By Alexander Ritzmann

  This report analyzes the potential threats affiliated with the largest and fast growing transnational right-wing extremist (RWE/REMVE) combat sports network, called Active Clubs. It explores the objectives, strategies, strengths, and weaknesses of this network, which has spread from the U.S. to Canada and to at least 14 countries in Europe within three years. ● The overall objective of the Active Club White Supremacy 3.0 strategy is the creation of a stand-by militia of trained and capable RWE/REMVE individuals who can be activated when the need for coordinated violent action on a larger scale arises. ● Over 100 Active Clubs have been created between late 2020 and August 2023, with at least 46 in the United States across 34 U.S. states. At least 46 Active Clubs exist in 14 European countries, and 12 in Canada. The estimated number of members per Active Club is between five and 25. ● Some Active Clubs in the U.S. are conducting or participating in military-style tactical and casualty care trainings. Members or sympathizers of Active Clubs in France and Estonia appear to be fighting in the Russia-Ukraine war. ● If Active Clubs are allowed to continue to operate and multiply, the likelihood for targeted political violence and terrorism by their members against supposed enemies of the “white race” (e.g., Jews, people of color, Muslims, and LGTBQI+ people) will increase. ● A key component of the White Supremacy 3.0 strategy is to hide in plain sight. To avoid, delay, mitigate, or withstand law enforcement interventions, Active Clubs are supposed to present a friendly face to the public. Consequently, network members are asked to avoid threatening behavior or displaying obvious Nazi symbols to appear less relevant to law enforcement. This less aggressive and more mainstream strategy is also meant to help grow the network, in particular from the general public. ● For the Active Club strategy of hiding in plain sight to work, members should look like regular guys, like the members of the (NSDAP Schutzstaffel) SS did. When recruiting, Active Club members should not talk about Jews and history. Instead, the focus in public should be on brotherhood, community, fitness, and self-defense. 

 Berlin:  Counter Extremism Project (CEP), 2023. 52p. 

By  A.K.M. Maksud, Khandaker Reaz Hossain, Sayma Sayed and Jody Aked 

The CLARISSA programme aims to understand the dynamics that are central to running a business in the informal economy in Bangladesh’s leather industry and explore how and why worst forms of child labour become a feature of business operations. This research paper explores the findings from semi-structured interviews with business owners operating enterprises involved in leather processing and production across three prominent neighbourhoods and business districts in and around Dhaka. A focus on the leather industry in Bangladesh is an opportunity to explore the demand side of the child labour issue in a situated way, with the intention of bringing the lived experience of business owners to pre-existing literature on poverty entrepreneurship, supply chain governance, and political economy. The paper details the risks and stressors business owners face, the relationships they have with other informal and formal enterprises in the supply chain system, and their rationale for hiring children. Business owners experience poverty and financial precarity, taking significant financial risks to sustain enterprises that are barely viable economically. Stuck in vicious operating cycles, on ‘produce now, pay later’ credit arrangements, enterprises respond by squeezing labour budgets. The need for cheap labour is amplified by price points at lower than the cost of production. To understand why child labour has been so difficult to ‘end’, an informal economy business perspective points to the economic dysfunction of complex supply chains, particularly mediated by downward financial pressures produced and reproduced by highly fragmented manufacturing processes in cost-driven markets. When poverty and precarity among informal economy business owners intersects with formal economy power, the result is business models that rely on children as cheap labour. The findings make clear the policy value of engaging business owners in the informal economy in efforts to reduce worst forms of child labour, especially given the insights they can offer about how, when, and why supply chain systems are at risk of depending on children for the provision of goods and services.

  CLARISSA Research and Evidence Paper 8, 

Brighton: Institute of Development Studies, 2024. 54p.

By Robert A. Kleinman

Background

Despite the increase in fentanyl-involved overdose deaths in Canada, there have been no national-level studies evaluating the proportion of illicit opioids containing fentanyl or fentanyl analogues in Canada.

Methods

This cross-sectional exploratory study characterized trends in fentanyl, carfentanil and other fentanyl analogues within opioids seized by law enforcement agencies in Canada from 2012 to 2022 and submitted to the Health Canada Drug Analysis Service (DAS). Analyses were stratified by province/region. Mann-Kandell tests were used to test for trends.

Results

A total of 157,616 samples containing any opioid (“opioid-containing samples”) were submitted to the DAS from Canadian provinces between 2012 and 2022, of which 81,165 (51.5%) contained fentanyl or a fentanyl analogue. The percentage of opioid-containing samples that were positive for fentanyl or a fentanyl analogue increased from 3.0% (95% CI: 2.6-3.4%) in 2012 to 68.3% (67.7-68.9%) in 2022 (p < 0.001 for trend). The percentage of opioid-containing samples that were positive for fentanyl or a fentanyl analogue increased between 2012 and 2022 in all regions. In 2022, the percentage of samples containing fentanyl or an analogue followed an east-to-west gradient: 15.8% (13.3-18.6%) of samples in Atlantic Canada and 84.7% (83.6-85.7%) in British Columbia. Carfentanil was present in 4.9% (4.6-5.2%) of opioid-containing samples in Canada in 2022 and 19.7% (18.3-21.2%) of opioid-containing samples in Alberta.

Conclusions

The illicit opioid supply in Canada increasingly contains toxic synthetic opioids. As of 2022, important regional differences existed in the illicit opioid supply in Canada.

   Drug and Alcohol Dependence Reports, (2024)

By The International Crisis Group

  Outgoing Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador has deployed troops on a scale never seen before to fight crime across the country, but this measure has barely loosened the grip of illegal outfits. In some ways, the government can call its policy a success. Violence, measured by reported murders, has dipped from the historic heights of a few years ago, an achievement supporters attribute to the president’s incorruptible character. Polls suggest that his party’s candidate, Claudia Sheinbaum, will romp to victory in the 2 June election. But in the states hardest hit by crime, the reasons behind lulls in fighting appear less flattering to federal authorities. Some security officers and criminal leaders suggest that a modus vivendi between military commanders and illegal outfits has enabled crime groups to profit and expand their hold on communities so long as overt violence is curtailed. Mexico’s next president may be unable to withdraw troops from public security, but she should delineate limits to their role while endeavouring to sever state ties to crime and create the conditions for effective civilian law enforcement. After campaigning in 2018 on a platform promising to pacify Mexico, end the “war on drugs” and return troops to the barracks, López Obrador seemingly underwent a radical conversion. Even before he took office, the president declared that he could not trust the country’s various police forces to curb heavily armed criminal groups, opting instead to reinforce the role of the military – whose law enforcement capacities had been an article of faith for the previous two governments. López Obrador boosted troop deployment and created an entirely new security force under military leadership, the National Guard. In addition to expanding the military’s role in ensuring public safety, he also handed the armed forces major roles in infrastructure, migration control, and seaport and airport management. According to the 2024 budget, 20 percent of state spending is now being channelled through the armed forces. Top government officials insist that the president’s integrity – alongside the military's robust presence and a barrage of social programs – have served to dampen levels of armed conflict. On closer inspection, however, the areas most affected by warring criminal groups – including states such as Michoacán, Veracruz, Colima and Guerrero – have seen large military deployments but limited concrete crime fighting. Security force insiders and criminal leaders note that a set of largely unspoken rules has been established, encouraging illegal groups to reduce and conceal the violence they perpetrate. In exchange, authorities have turned a blind eye to a degree of illegality, enabling these organisations to diversify their trafficking operations (including into newer illicit drugs such as fentanyl), expand their extortion rackets, branch out into legal business, and assume greater control of communities and local governments. When these understandings fall apart, or when major criminal syndicates engage in frontal battle with one another, triggering humanitarian emergencies and drawing national media and political attention, the military are prone to take on a more interventionist and offensive role. But even then, they do not always focus on undermining criminal power, and they can be ambivalent toward illicit operations. When the Jalisco New Generation Cartel launched a major offensive in Michoacán, military    commanders are reported to have hatched deals with crime rings to fight the group, including a campaign to kill numerous members of the cartel. Elsewhere, military officers in cahoots with specific crime groups have allegedly abused their authority to shield their illegal partners. The misuse of authority in Mexico is not unique to the military. But the sheer extent of the armed forces’ security, political and budgetary powers, combined with the lack of any independent civilian oversight, reinforces the risks that members of the armed forces will engage in corruption and collusion. That said, a precipitous move to return soldiers to the barracks could destabilise areas plagued by crime groups locked in arms races and trigger political risks that neither of the main candidates seems willing to countenance. As the candidate for López Obrador’s party, Shein baum has defended the strategy of the past six years, saying the military should remain at the heart of public security for as long as needed. Her main adversary, Xóchitl Gálvez, representing a coalition of opposition parties, has advocated for pulling troops back from some of their many duties. But she concedes a continuing role for troops in tackling the most violent criminal outfits, and she appears ready to reinforce the National Guard, albeit under civilian command..........

Brussels, Belgium: ICG, 2024. 44p.

 Latin America Report N°106 | 24 May 2024  

MAY CONTAIN MARKUP

Donato Masciandaro, EI6d Takats and Brigitte Unger

FROM THE INTRODUCTION: “Traditionally, monetary and financial economics has focused on legal financial transactions, while the economics of crime - following Becker - has neglected the financial aspects. Hence, black finance - finance that relates to illegal or criminal activities - has fallen between the two stools. Due to this separate development in the two sub-disciplines of economics, economic theory has not addressed financial crime sufficiently, so far. This creates a particularly disturbing gap in the literature, since lately, especially in connection with terrorist financing, the financial side of crime has become accentuated in the public and political debate.”

Edward Elgar. Cheltenham, UK • Northampton, MA, USA. 2007. 274p.

By George Sternlieb and James W. Hughes

FROM THE FOREWORD: “The quest for a quick and painless, that is, politically popular, means of raising funds and stimulating economic development never ends. In the last decade, politicians seized on a number of seemingly ingenious devices, from lotteries to off-track betting, that promised benefits such as big increases in revenues and decreases in the role of so-called organized crime. The results have rarely measured up to the expectations-the only thing painless about lotteries and betting shops is the way in which they have parted their clients from their money, and the only real benefits have been to the relatively few individuals who have hit large jackpots and the politicians who have found a new and rich source of patronage.”

Harvard University Press Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, England. 1983. 224p.

MAY CONTAIN MARKUP

UNITED STATES. CONGRESS. HOUSE. SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE STRATEGIC COMPETITION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY

From the document: "The fentanyl crisis is one of the most horrific disasters that America has ever faced. On average, fentanyl kills over 200 Americans daily, the equivalent of a packed Boeing 737 crashing every single day. Fentanyl is the leading cause of death for Americans aged 18-45 and a leading cause in the historic drop in American life expectancy. It has led to millions more suffering from addiction and the destruction of countless families and communities. Beyond the United States, fentanyl and other mass-produced synthetic narcotics from the People's Republic of China (PRC) are devastating nations around the world. It is truly a global crisis. The PRC, under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), is the ultimate geographic source of the fentanyl crisis. Companies in China produce nearly all of illicit fentanyl precursors, the key ingredients that drive the global illicit fentanyl trade. The House Select Committee on the Strategic Competition between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party (Select Committee) launched an investigation to better understand the role of the CCP in the fentanyl crisis. This investigation involved delving deep into public PRC websites, analyzing PRC government documents, acquiring over 37,000 unique data points of PRC companies selling narcotics online through web scraping and data analytics, undercover communications with PRC drug trafficking companies, and consultations with experts in the public and private sectors, among other steps. [...] [T]he Select Committee found thousands of PRC companies openly selling [...] illicit materials on the Chinese internet--the most heavily surveilled country-wide network in the world. The CCP runs the most advanced techno-totalitarian state in human history that 'leave[s] criminals with nowhere to hide' and has the means to stop illicit fentanyl materials manufacturers, yet it has failed to pursue flagrant violations of its own laws."

UNITED STATES. CONGRESS. HOUSE. SELECT COMMITTEE. 16 APR, 2024. 64p.

By David C. Brotherton, and Follow Rafael Gude

Since 2007, the Ecuadorian approach to crime control has emphasized efforts to reach higher levels of social control based on policies of social inclusion and innovations in criminal justice and police reform. One innovative aspect of this approach was the decision to legalize a number of street gangs in 2007. The government claims the success of these policies can be seen in homicide rates that have fallen from 15.35 per 100,000 in 2011 to 5 per 100,000 in 2017. However, little is understood about the factors and their combination that have produced this outcome. To explore this phenomenon, we developed a research project focusing on the impact of street gangs involved in processes of social inclusion on violence reduction. From April to October 2017, we collected multiple data sets including 60 face-to-face interviews with members from four different street subcultures in several field sites, field observations and archival materials to answer two primary questions: How has the relationship between street groups and state agencies changed in the past 10 years? How has this changed relationship contributed to a hitherto unexamined role in the homicide reduction phenomenon of Ecuador? We found that legalization helped reduce violence and criminality drastically while providing a space, both culturally and legally, to transform the social capital of the gang into effective vehicles of behavioral change. In policy terms, we argue that the social inclusion approach to street gangs should be continued and highlighted as a model of best practices of the state.

Washington, DC: IDB, 2018.

By The National Association of Manufacturers

Amid an unprecedented global health crisis, manufacturers have stepped up and taken the lead, working together and with national, state and local governments to fight the spread of COVID-19. Manufacturers deliver day-to-day necessities, lifesaving medical innovations and products that improve people’s lives in countless ways. While the pandemic has demonstrated anew the importance of American innovation and ingenuity, it has also revealed a serious threat: counterfeit products that put lives and livelihoods at risk. Counterfeiting is not a new problem; it has harmed manufacturers, American workers and consumers for years. But the problem is getting worse, and the COVID-19 pandemic has shown just how dangerous inaction can be. As part of the nation’s critical response effort, manufacturers have been supplying health care workers and other Americans on the front lines of this crisis with vital goods, including personal protective equipment, hospital beds, ventilators, hand sanitizers, cleaning supplies and other critical health care and safety products. But while manufacturing men and women work long hours to ramp up production of desperately needed products to fight the spread of this deadly illness, counterfeiters have exploited the crisis to peddle fake tests, dangerous vaccines and ineffective protective gear. These counterfeits are harming American citizens and hindering manufacturers’ efforts to protect their workers and communities. The prevalence of counterfeits in the COVID-19 response has brought new urgency to this long-simmering issue. So the National Association of Manufacturers is leading the charge against fake and counterfeit goods, bringing together diverse stakeholders and driving innovative policy solutions to address these issues once and for all and to ensure the long-term success of our sector and the safety and security of the people who rely on our products. 

Washington, DC: National Association of Manufacturers, 2020.  21p.

By John Dunham & Associates

The Retail Industry Leaders Association (RILA) is the US trade association for retailers that have earned leadership status by virtue of their sales volume, innovation, or aspiration. The Buy Safe America Coalition (BSA) represents a diverse group of responsible retailers, consumer groups, manufacturers, intellectual property advocates and law enforcement officials who support efforts at all levels of government to protect consumers and communities from the sale of counterfeit and stolen goods. One important issue facing US retailers is the growth in the availability and sales of illicit products, both from counterfeit imports and from products stolen from legitimate retailers. These products are increasingly sold online through third-party marketplaces. RILA and BSA asked John Dunham & Associates (JDA) to examine the data around these illicit sales to determine how they impact the US economy, federal tax revenues, and criminal activity. This is the second in a series of papers examining the issue of organized retail crime (ORC), and its effect on the United States economy. This analysis will focus on product theft from brick-and- mortar retailers and the rise of organized theft operations that fence illegally obtained goods to consumers, increasingly online. While this paper focuses solely on those goods stolen from retail locations, there is a growing problem with consumer goods being stolen from containers and trucks as the supply chain has backed up in recent months. For the purpose of this analysis, cargo theft was not included. According to the analysis: • As much as $68.9 billion worth of products were stolen from retailers in 2019. This represents about 1.5 percent of total retail sales. • Law enforcement and retail asset protection officials have found that the availability of anonymous online marketplaces has provided an easy way to sell stolen goods, and that the growth of these marketplaces coincides with a recent surge in organized retail crime that puts both employees and customers in harm’s way. • Academic research has suggested that most retail theft represent crimes of opportunity. In other words, people steal when it is easy to do so. Other causes include poor economic conditions, and dissatisfaction among workers. However, professionals in the field identify the availability of anonymous on-line marketplaces as ways to easily fence goods, and prosecutorial changes as being major factors contributing to the growth in ORC. • The growth in on-line marketplaces is highly correlated (61 percent) to the number of shoplifting events reported each year. • In addition, those retail categories most subject to shoplifting activities are also the ones most sought after through on-line marketplaces. • Nearly 67 percent of asset protection managers at leading retailers surveyed report a moderate to considerable increase in organized retail crime, while 80 percent believe it will only get worse in the future.  The economic impact of retail crime is profound. Retailers face increased costs for lost product, security, and labor, which lead to higher prices for consumers and ultimately, lower sales. Lower sales translate to fewer jobs throughout the economy. The result is $125.7 billion in lost economic activity and 658,375 fewer jobs, paying almost $39.3 billion in wages and benefits to workers. • Retail theft is not a problem just in major metropolitan areas, it is pervasive across America. In fact, one factor that is associated with lower levels of retail theft is the density of retail locations. • The impact of theft is felt through higher prices, and this impact is more acutely felt by low- and middle-income families. • It is estimated that retail theft costs federal and state governments nearly $15 billion in personal and business tax revenues, not including the lost sales taxes.

Washington DC: Retail Industry Leaders Association (RILA) ;  Washington, DC:  Buy Safe American Coalition, 75p.

By John Dunham & Associates

The Buy Safe America Coalition represents a diverse group of responsible retailers, consumer groups, manufacturers, intellectual property advocates and law enforcement officials who support efforts at all levels of government to protect consumers and communities from the sale of counterfeit and stolen goods. One important issue facing US businesses is the massive growth in the availability and sales of illicit products, both from counterfeit imports — increasingly from China — and from products stolen from legitimate retailers and sold through online marketplaces, where the anonymity of a screenname has made it easier and more profitable to fence counterfeit and stolen goods. The Coalition asked John Dunham & Associates (JDA) to examine the data around these illicit sales to determine how they impact the US economy, federal tax revenues, and criminal activity. This is the first of a series of papers examining the issue of counterfeit and stolen goods and its effect on the United States economy. This analysis will focus on the importation of illicit products, notably counterfeits that violate producers’ intellectual property rights. Future analysis will examine the effects of domestic smuggling, the resale of stolen goods, and the effects of contraband on overall criminal activity. According to the analysis: • A large share of contraband items are delivered to US consumers by mail or by express consignment. These transactions account for over 60.8 percent of all seizures by the US customs service and over 90 percent of intellectual property rights (IPR) seizures. The growth in these types of shipments has increased along with the use of online marketplaces. Amazon, for instance, now derives more than 75 percent of their ecommerce revenue from marketplace sales. • In effect, as companies like the Chinese ecommerce marketplace Alibaba and the Amazon marketplace, have linked more consumers to more shippers, many companies producing illegitimate products have gained access to unwitting consumers in America. • The bulk of counterfeit products to the US come from China and its dependent territories, accounting for over 90.6 percent of all cargo with IPR violations. Of the $1.23 billion in total IPR violations intercepted, $1.12 billion was from China. • Examining just those data where CBP can provide an HS code, in some cases, the amount of contraband cargo is nearly equal to the entire import base. For example, imports of certain sweaters, jumpsuits and toys from China are almost 100 percent contraband, as are large amounts of handbags, jewelry and belts. • While there is substantial academic literature on the smuggling of narcotics, people and tobacco, there is very little written on counterfeit products. Using a very conservative model it is estimated that $44.3 billion in additional illicit cargo is escaping detection. • These lost sales alone mean that over 39,860 jobs in wholesaling and nearly 283,400 retail jobs are lost due to the impact of counterfeit goods skirting normal trade channels. All told, the sale of counterfeit items is expected to cost the wholesale and retail sectors of the US economy nearly 653,450 full-time equivalent jobs that pay over $33.6 billion in wages and benefits to US workers. • It is estimated that the smuggling of counterfeit goods costs the US government nearly $7.2 billion in personal and business tax revenues alone. • This analysis is based on the current level of CBP intercepts of illicit cargo. It is likely that the number of illegal imports is much larger than even estimated here.  

Washington, DC: Buy Safe America Coalition, 2021. 25p.

By Mafalda Pardal, Elle Wadsworth, Beau Kilmer

Potent synthetic opioids, illegally produced, are starting to emerge in Europe. Considering the damaging harms caused by the opioid crisis in North America, which has led to a substantial surge in overdose deaths, it is crucial that European leaders understand the challenges associated with synthetic opioids. In this Perspective, we present and discuss the current situation in Europe concerning synthetic opioids, and draw on earlier and ongoing crises involving this group of substances to reflect on likely challenges ahead and ways to improve preparedness.

Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2024. 20p.

By Frances Thomson, Patrick Meehan & Jonathan Goodhand (02 Apr 2024):

his article and the forum it introduces examine illicit drug crop (IDC) economies from agrarian perspectives. Examining IDCs as a group implies analysing how prohibition distinguishes them from other (licit) crops. We identify seven mechanisms through which prohibition shapes the agrarian political economy of IDCs and explore how these mechanisms and their effects generate distinctive patterns of development and political action amongst ‘illicit peasantries’. We also examine connections between illicit and licit crops, including how licit crop crises and illicit crop booms intertwine. We argue that IDC economies provide a bulwark for smallholders but are by no means peasant idylls.

The Journal of Peasant Studies. 2024. 39p.

European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA)

Availability remains high across the main drugs used in Europe, evidenced by the large and in some cases increasing quantities that continue to be seized in the European Union. In addition, the market for illicit drugs is characterised by the diversification of consumer products and the widespread availability of a broader range of drugs, including new psychoactive substances, often of high potency or purity. Specialised equipment may be required to meet the detection and monitoring challenges posed by this diversification.

The recent emergence of highly potent opioids, particularly benzimidazoles (nitazenes), poses a particularly complex threat to public health due to their increased risk of life-threatening poisoning. The potential emergence of new patterns of consumption in Europe is also a key threat, due to the availability of cheap and highly potent or pure drugs. This is particularly the case for cocaine, which has seen unprecedented levels of availability

European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA), 2024. 39p.

By A&A Multiprime

As part of our commitment to contribute to loss prevention in Colombia and across the region, our team regularly engages in meetings with representatives of the Colombian Highest Maritime Authority (DIMAR) and the officers in charge of anti-narcotic policies in the ports. We gather updated informa tion about new practices and precautions to be aware of, as well as relevant recommendations and measures to adopt while visiting any of our ports. This ongoing engagement has culminated in our 2024 report, which reflects the latest insights and strategies in combating the challenges faced by the maritime industry

Recent events highlight the ongoing challenges in countering cocaine trafficking. For example, on February 8, 2024, British authorities announced a historic seizure of over 12,500 pounds of cocaine concealed in a banana shipment from the Port of Turbo, Colombia, to Southampton. This incident, marking the largest single drug seizure in UK history, emphasizes the advanced techniques used by cartels to transport substantial drug quantities into Europe and the UK, thereby confirming the global impact of Colombian narcotics. This report results from our efforts and experience over the last years, successfully assisting in several drug smuggling-related incidents and administrative investigations for breaches of shipping regulations, including the ISPS Code. We trust that this report will serve as a valuable resource for all P&I Clubs, their Members, the Masters and crews, and, in general, the entire marine industry with an interest in Colombian ports to mitigate incidents associated with drug smuggling activities

Bogota: A&A Multiprime. 2024. 18p.

By Colleen King

In December 2023, the United States Coast Guard (USCG) offloaded approximately 18,219 pounds of cocaine from the USCG Cutter Waesche. The estimated street value of the cocaine was more than $239 million. The offload occurred as a result of six separate maritime interdictions, performed by separate cutters, taking place over a 17-day period off the coasts of Mexico and Central and South America. The interdictions were performed as part of the USCG’s counternarcotics mission. While interdictions of this size may seem out of the ordinary, the USCG routinely interdicts a variety of vessels, including Go-Fast Vessels and semi submersibles, with massive amounts of drugs (usually cocaine), moving from the Pacific and Caribbean coasts of South America northward to Mexico, the Caribbean, and eventually the United States. One can imagine that prosecuting interdictions like these may raise a variety of questions: could the United States assert jurisdiction over the suspected traffickers; would the maritime location of the interdiction matter; and would it make a difference if the ship carrying the contraband was flagged—registered—by another country? What about the transit time to a U.S. court for an initial appearance where the interdiction occurred over a thousand miles from the United States? The dizzying array of issues confronting a federal prosecutor following a high seas interdiction may not be typical of land-based legal challenges. Fortunately, a body of both federal law and international authorities is instructive on these questions. The Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA) is the United States’ principal statute addressing high seas drug trafficking and has supported thousands of prosecutions for decades. The MDLEA, as it re lates to controlled substances,5 prohibits the distribution, manufacture, or possession with intent to distribute or manufacture, controlled sub stances aboard a “covered vessel.” Its prohibitions apply “outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States,” and include both attempt and conspiracy liability. And, where an interdiction occurs outside of the United States, venue may be appropriate in your district. This article is intended to serve as an MDLEA primer. It will provide a brief his tory of the MDLEA, identify the MDLEA’s core definitional provisions, discuss its key criminal prohibition, detail its jurisdiction and venue pro vision, describe the MDLEA’s position on the use of international law as a defense, and finally, address its sentencing provisions.

March 2024 DOJ Journal of Federal Law and Practice

David H. Ucko, Thomas A. Marks

Organized crime both preys upon and caters to human need. It is corrosive and exploitative, but also empowering, and therefore pervasive. Indeed, though often out of sight, organized crime is everywhere: wherever governments draw the line, criminal actors find profitable ways of crossing it; wherever governments fail to deliver on human need, criminal actors capitalize on unmet desire or despair. For those excluded from the political economy, from patronage systems or elite bargains, organized crime can offer opportunity, possibly also protection.

PRISM, Vol. 10, No. 3 (2023), pp. 92-117 (26 pages)

By David H. Ucko and Thomas A. Marks

Organised crime is not going well. According to the 2021 Global Organized Crime index, ‘the global illicit economy simply continue[s] along the upward trajectory it has followed over the past 20 years, posing an ever-increasing threat to security, development and justice – the pillars of democracy’ (Global Initiative, 2021, p. 8). Wherever governments seek to draw the line, criminal actors find profitable ways of crossing it; wherever governments fail to deliver on human need, criminal actors capitalise on citizens’ desire or despair. As of now, more than three-quarters of the world’s population ‘live in countries with high levels of criminality, and in countries with low resilience to organized crime’ (Global Initiative, 2021, p. 12). On aggregate, the associated activity amounts to an illicit form of governance, furnishing alternative services to a wide range of clients, be they the vulnerable and weak or a covetous elite. The breadth of organised crime, its clandestine nature, and its blending of creative and destructive effects make it difficult to counter. In past SOC ACE research, we argued that the response to organised crime often shares certain pitfalls with counterterrorism, at least since 9/11 (Ucko & Marks, 2022c). Both efforts have been stymied by 1) conceptual uncertainty of the problem at hand; 2) an urge to address the scourge head on (be it violence or crime), without acknowledging its socioeconomic-political context; and, therefore, 3) unquestioned pursuit of strategies that miss the point, whose progress is difficult to measure, and which may even be counterproductive. This convergence is based on the common features of the two phenomena, which are both concerned with i) collective actors, who ii) use violence and coercion among other methods; and who have iii) corrupting, or outright destructive effects on society. Though organised crime is not consciously political in its ideological motivation, it is – like terrorism – deeply political in its origins, activities, and effects. Given the conceptual overlap, and the common pathologies that undermine response, the lessons from countering terrorism are relevant also to the countering of organised crime. Focusing on the concept of ‘irregular warfare’, our past research identified six key lessons, touching upon 1) the socio-political embeddedness of the problem, 2) the tendency to militarise the response, 3) the mirror-imaging of state assistance programmes, 4) the invaluable role of community mobilisation, 5) the dearth of strategy, and 6) the need to engage more closely with questions of political will. As argued elsewhere, these challenges point to a need for greater strategic competence both in assessing the problem of organised crime and in designing a response (Ucko & Marks, 2022c).

To generate this strategic competence, this follow-on report sets out an analytical toolkit to assist planners and policymakers with the crafting of strategy. This ‘Framework of Analysis and Action’ builds upon lessons – negative and positive – learned via years of experience with irregular warfare, defined by the Department of Defense as ‘a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s)’ (U.S. Department of Defense, 2007, p. 1).1 It is a framework that finds its origins within the U.S. National Defense University’s College of International Security Affairs (CISA), where for two decades it has been used to teach strategic planning for complex and intensely political challenges (Ucko & Marks, 2022a). The framework consists of two parts: the Strategic Estimate of the Situation (which maps the problem, explores its drivers, frames, and methods, and critiques the current response) and the Course of Action (which uses the strategic estimate to design an appropriate strategy, guided by a theory of success). The framework is in this report adapted for organised crime, to enable the mapping of relevant actors and the crafting, thereby, of a viable response. By design, the framework responds to the six key lessons identified in our earlier work. This report goes through the framework and explains its adaptation to organised crime. Appendix A provides a summation of the toolkit, a ‘user’s guide’, that will facilitate application of the framework. Testing to date suggests great potential and we look forward to sustaining a dialogue with those engaged with countering organised crime to further evolve this toolkit. Indeed, since the beginning, this framework has been a living product, enriched by theoretical application in the classroom and practical use in the field.

SOC ACE Research Paper No. 19. Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham, 2023. 45p.

By Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime’s Observatory of Illicit Economies in South Eastern Europe.

In this issue, we focus on three cases where criminal groups from the region have been active in recent years: the Netherlands, Ecuador and parts of Africa.

These examples illustrate the growing involvement of Balkan criminal groups in some of the world’s hotspots for illicit activity. Research for these articles is facilitated by the Global Initiative’s network of contacts with local investigative journalists, as well as close cooperation between regional observatories of illicit economies, namely South Eastern Europe, West Africa and Latin America.

As part of the GI-TOC’s analysis of the risks of firearms trafficking from Ukraine, in this issue we show that the Western Balkans remain the main source of illegal weapons in Europe. At present, weapons are still cheap and plentiful in the region, and stockpiles have been augmented by inflows from Turkey via Bulgaria, particularly of gas and alarm guns. More on this topic can be found in a forthcoming GI-TOC report on trends in arms trafficking from the Ukraine conflict.

In this issue, we also report on a major crackdown by Serbian authorities in late 2023 on increasingly violent smugglers operating along the border between Serbia and Hungary, and examine how this has displaced migration flows towards Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Risk Bulletin No. 18. Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2024. 25p.

By Amir Rotami

In this policy brief, based on published and forthcoming studies, author Amir Rostami outlines the changing nature of crime in Sweden, with a focus on organised crime, specifically lethal violence and fraud. What are the lessons learned from the Swedish crime paradox, namely the rise in organised crime, but not an equivalent rise in general crime, and what needs to be implemented to counter organised crime? The reaction to the question can be divided into two components: local and global/

European Liberal Forum Policy Paper . Brussels: European Liberal Forum, 2021. 19p.