By International Crisis Group

What’s new? Crime and violence have simmered along the lengthy ColombianVenezuelan frontier for decades. But the regional spillover of Venezuela’s political conflict and economic collapse has caused ties between the two states to fray as well, amid border closures, a migrant exodus and rival military exercises. Why does it matter? Numerous armed groups clash with one another and harm citizens along a border marked by abundant coca crops and informal crossings. High bilateral tensions could spur escalating border hostilities while perpetuating the mistreatment of migrants and refugees whose movements have been restricted by COVID-19. What should be done? Colombian and Venezuelan authorities should urgently establish communication channels to resolve violent incidents along the border, possibly with international backing. They should reopen formal border crossings as planned, but also increase humanitarian aid to help ensure that migrants and refugees are healthy and can move safely.

Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2020. 44p.

By International Crisis Group

Coca stands at the heart of a fierce debate over Colombia’s worsening rural insecurity. The plant’s leaves are the sole raw material from which cocaine, an illegal drug that generates outlandish profits and finances armed and criminal groups, can be manufactured. Colombian President Iván Duque argues that the whole narcotic supply chain – from coca cultivation to global cocaine trafficking – is the scourge behind rising massacres, forced displacement and assassinations of community leaders in Colombia. With cultivation hitting new highs in recent years, Bogotá has vastly expanded campaigns that involve sending in the army and police to pull up or otherwise eradicate coca crops. It also threatens to restart aerial fumigation. Yet an approach based on forceful eradication of coca, which the U.S. has stoutly backed, tends to worsen rural violence, while failing to reduce drug supply. A new strategy is needed that persuades coca farmers to abandon a plant that offers a stable income and an attractive alternative to other legal crops.

Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2021. 44p.

By International Crisis Group

What’s new? On 6 June, Mexico will stage its largest-ever election day, with 21,000 contests nationwide. Opposition forces accuse President Andrés Manuel López Obrador of planning to deepen authoritarian rule should his allies prevail in the polls. Meanwhile, criminal groups exploit electoral competition in their quest for impunity and power. Why does it matter? The country’s politics are highly polarised, and its parties are weak and opportunistic. Criminal groups can use favours and threats to gain influence over future elected officials. Entanglements between government and organised crime that have long undermined security policies help perpetuate Mexico’s high levels of violence. What should be done? Severing links between criminals and state officials will be challenging, especially given the government’s apparent reticence to act. Still, outside actors should encourage investment in independent election oversight bodies and local institutions, and a shift toward tailored and less militarised policies to curb insecurity in Mexico’s most conflict-ridden areas.

Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2021. 33p.

Edited by Laura Y. Calderón, Kimberly Heinle, Rita E. Kuckertz, Octavio Rodríguez Ferreira, and David A. Shirk

This is the second edition of Organized Crime and Violence in Mexico. Like last year’s report, this study builds on 10 years of reports published by Justice in Mexico under the title Drug Violence in Mexico. The Drug Violence in Mexico series examined patterns of crime and violence attributable to organized crime, and particularly drug trafficking organizations, as well as other related issues, such as judicial sector reform and human rights in Mexico. At the 10 year mark, in 2019, this series of reports was retitled “Organized Crime and Violence in Mexico” to reflect the proliferation and diversification of organized crime groups over the last decade and the corresponding wave of violence. As in previous years, this report compiles the most recent data. and analysis of crime, violence, and rule of law in Mexico to help inform government officials, policy analysts, and the general public.

San Diego: Justice in Mexico, University of San Diego, 2021. 70p.

Edited by Eric L. Olson, Andrew Selee, and David A. Shirk

The clichés describing United States-Mexico relations are well known and well worn. Given the enormity of the geographic, historical, cultural, and economic ties between both countries it’s now a commonplace to say Mexico is the United States’ most important bilateral relationship, and vice-versa. The nature of this critical binational relationship has been dissected and probed from every conceivable angle. Yet as we began to research the security relationship between both countries we realized that there is still much that is not generally known amongst the public and policy communities about how Mexico and the United States are working together to deal with the threats posed by organized crime. For example, the unique nature of money laundering operations taking place across the U.S.-Mexico border; the extent to which high-powered firearms are finding their way from U.S. gun shops into the hands of organized crime and street gangs in Mexico; and the surprisingly limited information about the amount of illegal drugs consumed in the United States are not widely understood. Likewise, the deployment of Mexico’s armed forces is only one aspect of the country’s anti-drug strategy. Police agencies are being reorganized and efforts at professionalization are underway. A major reform of Mexico’s justice system was adopted in 2008 that, if fully implemented, should help greatly strengthen the rule of law and reduce the relative power and impunity of organized crime. Yet, while significant progress has already been made in some of Mexico’s 31 states, many questions remain about the efficacy and sustainability of these reforms. But despite these developments, the extreme violence brought on by conflicts amongst and between organized crime groups still garners the most attention. The horrifying and gruesome details of drug violence are plastered on the front pages of daily newspapers and videos of narco-violence are easily available on public websites and YouTube. In some cases, the criminals themselves are publicizing their actions for their own aggrandizement and to terrorize the public. While understanding the nature and extent of the violence afflicting Mexico in recent times is important, we also recognized that the violence itself is more symptom than cause of the underlying problem. For this reason, we thought it important to focus this project’s research on a series of key issues that are feeding the growth of organized crime and related violence in Mexico. We also found it important to examine several policy areas where reform and action by one or both governments could contribute to a long term sustainable approach to weakening the grip of organized crime and illegal drugs on both countries

Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center and San Diego: University of San Diego, Trans-Border Institute, 2011. 388p.

Edited by Laura Y. Calderón, Kimberly Heinle, Rita E. Kuckertz, Octavio Rodríguez Ferreira, and David A. Shirk

This is the second edition of Organized Crime and Violence in Mexico. Like last year’s report, this study builds on 10 years of reports published by Justice in Mexico under the title Drug Violence in Mexico. The Drug Violence in Mexico series examined patterns of crime and violence attributable to organized crime, and particularly drug trafficking organizations, as well as other related issues, such as judicial sector reform and human rights in Mexico. At the 10 year mark, in 2019, this series of reports was retitled “Organized Crime and Violence in Mexico” to reflect the proliferation and diversification of organized crime groups over the last decade and the corresponding wave of violence. As in previous years, this report compiles the most recent data. and analysis of crime, violence, and rule of law in Mexico to help inform government officials, policy analysts, and the general public.

San Diego: Justice in Mexico, University of San Diego, 2021. 70p.

By InSight Crime

CACIF is the de facto political party of Guatemala's economic elites. It unites the most important economic actors and is capable of integrating, via informal mechanisms, the heads of consortia and family groups with significant weight in a variety of economic sectors. Private security firms under the umbrella of the “Illegal Clandestine Security Apparatuses (Cuerpos Ilegales y Aparatos Clandestinos deSeguridad - CIACS) weave in and out of organized crime activity involving drug, arms and human trafficking, systematically blocking investigations and operating with impunity. The CIACS are what raised the alarm to spur creation of the United Nations-backed International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala.

Washington, DC: InSight Crime, 2016. 112p.

By InSight Crime

Guatemala, Honduras, Colombia and Nicaragua represent an illuminating cross section of criminal organizations and types of elites. Elite dynamics in each of these countries are different, but with important commonalities; the makeup, role and penetration of criminal groups into intellectual, societal, legal, government and economic circles is varied, but interrelated. The study findings show local and national dynamics that influence intersections between organized crime and elites, and enable inferences and conclusions about what unifies these examples. The case studies reach the upper echelons of government and impact how the state deals with organized crime.

Washington, DC: InSight Crime, 2016. 51p.

By Sight Crime

Colombia's elite has always been made up predominantly of Colombian nationals. The country's economic and political elites overlap to a large extent, and the wealthy exert political power. The lack of government presence in many parts of the country and a tradition of contraband smuggling created trafficking expertise and a tolerance for illicit activities. The mass purchase of land by drug traffickers was so substantial that it is known as the "counter-reform" -- skewing Colombia's land further into the hands of the few. The paper also traces the rise and fall of drug lord Pablo Escobar and the Medellín cartel.

Washington, DC: InSight Crime, 2016. 117p.

By InSight Crime

This detailed study traces connections between wealthy and political elites in Honduras, and organized crime. For Honduran transnational elites, the state’s role is simple: to create and enforce rules that favour their continued power over key industries and the capital accumulation that accompanies it. Currently, all the elites seem to be facing the same dilemma: align their interests with the narco-powers surging in the country, or stand by as they assume control of the country’s most important economic and political levers. The dirty money provided by illicit criminal groups and businesses has become the difference that makes the difference in survival for the elite classes

Washington, DC: InSight Crime, 2016. 95p.

By Steven Dudley and Matthew Taylor

There are three major types of criminal networks in the Americas, and each requires the United States government to take a substantially different approach towards mitigating their power and effect . State-embedded networks are embedded in elected bodies, law enforcement, judicial entities, regulatory agencies, and other parts of the government. They use state power to enrich themselves and their partners via corrupt and criminal schemes and to systematically undermine the rule of law and regulatory powers, so as to protect their activities and ensure impunity. These networks are the most difficult for the United States government to address because they are, by definition, the US government’s counterparts. They may also play a double game, employing their resources towards battling some criminal activities, which may correspond with US interests, even while they shelter and build out their own criminal portfolios. Battling state-embedded networks requires empowering international and local bodies, as well as supporting civil society organizations and media. Social-constituency networks draw from a constituency, built on shared circumstances, heritage, and/or political beliefs, and create criminal networks that advance the interests of the constituency. They may provide protection from rival criminal groups and a predatory state, while also providing tools for social and economic advancement. They draw from various criminal economies, but their power base is decidedly social and political in nature. Entrepreneurial networks are designed like a commercial enterprise with multiple layers and a loose structure, which allow them to maximize profit and minimize risk. They mostly provide goods and services, but they are sometimes predatory and often employ violence. While the core of these networks is often one or more tight-knit families – which provide them many built-in advantages in terms of trust, recruitment, and conflict resolution – these networks are governed by profit motives, and they derive their power from economic capital.

Washington, DC: InSight Crime and American University’s Center for Latin American & Latino Studies, 2022. 155p.

By InSight Crime

Drug traffickers today realize that their best protection is not a private army but anonymity. This is the story of “Memo Fantasma” or “Will the Ghost,” who started life in the Medellín Cartel, funded the bloody rise of a paramilitary army, and today lives the high life in Madrid. He has helped move hundreds of tons of cocaine yet has no arrest warrants, and nobody is looking for him.

Washington, DC: InSight Crime, 2020. 50p.

By Maximo Q. Mejia Jr., Pierre Cariou, François-Charles Wolff

Piracy in its various forms has posed a threat to trade and shipping for millennia. In the 1970s, a steady rise in the number of attacks ushered in the present phenomenon of modern piracy and not many parts of the world's seas are free from piracy in one form or another today. This paper reviews the historical and geographical developments of piracy in shipping, with a discussion on contentious issues involved in defining piracy. Using data available on piracy acts collected from the IMB related to 3,957 attacks that took place between 1996 and 2008, we shed light on recent changes in geography and modi operandi of acts of piracy and investigate how poverty and political instability may be seen as the root causes of piracy.

Malmo, Sweden: World Maritime University, 2010. 35p.

By Lavinia Piemontese

This paper proposes a new approach for quantifying the economic cost of hidden economies. I specifically apply the method to the case of mafia racketeering in Northern Italy, and in so doing, provide the first explicit estimate of the economic cost of mafia spread in this area. I show both theoretically and empirically that acts of extortion imposed on certain firms are linked to resource misallocation. I quantify the share of output that the mafia extorts from firms, which ranges between 0.5 and 5 percent of firm-level output for the taxed firms. I then consider what these estimates imply and find that between 2000 and 2012, the Northern Italian economy suffered an aggregate loss of approximately 2.5 billion Euros. Quite remarkably, only one-fourth of this cost consists of the aggregate transfer to the mafia. The remaining three-fourths corresponds to the contraction of production due to misallocation.

Lyon, France: University of Lyon, 2021. 56p.

By Environmental Investigation Agency, UK

This is a tragic true story of high culture, peerless art forms, and a rich historical identity being warped by greed and obsession, which consumes its very foundations to extinction and sparks a violent crime wave across Asian forests. This report details the findings of EIA’s investigations into the Siamese rosewood trade in recent years, including in the year since the CITES listing. It reveals how crime, corruption, and ill-conceived government policies from Thailand to China, via Laos and Vietnam, are likely to result in the demise of Siamese rosewood in the coming years, unless significant and rapid reforms are made.

London: Environmental Investigation Agency, 2014. 28p.

By Alexander Fedorov, Alexei Babko, Alexander Sukharenko, Valentin Emelin

Transnational organized environmental crime is a rapidly growing threat to the environment, to revenues from natural resources, to state security and to sustainable development. It robs developing countries of an estimated US$ 70 billion to US$ 213 billion annually or the equivalent of 1 to 2 times global Official Development Assistance. It also threatens state security by increasing corruption and extending into other areas of crime, such as arms and drug smuggling, and human trafficking. Russia possesses enormous forest resources (over 83 billion m³), representing a quarter of the world’s timber reserves. However, illegal logging and forest crime result in enormous monetary losses from the state budget According to data from the Russian Federal Forestry Agency (Rosleshoz), in 2014 alone there were 18,400 cases of the illegal logging of forest plantations—a total volume of 1,308,400 m³—with an estimated value of 10.8 billion rubles. However other estimates vary from 10-20% (Prime Minister’s office) to 50% (Prosecutor General’s office) of total timber harvest. While there has been a reduction in the amount of illegal logging in some regions of the Russian Federation, illegal logging has increased in other regions. Presently, no effective methods have been adopted for assessing the amount of illegal logging in the Russian Federation. The damage caused to forests is not only economic, but also ecological. The report reveals the scale of illegal logging in Russia based on the best available, most up-to-date, expert data. It is hoped that governments will take note and take action.

Arendal, Norway: GRID-Arendal, 2017, 38p.

By Teagan McGinnis, Octavio Rodríguez Ferreira and David Shirk

Justice in Mexico has released its latest working paper titled Analyzing the Problem of Femicide in Mexico by Teagan McGinnis, Octavio Rodríguez Ferreira, and David Shirk. This study examines the patterns of violence against women in Mexico, with special attention to the problem of femicide. While national homicide data show that the proportion of female homicide victims in Mexico has stayed largely the same for decades, the authors demonstrate that the elevated rate of homicides throughout the country has contributed to a large increase in the total number of female homicide victims. Because many homicides targeting women have distinctive characteristics—such as sexual violence, intimate partners, or other factors attributable to the woman’s gender—they have been legally codified as “femicides,” murders targeting women due to their gender.

The authors explore the question of why both the number and proportion of femicides has increased dramatically since national level data became available in 2015. Since prosecutors play a key role in determining whether a crime will be classified as either a homicide or femicide, the authors specifically evaluate the effects of state level prosecutorial capacity on the reporting of such crimes. The authors compiled an original dataset of state prosecutorial budgets and levels of homicidal violence (by gender and by state) and used both means testing and linear regression models to assess differences between states with special prosecutors and those without, while controlling for the level of homicidal violence across states. In terms of qualitative methods, the authors also compiled federal and state laws to examine differences in criminal and administrative laws and conducted interviews with state prosecutors and security experts.

The authors find statistically significant evidence that states that have special prosecutors for the investigation of femicides are substantially more likely to classify female homicides as femicides. Indeed, appointing a special prosecutor for gender-related crimes increases the investigation of femicide cases by 50% on average, even controlling for levels of homicidal violence in those states. These findings illustrate the impact of recent prosecutorial reforms in Mexico and offer useful insights for policy makers and activists working to combat violence against women in Mexico. Informed by the novel findings in this study, the authors recommend that Mexican states lacking special prosecutorial offices for the investigation and prosecution of femicides should create such units, and that all states should provide more resources and prosecutorial tools for the investigation and prosecution of gender-motivated crimes.

Washington, DC: Wilson Center, 2022. 33p.

By Allepandro Bernales, Diether Beuermann, Douglas Cumming. and Christiaan Olid

Relatively little is known about the effects of blue-collar crime (theft, robbery, vandalism or arson) on financial decisions. Previous literature has focused its attention either on 'regional' crime rates or the 'perception' of crime as business obstacles. Instead, we examine financing terms of 'individual' firms that 'effectively' experimented blue-collar crime events. We show that blue-collar crime worsens the access and conditions to external financing, which is unexpected since firms do not have to reveal to lenders that they suffered such crime incidents. We also find evidence that firm-information leakages may explain the negative effects of blue-collar crime on financing terms.

Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank, 2022. 785p.

By Jorge M. Agüero

About half of Peruvian women between the ages of 15 and 49 have experienced some form of violence from their partners. Through a quantitative analysis, this report explores how violence rates against women vary by ethnic group and over time. Based on a nationally representative sample of more than 75,000 women surveyed between 2003 and 2012 and a review of the literature on ethnic classification in Peru, a typology is applied to measure ethnicity, based on women’s linguistic backgrounds, allowing for a consistent ethnic characterization throughout the period of analysis. In this typology, the first group is made up of women who speak an indigenous language at home and do not speak Spanish. A second group, called “historic” Spanish speakers, is composed of women who learned Spanish during childhood and still use it today, while the third group, called “recent” Spanish speakers, includes women who grew up speaking an indigenous language but now speak Spanish. The highest rate of all types of violence is found in this last group, with a much greater difference in sexual and severe physical violence. This is consistent with the predictions of the theoretical model developed in this study in which violence depends on the type of couple. The model finds that women who speak “recent” Spanish—and who have what is termed a lower “outside option” than their “historic” Spanish-speaking male partners—experience greater violence. The study found that the gap in rates of violence against women among these three language groupings has remained constant over time despite an overall reduction in violence. This shows that current policies to provide care for victims and prevent violence against women are insufficient because the policies do not necessarily target groups with a greater risk of violence. This is unlike other areas of public health, where interventions are directly targeted at the most vulnerable populations

Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank, 2018. 43p.

By Ben Coetzee and Riana Horn

Due to the importance of the precious metals mining industry and the continuous criminal threat to the industry, the Chamber of Mines of South Africa approached the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) to investigate the occurrence of theft and various related issues. The statistical information this project is based on was provided by the mining sector and is for the period January 2000-December 2004. Some of the mining houses have implemented orientation workshops to explain what type of employee conduct constitutes a crime and the importance of reporting crime. It was therefore important to test the perceptions of employees in the industry to ensure that these workshops are effective. Despite advancements in crime detection and prevention technology, transgressions are nonetheless common at most mines and processing plants. The precious metals mining industry is still not capable of determining exactly how much product is lost during processing phases, leaving a window of opportunity for theft and corruption. Reliable crime reporting is critical to determining the extent of the criminal threat facing the precious metals mining industry. Although most mines have developed processes to record and manage crime-related information, the methods used by the police and the mining industry are not standardised for efficient analysis purposes. It became evident during interviews conducted for the study that there is a general perception in the mining industry that most stolen product sold on the black market ends up in some organised illegal business or syndicate. It is presumed top-level syndicate members, who supply organised criminal dealers, dispose of the largest volume of stolen product. Statistics recorded on identified syndicates may therefore reflect the most reliable magnitude of losses suffered when it comes to approximating the extent of precious metals theft in South Africa.

Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, 2007. 140p.