By Mark Shaw, Tuesday Reitano, Simone Haysom, Peter Tinti

  I llicit trade is an umbrella term that covers multiple crimes and commodities, including the theft, diversion, adulteration, counterfeiting, and production of substandard goods, all acts which can occur at multiple points along a supply chain. It is initiated, enabled, and protected by a wide range of actors, from unethical corporations and corrupt officials at all levels of government to armed violent groups in conflict zones and organized crime networks operating locally and transnationally. As global trade routes increasingly encompass developing economies—as a source, transit, and market for consumer goods—they present unique challenges to creating effective national and, by implication, regional and global regimes against illicit trade. For many states around the world, and especially in the Global South, these challenges threaten to destabilize social, economic, and political structures. These states are the world’s “states on the cusp.” The term illicit trade, for the purpose of this report, refers to illegal production, movement, or sale of normally legal goods. Such illegal movement is often carried out to derive profit by avoiding costs such as those imposed by taxes or customs duties. There is a particularly strong incentive for illicit trade in cases where goods are subject to high duties, or where goods are subsidized to be cheaper in one jurisdiction (food, sugar, and flour are examples) but not in another, providing incentives for illegal cross-border trade. The phrase “licit goods traded illicitly” captures this phenomenon neatly. Importantly, however, this definition also includes some goods that are counterfeited to pass off as being licit, and then traded either illicitly (avoiding scrutiny) or, on occasion, in legal markets. The trade in counterfeit goods alone has been estimated to be worth between 3 and 7 percent of global GDP. Many forms of illicit trade, including counterfeit medicines, substandard goods, and the falsification or adulteration of food and agricultural commodities, medical equipment, and consumer and industrial goods have serious public health and safety implications. Other forms of illicit trade have huge environmental, social, and economic impacts, not least of which is reduced revenue collection which weakens state institutions, creating a downward spiral of higher illicit trade intertwined with weaker state capacity. Reversing this trend, therefore, must be a global public good. This complex mix of products and commodities being traded illegally raises the important question of whether advances in technology can assist in more effective regulation. At the core of these efforts is ensuring that commodities are both produced and traded legally to protect consumers from harm. Here, “harm” refers to harms to the public (arising from poor quality or counterfeit products) and to the state (such products harms the state’s ability to collect essential revenues and to control markets in accordance with democratic processes). Global economic trends in international trade and ever more complex supply chains are, however, reducing the role that governments can play in monitoring and regulating trade, creating both greater vulnerabilities and increasing the importance of the private sector as a critical actor. This poses significant new challenges. With an estimated 80 percent of global trade travelling by sea, the trend toward the privatization of ports and other critical infrastructure and the proliferation of free trade zones have created a growing blind spot for governments seeking to understand and regulate supply chains and illicit trade. For some forms of illicit trade, the role of small air shipments through private carriers has had a similar effect, eroding law enforcement’s ability to monitor, predict, and interdict where and how illicitly traded goods will reach the hands of their consumers. Online marketplaces and small package shipping are replacing the physical spaces where illicit transactions used to take place; their market size and reach are expanding while at the same time reducing the stigma of illegality. In short, the scope for illegality is growing, just as the capacity for states to respond is weakening. Can advances in technology fill the gap? Sophisticated and rapidly evolving technologies are bringing new ways to track, trace, monitor, and maintain records with integrity. They are steadily reinforcing law enforcement’s capacity to identify criminality in the vastness of the surface and dark web. Despite the promise that technology has to offer, some longstanding stumbling blocks need to be overcome. Some of these are particularly acute in developing economies. At the most basic level, for example, no system can provide quality control over data entry when those responsible for entering the primary data are either willfully or through lack of capacity corrupting that content. More generally, the lack of global standards and effective and consistent legal frameworks, and, increasingly, questions about jurisdiction caused by cyber-enabled trade and global supply chains, may limit the impact of purely national regimes of oversight and enforcement regimes. Lack of capacity, insecurity, and multiple forms and levels of corruption are pertinent features of developing economies that  compound the inherent challenges of responding to illicit trade. Evidence from case studies around the world, as well as two commissioned for this report—examining the political economy of illicit tobacco in Southern Africa and of counterfeit medicines in Central America—reveal that political actors and state institutions are complicit in enabling, promoting, and protecting illicit trade at the very highest levels of the state. They also show that it is often the most vulnerable and underserved in society who rely on illicit markets to meet basic needs. While there are clear distinctions by commodity and context, the perpetuation of illicit markets and trade within developing economies often can be exacerbated by systematic and serious failures in governance and political will, rather than technical shortcomings that can easily be overcome. Technical solutions also may have unintended consequences for governance and the poor. That does not mean that they should not be used, rather that a better understanding of the economic, political, and social context in which they are implemented is desirable. Implemented effectively, they hold great promise in taking forward steps to undercut illicit markets and improve citizens’ well-being. However, the changing landscape for infrastructure, investment, and development assistance also has reduced the leverage of more traditional multilateral institutions to insist upon the governance and policy reforms that would address these issues. These changes have had contradictory outcomes: increasing trade on the one hand but weakening regulatory systems and conditionalities (that had been a growing part of traditional multilateral development bank practices) on the other. Requirements for transparency, broad-based development benefits for the citizenry, or democratic governance have been weakened, although not removed, in the new financing landscape. Against this backdrop, private sector innovation for providing technology-based tools to enhance regulatory capacity combined with citizen empowerment is key. Such innovations, however, should be grounded in an understanding of the context into which they are introduced and be governed by effective oversight systems, including effective and transparent public-private partnerships. How to address illicit trade in developing economies, therefore, remains unsurprisingly complex. Wins often will be incremental and setbacks frequent. The overall goal simply may be to constrain the enabling environment for illicit trade rather than allowing it to endlessly expand, to target efforts where they have the greatest chance of sustained success, and to prioritize those commodities where the harmful implications are the greatest. This is a volatile time in global history, marked by rapid technological and political changes plus a global COVID-19 pandemic. We must develop a better understanding of the political economy of illicit trade and craft an active monitoring capacity for intervenening. In this report, we put forward a commodity- and context-specific political economy approach to achieve this and conclude with some guidance for policy makers from any sector, public or private, to assess when and how to respond to i o illicit trade, and to work in and with developing economies.  

Washington, DC: Atlantic Council,  Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security , 2020. 57p.

By United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)

  As defined in the Conceptual Framework for the Statistical Measurement of Illicit Financial Flows,  Illicit Financial Flows (IFFs) are “financial flows that are illicit in origin, transfer or use,that reflect an exchange of value and that cross country borders.”IFFs may arise from criminal activities, but also from some behaviours related to tax and commercial practices. Such flows are either directly generated by illicit income, including cross-border transactions performed in the context of illicit trade of goods such as drugs, or the management of illicit income through investment in financial and non-financial assets. National data on IFFs remain limited worldwide, but significant progress has been made since 2017, when the UN Assembly adopted indicator 16.4.1. ("Total value of inward and outward illicit financial flows") for the monitoring of progress towards Sustainable Development Target 16.4, which aims to significantly reduce illicit financial and arms flows by 2030.  The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) was entrusted, alongside the United Nations Commission on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), with the custodianship of SDG indicator 16.4.1. The International Classification of Crime for Statistical Purposes (ICCS)  provides definitions of illegal activities generating IFFs. Moreover, since 2017, UNODC and UNCTAD have taken a series of coordinated actions leading to a conceptual framework for the statistical measurement of IFFs, the implementation of pilot measurement exercises and the development of methodological guidelines to measure IFFs from selected illegal market activities. Additionally, in October 2019, the 10th session of the Inter-agency and Expert Group on Sustainable Development Goals Indicators,  held in Addis Ababa, reviewed the methodology and reclassified the indicator from Tier III to Tier II, meaning that the indicator is conceptually clear and has set out internationally established standards, although data are not yet regularly produced by countries. This document details the crime-related IFF estimates resulting from the engagement of UNODC with countries to implement the methodology outlined in the UNODC-UNCTAD conceptual framework.

Vienna: UNODC, 2023. 23p.

By The Financial Action Task Force (FATF)

The market of art, antiquities and other cultural objects has attracted criminals, organised crime groups and terrorists to launder proceeds of crime and fund their activities. Criminals seek to exploit the sector’s history of privacy and the use of third-party intermediaries while terrorist groups can use cultural objects from areas where they are active to finance their operations.

The vast majority of market participants do not have a connection to illicit activities, but there are risks associated with these markets and many jurisdictions do not have sufficient awareness and understanding of them. This results in a lack of investigative resources and expertise, and difficulties with pursuing cross-border investigations.

The report includes a list of risk indicators that can help public and private sector entities identify suspicious activities in the art and antiquities markets, and also highlights the importance of rapidly identifying and tracing cultural objects involved in money laundering or terrorist financing.

The report includes some good practices that countries have taken to address the challenges they face, including the establishment of specialised units and access to relevant databases and cooperation with experts and archaeologists to help identify, trace, investigate and repatriate cultural objects.

Paris: The Financial Action Task Force (FATF), 2023. 60p.

By Transparency International

Despite international standards and collective commitments, the world’s biggest economies and some key financial hubs remain far too open to corrupt people and other criminals laundering and enjoying their ill-gotten gains through real estate.

To help policymakers address these ongoing challenges, Transparency International and the Anti-Corruption Data Collective (ACDC) developed the Opacity in Real Estate Ownership (OREO) Index. The Index evaluates the ideal framework to protect real estate markets from dirty money, using two pillars. The first pillar assesses the availability and adequacy of real estate data. The second measures the coverage and scope of the anti-money laundering legal framework as it applies to the real estate sector.

The first edition of the index reveals gaps that make global property markets vulnerable to corrupt money flows through assessing and ranking 24 jurisdictions, including 18 G20 member nations plus guest countries Spain and Norway, as well as Hong Kong, Panama, Singapore and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

No country achieves a perfect mark, with 10 jurisdictions scoring below five out of possible 10 points.

By exposing weaknesses, the OREO Index aims to drive reforms that enhance transparency and accountability in the real estate sector. Both an effective data system and comprehensive anti-money laundering safeguards are essential for effectively preventing, detecting and investigating money laundering, and identifying policy gaps that allow it to go undiscovered.

Berlin: Transparency International, 2025. 49p.

By Fatjona Mejdini

Organized crime groups from the Western Balkans have over the last 20 years established a remarkably strong foothold in South America in their pursuit of cocaine that they ship to and distribute in Europe and beyond. They have evolved from minor European players into prominent international criminal enterprises in this illicit global commodity trade, building durable relationships at both ends of the highly lucrative supply chain. Their rise has been spurred, in part, by luck. Two key factors have favoured them: an unprecedented surge in cocaine production in South America and insatiable demand for the drug in Europe. The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC)’s European Drug Trends Monitor suggests that after reaching record high levels in 2023, and despite a drop in seizures in the beginning of 2024, cocaine availability remains stable, if not on the rise, in Europe.1 Indeed, record seizures are being documented at key EU ports and the bloc’s drugs monitoring agency, the European Union Drugs Agency, announced in March 2023 another annual increase in the levels of cocaine detected in wastewater, continuing an upward trend that began in 2016.2 But guile has played an equally important role in the success of these groups, which have leveraged the smuggling expertise and paramilitary training established during the Balkan ethnic conflicts and civil unrests of the 1990s. Playing the long game, they have learned from and won the respect of the Italian mafia, among others, while retaining an agility that has allowed them to seize market opportunities. This has largely been achieved – so far, at least – without provoking debilitating blowback from rival players. The research for this report focused on Western Balkan organized crime groups and was conducted within this framework. Consequently, the dynamics observed in South American countries are explored solely in relation to these criminal groups. The report aims to provide a detailed understanding of their presence in South America and the broader implications that this has for their future in the context of the Western Balkans. Balkan brokers have been crucial to their success in establishing symbiotic local relationships. They have forged strong and enduring connections in the cocaine-producing countries of Colombia, Peru and Bolivia, from cartels to coca farmers. They have also been able to establish strong bases and key relationships in dispatching countries such as Brazil, Ecuador and, more recently, the neighbouring Caribbean region. Not only have they managed to navigate the South America’s criminal environment with relative ease, but in some cases they have also proved able to forge relationships within high-level business and political circles in the countries where they operate.3 To avoid disruptions to their operations at the wholesale source, they have intentionally maintained a professional working distance from other foreign criminal organizations operating in South America, especially the infamous Mexican cartels. However, they have managed to expand their footprint in global cocaine markets, partly through arrangements with some of Europe’s most prominent criminal organizations, such as the Dutch–Moroccan networks, the Kinahan cartel and Italian mafia groups like the ’Ndrangheta and the Camorra. They have also displayed creativity by employing various forms of trafficking methods. These extend beyond the use of container ships, to also encompass cargo and leisure vessels and planes. Their presence in South America and the international cocaine supply chain has left a conspicuous footprint that has been tracked by law enforcement activity. Over the past three years, half of the targets of Europol-coordinated cocaine operations have been linked to individuals and networks from this region, thanks in part to the crackdown on communication platforms such as EncroChat and SKY ECC, which were widely used by criminal organizations from the Western Balkans.4 Western Balkan criminals have been accused of transporting tens of tonnes of cocaine from South America to major ports in Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain and elsewhere. Although these major European entry hubs appear to be the primary channels for criminal organizations from the Western Balkans, these actors also utilize ports in the Balkans region as transit points for trafficking cocaine elsewhere in Europe. Their involvement in the global illicit cocaine trade is not confined to the European consumer market, however. Western Balkan groups have been linked to significant seizures on other continents as well, including one of the largest cocaine seizures in US history (more than 20 tonnes, worth more than US$1 billion).5 Western Balkans groups have also, in recent years, been using their strong presence in South America to target even wealthier markets, such as Australia, using Africa and Southern Europe as transit regions.6 These criminal entities have also left a trail of blood. Since 2010, at least 19 people from the Western Balkans believed to be linked with cocaine trafficking have been killed in South America, according to GI-TOC records. Their activities have exacerbated instability in certain South American countries such as Ecuador, as they relentlessly secure supplies of cocaine and its safe shipment – at any cost. This research report identifies the links between criminal actors from the Western Balkans and the South American cocaine trafficking market. It provides an overview of the factors that have impelled the region’s organized crime groups towards South America and addresses the implications arising from their presence in that region. The study sheds light on their origins and operations, revealing common patterns despite the diverse backgrounds from which they have emerged. The study finds that links between the Western Balkans and South America have existed for around three decades but have significantly intensified in the last two. It predominantly focuses on organized crime groups from Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia, but also makes reference to those from other countries in South Eastern Europe where relevant, in relation to their collaboration in the cocaine trade. It is important to note that international law enforcement organizations, in their reporting, often refer to criminal groups from the Western Balkans as ‘Albanian-speaking networks’7 or the ‘Balkan Cartel’.8 The former is used to denote criminal groups of Albanian nationality that speak Albanian, while the latter refers to criminal groups of Slavic origin that speak the Bosnian-Croatian-Montenegrin-Serbian language.9 These terms indicate ethnicity and linguistic variations among actors rather than their organizational characteristics. Inter-ethnic cooperation between organized crime groups in the Western Balkans has a long history, particularly in the trafficking of weaponry and ammunition, cigarettes, fuel and drugs, and human smuggling. In some cases, integrated organized crime groups have emerged bringing together members from different countries within the region. But these groups prefer to retain their independence, and there is no evidence of the creation of cartels in the Western Balkan region.10 Organized crime groups in the region generally have a clear leadership structure, but Balkan organized crime groups operating in South America appear to prefer a horizontal organizational structure that allows flexibility. Due to the transnational nature of cocaine trafficking, these groups have become adaptable. Often, their trafficking operations in South America are seen as ‘joint ventures’ or ‘projects’ that bring together organizations or groups of criminals from different countries and ethnic backgrounds who happen to be in the right place and have the necessary resources and skills to achieve the desired outcome. The extensive supply chain coordination needed to procure, transport, process and distribute the drug has prompted enhanced flexibility within these groups. Therefore, in this report, the terms ‘organized crime groups’ and ‘criminal networks’ will be used interchangeably.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime , 2025. 48p.

By The International Organization for Migration, Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific

This second IOM regional situation analysis on trafficking in persons (TiP) for forced criminality (FC) in Southeast Asia's online scamming centres offers practitioners, policymakers and the donor community a concise overview of counter-trafficking initiatives. It encompasses IOM's key figures, achievements, prominent press coverage and publications from the year of 2023, accompanied by recommendations for 2024.

Bangkok: IOM, 2024. 19p.

By Martin Thorley

Under the concept of Community of Common Destiny for Mankind, the People’s Republic of China (henceforth referred to as ‘China’) has brought together a suite of initiatives that represent a new international relations framework, through which it aims to reform global governance. These include the Global Security Initiative (GSI), which is the most tangible manifestation of a wider development: China’s evolving engagement in international crime prevention. Framed in a way that encompasses both traditional and non-traditional security, China’s international promotion of the GSI has implications for global crime prevention norms. While China’s capacity to shape these norms should not be overstated, the GSI has already achieved a degree of uptake beyond countries commonly grouped as the ‘West’, including in global pariah states such as Syria. At the same time, analysis that looks predominantly at the impact of the GSI in liberal democratic states, or that considers the parameters most useful in analyzing liberal democratic legal systems, risks overlooking broader shifts in security norms. The GSI and associated Chinese party-state endeavours use familiar terms (for example, ‘rule of law’) in ways that are different from their more commonly understood meanings in the context of the socalled liberal international order. In addition to issues of meaning and language, there are fundamental differences between the GSI and existing norms related to accountability and power that demonstrate vast divergence between the existing order and what is proposed, creating potential hazards for those working on global crime prevention. The characteristics of the GSI are best understood in the context of China’s domestic approach to crime prevention, in which the party-state is vested with vast powers and the law is best seen as a tool utilized by the political elite. This suggests that substantive international cooperation with China on crime prevention would be possible only where it aligns with the interests and principles of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Beginning from the perspective that all proposals with the capacity to shape global crime prevention norms merit scrutiny, this report explores the broader implications of China’s proposals before detailing two case studies that allow for deeper examination of potential risks associated with the approach. By revealing previously unknown networks and relationships, the findings suggest there could be a gap between principle and practice. A pushback by China against cybercrime hubs in South East Asia, for example, includes instances where the party-state appears to demonstrate a high tolerance for organized crime. These cases raise questions about whether the Chinese party-state is prepared to associate with serious criminals when doing so would enable it to further its objectives abroad, for example as part of its cultivation of political elites. The findings of this report, within the context of a growing body of evidence, suggest that use of the term ‘geocriminality’, may be useful in explanation and conceptualization of state-crime nexus phenomena. The term here refers to a state’s use of criminal actors to achieve objectives in target countries, in the same way as the term geoeconomics describes the manipulation of economic tools in target countries to the same ends. This report is intended as an exploratory assessment of this issue and concludes that further research is merited

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. 2024. 35p.

By Louisa Waugh and Zahbia Yousuf

While there are known threads between criminality and conflict, most interventions to tackle either are rarely based on this knowledge. Therefore, integrating approaches to address both criminality and conflict at once continue to be a struggle.

Focusing on cases in Colombia, Kosovo and Mali, this report aims to move away from the blunt tools of law and order (aimed at rupturing organised crime networks) and counter-terrorism (aimed at degrading armed groups). It recognises the potential of peace agreements and peacebuilding efforts as important vehicles for laying the foundations for sustainable peace.

London: Saferworld, 2022. 40p.

By Transparency Venezuela

  Organised crime and corruption in Venezuela have become a state problem that not only keeps Venezuelans in constant danger, but their effects are already impacting a number of Latin American countries, while the United States and several European nations have witnessed how illegal operations of power groups have infiltrated their financial and real estate systems with dirty money stolen from Venezuela’s coffers. A simple explanation for the complex humanitarian emergency facing Venezuela is that the country was subjected for several years to misguided public policies and decisions by authorities, which in most cases right out aimed to steal large amounts of money from the nation’s Treasury. It was a Grand Corruption scheme,1 with systematic measures that impinged on the entire population. This context was a breeding ground for organised crime, which became stronger with substantial firepower and economic resources, to the point of collaborating—in many cases—with agencies at all levels of authority, including senior officials in the administration. In view of this situation, at the end of this investigation we propose a set of initiatives to combat this evil, which will require forceful and unprecedented actions in Venezuela, such as resorting to the support of international organisations in the search for solutions that have been effective in other countries of the hemisphere, to punish the culprits. This work encompassed a nationwide vision—as opposed to the 2019 Organised Crime and Corruption study2 focused on border issues—which shows the map of criminal organisations, the types of crimes, the regional situation in various states, the role of the Bolivarian National Armed Forces (FANB), as well as an analysis of the situation of women regarding organised crime and corruption. The most important findings of this new study can be summarised as follows: 1. The existence of at least 9 major organised crime rings in Venezuela, involving more than 13,000 criminal organisations, some of which have ties to policy makers and public officials. 2. Crimes and acts of corruption boast total impunity. 3. The lack of robust public institutions, the dismantling of some of them, as well as the existence of incentives derived from some public policies such as price controls and fuel subsidies, are a breeding ground for misdeeds, crimes, human rights violations and the theft of public funds. 4. Venezuelan migrants are victims of illegal groups. 5. The implementation of a model called garrison state, “banana republic” style, whose main characteristics include institutionalised violence, colonisation of public administration and the incorporation of members of the Armed Forces into the economic leadership of the country. 6. The differentiating aspect of organised crime and corruption among Venezuelan women 4. Venezuelan migrants are victims of illegal groups. 5. The implementation of a model called garrison state, “banana republic” style, whose main characteristics include institutionalised violence, colonisation of public administration and the incorporation of members of the Armed Forces into the economic leadership of the country. 6. The differentiating aspect of organised crime and corruption among Venezuelan women   

Transparency Venezuela, 2020. 135p.  

By Nicolás Cabra-Ruiz, Sandra V. Rozo, María Micaela Sviatschi

How does forced displacement shape development in origin countries? This article examines the case of Venezuela, where nearly eight million people have been forcibly displaced. To do this, it compares municipalities with varying shares of foreign-born populations before and after international oil price shocks accelerated forced displacement between 2014 and 2019. The findings show that municipalities with larger foreign-born populations in 1990, which also exhibited greater out-migration from Venezuela after 2014, experienced lower economic development and higher inequality. The paper highlights a new mechanism through which forced displacement facilitates the perpetuation of autocratic rule and hinders development: by weakening political opposition and enabling the growth of organized crime and illicit income sources. Using novel election data, the article finds that areas affected by mass forced displacement experienced lower voter turnout and opposition support, limiting political and social reforms. These areas also witnessed growth in organized crime and foreign non-state drug and human trafficking, which diminished incentives for economic change.

Washington, DC: World Bank, Development Research Group, Development Economics , 2025. 102p.

By Don Weatherburn, Michael Farrell, Wai-Yin Wan, Sara Rahman

Background: Very few studies have examined the criminal careers of drug traffickers. Our aim in this study was to determine (a) the percentage of drug traffickers who cease involvement in crime following their first conviction for drug trafficking, (b) the factors that affect the likelihood and speed of re-offending among drug traffickers, (c) the factors that affect the rate of reoffending among drug traffickers and (d) the scale of drug trafficker involvement in crimes other than drug trafficking.

Methods: We characterize the criminal careers of a sample of 30,020 cases of offenders convicted of drug trafficking in New South Wales (NSW), Australia over the 29-year period between 2000 and 2023, focussing on how drug charge, trafficker type, and drug and alcohol use affect the risk and frequency of offending. We use a combination of descriptive statistics, cure fraction regression and negative binomial regression. Our controls in the regression analyses consist of age, age of first conviction and number of prior convictions.

Results: The 'cure' rate among males aged 30-39 who were first convicted between 19 and 35 years of age, whose principal offence is trafficking in a non-commercial quantity of heroin, who have three prior convictions and who score 'moderate' in terms of the LSI-R drug/alcohol scale is 31 per cent. The instantaneous risk of re-offending among ATS, heroin, cannabis and ecstasy traffickers ranges between 62 and 82 per cent higher than among cocaine traffickers. Convicted drug traffickers commit a wide variety of offences but only a small proportion are convicted of drug offences before or after their first conviction for drug trafficking.

Conclusions: The present study raises two important questions for future research. The first concerns whether those involved in drug trafficking in Australia rely on it as a primary source of income or whether it is just one of several income-generating criminal activities they switch between in the course of a criminal career. The second question is why there are such marked differences in the risk, speed and frequency of offending among traffickers of different drugs.

International Journal of Drug Policy; 2024, 10p.

By Nicolas Lien and Gabriel Feltran

International cocaine trafficking from South America has increased significantly over the past decade. Based on mixed-methods research, we hypothesize that this change has been driven primarily by the globalization of its logistics, which has led to relevant technical and political changes along the value chain. Today’s global criminal logistics connect a wider variety of producers and retailers, ensuring a market without monopoly and monopsony, although very few transnational criminal groups control the center of the value chain. Their cooperation results in a virtuous circle for illicit accumulation, in which the constant improvement in productivity in South America also leads to an increase in consumer demand in Europe and, more recently, in Africa, Asia, and Oceania. We used a mixed-methods approach to relationally analyze coherent changes in the cocaine value chain in Latin American, African, and European countries. 

  Journal of Illicit Economies and Development, 7(1): pp. 20–34

By Oscar Contreras Velasco

This paper builds on social network analysis and structural balance theory to analyze, with a novel approach, some of the unintended consequences of Mexico’s kingpin strategy on the network of criminal organizations. I use data on violent conflicts between Mexico’s criminal organizations, between 2004 and 2020, from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), and a combination of statistics, social network analysis, GIS, and archival methods to understand the patterns and geography of violent conflicts and alliances before and after the war on drugs. The goal of this paper is threefold: first, to show that the kingpin strategy is associated with the fragmentation of criminal organizations in Mexico; second, to show that criminal organizations developed a set of structurally balanced arrangements before the government waged a war against them and that the kingpin strategy disrupted such arrangements, which led to an increase in the number of violent conflicts; third, I will argue that the fragmentation of criminal organizations also produced a process of clustering of violence, where sets of organizations started fighting each other in specific regions of the country, increasing the levels of violence in those geographical spaces.

Trends Organ Crim (2023), 25p.

By Lene Guercke

This Open Access book explores an issue that has received little attention in human rights research: organised criminal groups (OCGs) as perpetrators of human rights violations, especially disappearances. It takes an interdisciplinary approach, combining doctrinal legal research with a qualitative study on present-day disappearances in Mexico. Disappearances are a complex human rights violation that impacts not only the disappeared person but also their relatives, who are left in a limbo of uncertainty about their loved one’s fate. Originally part of state-led repression, today disappearances occur in varied contexts, often involving OCGs and other non-state actors. However, disappearances committed by non-state actors are not human rights violations under International Human Rights Law (IHRL), thereby potentially leaving a gap in the legal protection of victims. The book first analyses state obligations and case law involving state responsibility for human rights violations committed by non-state actors and applies the analysis to OCGs. This ‘internal’ legal perspective is complemented by an ‘external’ study based on interviews with human rights practitioners working on disappearances in Mexico, which often involve OCGs. The qualitative study offers a unique perspective on human rights protection ‘in reality’.

The book adds to scholarship on non-state actors and disappearances, and to incipient international legal scholarship on the issue of organised crime and international law. Moreover, the study on Mexico provides a richer understanding of challenges faced by practitioners ‘on the ground’ where OCGs commit human rights violations alongside, or in collusion with, state forces and against the backdrop of an overall failure of the state. The book may be of interest to a diverse audience, including legal scholars and practitioners, human rights scholars in fields such as political science, international relations, or socio-legal studies, as well as funders supporting the work of NGOs in Mexico and similar contexts, and NGOs themselves.

Cham: Springer Nature, 2025, 339p.

Edited by Simone Baglioni and Francesca Calo

This book explores the labour market integration of migrants, refugees and asylum seekers across seven European countries: the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Italy, Switzerland and the UK. Using empirical data from the Horizon2020 SIRIUS Project, it investigates how legal, political, social and personal circumstances combine to determine the work trajectory for migrants who choose Europe as their home.

Bristol, UK: Policy Press, 2023, 175p.

By Measures for Justice

South Dakota is currently in a dispute about legalized marijuana use for recreational and medicinal purposes. In this context, it’s worth considering how the state handles criminal cases involving drug and DUI offenses. Measures for Justice (MFJ) recently published county-level criminal justice data for the state of South Dakota that span 2009–2017. A review of our findings suggests that relative to other offenses, South Dakota counties pursue harsher responses to court cases in which the most serious offense was related to drug possession/distribution or driving under the influence (DUI). The pattern can be seen at multiple points in case processing. This report explores these disparate findings using three Measures: dismissal rates, time to disposition, amount of fees and fines. Year by year, we have found that drug and DUI cases (1) are dismissed at a lower rate in most counties, (2) take longer, on average, to dispose of than other case types, and (3) face some of the highest financial obligations at conviction

Rochester, NY: Measures for Justice, 2021. 7p.

By The: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

Illicit financial flows (IFFs)- financial flows that are illicit in origin, transfer, or use, that reflect an exchange of value and cross country borders – are major impediments to sustainable development. They divert important resources away from state revenue and public investments, foster impunity, and ultimately erode criminal justice systems as a whole. The harmful effects of illicit Financial flows and the need to reduce them are demonstrated by their inclusion in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development as Target 16.4. It stipulates the goal to “significantly reduce illicit financial flows and arms flows, strengthen the recovery and return of stolen assets and combat all forms of organized crime”. Progress towards this target is measured by SDG Indicator 16.4.1 (the “total value of inward and outward IFFs in current US dollars”), for which UNODC is the custodian together with UNCTAD.

Organized crimes vary in their characteristics, objectives, and the extent to which they cross national borders. Consequently, the amount and nature of the IFFs they generate also varies. Given the transnational nature of smuggling of migrants (SOM) and cross-border trafficking in persons (TIP), monitoring and combatting IFFs is crucially important for disrupting, prosecuting, and dismantling the organized criminal networks committing these dangerous crimes.

This Study focuses on the trends, nuances, and complexities surrounding IFFs associated with smuggling of migrants and trafficking in persons into the European Union (EU), with specific attention paid to those relating to GLO.ACT partner countries.1 It is based on an analysis of available data, field research findings, and review of secondary literature.

Vienna: UNODC, 2023. 86p.

By The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)

Key Takeaways Significant gross income from illicit drug trafficking Between 2019 and 2022, the Balkan route – a major corridor for trafficking opiates and, more recently, methamphetamine – generated an estimated total annual illicit gross income ranging from US$13.9 to US$21.4 billion. Opiates accounted for about 90 per cent of this total, with methamphetamine representing a smaller but growing share. The aggregated value of these trafficking flows surpasses the gross domestic product (GDP) of several countries along the route, highlighting the significant economic impact of these illegal activities. The data and analysis do not cover the period following the drug ban in Afghanistan that was imposed in 2022 by the Taliban and its impact on drug consumption and trafficking patterns. Geographic distribution of trafficking routes The Balkan route remains a critical pathway for drug trafficking, stretching from Afghanistan through Iran (Islamic Republic of) and Türkiye, and splitting into three main branches, all leading into Europe. Alongside the opiate flow, methamphetamine trafficking is expanding, with manufacturing hotspots identified in Afghanistan, Eastern Europe (Bulgaria, Czechia and Slovakia), Southern Europe (Greece) and Western Europe (Germany and the Kingdom of the Netherlands). Opiates and methamphetamine trafficking is concentrated in key hubs Given their location at the start of the Balkan route, Iran (Islamic Republic of) and Türkiye are the main hotspots for trafficking both drugs. Trafficking through Iran (Islamic Republic of) plays a pivotal role in the opiate trade, accounting for over one-third of total gross income along the Balkan route related to opiates. Other key trafficking hotspots can be found in Belgium and the Netherlands (Kingdom of the). These countries are not only key stops for traffickers but also act as hotspots for distributing opiates and methamphetamine in smaller quantities. Illicit actors in some countries like the Netherlands (Kingdom of the) also contribute to methamphetamine manufacture the impact of proximity and trafficker adaptability on interception rates Interception rates of illegally traded opiates and methamphetamine along the Balkan route are highest in the proximity of production sources. Iran (Islamic Republic of) and Türkiye intercept the highest percentage of all opiates that cross their territories at 28.2 and 29.3 percent respectively. Traffickers' adaptability − through tactics such as breaking shipments into smaller quantities, altering routes and employing advanced concealment methods − continue to pose significant challenges to law enforcement, particularly further along the supply chain. High profit margins in the drug trade Trafficking of opiates and methamphetamine can yield substantial profits, with an estimated combined annual illicit net income ranging from US$10.9 to US$16.9 billion. These profits represent more than 70 per cent of the total illicit gross income acquired through the trafficking of these two substances after deducting intermediate expenditures, production and purchasing costs.The largest shares of illicit net income are generated at the retail level, where price markups are highest. However, individuals higher up in the supply chain may earn more per person, as fewer people share the profits at the international and wholesale levels. Illicit financial flows (IFFs) related to the management of drug trafficking profits are in the order of billions. IFFs are cross border flows of financial or nonfinancial assets that are illicit in origin, transfer or use. These flows represent the hidden movement of wealth that undermines economic stability and evades lawful oversight. Looking at IFFs generated through the trafficking of opiates and methamphetamine, it is estimated that between a quarter and half of the US$13.7 billion in illicit net income generated from drug trafficking along the Balkan route is illegally moved across borders, generating potential IFFs related to the management of drug trafficking profits of US$3.4 billion to US$6.9 billion annually. Link between money laundering and IFFs There is some evidence that income from drug trafficking is laundered both domestically and abroad through investments in real estate, luxury vehicles and other assets. Shell companies and informal systems like Hawala are frequently used to transfer and launder money, complicating efforts to trace the illicit proceeds. Key trafficking transit points not only facilitate drug movement but also serve as hubs for laundering and redistributing illicit financial resources. Contrary to common assumptions, traditional tax havens may play a minimal role in laundering drug trafficking proceeds. Instead, the limited available data suggests that countries like Luxembourg, the Netherlands (Kingdom of the) and Spain are potential hubs for drug-related IFFs generated along the Balkan route, alongside the United Arab Emirates.

. Vienna / ©United Nations, 2025 59p.

By The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Research and Trend Analysis Branch\

Opium production in Afghanistan remains low for the second consecutive year, with production at 433 tons in 2024, confirmed new estimates from the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). Although this figure represents a 30 per cent increase from 2023, production still remains 93 per cent below 2022 levels, when the de facto authorities began enforcing a country-wide drug ban.

UNODC released opium cultivation figures on 6 November, confirming that cultivation in 2024 had increased by an estimated 19 per cent year-on-year to cover 12,800 hectares, remaining far below pre-ban levels.

The value of the 2024 opium harvest is roughly US$260 million, an increase of 130 per cent over the previous year but still 80 per cent lower than the pre-ban value in 2022.

“A second year of low opium cultivation and production presents opportunities and complex challenges,” said Ghada Waly, Executive Director of UNODC. “International efforts must be coordinated to ensure that this decline is not replaced with production of dangerous synthetic drugs such as methamphetamine within Afghanistan or the wider region. We also need to help poppy-dependent rural communities transition to licit, economically viable alternatives, by investing in infrastructure, agricultural resources, and sustainable livelihoods.”

In 2024, farmers cultivated more alternative crops like cereals and cotton on previously fallow land. However, opium provides up to 60 times more revenue in comparison to wheat. Without profitable, licit alternatives, economic hardships could encourage some farmers to return to poppy cultivation.

The majority of opium cultivation and production has shifted from the southwest provinces to the northeast, where two thirds of opium production was concentrated.

UNODC, in partnership with the UN Development Programme (UNDP), further released a report on capacities and resources for the treatment of substance use disorders in Afghanistan.

The survey findings show that treatment services are available in 32 out of 34 provinces, but significant disparities exist in service distribution, accessibility, and gender representation, particularly affecting female patients.

Although opiates remain the most frequently reported class of substance used by patients seeking treatment, demand for services addressing stimulant-related disorders is rising, as synthetic drugs such as methamphetamine have become increasingly available in Afghanistan.

Kabul/Vienna: UNODC: 2024. 36p.

By The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Research and Trend Analysis Branch

The Afghanistan Drug Insights are a series of reports that provide latest data and in-depth analysis on aspects of the evolving drug situation in Afghanistan. This second volume provides the latest figures on national and regional opium poppy production in 2024 and the challenges farmers are facing as they adapt to new economic conditions. The remaining reports in the series will cover a range of topics related to the drug situation in Afghanistan, including the socioeconomic situation of farmers after the drugs ban; drug trafficking and supply; and treatment availability and drug use. Given the unprecedented nature of the ongoing drugs ban in Afghanistan, having continued for a second year, UNODC has sought to examine different aspects of the drug situation in that country. Taken together, reports in the series paint a comprehensive picture of the enforcement of the ban on production, trafficking and consumption of all drugs, and delve deep into the impacts of the ban on the Afghan population, as well as on neighbouring countries and the wider region. The insights are aimed at informing efforts to address demand and supply of drugs within and outside Afghanistan in an objective and timely manner, using latest data at highest quality standards. The present insight has been produced under the project “Monitoring of Opium Production in Afghanistan” (AFG/F98). Information and data contained in this report, unless otherwise stated, are based on data collected by UNODC through remote sensing techniques, rural village surveys; as well as through global data collections on drugs (UNODC Annual Report Questionnaires and UNODC Drugs Monitoring Platform). Data on opium cultivation and production are based on the Afghanistan Opium Surveys 1994-2020 jointly published by UNODC and the Government of Afghanistan, as well as the Afghanistan Opium Surveys conducted by UNODC in 2021, 2022, and 2023.

Opium production in Afghanistan remains low for the second consecutive year, with production at 433 tons in 2024, confirmed new estimates from the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). Although this figure represents a 30 per cent increase from 2023, production still remains 93 per cent below 2022 levels, when the de facto authorities began enforcing a country-wide drug ban.

UNODC released opium cultivation figures on 6 November, confirming that cultivation in 2024 had increased by an estimated 19 per cent year-on-year to cover 12,800 hectares, remaining far below pre-ban levels.

The value of the 2024 opium harvest is roughly US$260 million, an increase of 130 per cent over the previous year but still 80 per cent lower than the pre-ban value in 2022.

“A second year of low opium cultivation and production presents opportunities and complex challenges,” said Ghada Waly, Executive Director of UNODC. “International efforts must be coordinated to ensure that this decline is not replaced with production of dangerous synthetic drugs such as methamphetamine within Afghanistan or the wider region. We also need to help poppy-dependent rural communities transition to licit, economically viable alternatives, by investing in infrastructure, agricultural resources, and sustainable livelihoods.”

In 2024, farmers cultivated more alternative crops like cereals and cotton on previously fallow land. However, opium provides up to 60 times more revenue in comparison to wheat. Without profitable, licit alternatives, economic hardships could encourage some farmers to return to poppy cultivation.

The majority of opium cultivation and production has shifted from the southwest provinces to the northeast, where two thirds of opium production was concentrated.

Kabul/Vienna: UNODC, 2024. 36p.