By The National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine

For nearly eight decades, the world has been navigating the dangers of the nuclear age. Despite Cold War tensions and the rise of global terrorism, nuclear weapons have not been used in conflict since Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. Efforts such as strategic deterrence, arms control and non-proliferation agreements, and the U.S.-led global counterterrorism have helped to keep nuclear incidents at bay. However, the nation's success to date in countering nuclear terrorism does not come with a guarantee, success often carries the risk that other challenges will siphon away attention and resources and can lead to the perception that the threat no longer exists.

This report found that U.S. efforts to counter nuclear or radiological terrorism are not keeping pace with the evolving threat landscape. The U.S. government should maintain a strategic focus and effort on combatting terrorism across the national security community in coordination with international partners, State, Local, Tribal and Territorial authorities, the National Laboratories, universities and colleges, and civil society. Developing and sustaining adequate nuclear incident response and recovery capabilities at the local and state levels will likely require significant new investments in resources and empowerment of local response from Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), working with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Environmental Protection Agency, Department of Energy, and National Institutes of Health

Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. 2024. 158p.

Metropolitan Police Department, Washington D.C.

On the morning of Monday, September 16, 2013, Aaron Alexis entered Building 197 at the Washington Navy Yard, where he served as an independent contractor, and carried out the most deadly workplace mass shooting in the Nation’s Capital in recent memory.

Over the course of 69 minutes, Alexis terrorized thousands of employees of Naval Sea Systems Command, firing indiscriminately from a shotgun he had legally purchased two days earlier and a handgun he had taken from a security guard after mortally wounding the guard. He would also get into multiple shooting engagements with responding law enforcement officers, seriously injuring a Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) officer. In his final confrontation with police, Alexis ambushed and fired upon another MPD officer. Fortunately, the officer was saved by his protective vest and was able to return fire, killing Alexis and ending his rampage. When it was over, Alexis had shot and killed twelve people and injured several others.

*****

In the aftermath of the incident, the members of MPD first and foremost want to remember and honor the twelve people who lost their lives. Twelve people went to work that Monday, but did not return home to their loved ones. It is truly a senseless tragedy beyond comprehension, and there are no words adequate enough to express our condolences. Our thoughts remain with the victims’ families and friends.

Metropolitan Police Department, Washington D.C. 2014.. 84p.

Mark S. Hamm and Ramon Spaaij

This research offers the largest and most comprehensive database ever created on lone wolf terrorism, along with a theory-informed case study component based on direct contact with imprisoned lone wolf terrorists, and a comparative analysis distinguishing lone wolves from those who undergo radicalization in a group setting. Strictly in terms of lethality, the data indicate that lone wolf terrorism in America is not on the rise. Although lone wolf terrorism may not be increasing, it is undergoing two important changes in modus operandi. First, uniformed police and military personnel have become the primary target of lone wolf terrorists. Second, consistent with the relaxation of U.S. gun laws since the 1990s and the recent trend in mass shootings, the lone wolf’s preferred weaponry is now a staggering range of high-velocity firearms. While there is no standard profile of the lone wolf terrorist, most of them are unemployed, single white males with a criminal record. Compared to members of terrorist groups, lone wolves are older, less educated and more prone to mental illness.

The study validates a series of commonalities associated with pathways to radicalization for lone wolf terrorists. The radicalization model indicates that lone wolf terrorism begins with a combination of personal and political grievances which form the basis for an affinity with online sympathizers. This is followed by the identification of an enabler, followed by the broadcasting of terrorist intent. The final commonality is a triggering event, or the catalyst for terrorism. The ability of law enforcement and intelligence communities to detect and prevent lone wolf terrorism demands a clear understanding of these radicalization processes. Such insight may provide investigators with a sort of detection system, or “signatures”—as minimal as they may appear—that an individual with a terrorist intent will demonstrate in preparing for an attack. Crucial to this understanding is the broadcasting of intent. While lone wolves physically isolate from society, at the same time they seek recognition for their causes through spoken statements and threats, manifestos, e-mail messages, texting and videotaped proclamations. Focusing on this kind of immediate objective of radicalization among lone wolves, rather than on their underlying grievances, may sharpen our focus on the dangers posed by lone wolf terrorism.

U.S. Department of Justice.. February 2015. 28p.

By Committee On Homeland Security House Of Representatives

The hearing focuses on improving information sharing across intelligence and law enforcement agencies following the Fort Hood attack.

• Major Nidal Hasan, the suspect, communicated with terrorist Anwar al-Awlaki, raising red flags that were missed by authorities.

• The FBI and the Department of Defense had pieces of information that, if combined, might have prevented the attack.

• The Webster Commission investigated the FBI’s handling of the case and found shortcomings in policy guidance and technology.

• Recommendations included enhancing data management, training, and policies for counterterrorism leads.

• The Commission emphasized the need for better information sharing and technology to prevent future attacks.

• The ISE works to improve information sharing while protecting privacy and civil liberties.

• The hearing highlighted the importance of addressing information-sharing gaps to enhance national security.

One Hundred Twelfth Congress Second Session, September 14, 2012. 54p.

By The Committee on Assessing and Improving Strategies for Preventing, Countering, and Responding to Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism: Chemical Threats; Board on Chemical Sciences and Technology; Division on Earth and Life Studies; National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine

Domestic and foreign violent extremist organizations, or terrorist groups, have caused a greater amount of harm with chemical agents than with biological or radiological weapons. The United States capacity and capability to identify, prevent, counter, and respond adequately to chemical threats is established by the strategies, policies, and laws enacted across multiple levels of government. While the number of chemical terrorism incidents has risen and fallen over time, there is no empirical or analytical indication that the threat is disappearing. This report comes at a time when the nation's highest-level strategies have shifted from focusing primarily on violent extremist organizations to focusing more on Great Power Competition. This shift in relative perceived threat and consequent prioritization will impact efforts against chemical terrorism, and in turn, affect funding priorities. Revised risk assessments are needed to reprioritize risks guided by new strategies, so that strategy-aligned budgets can be created. The report recommends weapons of mass destruction budgets be aligned with evolving priorities and incentivize activities that transition promising research to operations.

National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2024, 209 pages

By Rin Ushiyama,

Aum Shinrikyō’s sarin attack on the Tokyo subway in March 1995 left an indelible mark on Japanese society. This book is the first comprehensive study of the competing memories of Aum Shinrikyō’s religious terrorism. Developing a sociological framework for how uneven distributions of power and resources shape commemorative processes, this book explores how the Aum Affair developed as a ‘cultural trauma’ in Japanese collective memory following the Tokyo attack. The book shows how numerous stakeholders, including the state, the mass media, public intellectuals, victims, and perpetrators offered competing narratives about the causes and consequences of Aum’s violence. Combining multiple methods including media content analysis, participant observation, and original interviews with victims and ex-members, this book reveals various flashpoints of contention such as the state regulation of religion, ‘brainwashing’ and ‘mind control’ controversies, and the morality of capital punishment. It shows that although cultural trauma construction requires the use of moral binaries such as ‘good vs.. evil’ and ‘sacred vs.. profane’, the entrenchment of such binary codes in commemorative processes can ultimately hinder social repair and reconciliation.

Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2022. 231p.

May Contain Mark-Ups

Edited by Mustafa Ozguler, Ph.D., Ali Ozdogan, Ph.D., Ekrem Mus, Halim Iltas, & A. Sait Yayla, Ph.D.

The book“Terrorism: A Global Perspective,”edited by Mustafa Ozguler, Ali Ozdogan, A. SaitYayla, Ekrem Mus, and Halim Iltas, is a comprehensive compilation of presentations from the 2nd Istanbul Conference on Democracy and Global Security held in June 2007. The book is divided into three parts:“Terrorism: A Global Problem,” “Terrorism and CivilSociety,”and“Issues in Terrorism.”Each section addresses different aspects of terrorismand global security, ranging from the global and local dimensions of terrorism, the role of civil society in counter-terrorism efforts, to specific issues such as the use of biometrics incounter-terrorism and the financing of terrorist organizations through cigarette smuggling.The book emphasizes the importance of international cooperation, understanding local factors, and addressing core issues to effectively combat terrorism and enhance global security.Key topics include the framing of terrorist threats by different countries, the impact of globalization on terrorism, the fundamental causes of terrorism such as social injustice and political conflicts, and the role of media in counter-terrorism. The book also exploresthe psychological profiles of suicide bombers, the evolution of right-wing violence in Japan,and the strategic use of small-scale terrorist attacks. Additionally, it proposes new community protection initiatives, such as “Building Terrorism Resistant Communities,”to enhance local resilience against terrorism. Overall, the book provides a multifaceted analysis of terrorism, combining theoretical insights with practical recommendations for policymakers, law enforcement, and civil society

The Turkish Institute for Security and Democracy, 2009, 357 pages

By Travers Barclay Child, Kai Gehring, Sarah Langlotz, Austin Wright, and Rossella De Sabbata

This paper leverages granular survey data from within the conflict theater of Afghanistan to investigate how plausibly exogenous exposure to Islamic State (IS) propaganda in-fluences views towards local and international forces. We study two mediums of ter-rorist propaganda, exploiting high-frequency time variation in global distribution of IS videos and plausibly exogenous signal penetration of a prominent IS radio tower in Afghanistan. Our findings suggest violent video and radio content undermines public support for IS and its key opponents, while increasing demand for international forces to remain in the country. By contrast, videos depicting a capacity for IS governance boost their support.

University of Chicago, Becker Friedman Institute for Economics Working Paper No. 2024-121
Chicago: University of Chicago, The Becker Friedman Institute for Economics (BFI) , 2024. 59p.

By Kacper Rekawek  

The field of terrorism studies has traditionally been focused on non-state perpetrators of violence, such as different jihadi organizations which have been active in the West in the last three decades. Things looked different, however, during the Cold War, when state actors actively involved themselves in terrorism by, for example, supporting terrorist organizations operating abroad. This report takes stock of Russia's return to such a paradigm in the 21st century in general and after 2022, the onset of the Russian full-scale aggression against Ukraine, in particular. Russia not only terrorizes its population into submission but also uses homegrown terrorists for Vladimir Putin's regime's domestic ends, deploys terrorist tactics while fighting against Ukraine, and seems increasingly willing and able to use those tactics as part of its foreign policy toolbox in its "political warfare" against the broader West. For this reason, it is argued that one could seriously consider labeling Russia a "state terrorist" or a "state sponsor of terrorism." The report concludes that this might prove challenging in 2024, but also offers a way forward for prosecuting, sentencing, and arresting individuals involved in Russian state terrorism and state sponsorship of terrorism.   

The Hague: The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT)    2024. 27p.

Edited by Alex P. Schmid

This document compiles 35 chapters and over 1000 pages and thereby aims to provide an authoritative resource on terrorism prevention and preparedness. The Handbook is structured into five parts, comprising 32 chapters, next to the two introductory chapters and a concluding chapter by the editor followed by a comprehensive bibliography as follows: Part I: Lessons for Terrorism Prevention from the Literature in Related Fields (4 chapters); Part II: Prevention of Radicalization (6 chapters); Part III: Prevention of Preparatory Acts (7 chapters); Part IV: Prevention of, and Preparedness for, Terrorist Attacks  (10 chapters); Part V: Preparedness and Consequence Management (5 chapters

The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague (ICCT) , 2020.1312p.

By: Office of Intelligence and Analysis

The Homeland faces a complex set of threats to our public safety, border security, critical infrastructure, and economy from violent extremists, transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), adversarial nation-states, and malicious cyber actors. These threats, while varied in scope and intended purpose, at times compound one another in unexpected ways, harming our communities and generating costly disruptions to the US economy. Meanwhile, technological advances, climate change, and natural disasters have the potential to exacerbate many of the aforementioned threats.

PUBLIC SAFETY AND SECURITY: Over the next year, the terrorism threat environment in the Homeland will remain high. We are particularly concerned about a confluence of factors this year, including violent extremist responses to domestic sociopolitical developments—especially the 2024 election cycle—and international events that domestic and foreign violent extremists likely will use to justify or encourage attacks in the Homeland. Lone offenders and small groups continue to pose the greatest threat of carrying out attacks with little to no warning. Meanwhile, foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs) and their supporters will maintain their enduring intent to conduct or inspire attacks in the Homeland.

In addition, the production, trafficking, and sale of illegal drugs by transnational and domestic criminal actors will continue to pose the most lethal threat to communities in the United States. Fentanyl and other synthetic opioids remain the most lethal of drugs trafficked into the country, but small increases in overdoses linked to cocaine and methamphetamine highlight the danger from other drug types.

We expect the Homeland also will face threats to public safety from state actors using subversive tactics in an effort to influence and divide the American public and undermine confidence in our institutions. Many of these actors—in particular, the People’s Republic of China (PRC)—also target v U.S. Department of Homeland Security ethnic and religious minorities, political dissidents, and journalists in the United States to silence and harass critical voices, violating our sovereignty and the rule of law.

The 2024 election cycle will be an attractive target for many adversaries. Some domestic violent extremists (DVEs) likely view a wide range of targets indirectly and directly associated with elections as viable targets for violence with the intent of instilling fear among voters, candidates, and election workers, as well as disrupting election processes leading up to and after the November election. Nation-state-aligned foreign malign influence actors almost certainly will continue to target democratic processes with the aims of affecting US voter preferences, exacerbating social tensions, and undermining confidence in our democratic institutions and the integrity of the electoral process.

BORDER AND IMMIGRATION SECURITY: Migrant encounters at our border have declined over the last year, but migrants are still arriving in high numbers, complicating border and immigration security. As overall encounters have declined, so too have encounters with individuals in the Terrorist Screening Data Set, also known as the “terrorism watchlist,” which includes individuals associated with information indicating they may be directly engaged in or supporting terrorist activities as well as known associates of watchlisted individuals, such as family members. For several years prior to this year's decline, terrorism watchlist encounters had increased, a trend consistent with the overall increase in migrant encounters at the southwest border.

CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY: Domestic and foreign adversaries almost certainly will continue to threaten the integrity of our critical infrastructure with disruptive and destructive cyber and physical attacks, in part, because they perceive targeting these sectors will have cascading impacts on US industries and our standard of living. The PRC, Russia, and Iran will remain the most pressing foreign threats to our critical infrastructure. Most concerningly, we expect the PRC to continue its efforts to pre-position on US networks for potential cyber attacks in the event of a conflict with the United States. Nation-states, criminal hacktivists, and financially motivated criminals will likely hone their techniques to disrupt US services or to conduct espionage focused on gaining access to US networks, including critical infrastructure entities. We assess that domestic and foreign violent extremists will continue to call for physical attacks on critical infrastructure in furtherance of their ideological goals and, at times, in response to international conflicts and crises.

ECONOMIC SECURITY: Multifaceted and diverse economic threats—primarily from the PRC—will likely continue to harm US producers and consumers and degrade the competitiveness and future health of US companies and industries. The PRC likely will remain our greatest economic security threat because of its aggressive use of anticompetitive, coercive policies and theft of US intellectual property, technology, and trade secrets. Lastly, we expect our supply chains will remain vulnerable to foreign manipulation abroad, which could harm global productivity and consumer demand.

U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2024

MAY COTAIN MARKUP

By Kieran McConaghy

State Dynamics in Counter-Terrorism: The book challenges the view of the state as a unitary actor, emphasizing the importance of intra-state dynamics and the individual identities of state personnel in shapingcounter-terrorism responses.

Case Studies: It provides comparative analyses of Spain, France, and theUnited Kingdom, highlighting how state responses to terrorism are influenced by historical and cultural contexts.

Emotional and Political Impetus: The book discusses how emotional reactions and political motivations of state personnel impact counter-terrorism strategies, sometimes leading to actions driven by revenge or political gain.

Recommendations for Future Research: It suggests that future studies on counter-terrorism should consider the complexities of the state and the emotional and organizational factors that influence stateactions.

Springer, Aug 22, 2017, 182 pages

MAY COTAIN MARKUP

Edited by Ozgur Nikbay & Suleyman Hancerli

Understanding TerrorismThis section delves into the psychological profiles of terrorists, theuse of the internet by terrorists, the potential threat of bioterrorism, and the socio-economic factors contributing to terrorism. It emphasizes the importance of education in combating terrorism and understanding the true motives behind terrorist acts.

Suicide Attacks, Radical Terrorism, and Case StudiesThis part examines the characteristics and motivations behind suicide attacks, the rise of radical Islam in post-Soviet states, and includes case studies of terrorist incidents. It also explores the financing of terrorism through narcoterrorism and the spatial patterns of terrorist incidents.

Strategies and Tactics for Dealing with Terrorist Hostage Sieges, Hijackings, andKidnappingsThis section discusses various strategies and tactics for handling terrorist hostage situations, including negotiation strategies, the psychological aspects of kidnappings, and the importance of proper training and preparation for law enforcement agencies.

Counter-Terrorism Policies: Lessons for the FutureThe final section explores different counter-terrorism policies and strategies, such as situational crime prevention, democratic policing, the role of intelligence in counter-terrorism, and the need for international cooperation. It emphasizes the importance of maintaining public trust and preventing the radicalization of individuals.

IOS Press, 2007, 431 pages

By Gonzalo Saiz and Stephen Reimer

Concern about the so-called ‘crime–terror nexus’, a centrepiece of discussion, debate and research in the counterterrorism field, has yielded a vast body of academic and policy literature regarding the nature of symbiotic relationships between organised criminal formations and terrorist organisations. Recognising a spectrum of possible synergies – including direct interactions between criminals and terrorists, the adoption of criminal tactics by terrorists, and even the merging of these artificial categories altogether in certain cases – regard for the ‘crime–terror nexus’ has largely ignored the question of whether and how relationships between crime and terrorism may yield opportunities for terrorist financing, particularly in the European context. Such uncertainty risks giving way to speculation about the true extent of what might be called ‘crime-enabled terrorist financing’ (CETF), speculation driven in part by contemporary examples of petty criminality having played a significant role in the financing of violent terrorist attacks in Europe in the recent past. Should distinct linkages between crime and terrorist financing be identified, entry points for disruption by law enforcement may arise, and it is for this purpose that the research for this paper was conducted. The paper queries the nature and extent of CETF in Europe, including the importance of this financing stream in relation to others. In doing so, the paper also evaluates the present policy and law enforcement response to CETF, and endeavours to assess whether it is properly calibrated to the degree and character of the threat. The paper finds that terrorists and their financiers do indeed exploit European criminal markets for acquiring important materiel and raising funds, but that CETF is not a dominant form of terrorist financing for most actors, though not all. Specific foreign-based terrorist organisations that use Europe as an economic staging ground to finance violence committed overseas were revealed as the most likely to engage in CETF in Europe, and the most competent at doing so. That these groups typically do not (and are unlikely to) launch violent attacks within Europe means a prime motivator for countering their CETF activity is lacking, which along with other conditions poses a challenge to law enforcement agencies. Overall, Europe’s CETF problem is not its dominant terrorist-financing threat, though a proportionate reconfiguration of its counterterrorist financing response is needed to preclude terrorist organisations from abusing Europe’s economy to finance destabilising operational activity in its near neighbourhood.

Brussels; London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies RUSI, 2023. 54p

By Megan K. McBride, Kaia Haney, Michelle Strayer, and Jessica Stern

Despite the focus on suicide terrorism over the past 20 years—particularly by media outlets, policy-makers, and academics—scholarship regarding suicidality in domestic terrorism remains sparse. The post-9/11 research related to suicidality in terrorism has largely focused on the suicide terrorism of Islamist extremists. The research that touches on domestic terrorism, however, is both limited and inconclusive. Lankford, for example, has argued that suicidality is one of three key similarities between perpetrators of suicide terrorism and perpetrators of mass shootings. But a 2017 article by Freilich et al., whose research focused on far-right and jihadi attacks in the US, found that suicide attackers were no more likely than non-suicide attackers to have previously attempted suicide. By contrast, suicidality among those who carry out public shootings is well documented. Jillian Peterson and James Densley, leveraging The Violence Prevention Project’s (TVPP’s) Mass Shooter Database, found that 70 percent of the 197 individuals who committed mass shootings over the past 60 years either had a history of suicidality or intended to die carrying out their attack. Retrospective research by the US Secret Service on school shooters from 1974 to 2000 found that at least 78 percent had experienced suicidal thoughts or engaged in suicidal behavior before their attack. And an analysis leveraging the Columbia Mass Murder Database found that nearly half of all mass shooters died by suicide at the scene of their attack. Mass shootings, as Peterson and Densley have noted, may in fact be “crimes of despair.” We leveraged a new dataset—the Domestic Terrorism Offender Level Database (DTOLD)—to explore whether domestic terrorism attacks may also be crimes of despair. The database captures publicly available information (e.g., media reporting, court records) on the life histories of 320 individuals who carried out a non-Islamist terrorist attack in the United States between January 1, 2001, and December 31, 2020. Our data suggest that domestic terrorists in general may be more suicidal than the general population but significantly less suicidal than mass shooters except when domestic terrorists kill four or more people (notably, four is the number of deaths required for a shooting to meet the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s definition of a mass shooting). DTOLD contains three variables relevant to the question of suicidality: history of suicidality (including suicide attempts and suicidal ideation), intention to die while committing a terrorist attack, and death by suicide during or immediately after a terrorist attack. Collecting data on suicidality is difficult, but 19.3 percent (62) of the individuals in DTOLD have been coded positively for at least one of the three indicators of suicidality. This rate is notably higher than the rate calculated by the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, which is 4.37 percent for men (89 percent of those in DTOLD are men). This rate is still lower, however, than TVPP’s rate of 70 percent among mass shooters.

Arlington, VA: CNA, 2024. 4p

By Megan K. McBride and Monique Jenkins

Within the public violence literature—that is, the literature on domestic terrorism, mass shootings, school shootings, and hate crimes, among others—leakage has been identified as a core warning behavior. Leakage occurs when a would be assailant communicates an intention to harm a target before committing an attack.1 This communication can vary in timing, level of detail, form, intentionality, and audience.2 Through such a communication, an individual might directly verbalize an intent to commit an act, make more subtle threats and innuendos, or share a plan via social media.3 Researchers have found relatively high levels of leakage associated with acts of public violence, including adolescents perpetrated mass murders,4 mass shootings,5 political and public figure assassinations,6 and domestic terrorism.7 For this reason, leakage—which often occurs in interactions online or with loved ones—can be an important warning sign. But leakage to family, friends, or acquaintances is not the only way to detect when an individual is intending to commit an act of public violence, and over the last decade, researchers have started to examine preattack contact with system stakeholders, such as law enforcement, mental health, and education professionals. For example, one study found that 40 percent* of violent extremists had engaged in a crime before their act of extremist violence.8 Another study reported differences in system contact for lone and group-affiliated actors among American far-right extremists who committed fatal attacks. Specifically, it found that 61.7 percent of lone actors, but just 51.1 percent of group-affiliated extremists had prior arrests.9 In addition, multiple case studies exploring the personal histories of small populations of violent extremists have included information on system contact.10 However, comprehensive research exploring previous contact between system stakeholders and individuals engaged in domestic terrorism is relatively scarce. We sought to advance understanding of what percentage of the violent extremist population could be “catchable” in the sense that an individual had been in previous contact with a system stakeholder (e.g., law enforcement, mental health provider) or had been reported to a system stakeholder (e.g., by a friend or loved one to whom they had intentionally or unintentionally leaked information). To explore this issue, we leveraged a new dataset: the Domestic Terrorism Offender Level Database (DTOLD). The database includes detailed information on the 320 non-Islamist individuals who carried out terrorist attacks in the United States between January 1, 2001, and December 31, 2020. Specifically, we sought to understand what percentage of this population was known to system stakeholders at some point before they perpetrated their attacks. 

Arlington VA: CNA, 2024. 4p

By CLARA BROEKAERT, COLIN P. CLARKE, MICHAELA MILLENDER, ANNIKA SCHARNAGL, AND JOSEPH SHELZI

The horrific attacks by Hamas on October 7, 2023, fundamentally shifted the security posture of the Middle East, while also having severe humanitarian consequences and ripple effects in countries throughout the globe, including many in the West. This TSC Special Report, generously sponsored by the Airey Neave Trust, aims to explore how October 7 impacted several Western countries, including the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Italy. While the conflict remains ongoing – and indeed will reverberate long after the fighting actually ends — this report attempts to take the pulse of five Western countries just shy of the one-year anniversary marking the attack.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, and in line with trends that have been unfolding in recent years, there has been a spike in both Islamophobic and antisemitic incidents across all five countries — it is not an either/or phenomena. Still, the data underpinning these incidents remains challenging, limited, and frequently incomplete, often collected by civil society groups or non-profit organizations with different definitions of the terms. Government data varies on how it is collected, if it is recorded at all, across local, state, and federal levels. This makes it exceedingly difficult to compare the data rigorously and make generalizable conclusions with confidence. The data that is available, however, does suggest that extremist groups are leveraging the conflict to promulgate and amplify preexisting antisemitic and Islamophobic narratives. In other words, the terrorist attacks of October 7 and the Israeli response provide an opportunity to promote their hateful narratives and repackage them for the moment, often inciting their followers to wreak havoc and pushing their supporters to engage in violence.

New York: The Soufan Center, 2024.63p.

May Contain Markup

Edited by Helen Fein

Definitions of Genocide: The book explores various definitions of genocide, highlighting the limitations of the U.N. Genocide Conventionand proposing broader sociological definitions.

Recognition and Denial: It discusses the challenges in recognizing and labeling genocides, including the role of media and state motives in denial and misinformation.

Prevention and Punishment: The book examines approaches to preventing genocide and holding perpetrators accountable, includingreflections on historical cases and legal frameworks.

Role of Refugees: Refugees are highlighted as contemporary witnesses to genocide, with their testimonies providing crucial evidence andinsights into ongoing atrocities.

SAGE Publications, 1993, 204 pages

MCBRIDE, MEGAN K.; JENKINS, MONIQUE

From the document: "Within the public violence literature--that is, the literature on domestic terrorism, mass shootings, school shootings, and hate crimes, among others--leakage has been identified as a core warning behavior. Leakage occurs when a would be assailant communicates an intention to harm a target before committing an attack. This communication can vary in timing, level of detail, form, intentionality, and audience. Through such a communication, an individual might directly verbalize an intent to commit an act, make more subtle threats and innuendos, or share a plan via social media. Researchers have found relatively high levels of leakage associated with acts of public violence, including adolescent-perpetrated mass murders, mass shootings, political and public figure assassinations, and domestic terrorism. For this reason, leakage--which often occurs in interactions online or with loved ones--can be an important warning sign. But leakage to family, friends, or acquaintances is not the only way to detect when an individual is intending to commit an act of public violence, and over the last decade, researchers have started to examine preattack contact with system stakeholders, such as law enforcement, mental health, and education professionals. [...] We sought to advance understanding of what percentage of the violent extremist population could be 'catchable' in the sense that an individual had been in previous contact with a system stakeholder (e.g., law enforcement, mental health provider) or had been reported to a system stakeholder (e.g., by a friend or loved one to whom they had intentionally or unintentionally leaked information). To explore this issue, we leveraged a new dataset: the Domestic Terrorism Offender Level Database (DTOLD). The database includes detailed information on the 320 non-Islamist individuals who carried out terrorist attacks in the United States between January 1, 2001, and December 31, 2020. Specifically, we sought to understand what percentage of this population was known to system stakeholders at some point before they perpetrated their attacks." Further information for this document can be found here: www.cna.org/reports/2024/08/domestic-terrorists-contact-with-system-stakeholders-before-attacks

CNA CORPORATION. 2024. 4p.

By André Duffles, Teixeira Araneg and Ariel Faccioli Fernandes

Grounded on an extensive literature review derived from evidence-based studies (e.g., scientific articles, institutional and technical reports, journalistic evidence, academic books, and book chapters), our article develops a qualitative analysis to address the following question: to what extent do the strategic motivations of states and organized crime groups converge/diverge in the context of the current Russo-Ukrainian conflict? This article is divided into three parts. The initial section delves into the interconnections between illicit markets and armed conflicts. Secondly, after acknowledging the background of organized crime in both countries and the emergence of the current Russo-Ukrainian war, it highlights the implications of this conflict on the dynamics of illicit markets. Finally, it analyzes the strategic motivations of states and organized crime within this setting, as well as its points of convergence and divergence. This research potentially explores the frequently wicked ties of (inter)national politics and criminal adaptation during (post-)war times in Eastern Europe and within the international system.

Journal of Illicit Economies and Development, 6(2): pp. 48–60. 2024.