By Lucía Miranda Leibe, Bettina Steible, Almudena Díaz Pagés and Natalia Sueiro Monje

Violent right-wing extremism has resurfaced as a worrying phenomenon in Europe, with terrorism being one of its most serious and visible forms. Old and new forms of right-wing based violence have emerged in recent years, as the Utøya attack showed in 2011. This massacre served as a wake-up call for European societies and security authorities, and highlighted the dangers of right-wing terrorism in Europe, particularly for the youth. Furthermore, terrorism is not the sole form of extreme-right and hate-based violence. Conversely, the range of extreme-right related violence also includes hate crime and hate speech, two phenomena that should not be overlooked. The former is especially relevant considering the impact it has on minority groups, on women, but also on the general population. As for the latter, the increasing use of the Internet and social media platforms has facilitated the exponential dissemination of hate speech. While two decades ago, much more effort was required by individuals to gain access to extremist right-wing ideology, nowadays these ideas are spread at a much higher speed and to a much broader audience. This is not a trivial matter. The spread of hate speech has an important impact on minority groups, as the primary victims, but also on society as a whole, as it affects social cohesion and the quality of democratic debate.

Madrid: Observatorio de la Juventud en España, 2020. 98p.

Chairman: The Rt Hon. Dr Julian Lewis MP

This report highlights the significant close working relationship between our security and intelligence agencies and counter-terrorism policing. It is through this regular collaborative approach that we can keep our citizens safe from all forms of terrorism. I would like to take this opportunity to thank our agencies and counter-terrorism policing for their excellent work to better understand and disrupt the threat from extreme right-wing terrorism.

London: Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, 2022. 137p.

By Topher McDougal, David A. Shirk, Robert Muggah and John H. Patterson

Mexico is experiencing a surge in gun-related violence since 2006. Yet Mexico does not manufacture small arms, light weapons or ammunition in sizeable quantity. Moreover, Mexico has some of the most restrictive gun legislation in the world. It is assumed that a considerable proportion of weapons in Mexico are illegal, most having been trafficked from the United States (U.S.). The volume of firearms sold in the United States and trafficked across the U.S.-Mexico border, however, is notoriously difficult to record. Previous attempts have involved multiplicative approximations based upon the quantity of arms confiscated at the border.

San Diego: Trans-Border Institute, University of San Diego; Rio de Janeiro, Brazil: Igarapé Institute, 2013. 31p.

By Mary Ellen O'Toole

This paper presents a systematic procedure for threat assessment and intervention of school shooters. The model is designed to be used by educators, mental-health professionals, and law-enforcement agencies and is intended to help refine and strengthen the efforts of the National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime. Its fundamental building blocks are its threat-assessment standards, which provide a framework for evaluating a spoken, written, and symbolic threat, along with a four-pronged assessment approach, which looks at the personality of the student, the student's family dynamics, the school dynamics, the student's role in those dynamics, and social dynamics. The model is not a profile of the school shooter or a checklist of danger signs pointing to the next adolescent who will bring lethal violence to a school. It discusses misinformation about school shootings; how to assess a threat, including motivations; types of threats; factors in threat assessment; and levels of risk. The document cautions that one or two traits or characteristics should not be considered in isolation or given more weight than the others. The text outlines the intervention process and closes with a number of recommendations. Four appendices list methodologies used in the report, suggested readings, and other information. (RJM)

Quantico, VA: Critical Incident Response Group (CIRG), National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime (NCAVC), FBI Academy , 1999. 52p.

By Edward Gaughan, Jay D. Cerio, and Robert A. Myers

American public schools are safe places, perhaps even safer than American homes. The tragic school shootings that are the focus of this report have occurred in less than one-hundredth of one percent of schools. The probability of being shot at school is similarly low. But shootings have occurred at schools, have been largely unpredictable, and have raised the anxieties and concerns of students, families, teachers, and the public at large. Between 1974 and 2000, the National Threat Assessment Center (NTAC) of the United States Secret Service identified 37 incidents. At least 20 incidents have been reported in the national media since 1992, and eight since 1999, and these do not include several planned shootings that were prevented by authorities. Why do these shootings occur? Why do they occur where they do? What can we do to protect our children?

Alfred, NY: Alfred University, 2001. 44p.

By J,M, Nowicki

GAO found that shootings at K-12 schools most commonly resulted from disputes or grievances, for example, between students or staff, or between gangs, although the specific characteristics of school shootings over the past 10 years varied widely, according to GAO’s analysis of the Naval Postgraduate School’s K-12 School Shooting Database. (See figure.) After disputes and grievances, accidental shootings were most common, followed closely by school-targeted shootings, such as those in Parkland, Florida and Santa Fe, Texas.

Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2020. 58p.

By Jay Van Kirk

Mass shootings occur on a regular basis in the United States, and depending on the definitions applied to the shootings an argument can be made that mass shootings of all types occur far more often than what is reported in the media as a “mass shooting.” Unfortunately, school shootings are also part of this analysis of mass shootings, and school shootings in the United States have occurred on a recurring basis since at least 1853. In the modern era, however, school shootings have become more frequent and more deadly as demonstrated by the May 24th, 2022, school shooting in Uvalde, Texas. This heinous crime at Robb Elementary School resulted in the deaths of nineteen children, and two teachers. Although there has been extensive research on mass shooters, mass shootings, and mass shootings in schools, there has not been enough emphasis on the application of homeland javascript:void(0);security principles of target hardening in schools as a risk mitigation factor for mass shootings. In fact, there is much that can be done to keep schools safe through basic target hardening measures, and many of these security updates can be immediately undertaken at the state and local level with relatively minor additional cost to schools and the taxpaying public. This paper references the mass shooting on February 14, 2018, at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School in Parkland, Florida, and makes policy recommendations toward basic target hardening measures which may be applied as necessary within the public school K-12 environment. The school shooting at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School was selected due to the fact that it has been recently investigated regarding the facts and circumstances of the incident, and provides ample information for analysis of effective target hardening measures.

Des Moines, IA: Des Moines Area Community College, 2022. 17p.

By William Krouse and Daniel J. Richardson

In the wake of tragedy in Newtown CT, Congress defined “mass killings” as “3 or more killings in a single incident” (P.L. 112-265). Any consideration of new or existing gun laws that follows mass shootings is likely to generate requests for comprehensive data on the prevalence and deadliness of these incidents. Despite the pathos of mass shootings, only a handful of researchers and journalists have analyzed the principal source of homicide data in the United States—the Supplementary Homicide Reports (SHR) compiled by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)—to determine whether those incidents have become more prevalent and deadly. According to the FBI, the term “mass murder” has been defined generally as a multiple homicide incident in which four or more victims are murdered, within one event, and in one or more locations in close geographical proximity. Based on this definition, for the purposes of this report, “mass shooting” is defined as a multiple homicide incident in which four or more victims are murdered with firearms, within one event, and in one or more locations in close proximity. Similarly, a “mass public shooting” is defined to mean a multiple homicide incident in which four or more victims are murdered with firearms, within one event, in at least one or more public locations, such as, a workplace, school, restaurant, house of worship, neighborhood, or other public setting. This report analyzes mass shootings for a 15-year period (1999-2013). CRS analysis of the FBI SHR dataset and other research indicates that offenders committed at least 317 mass shootings, murdered 1,554 victims, and nonfatally wounded another 441 victims entirely with firearms during that 15-year period. The prevalence of mass shooting incidents and victim counts fluctuated sporadically from year to year. For the period 2007-2013, the annual averages for both incidents and victim counts were slightly higher than the years from 1999-2007.

Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2015. 51p.

Edited by Rajeev Ramchand, Jessica Saunders

This report, part of RAND's Gun Policy in America project, presents a collection of essays that synthesize the available scientific data on topics pertinent to firearm policy in the United States. In particular, the authors examine mass shootings, firearm and ammunition taxes, the effects of the 1996 National Firearms Agreement in Australia, whether mental illness is a risk factor for gun violence, and law enforcement approaches to reduce community gun violence.

Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2021. 115p.

By Irene Ndung’u, Uyo Salifu and Romi Sigsworth

This study seeks to understand how women in Kenya are involved in violent extremism and in efforts to prevent and counter it. It also explores how women are affected by and respond to extremism. The findings show the multifaceted impact of violent extremism on women and their communities. There is also a complex set of dynamics that influence how women become actively involved as perpetrators or, more commonly, as supporters and facilitators of violent extremism. The study shows that more must be done to include women in programmes that aim to prevent and counter violent extremism in Kenya.

Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, 2017. 124p.

By Kacper Rekawek, Alexander Ritzmann, and Hans-Jakob Schindler

This study titled “Violent Right-Wing Extremism and Terrorism – Transnational Connectivity, Definitions, Incidents, Structures and Countermeasures” focuses on the transnational connections of the violent extreme right-wing milieus in six countries: Finland, France, Germany, Sweden, United Kingdom and the United States. It was commissioned by the German Federal Foreign Office, Division “International Cooperation against Terrorism, Drug Trafficking, Organized Crime and Corruption”, in 2020. CEP is grateful for the constructive support and critical feedback received throughout the process by the Federal Foreign Office. We would also like to thank the renowned external project experts engaged in the production of this study, without whom this work could not have been as comprehensive. The positions presented in this study only reflect the views of the authors and do not necessarily correspond with the positions of the German Federal Foreign Office.

New York; London;Germany: Counter Extremism Project, 2020. 158p.

By The Soufan Center

The self-styled Islamic State is an accident of history, emerging from multiple social, political, and economic tensions in the Middle East and beyond. It has challenged the territorial divisions imposed on the region following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire by carving out for itself a large area of territory.

Washington, DC: The Soufan Center, 2014. 80p

By The Soufan Center

From Pittsburgh to Poway and Charleston to El Paso, white supremacist extremists (WSEs) pose a clear terrorist threat to the United States. And while extremist groups operating on American soil are often labeled or categorized as domestic terrorist organizations, this report will demonstrate that they maintain links to transnational networks of like-minded organizations and individuals, from Australia, Canada, Russia, South Africa, and elsewhere. The danger of terrorism is growing in the United States, just as it is elsewhere in the world, with white supremacist extremists strengthening transnational networks and even imitating the tactics, techniques, and procedures of groups like al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (IS). These networks share approaches to recruitment, financing, and propaganda, with Ukraine emerging as a hub in the broader network of transnational white supremacy extremism, attracting foreign recruits from all over the world.

Washington, DC: The Soufan Center, 2019. 79p.

By The Soufan Center

A May 2019 intelligence bulletin from the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) Phoenix office labeled conspiracy theories as a domestic terrorism threat for the first time. The bulletin mentioned QAnon by name specifically and described the broader movement of “conspiracy theory-driven domestic extremists” as deserving particular attention. “Conspiracy theories promoting violence” was designated one of the most serious aspects of the domestic violent extremism threat in a recently released unclassified report by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). QAnon is a far right conspiratorial movement that creates and co- opts “theories” to fit an evolving narrative underpinned by the core notion that the “Deep State,” led by a cabal of elitist pedophiles, is leading the United States. These ideas are fueled by occasional messages from an anonymous individual, known as Q.

Washington, DC: The Soufan Center, 2021. 46p.

By The Soufan Center

Over the past twenty years, al-Qaeda has proven to be resilient and adaptive in its efforts to survive the Global War on Terror (GWOT). Twenty years after the attacks of September 11, 2001 in the United States, perpetrated by al-Qaeda, the organization looks much different than it did at the time. “We are no longer dealing with the same terrorist threat, or even the same al-Qaeda, as we did on September 11,” says Ali Soufan. “What we have today is something more complex and resilient, and an organization that has learned lessons from our policies and counterterrorism approaches. We did a lot to secure the U.S. homeland, but in our handling of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, we may have shown terrorist groups that all it requires to outlast a superpower is patience.”

Washington, DC: The Soufan Center, 2021. 47p.

By The Soufan Center

In the last three years, Indonesia and the southern Philippines have seen something new: women carrying out suicide bombings – some with their husbands, some with their children, and some avenging slain husbands – targeting churchgoers, police officers, and soldiers.1 In Malaysia, during the May 2018 general election, a 51-year-old housewife planned to use a car filled with gas canisters and explosives to mow down voters at a polling station, raising the spectre of women killing not only with their families, but also perpetrating “self-directed” or “lone wolf” terrorist acts themselves.2 More recently, the suicide bombing of a church in Makassar, Indonesia, and a shooting at a police headquarters in Jakarta have once again highlighted the potential of female terrorist operatives. Like suicide bombing, it was once assumed that women’s involvement as perpetrators of terrorist violence was culturally and ideologically anathema to terrorist groups in the region.

Washington, DC: The Soufan Center, 2021. 38p.

By Colin P. Clarke, Naureen Chowdhury Fink, and Mollie Saltskog

The Capitol Insurrection in the United States on January 6, 2021, sent shockwaves around the world. From London to Canberra, and Ottawa to Auckland, millions watched as a mob of far-right violent extremists stormed the U.S. Capitol seeking to overturn the results of a free and fair presidential election that had already been certified many times as both legitimate and credible. Dozens of Capitol Police officers were injured and attacked with racist slurs by the crowd; chants could be heard throughout the crowd to “hang Mike Pence,” then Vice President. The day after the attack, one of the Capitol Police officers died of a stroke linked by many to the attacks. Members of the crowd even erected makeshift gallows—not a prop that was hastily constructed, but rather a deliberate sign of the mob’s intentions. As of mid-September 2021, 608 federal cases have been brought against individuals involved in the January 6 attack.

Washington, DC: The Soufan Center, 2021. 62p.

By Marcus A. Boyd and Samuel Henkin

This report investigates spatial patterns of terrorism and targeted violence in the United States. Such investigations are rare because terrorist attacks are rare in the United States compared to other nations and the terrorist attacks that do occur are dispersed in similar patterns as population centers. In sum, the relative rarity of attacks, the geographic size of the United States, and the distribution of population density create inherent challenges historically. However, the recent outbreak of political violence throughout the United States coupled with advances in spatial statistics creates an opportunity to investigate emerging patterns at subnational scales.

College Park, MD: START, 2022. 19p.

By Pete Simi, Steven Windisch, Karyn Sporer

This report presents findings from a two-year study, “Recruitment and Radicalization among US Far-Right Terrorists.” This investigation examines multiple aspects of recruitment and radicalization, such as the quality and quantity of exposure to right-wing ideologies prior to extremist involvement; types of recruitment; pre-entry risk factors for extremist participation; and the extremists’ perception about why he/she was unable to progress beyond the planning stages of a terror plot. The empirical analysis is divided into four distinct but overlapping reports. Report one consists of a comprehensive thematic assessment, which focuses on family socialization prior to extremist involvement; entry processes into extremism; recruitment strategies and the extremist subculture of violence. In terms of socialization, although only a small segment of our sample (n=3, 9.7%) were raised by parents who were members of extremist groups, a vast majority (n=28, 90.3%) were exposed to racist/anti-Semitic beliefs during childhood. Regarding motivation for entry into violent extremism (VE), our findings indicate a variety of non-ideological factors increased the appeal of these groups such as acceptance from peers, attraction to the group’s forbidden social image and the ability to increase ones’ level of personal significance. In addition, participants also felt the group offered protection from bullies at school and rival gangs in their neighborhoods. In terms of recruitment, extremist groups relied on a variety of marketing strategies (e.g., leafleting and house parties) in order to promote their political agenda. Our data suggest these groups targeted marginalized youth who were angry and looking for solutions to their problems. However, the most effective recruitment tool was extremist music. Music provided recruiters with opportunities to introduce potential recruits to the extremist subculture in venues and through mediums with decreased monitoring from agents of formal social control. In addition, report one also examines the violent subculture of right-wing extremist groups. As part of this discussion, we highlight the role of various cultural practices such as violent rituals which were used to increase commitment to the group and to distinguish strong members from weaker ones. As our data indicates, however, there does seem to be a threshold for violence. That is, some extremists condemned violence when it was directed towards “defenseless” targets. Overall, these findings underscore the similarities individuals experience throughout their extremist careers.

College Park, MD: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), 2016. 260p.

By Pete Simi and Steven Windisch

In 1969 Travis Hirschi published Causes of Delinquency which assessed the status of existing criminological theory and outlined his own version of social bond theory. Hirschi argued, among other things, that criminological theory should focus more on asking “why don’t we do it” rather than the more common question “why do they do it?”(Hirschi, 1969) In this respect, Hirschi advocated for a focus on the constraints or barriers that prevent or reduce the likelihood of crime. The importance of this twist in thinking is the emphasis on the elements of the social fabric, which compel conformity rather than deviation by limiting certain types of human behavior. Following Hirschi, we examine violent radicalization where the expected end point is committing an act of mass casualty terrorism (MCT). For purposes of the current study, MCT can be distinguished from more common types of interpersonal violence along two dimensions (Rutherford et.al., 2007, Tilly 2003). First, as compared to interpersonal violence, which is characterized by close physical proximity between the perpetrator and victim (s), MCT typically involves a greater physical distance between the aggressor and the target (Black, 1996, Senechal de la Roche 1996). Second, MCT typically involves the potential for a large number of fatalities whereas interpersonal violence is much more likely to result in fewer victims (Arnold et.al., 2002, Quillen 2002). Bombings and shooting rampages are common examples of MCT while interpersonal violence includes acts such as fistfights, attacks involving blunt objects (e.g. bats) and stabbings.

Oslo: Center for Research on Extremism, The Extreme Right, Hate Crime and Political Violence, University of Oslo, 2017. 28p.