By United States. Federal Bureau Of Investigation; United States. Office Of Homeland Security

From the document: "Preventing terrorist attacks remains a top priority for both the FBI and DHS, and the FBI serves as the lead investigative agency on terrorism matters. The threat posed by international and domestic threat actors has evolved significantly since 9/11. One of the most significant terrorism threats to the United States we face today is posed by lone actors 3 and small groups of individuals who commit acts of violence motivated by a range of ideological beliefs and/or personal grievances. Of these actors, domestic violent extremists represent one of the most persistent threats to the United States today. These individuals are often radicalized online and look to conduct attacks with easily accessible weapons. Many of these violent extremists are motivated and inspired by a mix of ideological, socio-political, and personal grievances against their targets. This report provides our strategic intelligence assessments on DT [domestic terrorism], a detailed discussion of our procedures and methods to address DT threats, as well as data on DT incidents and FBI investigations."

United States. Federal Bureau Of Investigation; United States. Office Of Homeland Security . 2023. 46p.

By Unidad de investigación de Venezuela

For twenty years, Venezuela was a refuge for Colombia’s Marxist guerrillas, a place where they could hide out from the military, run criminal economies, and carry out political work with impunity thanks to their friendly relationship with the government of President Hugo Chávez. But today, it is so much more. Guerrillas such as the ELN have spread deep into Venezuelan territory, they are filling their ranks with recruits, taking control of communities, and interfering in politics. Today, they are binational guerrilla groups. The product of five years of fieldwork along the Colombia-Venezuela border and beyond, this investigation reveals the Venezuelan operations of Colombia’s guerrillas and explores the far-reaching implications for both countries of their evolution into Colombo-Venezuelan groups.

Washington, DC: Insight Crime, 2022. 53p.

Armstrong-Scott, Gabrielle L.; Waldo, Jim

From the document: "Ten years ago, U.S. national security agencies grew concerned about a relatively new and powerful weapon used by terrorists: the World Wide Web. What had begun as an effort to connect end users from across the world to share information and to serve as a force of human liberation, instead began to be used as a tool for destruction of life. Terrorists were exploiting technology companies' lax content moderation policies to recruit new members, spread violent extremist ideology, and plan terrorist attacks. [...] Technology companies and governments have spent the past decade trying to better address the evolving threat of terrorist and violent extremist content online (TVEC). However, there are few studies examining just how effective these efforts have been, where we are today in managing the problem, and wherein lie gaps for improvement. This paper argues that companies' efforts to deal with TVEC have been hampered at the outset by a tendency to define TVEC extremely narrowly. [...] This paper also explores the idea of ethical obligations and norms as an alternative to a legally required definition. On the technical side, this paper finds that even if there was consensus on the legal and ethical questions surrounding TVEC, the technical tools currently available are no panacea. Trade-offs across efficiency, scalability, accuracy, and resilience are persistent. Current technical tools tend to disadvantage minority groups and non-English languages. They are also less robustly implemented across small and non-U.S./European firms, generally either because they are left out of inter-firm initiatives or because they lack resources and capability. This paper does not claim to cover every issue relevant to TVEC; however, it highlights several important gaps that could be addressed by policymakers and tech companies and identifies avenues for future research."

Belfer Center For Science And International Affairs. 2023.

By Pieter Van Ostaeyen | Kwesi Aning  

Since the initial rise in violent extremist and terrorist groups in the Sahel in the mid-2000s, the number of such groups in the region has continued to grow. This is reflected in the nature of the opportunistic alliances that have developed among different groups, with varying interests and memberships. Furthermore, these groups have changed their operational tactics over time and, since 2019, began a gradual expansion of their activities towards the littoral states of West Africa. This paper focuses on two of the most important extremist groups in the Sahel: Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP) and Islamic State in Greater Sahel (ISGS). In discussing the origins of both groups, this paper argues that their establishment was not borne out of religious rationales alone. Rather, ISWAP’s and ISGS’s formation and expansion were based on their fractured relationships with the organizations from which they split and to a certain extent transformed, as well as their pursuit for new allegiances and competition for preeminence in the leadership as they battled to expand and establish Islamic states in northern Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and the Sahel. Ideologically, this paper identifies the adoption of Takfiri doctrines as the driving force resulting in more draconian interpretation and implementation of Islamic laws implemented by the hisba relating to zakat, hudud, ta’zir, and qisas. This paper argues that factionalism and splits from the original organizations represent fundamental splits from their original members and that the alliances formed by these originally distinct groups constitute a fundamental split and shift in operational tactics. ISWAP and ISGS operations are characterized by opportunism and exploitation of local grievances that enables them to build specific narratives for support….

Berlin: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V.. Counter Extremism Program, 2023. 20p.  

By Edmund Fitton-Brown and Bakary Sambe 

  This short paper explores how Jamaat Nusrat Al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), the predominant coalition of al-Qaeda (AQ) affiliates in the region, is structured and financed and how its component parts relate to one another. The paper will outline how the various groups constituting JNIM train and operate jointly and the extent of their use of trafficking routes and overlap with regional organized crime. It addresses the extent to which the spillover of JNIM activity from Mali and Burkina Faso into the Atlantic/Gulf of Guinea littoral states represents a threat to their stability. It also addresses the impact of political instability in Mali, Burkina Faso, and elsewhere on counterterrorism (CT) activity and the impact on terrorism of external state and non-state assistance. The paper seeks to diagnose the challenges posed by JNIM considering its local and regional circumstances on the ground and to provide operationally relevant recommendations both for actions within the region itself and through the use of international resources. The recommendations seek to integrate CT with measures aimed at preventing and countering extremism, conflict resolution, and development goals. They also highlight that the needs vary between different countries in the region. For example, measures applied to Mali cannot easily be transferred to mitigate the challenges in Burkina Faso  

Berlin: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V. , Counter Extremism Program, 2023. 14p.

By Ini Dele-Adedeji | Sofia Koller

This policy paper summarizes the current state of affairs regarding the linkages of terrorist groups in West Africa with terrorist networks in other African regions. It also provides recommendations for policymakers and security agencies. ● The paper looks at linkages of JNIM, IS West Africa Province (ISWAP), and IS in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) with terrorist groups in North, West-Central, Eastern, and Southern Africa. ● In West Africa, ISWAP’s activities have been regionally confined to Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon. There is no indication that ISWAP intends to expand its territorial base beyond these countries or that it has any transregional linkage with terrorist groups in other parts of Africa. ● JNIM and ISGS have demonstrated that they possess the intention and capability of regional expansion across West Africa. Increasing attacks further southwards in West Africa and their presence in the neighboring regions of Ivory Coast, Ghana, Togo, and Benin suggests that both groups intend to expand their geographical zone of influence to the Gulf of Guinea….

Berlin: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V. Counter Extremism Program, 2023. 16p.

By Theo Clement and Hans-Jakob Schindler  

The nexus between terrorist and transnational organized crime (TOC) networks in West Africa presents one of the most significant security challenges. Both networks undermine governance and the rule of law and cooperate on a multitude of levels in a complex web of mutual beneficial arrangements. Therefore, this nexus presents a mutually enforcing mechanism that supports and accelerates regional destabilization. This paper argues that the risks emanating from this cooperation are not limited to terrorism financing alone as terrorist groups also use their cooperation with TOC networks to gain access to resources needed for their activities, such as arms and ammunition. Finally, such cooperation also allows terrorist groups to carve out spaces that allow them to control the local population while at the same time provide security for local licit and illicit economic activities. Therefore, this cooperation is in some cases also a tool through which terrorist groups can gain support and acceptance among the local population. Therefore… 

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  , tackling this nexus must involve both the regaining of territorial control from terrorist groups by the respective governments as well as the strengthening of governance structures. Both aims should also be attempted concurrently. This paper presents a range of recommendations for German and European decision-makers that primarily aim to disrupt the entry as well as exit points of the flows of illicit goods of the region. Given the current challenges European and German projects face when cooperating with some of the governments in the region, an emphasis on increasing regional cooperation in West Africa seems advisable. In particular, the paper suggests strengthening national and regional law enforcement and border control capabilities, especially within the coastal states of the Gulf of Guinea. Increased cooperation with the Intergovernmental Action Group Against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA), increased support to strengthen the management and control mechanisms for national parks, and intensified exchange mechanisms, such as the West Africa Police Chief Committee (WAPCC) of Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), could be contemplated. In addition, German and European decision-makers could encourage and support governments in the region in their efforts to intensify the use of existing regional mechanisms such as the ECOWAS sanctions mechanism, as well as increase the participation of regional states in the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)-World Customs Organization (WCO) Container Control Program and INTERPOL’s West African Police Information System (WAPIS) as possible priorities. 

Berlin:  Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V. Counter Extremism Program 2023. 16p 

By Europol

  Terrorism remains a significant threat to the internal security of the European Union. Terrorists operate across borders, leveraging new technologies and modi operandi to target innocent people. EU law enforcement authorities, in particular the counter-terrorism community, remain vigilant and united in countering the threat. The EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT) 2023 contributes to this effort, by presenting prevalent terrorism trends in the EU. Terrorism constitutes an attack on our society intending to create fear and chaos among EU citizens. In 2022, 16 terrorist attacks took place in the EU and an additional 12 attacks failed or were foiled. While the attacks directly affected seven Member States, more Member States arrested suspects in terrorism-related cases. Tragically, four people were killed in terrorist attacks in the EU, two resulting from jihadist attacks and two from a right-wing terrorist attack. We honour the memory of all those lost to terrorism in 2022 and in previous years.

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  Member States continue to view jihadist terrorism as the most prominent terrorist threat to the EU despite the fact that the number of jihadist attacks has decreased compared to 2021 and 2020. The threat from right-wing terrorist lone actors, radicalised online, remains significant. Left-wing and anarchist terrorists and violent extremists continue to pose a threat to public safety and security in the EU. Additionally, the spread of propaganda online and its potential for radicalisation remains a key concern. Social isolation and the lack of a solid support system remain key vulnerabilities which terrorists take advantage of in order to propagate their messages and to recruit new followers. This is particularly worrying with the increasing number of young people, including minors, exposed to online terrorist propaganda. Furthermore, the terrorist and violent extremist environment is becoming more decentralised and volatile. Diffuse actors connect and inspire one another, uniting behind grievances beyond ideology or group affiliation. This context is ripe for self-radicalisation and for lone actors to begin engaging in attack planning, and poses significant challenges for preventing and combating terrorism and violent extremism in the EU.   

  Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 2023. 94p. 

By Anna Kruglova

This policy brief analyses the phenomenon of conspiracy theories, and how they fit in the realm of research on violent extremism. Using the case study of QAnon, this Policy Brief looks at how the movement mobilises people to violence on social media and attempts to determine how different this  process is from any other process of radicalisation to violence. By combining discourse analysis of the movement’s Gab posts, interviewing former supporters, and analysing three illustrative case studies, this Policy Brief identifies five discourses - such as revenge, “the Other”, chosenness/ specialness, apocalypse, and urgency for action and altruism - that are used to bring people into the violent mindset. It emphasises the similarity of these discourses to the ones used by other extremist organisations and argues against exceptionalising the threat of QAnon and other conspiracy theories. It concludes by making recommendations about how to tackle QAnon propaganda.

The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT),    2023. 22p.

By Parsons, Chelsea; Bengali, Ruhi; Zale, Courtney; Geller, Lisa; Cantrell, Spencer

From the document: "Extreme Risk Protection Order (ERPO) laws create an opportunity to intervene and prevent firearm violence when there are warning signs that an individual poses a risk of harm to self or others. While ERPO laws are relatively new, a growing body of research demonstrates the potential for these laws to prevent firearm violence, particularly firearm suicide, and multiple victim/mass shootings. Interest in ERPO laws has increased in recent years, with 16 states having enacted these laws between 2018 and 2023. Implementation varies widely across and within states. As a result of strong ERPO implementation efforts in some jurisdictions, more information is now available for state and local leaders about how to implement and adapt ERPO laws for their own communities. In addition, the Bipartisan Safer Communities Act of 2022 included $750 million in new federal grant funding for states, some of which is designated to support ERPO implementation. To meet this moment, the Everytown for Gun Safety Support Fund and the Johns Hopkins Center for Gun Violence Solutions have partnered to compile this guide of the best available practices and promising approaches to effective implementation of extreme risk laws. These recommendations are informed by conversations with individuals who are pioneering ERPO implementation, in addition to the best practices shared at a December 2022 convening of ERPO leaders from around the country."

Johns Hopkins Center for Gun Violence Solutions. Everytown for Gun Safety. 2023. 52p.

Corrigan, Jack; Flagg, Melissa; Murdick, Dewey

From the document: "This brief aims to provide a framework for a more systems-oriented technology and national security strategy. We begin by identifying and discussing the tensions between three strategic technology and national security goals: '1. Driving technological innovation. 2. Impeding adversaries' progress. 3. Promoting safe, values-driven deployment.' We go on to provide a brief overview of 15 levers of power through which policymakers can pursue these goals. These proposed levers fall into two categories: 'direct levers of power' (there are nine), which are focused on discrete functions and issue sets; and 'enabling levers of power' (there are six), which are more general-purpose and can be used to enhance the effect of the direct levers. These proposed categories are based on our own analysis, and while the list is non-exhaustive, it provides a useful framework for characterizing government actions and aligning them to particular goals of technology policy. [...] This adaptable framework, suitable for any country or international body, emphasizes the importance of creative problem-solving and having a comprehensive understanding of the policy landscape to achieve strategic goals. This framework is intended for decision-makers and stakeholders in the realms of technology, national security, and economic policy."

Georgetown University. Walsh School of Foreign Service. Center for Security and Emerging Technology. 2023. 33p.

By Gary Peters

From the document: "At the direction of U.S. Senator Gary Peters, Chairman of the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee (HSGAC), and following the Committee's initial review of the security, planning, and response failures in advance of and during the January 6th attack, Majority Committee staff conducted a subsequent review focused on the intelligence failures leading up to the attack on the U.S. Capitol on January 6th. This review included assessments of documents and information provided to the Committee pursuant to its original February 2021 request for information from relevant agencies, as well as documents, interview transcripts, and supporting materials related to the House Select Committee's investigation and final report. This report assesses federal intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination processes and interagency coordination in advance of January 6th. The report finds that FBI and I&A [Office of Intelligence and Analysis] obtained large amounts of intelligence indicating the potential for violence on January 6th. However, neither FBI nor I&A issued sufficient warnings to their law enforcement partners based on that intelligence, partially because these agencies were biased toward discounting the possibility of such an unprecedented event. Federal agencies also suffered from a lack of coordination as they prepared for January 6th."

United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. 2023. 106p.

By Rohan Gunaratna and Katalin Petho˝-Kiss  

  The global COVID-19 pandemic continues to attract the attention of threat groups. Although conventional means—the gun and the bomb— will remain terrorists’ preferred mode of attack, threat groups have expressed an interest in exploiting the virus. Terrorist and extremist groups, cells, and personalities will not let up using what works for their stated purposes. Rather than using tested and proven traditional weapons, will contemporary and future threat groups use bioweapons? Some terrorist and extremist groups, especially the Islamic State and right-wing extremist groups, have shown intentions to weaponize the virus. Unlikely to disappear in the near future, the contagion worldwide reached six and a half million deaths in 2022 and is expected to further increase in 2023. Modified organisms can certainly be weaponized, but the weaponized versions would not come from a backstreet lab. The infrastructure to produce a sophisticated weapon needs highly trained scientists. Such weaponization would most probably come from government-run programs. The analogy would be nuclear weapons, where terrorists cannot manufacture them but they can get hold of weapons created by governments and use them. Bioweapons are invisible, replicate, and self-perpetuate. Because of the widespread availability of SARS-CoV-2 causing COVID-19 disease, will there be a paradigm shift from traditional terrorism to bioterrorism?  

New York: London: Berghahn Books, 2023.  213p.

By Jacob Davey and Julia Ebner

  This report presents the findings of a project that investigated the prevalence, scale and nature of the ideologies and narratives that motivated the attack which left 51 dead and injured a further 50 more during Friday prayers at the Al Noor Mosque and the Linwood Islamic Centre in Christchurch, New Zealand. The report explores the origins of the ‘Great Replacement’ and ‘white genocide’ theories and the dynamics and platforms which have allowed the ideas to spread. Using a combination of quantitative and qualitative analysis across mainstream and alternative social media channels, this report reveals significant mainstreaming of extreme-right narratives across social media platforms and in language and policies promoted by mainstream politicians in Europe and North America. This report provides some recommendations for steps to be taken by technology companies, government and civil society to counter the spread of extremist ideologies.   

Beirut; Berlin; London; Paris; Washington DC : Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD), 2019. 36p.

United States. Department Of Justice. Office Of The Inspector General

From the document: "The objectives of this audit were to: (1) evaluate the Department of Justice's (DOJ or Department) efforts to develop a comprehensive strategy to address domestic violent extremism (DVE) in the United States, and (2) determine if the Department is effectively coordinating among Department stakeholders on the implementation of its strategy. Our audit scope covered the period of fiscal year (FY) 2017 to FY 2022. [...] DOJ has identified DVE, which it refers to interchangeably as domestic terrorism, as one of the most significant threats facing the country. DOJ has characterized its efforts to counter DVE as a whole-of-Department commitment that requires sustained attention and resources. Nonetheless, DOJ has not formalized a DVE strategy. DOJ has focused attention on investigating, prosecuting, and preventing acts of DVE, but it also has experienced challenges in ensuring that its various efforts are cohesive and used in a strategic way to better identify lessons learned and spread awareness of available resources. Moreover, although DOJ has issued some internal guidance relating to DVE investigations, additional clearer guidance across all law enforcement and litigating components could assist in promoting greater consistency about what qualifies as a DVE case and better coordination in the handling of cases with a DVE nexus. DOJ should also consider formalizing mechanisms to routinely evaluate the efficacy and impact of its DVE efforts and to maintain the continuous protection of civil liberties. Finally, DOJ should improve its coordination on data-driven efforts to consistently track DVE-related cases across the Department. [...] Our report contains seven recommendations to assist the Department in its efforts to have a cohesive and sustained approach to addressing the DVE threat."

United States. Department Of Justice. Office Of The Inspector General . 2023. 43p.

Edited by Rafael Reuveny and William R. Thompson

Terrorism is imprinted on Western society's consciousness. Nearly every week a terrorist attack occurs in the world. The academic world, in attempting to understand terrorism, has often been limited to descriptive work rather than analysis, and has produced surprisingly few mainstream collections on the subject. Coping with Terrorism offers a collection of essays that ask: who are terrorists, what are their goals, who supports them, and how can we combat their tactics? The essays are scholarly, rather than journalistic or ideological, in their approach. As such, they scrutinize a much-discussed and prevalent subject and bring it into the mainstream for international relations.

Albany: State University of New York Press, 2010. 418p.

By  Grahame Allen, Matthew Burton and Alison Pratt

The beginning of the millennium saw an increased political focus on the threat from international terrorism, heightened by the attack on the Twin Towers on 11 September 2001. Only one year before 9/11, new counter-terrorism legislation had been passed in the UK. Designed to reform and extend state powers found in previous counter-terrorism legislation, the Terrorism Act 2000 gave increased powers to the Home Secretary and the police. It moved the focus of counter-terrorism to all forms of domestic and international terrorism, rather than just Northern Ireland-related terrorism. In 2003, the Government introduced its counter-terrorism strategy, CONTEST. Now in its fourth iteration, CONTEST aims to reduce the risk to the UK from terrorism with four objectives:

• Pursue: to stop terrorist attacks

• Prevent: to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism

• Protect: to strengthen protection against a terrorist attack

• Prepare: to mitigate the impact of a terrorist attack

Although statistics relating to terrorism and the use of counter-terrorism legislation have been collected by the Home Office since the 1970s, the publication (and consistent collection) of data was halted in 2001. This briefing examines the available statistics on terrorism in Great Britain including:

• Deaths due to terrorism

• The use of stop and search legislation

• Terrorism arrests

• Pre-charge detention periods

• Prosecutions and convictions for terrorism

• Terrorist prisoners

• The use of TPIMS

• The number of foreign fighters fighting in Syria

London: Home Office Library, 2022. 37p.

By Maaha Elahi and Julian Hargreaves  

This article presents a legal and public policy analysis of Shakeel Begg v British Broadcasting Corporation, a British libel case brought before the High Court in 2016. Begg v BBC provides a lens through which current debates on extremism and counter-extremism in the UK may be analysed. More specifically, the authors use their analysis of the case to address criticisms levied against the UK Government’s counter-extremism strategy, including the conceptualisation and definition of “Islamist extremism”. The article offers two main contentions. First, that the judgment in Begg v BBC has been undervalued by politicians and policymakers in the UK, as well as by scholars, journalists and other commentators. Second, that Lord Justice Haddon-Cave’s judgment in Begg v BBC provides a useful framework for those wishing to define, identify and tackle Islamist extremism, and extremism of any kind, in the UK and elsewhere.  

 The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT),  2022.  32p.

By Anti-Defamation League

Every year, individuals with ties to different extreme causes and movements kill people in the United States; the ADL Center on Extremism (COE) tracks these murders. Extremists regularly commit murders in the service of their ideology, in the service of a group or gang they may belong to, or even while engaging in traditional, non-ideological criminal activities. In 2022, domestic extremists killed at least 25 people in the U.S., in 12 separate incidents. This represents a decrease from the 33 extremist-related murders documented in 2021 and is comparable to the 22 extremist-related murders in 2020. It continues the recent trend of fewer extremist-related killings after a five year span of 47-78 extremist-related murders per year (2015-2019). The 2022 murder totals would have been much lower if not for two high-casualty extremist-related shooting sprees. Only 10 of the 25 deaths occurred outside of those sprees—and one of those 10 deaths occurred in a less lethal mass shooting attempt. The issue of extremist-related mass killings is of growing concern and is the subject of a special section of this report. From the 1970s through the 2000s, domestic extremist-related mass killings were relatively uncommon. However, over the past 12 years, their number has greatly increased. Most of these mass killings were committed by right-wing extremists, but left-wing and domestic Islamist extremists were also responsible for incidents. The Center on Extremism has identified 62 extremist-connected mass killing incidents since 1970, with 46 of them being ideologically motivated. Disturbingly, more than half (26, or 57%) of the ideological mass killings have occurred within the past 12 years. Of particular concern in recent years are shootings inspired by white supremacist “accelerationist” propaganda urging such attacks. In 2022, 18 of the 25 extremist-related murders appear to have been committed in whole or part for ideological motives, while the remaining seven murders either have no clear motive or were committed for a non-ideological motive.....  

New York: ADL, 2023. 36p.

By The Financial Action Task Force (FATF)

This report focuses on the funding behind ethnically or racially motivated terrorism, also referred to as extreme right-wing terrorism. Extreme right-wing attacks have increased in recent years, highlighting the need to raise awareness about this complex phenomenon and its financing. While most of these attacks were carried out by self-funded lone actors, they can also involve small and medium organisations, as well as transnational extreme right-wing movements. Few countries have designated these groups or individuals as terrorists and there are differences in the countries’ legal regimes to addressing their activities. Extreme right-wing groups can obtain funding from criminal activity, but most funding comes from legal sources, such as donations, membership fees and commercial activities. These groups are becoming increasingly sophisticated in the way they move and use funds and there are growing transnational links between the groups.

The report highlights the challenges in tackling the financing of extreme right-wing terrorism and preventing attacks. These challenges include how countries view the threat, ranging from terrorism, to racially motivated violence. The report encourages countries to continue to develop their understanding of this increasingly transnational criminal activity, including by considering ethnically or racially motivated terrorism financing in their national risk assessments. It also encourages public, private and international partners to work together to identify the threats and exchange best practices on combating ethnically or racially motivated terrorism financing. The findings in this report are based on inputs from around 30 jurisdictions across the FATF Global Network, as well as expertise from the private sector and international bodies partnered with the FATF.

Paris: FATF, 2021. 48p.