in Venezuela. In 2022, one in five killings of land and environmental defenders worldwide occurred in the Amazon.As demand for illicit goods, particularly cocaine, has risen to historically high levels and the price of gold has increased dramatically since the early 2000s, so have criminal opportunities.4 This, combined with a low state presence, high levels of corruption, decades of faltering security strategies and a lack of coordination between states, has created the perfect environment for some of Latin America’s most prolific criminal groups to reorganize and take over. The reshuffling of the local criminal ecosystem – which includes Colombian guerrilla groups, Brazilian gangs, Peruvian criminal groups (including drug and human traffickers) and Venezuelan crime syndicates – has resulted in some groups being wiped off the map, leaving room for others to emerge or expand. Through field research and data analysis, Amazon Underworld found that non-state armed groups or crime syndicates are active in 70 per cent of the municipalities investigated in Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela (see the methodology section below), and that all of the Amazon’s borders have at least one armed actor on one side of the divide.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime.2023. 40p.

By Vanda Felbab-Brown

Since 2007, negotiations with violent organised crime groups (hereafter, “criminal groups”) have been increasingly featured in government, church and NGO responses to violent criminality in Latin America and the Caribbean. They are enormously controversial, both politically and ethically. Many consider them unacceptable and counterproductive, as they may involve risks such as legitimising the criminal group or emboldening others to engage in criminal activities. The relative rarity with which such negotiations produce a deal and the great uncertainty as to their long-term outcomes are further sources of controversy. The sensitivity and risks are so large that some who have participated in the situations examined in this paper are wary of calling them “negotiations.” They may avoid the term even when they have bargained from a position of superiority or succeeded in striking a deal. In attempting to address the challenges criminal groups present, most countries understandably employ a tough-on-crime stance. Any other would be hard to justify to the public. Yet, where the activities of these groups have become especially pervasive and violent, there is often a lack of deterrence capacity, leading to public anger and desperation. Negotiation can thus sometimes become an option and may be pursued in conjunction with coercive tactics, institutional strengthening, legalisation measures and more. As a diplomat involved in the talks with criminal gangs in El Salvador and Honduras put it, by negotiating “we were not trying to get to heaven; we were just trying to avoid hell.” But if negotiation with criminal groups sometimes becomes necessary, which group characteristics and contextual factors must be taken into account? What end-goals are appropriate and realistic? What inducements, concessions and redlines must be contemplated? And how do such processes compare and contrast with negotiations conducted with politically-motivated insurgents? These are just some of the questions examined in this paper.   

Barcelona, Spain: The Institute for Integrated Transitions, 2021. 47p,

By Bodean Hedwards,, Lucia Bird, and Perkha Traxl 

This report analyzes recent trends in maritime people smuggling from South and South East Asia on journeys towards Asia-Pacific, focusing on four case study countries: Indonesia, Malaysia, India and Sri Lanka. These were chosen to provide a cross-section of source, transit and destination countries in the region, with Sri Lanka and Indonesia being well-established departure countries toward Oceania. The paper considers key trends, the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and intersections with human trafficking. It is important to note that maritime migration does not occur in isolation but typically forms part of what is usually a longer migration journey that involves land border crossings as well as air routes. This report examines trends in the smuggling of migrants across maritime pathways in South and South East Asia, with a particular focus on journeys towards the Asia-Pacific region. The paper provides insight into the conditions that compel migrants to choose people smuggling – and particularly maritime smuggling – as a means of migration and details the reasons that influence migrants’ decisions in relation to destination and migration routes. It explores the factors that make irregular migrants vulnerable to trafficking during their journey and examines the nature of maritime people-smuggling models and operations around the region, looking at, among other factors, recruitment, payment, and border crossing and immigration arrangements. Finally, drawing on what is known about people-smuggling dynamics and experiences across South and South East Asia, the report explores emerging responses identified during interviews that are thought to be having an impact on the various intersections of people smuggling and human trafficking.

Geneva, SWIT:  Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime., 2023. 60p.