By William J. Aceves

On the eve of the 1992 Los Angeles uprising, a small group of gang leaders and community activists drafted an agreement to curtail violence in south Los Angeles. Several gangs in Watts accepted the truce and established a cease-fire agreement. By most accounts, the 1992 Watts Gang Treaty succeeded in reducing gang violence in Los Angeles. Local activists attributed the reduction in shootings to the Treaty. Even law enforcement officials grudgingly recognized the Treaty’s contribution to reducing gang violence and a corresponding decrease in homicides. The origins of the Watts Gang Treaty can be traced to gang leaders recognizing that the devastating struggle between rival gangs was analogous to a military conflict—complete with “no-man’s land,” assault weapons, targeted killings, and civilian casualties—and, therefore, it required a diplomatic solution. Seeking inspiration from international conflict resolution efforts, gang members looked to the 1949 Armistice Agreement adopted by Egypt and Israel to end the Arab-Israeli War. The drafters of the Watts Gang Treaty mirrored the key provisions of the Armistice Agreement, including a cease-fire agreement and other confidence-building measures. The drafters then built a social movement to support the Treaty. This Article examines the origins, impact, and legacy of the Watts Gang Treaty. It also pursues a prescriptive agenda. It supports the study of hidden history that runs counter to the common narrative of power and privilege in the United States. Moreover, this Article argues that social movements can achieve meaningful change even in the face of poverty, violence, and structural racism.

Harvard Civil Rights- Civil Liberties Law Review (CR-CL), Vol. 57, 2022. 63p.

By Jessica Reichert, Sharyn Adams, Morgan McGuirk,

Lauren Weisner

Court diversion programs for individuals convicted for drug crimes have been found to reduce recidivism and be cost effective. Some courts have established programs offering alternative sentencing and specialized programming for persons convicted of felony drug offenses. We conducted a process evaluation of a court diversion program for individuals charged with a first-time felony drug possession offense in DuPage County, Illinois called the First Offender Call Unified for Success (FOCUS) program. We examined the program’s development, operations, and participants, as well as collected feedback from the participants and probation and court staff involved in the program. We conducted interviews, administered surveys, and analyzed administrative data. As of April 2021, there were 231 active participants; a majority of participants were White males with a Class 4 felony drug possession charge. Thirty-nine participants had successfully completed the two-year program and three were unsuccessful. Overall, participants and clients provided positive feedback on the program. Based on our findings, we offered several recommendations to improve program operations.

Chicago: Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority 2022. 57p.

By Jonathan Klick and John MacDonald

Objectives This study examines the impact of alcohol consumption in a Major League Baseball (MLB) stadium on area level counts of crime. The modal practice at MLB stadiums is to stop selling alcoholic beverages after the seventh inning. Baseball is not a timed game, so the duration between the last call for alcohol at the end of the seventh inning and the end of the game varies considerably, providing a unique natural experiment to estimate the relationship between alcohol consumption and crime near a stadium on game days. Methods Crime data were obtained from Philadelphia for the period 2006–2015 and geocoded to the area around the MLB stadium as well as popular sports bars. We rely on difference-in-differences regression models to estimate the change in crime on home game days around the stadium as the game time extends into extra innings to other areas of the city and around sports bars in Philadelphia relative to days when the baseball team plays away from home. Results When there are extra innings and more game-time after the seventh inning alcohol sales stoppage crime declines signifcantly around the stadium. The crime reduction beneft of the last call alcohol policy is undone when a complex of sports bars opens in the stadium parking lot in 2012. The results suggest that alcohol consumption during baseball games is a contributor to crime. Conclusions The fndings provide further support for environmental theories of crime that note the congregation of people in places with excessive alcohol consumption is a generator of violent crime in cities. The consumption of alcohol in MLB stadiums appears to increase crime.

Journal of Quantitative Criminology (2021) 37:813–834

By Paul J. Larkin

The raw, agricultural form of cannabis is not capable of being approved for use by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)—regardless of whether Congress or the U.S. Attorney General reschedules it downward from Schedule I. Rescheduling cannabis would not allow the drug to be distributed under federal law unless the FDA finds that it is a safe, effective, and uniform drug. The FDA could not do so under existing law, and the Attorney General cannot waive the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act’s requirements. Congress could do so by statute—but any such law would put at risk the health of users and nonusers in order to satisfy the desires of a minority for a transient high.

Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, 2023. 57p.

By The Council for Court Excellence

What follows is an edited transcript of a virtual public forum held on September 15, 2021, by the Council for Court Excellence (CCE) and the Office of the District of Columbia Auditor (ODCA), highlighting issues presented by the partial legalization of marijuana in the District of Columbia. This event was the last of four forums focused on timely criminal justice issues in the District. Each forum featured a panel of experts, local stakeholders and impacted individuals brought together to address barriers to effective policy, explore whether community needs are being addressed, and review options for action on each forum topic. Here we share the discussion from the fourth forum, “Confusion and Exclusion: Impacts of the Hazy State of D.C. Marijuana Legalization on People with Criminal Records,” focused on marijuana law and policy in D.C., the risks and barriers posed to people with criminal records, and the opportunities to transform our system moving forward. Participants provided thought-provoking commentary, constructive criticisms, and concrete policy proposals. The edited transcript allows readers to consider the nuances of each expert’s perspective and their real-time responses to one another’s ideas. Martin Austermuhle, a reporter and editor with WAMU 88.5 who frequently reports on the cannabis industry and local government, moderated the forum. The discussants included: • Queen Adesuyi, a policy manager at the Drug Policy Alliance; • Corey Barnette, owner and CEO of both District Growers LLC and Kinfolk Dispensary; • The Hon. David Grosso, a partner at Arent Fox LLP, previously served on the D.C. Council as an At-Large Member from 2013-2021 and was an early proponent of marijuana decriminalization; • Emily Gunston, Deputy Attorney General for Legislative Affairs and Policy for the D.C. Office of the Attorney General; and • Crystal Marshall, returning citizen and member of the Community Family Life Services Speakers Bureau. The panelists opened by discussing the history of cannabis law and policy in the District, and the jurisdictional issues presented by Congressional oversight. Each year since 2014, the House of Representatives has included a budget rider forbidding the D.C. Council from enacting any tax or regulatory structure related to recreational marijuana use, which has prevented the District from fully legalizing the sale of cannabis. D.C. is left in limbo: possession and private use of small amounts of marijuana are legal but purchasing and selling marijuana remain illegal. Plus, because the federal government controls D.C.’s pre-trial supervision, probation, parole, and supervised release, people under correctional supervision are still at risk of violating the terms for their supervision for legal use of cannabis. D.C. was one of the first jurisdictions in the United States to legalize medical marijuana use. Given the devastating impact of the “War on Drugs” on Black and Brown individuals, families, and communities, panelists noted that D.C. was at the forefront of social- and racial-justice oriented cannabis laws passed over the last 20 years. Panelists discussed the ways in which the District has prioritized Black and Brown people and communities in the medical cannabis industry including those who are patients and those who own, operate, and staff dispensaries. The discussants agreed that the racial equity goals of marijuana laws—to close wealth gaps among racial groups, to reinvest in those communities of color hit hardest by the “War on Drugs,” and to ultimately end discrimination in enforcement of drug laws more broadly—have not yet been met. Several panelists mentioned the necessity of a tax-and-regulate structure that would enable D.C. to collect proceeds from marijuana sales and, most importantly, reinvest those proceeds in social, educational, employment, and other programs to support members of historically marginalized Black and Brown communities. A particular focus of this discussion was the impact of D.C.’s perplexing marijuana laws on people in the District who have criminal records including marijuana-related charges. The panel described the personal toll that such confusion can take: it can lead those with criminal records to fear any interaction with cannabis, even interactions that are legal in D.C., because of the potential an arrest or conviction poses to their housing, employment, or immigration status. The disproportionately Black and poor District residents with criminal records are also prohibited under the current law from participating in the medical cannabis industry, depriving them of the opportunity to capitalize on economic benefits that other D.C. residents are free to pursue. Panelists also discussed the ways in which the Metropolitan Police Department’s enforcement of the complicated laws can impact crime, safety, and the economy. Participants cited cause for optimism, however, and shared their views on proposed legislation that would change the status of legal cannabis in D.C.: the MORE Act and the Cannabis Administration and Opportunity Act in Congress, and two bills proposed by Mayor Muriel Bowser and by Chairman Phil Mendelson of the D.C. Council. The panelists agreed that any new law should prioritize investment in Black and Brown communities and preserve the robust medical marijuana industry that has grown in D.C. Specific suggestions included removing the Congressional rider on the D.C. budget; establishing designated “use sites” for those in public housing or other housing that prohibits marijuana use; granting special business licenses to individuals who were directly harmed by the War on Drugs; funding industry training specifically for people with criminal records; and reframing marijuana as a medical and recreational aid, rather than a vice. The bibliography provides further reading on marijuana law and policy, local control of the District’s criminal justice system, the impacts of both on people with criminal records, and other issues discussed throughout the forum. Biographies of the discussants are also included at the end of this report. Finally, a full video of the panel can be found at: https://youtu.be/uFV6SNeuHv0. The transcript in this report has been lightly edited for length and clarity

Washington, DC: Office of the DC Auditor, 2021. 40p.

By John Woodhouse

There is no general prohibition on drinking in the street but certain offences relating to alcohol may be committed in “public places” (this generally means “any place to which the public have access, whether on payment or otherwise” (the Licensing Act 1872 and subsequent Licensing Acts)).

Councils can use public spaces protection orders to restrict the consumption of alcohol in a public space where it is associated with anti-social behaviour. It is an offence to fail to comply with a request to stop drinking or to surrender alcohol in a controlled drinking area.

The police can disperse individuals engaged in anti-social behaviour where alcohol is a factor. It is an offence to fail to comply with a direction to leave an area.

Other offences include being drunk and disorderly in a public place and being drunk in any highway or other public place. This Briefing refers to the law in England and Wales.

Research Briefing. London: UK House of Commons, 2023. 11p.

By Ashna Arora and Panka Bencsik

In the United States, law enforcement officers serve as first responders to most health crises, allowing them to connect many more individuals to treatment services than other government actors, a fact that has come into increasing focus due to the opioid epidemic. In response, police departments across the country have begun to divert individuals that possess narcotics away from arrest and towards treatment and recovery. Evidence on whether these programs are able to engender meaningful change—initially by increasing participation in substance use treatment, and eventually by reducing the likelihood of continued drug use and criminal justice involvement—remains limited. This paper aims to shed light on the potential of these programs by exploiting the eligibility criteria for and staggered rollout of narcotics arrest diversion in Chicago between 2018 and 2020 using a difference-indifference-in-differences framework. We find that the program reaches individuals with medically diagnosed substance use disorders, increases connections with substance use treatment, and reduces subsequent arrests. We conclude that Chicago’s drug diversion program is able to simultaneously reduce the reach of the criminal justice system, expand the number of individuals with substance use disorders connected with treatment, and improve public safety.

Chicago: University of Chicago, Crime Lab, 2021. 38p.

By The National Audit Office (NAO) (UK)

The distribution, sale and consumption of illegal drugs causes significant harm to individuals, families and communities. In 2021, almost 3,000 people in England died because of drug misuse and thousands more suffered complex health problems. The government also estimated that around three million people in England and Wales take illegal drugs at a cost to society of approximately £20 billion a year. The drugs trade generates significant levels of violence and is believed to be responsible for around half of all murders in England and Wales.

Tackling the problems caused by illegal drugs is complex. It involves disrupting the organised gangs which supply and distribute drugs, and providing effective treatment and recovery services to help people with addictions. The government announced a £900 million increase in funding for 2022-23 to 2024-25 and committed to long-term targets to reduce drug use and drug-related crime and deaths. The government established the cross-government Joint Combating Drugs Unit (JCDU) to co-ordinate and oversee the development and implementation of the strategy.

t is almost two years since the government introduced its latest drugs strategy and less than 18 months remain in the current funding period to March 2025. This report examines whether the government is well positioned to achieve the strategy’s 10-year ambitions. It covers:

the development of the 2021 drugs strategy, its objectives and funding

progress in implementing the strategy

the approach to achieving the strategy’s long-term outcomes

It is too early to conclude whether the 2021 strategy will reduce the harm from illegal drugs. It will take time for new funding and interventions to address a complex set of issues, and many of the indicators used to measure progress lag behind activity. This report therefore assesses whether departments are making the planned progress in implementing the strategy, and whether the JCDU has an effective approach to understanding the impact it is having and managing the risks to achieving the strategy’s aims. It does not examine the effectiveness of interventions at the local level.

Conclusions

In 2021 the government estimated that the harm caused by illegal drugs costs society £20 billion each year. Its 2021 drugs strategy, led by the cross-government Joint Combating Drugs Unit, has provided new impetus to efforts to address these harms, and committed £900 million to 2024-25.

The strategy has established new partnerships across central and local government, and local authorities are taking steps to rebuild the workforce that was lost over the past decade. But these measures alone will not address all of the barriers to achieving a long-term reduction in drug use, deaths and related crime. The issues are complex and will require a sustained long-term response.

To inform government’s response, the JCDU and relevant departments need to develop a deeper understanding of the impacts of government spending, working closely with local service providers to understand and help address the practical challenges they face. The JCDU and departments need to be realistic about what is achievable in the first three years and assess how to adapt their approach to achieve the strategy’s 10-year outcomes.

In doing so, the JCDU should seek to provide confidence to local government: that this is a long-term commitment. It must also urgently develop a plan to reduce the demand for illegal drugs. The current lack of emphasis on preventing illegal drug use means that departments risk only addressing the consequences, rather than the causes, of harm. The government will only achieve value for money if it builds on the initial momentum of the new strategy and develops a longer-term, funded plan that delivers a joined-up, holistic response.

London: The National Audit Office (NAO), 2023. 56p.

By Linda M. Williams, April Pattavina, Alison C. Cares, and Nan D. Stein

Given the considerable changes in federal legislation and the pressing requirements that colleges and universities develop policies and practices that meet the needs of victims and of those accused of sexual assault, there is a critical need to document and understand how colleges are handling these demands and coordinating campus approaches to investigation and adjudication of sexual assaults. In 2015, the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) funded a project to commence January 2016, designed to examine the variations in policies and practices and understand more about challenges and emerging best practices. The research reported here was designed to identify the range and scope of policies and practices related to the investigation and adjudication of sexual assault on college campuses in the U.S. The Wellesley Centers for Women (WCW) with the assistance of an expert panel of advisory board members has documented and classified the current landscape (the breadth and differences) of campus approaches to investigations and adjudication of sexual assault. Our first step, informed by a victim-centered focus, was a web-based search of a randomly selected sample of four year colleges and universities (Institutions of Higher Education, IHEs) on policies and practices for investigation and adjudication of sexual assault reports. This web search was a systematic broadbased environmental scan designed to examine the policies and practices promulgated to the public and, most importantly, made available to students by IHEs. This environmental scan was followed by interviews with Title IX coordinators to develop a clearer understanding of the challenges and successes of these policies.

Washington, DC: U.S. National Institute of Justice, 2020. 91p.

By John Coyne and Teagan Westendorf

THis report helps develop an understanding of the quantum of profits being made and where in the value chain they occur. Australians spent approximately A$5.8 billion on methamphetamine and A$470 million on heroin in FY 2019.

Approximately A$1,216,806,017 was paid to international wholesalers overseas for the amphetamine and heroin that was smuggled into Australia in that year. The profit that remained in Australia’s economy was about A$5,012,150,000. Those funds are undermining Australia’s public health and distorting our economy daily, and ultimately funding drug cartels and traffickers in Southeast Asia.

One key takeaway from the figures presented in this report is that the Australian drug trade is large and growing. Despite the best efforts of law enforcement agencies, methamphetamine and heroin use has been increasing by up to 17% year on year. Falling prices in Southeast Asia are likely to keep pushing that number up, while drug prices and purity in Australia remain relatively stable.

Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2021. 40p.

By Nicholas Pope

This thesis examines the emergence and sustainment of milícias (militias) in the 1990s in the West Zone ‘margins’ of the city of Rio de Janeiro. It considers the rise of milícias as they coincide with urbanisation, economic liberalisation, democratisation, decentralisation and the rise of violent drug trafficking organisations. This thesis sets out to answer the following overarching research question: ‘How and why did milícias emerge in Rio de Janeiro’s West Zone since the 1990s and how and why were they sustained? What is their relationship to the management of (dis)order?’ The analytical approach developed to answer this question draws on an historically situated political settlements framework to understand milícias as power relations within coalition formations and as facilitators of rent extraction and distribution. The framework introduces urban and political geography literatures on frontiers to advance a thesis that milícias in Rio de Janeiro are coercive brokers that mediate urban frontier zones. This study draws on ethnographic fieldnotes from direct and participant observation, in-depth interviews and oral histories, and extensive archival research of parliamentary documents. It argues that milícias emerged to provide temporary ‘solutions’ to address the violent inequalities, structural insecurities, and the threats and insecurities posed by drug trafficking organisations in the urban frontiers. They emerged through ‘bottom-up’ processes but were also seen as convenient to political and economic elites in the central state who were unable (or unwilling) to provide formal security in the West Zone. However, this thesis makes the case that there was a trade-off for the central state as paramilitaries, as accrued power in the urban frontier, they also attempted to reshape state institutions. Because of their roots in local communities, this thesis also recognises the dependency of milícias on legitimacy, ideas, beliefs and norms, and the power imbued in community relations. This study contributes to the literatures on milícias by accounting for their role as co-producers of (dis)order in the urban margins, the literature on political settlements by intertwining questions of violence and conflict with spatiality, and finally the Latin American literatures on local political order and governance by advancing a conceptualisation of armed groups straddling state and society and challenging conventional state/-non-state binaries.

London: Department of Development Studies SOAS, University of London , 2019. 307p.

By Zahid ul Arefin Choudhoury, Fahima Durrat, Maria Hussain, et al.

The study takes up the pertinent challenges in human rights work of consistent lacks, deficiencies and uncertainties in human rights work and human rights reporting. These challenges pose questions to the human rights community on how to provide reliable information on violence, torture and ill-treatment, which includes the detection and identification of both victims and perpetrators necessary to ensure individual justice and institutional accountability. The report demonstrates that it is possible to address sensitive political issues of governance and violence, even in a nervous political setting, and produce relevant and solid data on violent encounters, that describes the unfolding of these events and the effects on life and livelihood, including health and economy, of the individuals and families involved. The richness and depths of the data confirms the usefulness of the methodological approach, at least in Korail Basti in the centre of Dhaka. It indicates a potential for broader and hopefully general applicability in other similar areas of the city, the country or the region and perhaps even at a global level. Confirming this general applicability would entail the need to replicate, adapt and carry through the study in additional sites and places with other contextual social, political and economic conditions and configurations. The solidity of the survey’s findings is a promising result of the study and could be a possible departure point for further testing of the proposed methodology

Bangladesh, UK and Denmark: University of Dhaka Department of Peace and Conflict Studies, DIGNITY and University of Edinburgh Anthropology Department, 2016. 110p.

By The Blue Ribbon Panel on MTA Fare and Toll Evasion, Metropolitan Transportation Authority

Fare and toll evasion is a sensitive issue that raises difficult questions about social cohesion, inequality, and appropriate use of enforcement. But the situation in New York has reached a crisis level, and avoiding the topic is no longer a viable option. Losses to the MTA’s operating budget are staggering, with nearly $700 million in revenue not collected in 2022 alone. This includes $315 million lost in bus fares, $285 million in subway fares, $46 million in bridge and tunnel tolls, and $44 million in railroad fares. Fares and tolls account for a significant proportion of the MTA’s annual budget revenue — almost $7 billion a year. But every dollar lost to evasion impairs the MTA’s financial stability, threatens reliable transit for all New Yorkers, and increases the need for alternative revenue sources, including through larger fare and toll hikes. The MTA convened a Blue-Ribbon Panel of high-profile New Yorkers with expertise in relevant fields to better understand fare and toll evasion, and develop fresh solutions to the issue. Panelists spent the better part of a year meeting with stakeholders inside and outside the MTA, speaking with transit users, and observing fare and toll collection operations throughout the system. The panel’s final report proposes a cohesive and comprehensive set of strategies around education, environment, equity, and enforcement.

New York: MTA, 2023. 125p.

By Isabella Voce and Anthony Morgan

This is the first report in the Cybercrime in Australia series, which aims to provide a clearer picture of the extent of cybercrime victimisation, help-seeking and harms among Australian computer users. It is based on a survey of 13,887 computer users conducted in early 2023. In the 12 months prior to the survey, 27 percent of respondents had been a victim of online abuse and harassment, 22 percent had been a victim of malware, 20 percent had been a victim of identity crime and misuse, and eight percent had been a victim of fraud and scams. Overall, 47 percent of respondents experienced at least one cybercrime in the 12 months prior to the survey—and nearly half of all victims reported experiencing more than one type of cybercrime. Thirty-four percent of respondents had experienced a data breach. Cybercrime victimisation was not evenly distributed, with certain sections of the community more likely to have been a victim, and certain online activities associated with a higher likelihood of victimisation.

Most cybercrime victimisation went unreported to police or to ReportCyber, meaning official statistics significantly underestimate the size of the problem. Satisfaction with the outcomes of these reports was mixed, and relatively few reports resulted in an offender being apprehended. Rates of help-seeking varied and were influenced by the perceived seriousness of cybercrime and knowledge of how and where to report it.

The financial losses experienced by victims were wide ranging. Some victims reported losing large sums of money, but most victims reported relatively small financial losses. This report measures, for the first time, the harms experienced by individual victims and small businesses that extend beyond these financial costs. Twenty-five percent of respondents were negatively impacted by cybercrime in the 12 months prior to the survey, while 22 percent of respondents who owned or operated a small to medium business said their business was negatively impacted by cybercrime.

Statistical Bulletin, 43. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2023. 113p.

By Kylie Murdock and Jim Kessler

Takeaways: The murder rate in the 25 states that voted for Donald Trump has exceeded the murder rate in the 25 states that voted for Joe Biden in every year from 2000 to 2020. Over this 21-year span, this Red State murder gap has steadily widened from a low of 9% more per capita red state murders in 2003 and 2004 to 44% more per capita red state murders in 2019, before settling back to 43% in 2020. Altogether, the per capita Red State murder rate was 23% higher than the Blue State murder rate when all 21 years were combined. If Blue State murder rates were as high as Red State murder rates, Biden-voting states would have sued over 45,000 more murders between 2000 and 2020. Even when murders in the largest cities in red states are removed, overall murder rates in Trump-voting states were 12% higher than Biden-voting states across this 21-year period and were higher in 18 of the 21 years observed.

Washington, DC: Third Way, 2023. 10p

Edited by Sundari Anitha and Ruth Lewis  

Until recently, higher education in the UK has largely failed to recognise gender-based violence (GBV) on campus, but following the UK government task force set up in 2015, universities are becoming more aware of the issue. And recent cases in the media about the sexualised abuse of power in institutions such as universities, Parliament and Hollywood highlight the prevalence and damaging impact of GBV. In this book, academics and practitioners provide the first in-depth overview of research and practice in GBV in universities. They set out the international context of ideologies, politics and institutional structures that underlie responses to GBV in elsewhere in Europe, in the US, and in Australia, and consider the implications of implementing related policy and practice. Presenting examples of innovative British approaches to engagement with the issue, the book also considers UK, EU and UN legislation to give an international perspective, making it of direct use to discussions of ‘what works’ in preventing GBV.

Bristol, UK: Bristol University Press, 2018. 262p.

Edited by Jean-Marc Dreyfus and Élisabeth Anstett

This book outlines for the first time in a single volume the theoretical and methodological tools for a study of human remains resulting from episodes of mass violence and genocide. Despite the highly innovative and contemporary research into both mass violence and the body, the most significant consequence of conflict - the corpse - remains absent from the scope of existing research. Why have human remains hitherto remained absent from our investigation, and how do historians, anthropologists and legal scholars, including specialists in criminology and political science, confront these difficult issues? By drawing on international case studies including genocides in Rwanda, the Khmer Rouge, Argentina, Russia and the context of post-World War II Europe, this ground-breaking edited collection opens new avenues of research. Multidisciplinary in scope, this volume will appeal to readers interested in an understanding of mass violence's aftermath.

Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2014. 218p.

By Allison B. Dymnicki, Beverly Kingston, Sabrina Arredondo Mattson, Elizabeth Spier, Susanne Argamaso Maher, Jody Witt

Researchers from the University of Colorado Boulder’s Center for the Study and Prevention of Violence (CSPV) partnered with educators in 46 middle schools to implement Safe Communities Safe Schools (SCSS). SCSS seeks to prevent and reduce behavioral incidents, address mental and behavioral health concerns, and increase prosocial behavior in the school setting through three core program components: developing a functioning multidisciplinary school team, building capacity around data use, and selecting and implementing evidence-based programs. The study explored research questions in three areas: readiness (whether schools met baseline criteria and experienced changes in readiness over time), implementation (whether the SCSS model was implemented as intended; whether it is feasible, acceptable, and effective when implemented schoolwide), and associated outcomes (effects on school climate, safety, related behavioral and mental health indicators, and academic outcomes). To explore questions in these three areas, CSPV and external evaluators from American Institutes for Research conducted a mixed-methods randomized control trial with a staggered implementation design using qualitative data (open-ended questions on implementation surveys, focus groups) and quantitative data (staff and student school climate data, attendance/truancy rates, suspension rates, and academic achievement data). The study found that (1) the participating schools met the pre-developed readiness criteria and reported some improvements in readiness constructs over time; (2) some components of the model were implemented as intended and were acceptable and effective (from the educators’ perspective), but increased knowledge, understanding, and skills were limited to school team members; and (3) there were mixed impacts on school climate, safety, behavioral and mental health indicators, and academic outcomes, with outcomes varying (to some extent) by implementation characteristics. This report discusses the study’s findings and their implications for criminal justice policy and practice.

Washington DC: American Institutes for Research. 26p

United States. White House Office

From the document: "In this first-ever U.S. National Plan to End Gender-Based Violence (the National Plan or Plan), the Federal Government advances an unprecedented and comprehensive approach to preventing and addressing sexual violence, intimate partner violence, stalking, and other forms of gender-based violence (referred to collectively as GBV). This initiative builds on the lessons learned and progress made as the result of tireless and courageous leadership by GBV survivors, advocates, researchers, and policymakers, as well as other dedicated professionals and community members who lead prevention and response efforts. Gender-based violence is a public safety and public health crisis, affecting urban, suburban, rural, and Tribal communities in the United States. It is experienced by individuals of all backgrounds and can occur across the life course. GBV happens in all spaces and spheres of human interaction, public and private--in homes, schools, and public venues; through social media and other online spaces; and in workplaces. In today's globalized world, it can transcend national boundaries, including through online exploitation and abuse, human trafficking, and individuals fleeing GBV. The risks of GBV are heightened in conditions of disaster, conflict, or crisis, including public health crises such as a pandemic. [...] The priorities in this National Plan to End GBV, as well as those reflected in the 2022 update to the U.S. Global GBV Strategy, reflect our nation's ongoing commitment to continue advancing and integrating efforts to prevent and address gender-based violence both at home and abroad. Ending gender-based violence is, quite simply, a matter of human rights and justice."

United States. White House Office .2023. 149p.

By Tamsin Bradley

Growing awareness of femicide has not universally translated into effective policy and programming. Though legislation relating to gender-based violence and/or femicide exists in many countries, both persist. A combined social, cultural, political and economic approach situates femicide prevention and responses at various levels, including changes in individual behaviour. Using the term ‘femicide’ more frequently at international forums is crucial not only to focus attention on the gendered nature of violence but also to act as a call for action. Situational studies reveal that political will to end femicide differs from country to country. Femicide together with the patriarchal norms and misogyny that precipitate it are not just extra-EU problems. Rather, they are of global concern, demanding a global response; in non-EU countries this response is often dependent on donor funding. We now know more than ever what works to reverse patterns of violence. These patterns can be broken by developing the capacity of women’s organisations and strengthening global feminist movements that work with national and local activist networks. Additionally, engaging men and boys in this process of transformation is vital if we are to address violence against women and girls and ultimately end femicide.

Brussels: European Parliament, 2021. 22p.