By Daniel S. Nagin

Do states with more guns have higher rates of fatal police shootings? This article uses a validated measure of firearm availability (the percentage of suicides committed with a firearm) to examine the relationship between gun proliferation and fatal police shootings. It expands on existing research to include (1) measures of access to Level I and II trauma centers, (2) interpretation of the findings from the lenses of “statistical prediction,” and (3) tests for structural differences between models for black descendants versus nonblack decedents. Findings confirm the correlation between statewide prevalence of gun ownership and fatal police shootings for both all decedents and unarmed decedents. It provides partial support for “statistical prediction” by police and finds that greater access to trauma centers is associated with lower rates of citizen deaths. The analysis suggests a far broader range of policy options for saving lives, such as better enforcement of legal restrictions on firearm possession, than focusing solely on policing systems.

The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social ScienceVolume 687, Issue 1, January 2020, Pages 49-57

By Charles C Lanfear , Rebecca Bucci , David S Kirk , Robert J Sampson

Importance: The past quarter-century has seen both sharp declines and increases in firearm violence in the United States. Yet, little is known about the age of first exposure to firearm violence and how it may differ by race, sex, and cohort.

Objective: To examine race, sex, and cohort differences in exposure to firearm violence in a representative longitudinal study of children who grew up in periods with varying rates of firearm violence in the United States and to examine spatial proximity to firearm violence in adulthood.

Design, setting, and participants: This population-based representative cohort study included multiple cohorts of children followed-up from 1995 through 2021 in the Project on Human Development in Chicago Neighborhoods (PHDCN). Participants included Black, Hispanic, and White respondents from 4 age cohorts of Chicago, Illinois, residents, with modal birth years of 1981, 1984, 1987, and 1996. Data analyses were conducted from May 2022 to March 2023.

Main outcomes and measures: Firearm violence exposure, including age when first shot, age when first saw someone shot, and past-year frequency of fatal and nonfatal shootings within 250 m of residence.

Results: There were 2418 participants in wave 1 (in the mid-1990s), and they were evenly split by sex, with 1209 males (50.00%) and 1209 females (50.00%). There were 890 Black respondents, 1146 Hispanic respondents, and 382 White respondents. Male respondents were much more likely than female respondents to have been shot (adjusted hazard ratio [aHR], 4.23; 95% CI, 2.28-7.84), but only moderately more likely to have seen someone shot (aHR, 1.48; 95% CI, 1.27-1.72). Compared with White individuals, Black individuals experienced higher rates of all 3 forms of exposure (been shot: aHR, 3.05; 95% CI, 1.22-7.60; seen someone shot: aHR, 4.69; 95% CI, 3.41-6.46; nearby shootings: adjusted incidence rate ratio [aIRR], 12.40; 95% CI, 6.88-22.35), and Hispanic respondents experienced higher rates of 2 forms of violence exposure (seen someone shot: aHR, 2.59; 95% CI, 1.85-3.62; nearby shootings: aIRR, 3.77; 95% CI, 2.08-6.84). Respondents born in the mid-1990s who grew up amidst large declines in homicide but reached adulthood during city and national spikes in firearm violence in 2016 were less likely to have seen someone shot than those born in the early 1980s who grew up during the peak of homicide in the early 1990s (aHR, 0.49; 95% CI, 0.35-0.69). However, the likelihood of having been shot did not significantly differ between these cohorts (aHR, 0.81; 95% CI, 0.40-1.63).

Conclusions and relevance: In this longitudinal multicohort study of exposure to firearm violence, there were stark differences by race and sex, yet the extent of exposure to violence was not simply the product of these characteristics. These findings on cohort differences suggest changing societal conditions were key factors associated with whether and at what life stage individuals from all race and sex groups were exposed to firearm violence.

JAMA Network Open 6(5); 2023

Bailey K. Roberts, Colleen P. Nofi,  Emma Cornell,  Sandeep Kapoor,  Laura Harrison,  Chethan Sathya, 

BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES: In 2020, firearm injuries became the leading cause of death among US abstract children and adolescents. This study aimed to evaluate new 2021 data on US pediatric firearm deaths and disparities to understand trends compared with previous years. METHODS: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Wide-ranging Online Data for Epidemiologic Research was queried for firearm mortalities in children/adolescents from 2018 to 2021. Absolute mortality, death rates, and characteristics were reported. Death rates were defined per 100 000 persons in that population per year. Death rates across states were illustrated via geographic heat maps, and correlations with state poverty levels were calculated. RESULTS: In 2021, firearms continued to be the leading cause of death among US children. From 2018 to 2021, there was a 41.6% increase in the firearm death rate. In 2021, among children who died by firearms, 84.8% were male, 49.9% were Black, 82.6% were aged 15 to 19 years, and 64.3% died by homicide. Black children accounted for 67.3% of firearm homicides, with a death rate increase of 1.8 from 2020 to 2021. White children accounted for 78.4% of firearm suicides. From 2020 to 2021, the suicide rate increased among Black and white children, yet decreased among American Indian or Alaskan Native children. Geographically, there were worsening clusters of firearm death rates in Southern states and increasing rates in Midwestern states from 2018 to 2021. Across the United States, higher poverty levels correlated with higher firearm death rates (R 5 0.76, P < .001). CONCLUSIONS: US pediatric firearm deaths increased in 2021, above the spike in 2020, with worsening disparities. Implementation of prevention strategies and policies among communities at highest risk is critical 

Pediatrics (2023) 152 (3): e2023061296.

By Brady United Against Gun Violence

Understanding the source of America’s gun violence epidemic is essential to building effective solutions to prevent it. For decades, laws passed at the behest of the gun industry have shielded important information from public view, making it nearly impossible to understand how, and from where, guns are funneled into the criminal market. Brady has used Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests to uncover information in an attempt to better understand how guns make their way from the legal marketplace to ultimately being used in crime. This report examines federal records that identify gun dealers subject to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives’ (ATF) Demand Letter 2 program — a program created to identify firearms dealers that sell the most crime guns and to aid law enforcement investigations. Only 2% of gun dealers nationwide are subject to this program, which includes dealers who have sold at least 25 guns that were recovered in crime during the past year that were found to have taken less than three years to make it from point of sale to being recovered in that crime. The ATF had identified that this low “time-to-crime” is a strong indicator of gun trafficking. This report, and its underlying national data, are the clearest look we’ve had in two decades as to which gun dealers sell the most crime guns. Absent complete transparency into the gun industry’s role in supplying firearms that fuel our nation’s gun violence epidemic, this data is the best indicator we have as to which gun dealers are fueling crime.

Washington, DC: Brady Campaign, 2024. 20p

By David Lochhead, Tidiani Diakité, Roberto Sollazzo, Saikou Sow, Raoul Sumo Tayo, Leonard Tettey

The use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in West Africa expanded dramatically between 2014 and 2022. As of 2022, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Mali, Niger, and Nigeria were heavily affected by these weapons, while Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, and Togo suffered from their use as an emerging threat. IED-building networks have established material and training links across conflict theatres in West and Central Africa, including the Lake Chad Basin, where armed groups have used IEDs extensively. IED designs have remained constant and inexpensive throughout the West Africa region, making them attractive for use in attacks against domestic and international security forces, UN peacekeepers, and civilians. The Small Arms Survey collected data on more than 2,200 IED-related incidents between March 2013 and September 2022, including the type, date, and location of these events. Information on perpetrators, their targets, and more than 6,600 casualties from deaths and injuries was also collected (Small Arms Survey, 2022). The data was collected through research undertaken in Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, and Niger, as well as desk research and remote interviews concerning Benin, Chad, and Nigeria. Where relevant from a comparative perspective, discussion of other regions that have countries with IED incidents or components occurs throughout the Report, such as those in North Africa, Central Africa, East Africa, and the Middle East. Most IED incidents analysed during this study involved IEDs containing explosive components or precursors specifically manufactured for the commercial extractive and construction sectors. Chemical products such as ammonium nitrate (AN), manufactured and supplied for bulk mining explosive emulsions, have entered IED-building networks, and are sourced principally from Ghana and Nigeria. Commercial explosives in bulk, including their precursors and accessories such as electric initiators and detonating cords, are diverted from the legal to illicit markets. This diversion primarily fulfils demand from the largely unregulated artisanal gold mining sector across West and Central Africa. A small subset of this diverted material also provisions IED construction. Captured, stolen, and recovered explosive ordnance—including legacy anti-vehicle mines trafficked from Chad, Libya, and possibly Sudan—also constitutes a source of IED components. Coordinated action among affected, source, and transit states is required to prevent armed groups and criminals from accessing commercial explosive materials and other IED components. Such action can involve: national stocktaking exercises; the development of national and regional counter-IED (C-IED) strategies; monitoring, information-sharing, and coordination mechanisms; regulatory modernization and harmonization;  engagement with artisanal mining associations, the mining and explosives industry, states, and regional trade blocs in pursuit of regulatory reform; and efforts to establish minimum standards for bulk and individual traceability of commercial explosives. Reducing the recovery of explosive ordnance requires renewed programmatic investment in clearing minefields and explosive remnants of war across the Sahe   

Geneva, SWIT:  Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies , 2023.  124p.

By Anne-Séverine Fabre, Nicolas Florquin, and Matt Schroeder

The trafficking of firearms and their use in criminal violence in Europe has received significant attention from researchers and policymakers. Less is known, however, about the illicit proliferation of firearm ammunition and other explosive munitions. Currently, detailed data on illicit munitions in Europe can only be accessed through specialized law enforcement agencies. National seizure statistics often lack the necessary detail for policy-relevant analysis, as do the media reports, which often include incomplete or inaccurate information on the types and calibres of ammunition. 

KEY FINDINGS • Calibres typically associated with handguns and widely available commercial brands of ammunition usually represent the bulk of the illicit firearm ammunition seen in the countries studied. • Illicit firearms ammunition is not necessarily trafficked from abroad, as shown by the misuse of domestically produced cartridges in the five surveyed countries. Moreover, cartridges produced legally within the European Union (EU) have been recovered the same year at crime scenes. • A large percentage of illicit hand grenades and other factory-produced explosive munitions seized in the European countries under review were manufactured in the former Yugoslavia. The seizures are consistent with media reports and government statements indicating that the Balkans are a major source of illicit grenades acquired and used by criminals in the EU. • The number of illicit grenades documented in the Netherlands and Sweden has decreased significantly in recent years, possibly owing to Covid-19-related travel and shipping disruptions, an increased reliance on other types of explosives by criminals, and national and regional counter-trafficking efforts.

Geneva, SWIT: Small Arms Survey, 2023. 24p.

By Rachel A. Kane; Basia E. Lopez; Paul A. Haskins

This Special Report of the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) presents a synthesis of select findings from over 60 publications on 18 NIJ-supported research projects on public mass shootings, including school mass shootings, since 2014. It also identifies areas of need and interest for future research and recommendations. For the purpose of this report, we define public mass shooting as a shooting event in a public setting that causes at least four fatalities in a single event. Excluded from our definition are events that occur in the course of a separate felony or domestic incident. However, the definition of a mass shooting varies among sources; for more information see “The Challenges of Defining ‘Mass Shooting’” in Part I of this report.

Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs National Institute of Justice , 2023. 42p.

By: Jonathan P. Caulkins, Philippe C. Schicker, H. Brinton Milward & Peter Reuter

Overdose deaths in North America have soared, primarily because of the spread of illegally manufactured fentanyl. This paper uses detailed qualitative and transaction-level data to analyse an early and prominent dark web fentanyl-selling operation. The data record the date, drug, quantity, and selling price for 5,589 transactions comprising 872,659 items sold for a little over $2.8 million through AlphaBay. Findings include that the organisation sustained an impressive sales growth rate of approximately 15% per week, com-pounded. Increasing order sizes by a factor of ten reduced the price per pill by approximately 25% for Oxycodone and 50% for Xanax. Those steep quantity discounts imply large price markups when selling further down the distribution chain. Such high growth rates and price markups suggest that it might be difficult to constrain supply by shutting down individual organisations, since any remain-ing organisations may be able to quickly grow to fill unmet demand.

Glob. Crime 2023

By: Eric L. Piza; George O. Mohler; Jeremy G. Carter; David N. Hatten; Nathan T. Connealy; Rachael Arietti; Jisoo Cho; Emily Castillo

This report presents a study on the impact of gunshot detection technology (GDT) on gun violence. The authors leverage over a decade of data from Kansas City, MO, and Chicago, IL, to measure how GDT contributes to policing and public safety. Both cities installed ShotSpotter GDT systems in 2012, allowing for a long-term quasi-experiment of program effects. Kansas City Police Department installed GDT in October 2012, with the target area covering approximately 3.5 square miles of the city and remaining unchanged to this day. Chicago Police Department installed GDT over approximately 3.0 square miles of the city in August 2012 with the coverage area expanding to 22 additional police districts between February 2017 and May 2018. This expansion led to approximately 100 square miles being covered by GDT in Chicago. The GDT system in Kansas City detected 11,517 gunfire incidents through the end of the study period (12/31/2019). The GDT system in Chicago detected 85,572 gunfire incidents over the full installation period from 2/6/17 – 12/31/19.1 Based upon ShotSpotter’s reported annual subscription costs of between $65,000 and $90,000 per square mile2, GDT coverage costs between $227,500 and $315,000 per year in Kansas City and between $8.8M and $12.3M per year in Chicago.

Final report submitted to the National Institute of Justice, 2023. 114p.

By Elinore J. Kaufman; Douglas J. Wiebe; Ruiying Aria Xiong

Importance  Firearm injury research in the US has focused on fatal injuries. The incidence and epidemiologic factors associated with nonfatal firearm injuries are less understood.

Objective  To evaluate estimates of incidence and trends over time of fatal and nonfatal firearm injuries.

Design, Setting, and Participants  A cross-sectional, ecologic study was conducted using data throughout the US from 2009 to 2017. Data on fatal injuries from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention were combined with national data on emergency department visits for nonfatal firearm injury from the Nationwide Emergency Department (ED) sample. Data analysis was conducted from August 2019 to September 2020.

Exposures  Firearm injuries identified with International Classification of Diseases external cause of injury codes and categorized by intent of injury, age group, and urban-rural location.

Main Outcomes and Measures  Incidence, case fatality rate, and trends over time of firearm injury according to intent, age group, and urban-rural location.

JAMA Intern Med. 20210 181(2): 1–8

.

By  Anne-Séverine Fabre, Nicolas Florquin and Matt Schroeder

Calibres typically associated with handguns and widely available commercial brands of ammunition usually represent the bulk of the illicit firearm ammunition seen in the countries studied.

Illicit firearms ammunition is not necessarily trafficked from abroad, as shown by the misuse of domestically produced cartridges in the five surveyed countries. Moreover, cartridges produced legally within the European Union (EU) have been recovered the same year at crime scenes.

A large percentage of illicit hand grenades and other factory-produced explosive munitions seized in the European countries under review were manufactured in the former Yugoslavia. The seizures are consistent with media reports and government statements indicating that the Balkans are a major source of illicit grenades acquired and used by criminals in the EU.

The number of illicit grenades documented in the Netherlands and Sweden has decreased significantly in recent years, possibly owing to Covid-19-related travel and shipping disruptions, an increased reliance on other types of explosives by criminals, and national and regional counter-trafficking efforts.

Brussel, Belgium: Flemish Peace Institute. 2024, 24pg

By David M. Hureau1 , Theodore Wilson , Hilary M. Jackl, Jalon Arthur , Christopher Patterson znc Andrew V. Papachristos

Gun violence is a leading cause of premature death and a driver of racial disparities in life expectancy in the United States. Community-based interventions are the foremost policy strategy for reducing gun violence without exacerbating harm associated with criminal justice approaches. However, little is known about the interventionist workforce. In 2021, we used a researcher-guided survey to obtain a near-census of Chicago violence interventionists (n = 181, 93% response rate). Workers were mostly male (84%) and Black (80.9%), with a mean age of 43.6 years. Interventionists commonly experienced work-related exposure to violence and direct victimization. A total of 59.4% witnessed someone being shot at, whereas 32.4% witnessed a victim struck by gunfire. During work hours, 19.6% were shot at, while 2.2% were nonfatally shot. Single-year rates of gun violence victimization exceeded those of Chicago police. Results suggest that investment in community violence intervention should prioritize improving worker safety and reducing violence exposure while developing support for vulnerable frontline practitioners.

Science Advances, Dec. 2022.

By The Educational Fund to Stop Gun Violence, DC Justice Lab, Cities United, March for Our Lives, Community Justice Action Fund, Consortium for Risk-Based Firearm Policy, and Johns Hopkins Center for Gun Violence Prevention and Policy

This report urges us to think carefully about the relationship between gun violence prevention and racial equity. Racial equity impact assessments (REIAs), such as the assessment proposed in this report, guide advocates, policy makers, and researchers through a thorough examination of policies with an equity lens to anticipate the potential outcomes and mitigate foreseeable risks. It requires one to ask fundamental questions about when to justify involvement with the criminal legal system, identify the costs and benefits of engagement, and think about alternatives to minimize harm. This framework acknowledges that solutions to gun violence, however well intentioned they may be, can exacerbate or compound upon the harms suffered by impacted communities if they are made without careful analysis and the input of those directly affected by it. Gun violence affects everyone. It inflicts an enormous burden upon our country, particularly within under-resourced Black and Latino/Hispanic communities. The politics of guns and race have long been intertwined, but racial equity only recently became a focal point of discussions among gun violence prevention groups, catalyzed by the advocacy of community-based and BIPOC2-led organizations. In partnership with many stakeholders across the gun violence prevention movement, this racial equity framework is a resource that can be used by policymakers, researchers, and organizations working in gun violence prevention. Representatives from the six authoring organizations comprised a small working group to plan development of the report and convened a series of conversations to share proposals and review feedback from expert contributors. In addition to advancing racial equity, the core values of inclusion, collaboration, and consensus-building guided the project from early stages through completion. Building upon existing racial equity work and guidance, this report is informed by the public health model of social determinants of health and has been tailored to the specific needs of gun violence prevention. The tools and recommendations proposed in this report are derived from relevant academic literature, racial equity impact assessments, and frameworks for building more equitable social movements. The racial equity framework for gun violence prevention is divided into three main sections: The first section introduces the most relevant considerations about gun policy and race. It helps contextualize the issue of racial disparities in gun violence and the role of the criminal legal system. The second section is the racial equity impact assessment tool (REIA) for gun violence prevention policy. It includes the analysis of the foundational assessments that were considered to develop the tool and a practical explanation of each of the questions that comprise the REIA. The third section provides resources to build a more equitable gun violence prevention movement. It describes the need to center and invest in BIPOC-led organizations and presents a set of recommendations for developing and sustaining a more equitable gun violence prevention movement.

The Authors, 2022. 54p.

By Astrid De Schutter and Nils Duquet

Firearms trafficking in the European Union (EU) is driven by criminal demand and is a key enabler for other criminal activities such as drug trafficking. Criminals seek to acquire firearms for instrumental purposes, namely to facilitate their criminal activities, where they use guns to threaten, intimidate or assault others (criminals or non-criminals), but they can also be acquired for the reputation afforded through the possession of – especially certain types of – firearms. Previous studies have shown that handguns are the type of firearm most commonly possessed by criminals in Europe as they are lightweight, easy to conceal and generally reliable. While automatic rifles can also be very effective for intimidation and assault purposes, their possession by criminals is less common. Criminal demand for firearms comes from various types of criminals ranging from international drug traffickers, armed robbers, youth gangs involved in street drug dealing, human traffickers, loan sharks, professional assassins and so on. Yet not all criminals have equal access to firearms. Given that legal access to firearms is almost impossible for criminals in Europe, they acquire them through other means. These firearms can, for example, be stolen from legal gun owners or state stockpiles, bought from a local criminal arms dealer or trafficked internationall . Interviews with experts, as well as previous studies, suggest also that the criminal demand for firearms is increasing in various EU Member States (9). Due to the traditionally closed character of illicit gun markets in Europe, firearms are often only accessible to criminals when they have the necessary criminal connections. Younger and less experienced criminals tend to experience more difficulties in their attempts to acquire firearms. In the past decade, however, law enforcement agencies from various European countries have noted an increased availability of firearms for criminals in their country. Previous studies have linked this to various trafficking methods, including the continuous supply of conflict legacy weapons from the Western Balkans, the increased trafficking in easy-to-reactivate firearms and in easy-to-convert blank-firing weapons and Flobert-calibre firearms . The possibilities generated by the internet have further eroded the closed character of illicit gun markets in Europe. The increased availability of firearms is believed to have ‘facilitated the gradual trickling-down of the possession and use of firearms to lower segments of the criminal hierarchy in several EU Member States, especially in western Europe’. In 2021 Europol noted that the use of violence in serious and organised crime seemed to be increasing in the EU, both in frequency and severity, augmented by the frequent use of firearms and explosives. A 2021 comparative study on gun violence in Europe, coordinated by the Flemish Peace Institute, concluded that firearms trafficking in Europe is not only driven by criminal demand, but is also strongly connected to criminal gun violence. The observed increased availability of various types of firearms to criminals has led to an escalation of criminal gun violence in several European countries and sometimes also to arms races among criminals. The study also concluded that shootings in the criminal underworld in Europe are mainly connected to the drugs trade and enabled by firearms trafficking. A 2018 EMCDDA study on drug-related homicide concluded that this type of homicide is more likely to involve the use of firearms than other means of violence . Findings from project TARGET state that young men (under the age of 35) are the main victims and perpetrators of lethal gun violence. This is also the case for non-lethal gun violence, but there is a more even age distribution in this category. In 2019 the EMCDDA and Europol noted that the criminal use of firearms, including automatic weapons, by organised crime groups involved in European drug markets appeared to be increasing (16). According to Europol, the use of violence related to the trade in drugs – cocaine and cannabis in particular – has escalated in recent years, and the availability of firearms and explosives is a key enabler for this violence (17). A previous study concluded that more research is needed to uncover the dynamics between drug markets in Europe and gun violence: ‘While there is clearly a link between the illegal drug trade and firearm violence, this connection and its enabling elements are an important avenue for further research’ (18). Counteracting drug-related gun violence requires a good intelligence picture of its scope, characteristics and dynamics. The objective of this report is to analyse the nexus between gun violence and the illegal drug market in Europe. To reach this objective, this paper addresses the following research questions: 1. What is the nexus between firearms trafficking and drug trafficking in the European Union? 2. What are the scope and characteristics of drug-related firearms violence in the European Union? 3. How does this violence impact society?

Brussels: Flemish Peace Institute, 2023. 57p.

By Gergely Hideg

KEY FINDINGS: Between 2010 and the end of the 2014–15 phase of the Russo-Ukrainian war, lethal criminal violence in Ukraine increased by nearly 50 percent. This raises the possibility of an even steeper future increase in violent crime resulting from the current full-scale war.

In spite of the increasing crime victimization rate of households since the 2022 invasion, incidents involving firearms remain less common compared to the pre-invasion period. Nonetheless, trust in the police—while still high—has declined since winter 2022–23, and approximately 14 percent of Ukrainian civilians now carry some form of typically non-lethal weapon for self-defense, which is more than a twofold increase from 2019 and more than a threefold increase from 2011.

The full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine initially led to a slight decrease in firearms kept in households as civilians and weapons were mobilized for the war effort. As of summer 2023, household ownership levels have gone back up, but the number of firearms held by these households has decreased by approximately 20 percent since the start of the full-scale war.

Survey respondents believe that the acquisition of firearms has become more straightforward than in winter 2022–23, although it still presents much greater challenges than in 2019. Acquiring ammunition appears to be more difficult than acquiring firearms.

Between 43 and 46 percent of men in every age group indicated that they either already own a firearm (7 percent overall) or would like to own one. Only 11 percent of women expressed the desire to own a firearm.

The survey indicated that more women than men expressed negative views about firearms: they have less desire to own a firearm, they are less likely to think they are necessary, and not many would feel safer if their household had a firearm. Nonetheless, many respondents, among them women, thought women ‘in their area’ expected their husbands to be able to use a firearm.

Geneva, SWIT: Small Arms Survey, 2023. 9p.

By United States. Department Of Justice. Office Of Community Oriented Policing Services

From the document: "At the request of then Uvalde Mayor Don McLaughlin, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) announced on May 29, 2022, that it would conduct a Critical Incident Review (CIR) of the law enforcement response to the mass shooting. [...] A full understanding of the response of local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies and personnel is critical for addressing many unanswered questions, identifying crucial lessons learned, enhancing prevention initiatives, and improving future preparation for and responses to mass shootings in other communities. In providing a detailed accounting and critical assessment of the first responder actions in Uvalde, and the efforts since to ameliorate gaps and deficiencies in that response, the CIR is intended to build on the knowledge base for responding to incidents of mass violence. It also will identify generally accepted practices for an effective law enforcement response to such incidents. Finally, the CIR is intended to help honor the victims and survivors of the Robb Elementary School tragedy."

United States. Department Of Justice. Office Of Community Oriented Policing Services . 2024. 62p.

By R. Blake Brown  

This report provides a legal history of firearm regulation to help understand the current debate over gun control policy in Canada, particularly regarding semi-automatic firearms. Debate over the regulation of such guns has been particularly heated since 1 May 2020, when Prime Minister Justin Trudeau announced that the federal cabinet had issued an Order in Council (PC 2020-298) to ban several models of semi-automatic firearms. 1 This report describes some of the key technological developments in handguns and long guns that have spurred debates about the kinds of firearms that should be available for certain uses in Canada. It identifies weapons employed in mass casualty events in Canada with reference to specific examples and notes the policy response to those events. The report explains the legislative tools used to address the dangers associated with semi-automatic firearms and considers the public policy debates about these regulatory approaches. It also identifies the strengths and shortcomings of past legislative approaches and considers policy options concerning the availability of semi-automatic weapons. This report demonstrates that the federal government has used a somewhat piecemeal approach to regulating handguns and semi-automatic firearms. Governments have historically sought to balance public safety and the interests of gun collectors, hunters, and target shooters. Efforts to limit the availability of some kinds of firearms have often resulted from their use in domestic and international mass shootings. Changes in firearm technology have contributed to attempts to limit the ownership or use of firearms deemed especially dangerous. The federal government has prohibited some semi-automatic rifles, declared others to be restricted firearms,   and left others as non-restricted firearms. This has complicated the enforcement of Canada’s gun laws. It has also permitted firearms with the capability to cause substantial harm to remain in circulation. Similarly, the federal government has prohibited some handguns but left many others available for purchase, thus contributing to the movement of firearms from the legal market to those wanting handguns for illegal purposes.

Halifax, NS: The Joint Federal/Provincial Commission into the April 2020 Nova Scotia Mass Casualty, 2022. 112p.

Nuclear Threat Initiative

From the document: "NTI [Nuclear Threat Initiative] convened a dialogue among nongovernmental U.S. and Russian cyber/information security and nuclear weapons policy experts. Following initial conversations in Moscow in 2019 about the findings from NTI's Cyber-Nuclear Weapons Study Group, the Track II dialogue was established and proceeded virtually in plenary and small-group sessions in 2020 and 2021. The participants are listed in Appendix 1. Expert participants built on a shared understanding that nuclear weapons systems must be protected from cyber threats, as well as other threats involving information and communications technologies (ICT), and that despite the current geopolitical environment, the unique U.S.-Russian nuclear relationship requires bilateral cooperation to maintain stability. They addressed topics including possible crisis scenarios and escalation pathways, opportunities for building confidence and predictability in the relationship, and bilateral cyber-nuclear norms that could mitigate the risks. The group generated ideas for joint and parallel actions to reduce cyber-nuclear weapons risks for both governments to consider and adopt. The following recommendations are designed to help avoid or mitigate the risks of a cyberattack prompting a nuclear crisis. The recommendations in this paper offer policymakers in Russia and the United States--and in other countries--options for reducing the risks of a cyber or information security attack that could lead to nuclear war." This record contains a Russian version following the English publication.

Nuclear Threat Initiative . 2023. 40p.

By Pew Research Center

In an era marked by deep divisions between Republicans and Democrats, few issues are as politically polarizing as gun policy. While a few specific policy proposals continue to garner bipartisan support, the partisan divisions on other proposals – and even on whether gun violence is a serious national problem – have grown wider over the last few years.

Today, just over half of Americans (53%) say gun laws should be stricter than they currently are, a view held by 81% of Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents but just 20% of Republicans and Republican leaners. Similarly, while nearly three-quarters of Democrats (73%) say making it harder to legally obtain guns would lead to fewer mass shootings, only 20% of Republicans say this, with most (65%) saying this would have no effect.

The new national survey by Pew Research Center, conducted from April 5-11, 2021 among 5,109 adults, finds that 73% of Democrats consider gun violence to be a very big problem for the country today, compared with just 18% of Republicans who say the same. The current partisan gap on this question is 11-percentage-points wider than in 2018 and 19 points wider than in 2016.

Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, 2021. 29p.

By The National Institute for Criminal Justice Reform

In 2021, gun violence killed 20,984 people in the United States, more than any single year in the preceding two decades.1 Daily shootings in communities across the country are the most common form of gun violence. On average, 14,062 people are murdered every year by someone using a gun.2 Gun violence is disproportionately concentrated in urban centers, usually in underserved communities of color. Of the more than 13,000 firearm related homicide victims in the US in 2020, 55.8% were Black men.3 Although Black men and boys between the ages 15 and 34 make up just 2% of the nation’s population, they accounted for 37% of gun homicide victims in 2019,4 making homicide the leading cause of death for Black males in this age range.5 According to the American Journal of Medicine, US residents are 25 times more likely to be killed from gun violence than the citizens of any other developed country.6 In addition to its human toll, gun violence imposes a substantial economic cost on society. Direct costs include law enforcement and the criminal justice system, hospital and rehabilitation, incarceration, and victim support. Indirect costs include lost tax revenue, lost business opportunities, reduced property values, and neighborhood population decline and destabilization. When someone is shot, there is an immediate, multifaceted response from an array of government agencies. The fire department dispatches emergency medical technicians (EMTs), government-contracted ambulances respond, and several police department units as well as staff from a city’s office of violence prevention or contracted outreach workers descend on the scene. Investigators from the district attorney’s office also often arrive, and if the victim is declared dead on the scene, the coroner is called. And this is only the immediate aftermath of the shooting. Costs accumulate for many months, even years following a shooting. For surviving victims this includes hospitalization and, in the case of serious injury, rehabilitation–both of which are often paid for by tax dollars. This also includes victim compensation and a protracted investigation by the police department and prosecutors. When there are multiple victims and/ or multiple suspects, the cost of a single shooting incident will increase accordingly.

NICJR has calculated the costs of shootings in numerous cities across the country, deliberately using conservative estimates and only counting documentable direct costs.7 Using these studies as a starting point, this report aggregates the city-specific data and combines it with other data sources to model the direct unit costs and the direct average costs of gun violence nationwide.8 Unit costs reflect all of the potential costs of a single incident of gun violence, while average costs take into account the fact that certain costs are not incurred for every incident. For example, this report estimates the costs that gun violence imposes on the courts, district attorney, and public defender when a suspect is charged and goes to trial. However, because many incidents of gun violence do not result in prosecution or a trial, these estimates, or unit costs, are deflated to calculate the average cost per shooting

NICJR calculates that the unit cost of a single gun-related homicide is just over $1.2 million, while the average cost, or the cost per homicide, is approximately $625,000. This means that, on average, the total direct cost of gun-related homicides in the United States is more than $8.7 billion each year. For non-fatal injury shootings, NICJR calculates the unit cost at almost $700,000, with an average per-shooting cost of about $337,000, for an annual total of $11.7 billion.9 Combined, the total cost of gun homicides and non-fatal shootings is over $20 billion per year. If indirect expenses were included, the total cost of shootings would be much higher.

National Institute for Criminal Justice Reform, 19p.