By Deanna Davy

The transnational organized crime (TOC) landscape in Southeast Asia has evolved dramatically in recent years. Trafficking in persons for the purpose of forced criminality to commit online scams and financial fraud, particularly occurring in Special Economic Zones (SEZs) and other areas of Cambodia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic (PDR), and Myanmar, as well as other destination countries (including Malaysia, and the Philippines), has emerged as a new and growing trend. Trafficking in persons for forced criminality has been driven by organized crime groups in the region, which operate in a remarkably open way. Their illicit activities are linked to various legal and illegal entertainment establishments, such as casinos, hotels, and registered companies (businesses), which operate from compound-like buildings where victims are harbored and forced to commit, or be complicit in, cyber-enabled crimes. This phenomenon of trafficking for forced criminality has recently become prominent in Southeast Asia, though it had already been identified in many parts of the world. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) 2022 Global Report on Trafficking in Persons1 has indicated a considerable increase in the identification of trafficking in persons for the purpose of committing criminal offences, currently reaching 10.2% of all reported trafficking cases globally. Trafficking for forced criminality (or for exploitation in criminal activities) can be understood as trafficking in persons for the purpose of exploitation of victims through forcing or otherwise compelling them to commit criminal acts for economic or other gains of traffickers or exploiters. While not included in the definition of the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons (Trafficking in Persons Protocol) explicitly, exploitation in criminal activities has been incorporated into the trafficking definition of many countries around the world. In the Southeast Asia region, currently only Malaysia has incorporated this form of exploitation into domestic legislation. Nevertheless, the intent of traffickers, the methods.

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), 2023. 50p.

By Global Financial Integrity and the Cyrus R. Vance Center for International Justice

On September 7, 2021, El Salvador became the first country in the world to adopt Bitcoin as legal tender. Two years later, the country has undergone technological change and growth, faced operational and regulatory challenges, and learned a tremendous amount in the process. This joint publication by the Vance Center and Global Financial Integrity (GFI) analyzes virtual assets (VAs) in El Salvador, first from a legal and regulatory perspective, as well as from an anti-money laundering (AML) and counter-terrorism financing (CFT) perspective The first half of the report analyzes the current regulatory landscape in El Salvador regarding Bitcoin and VAs. El Salvador has taken a major leap in embracing technological innovation, specifically in the digitalization of the financial system, through adopting bitcoin, cryptocurrencies, and digital assets. The country has established a regulatory framework encompassing the Bitcoin Law, the Digital Assets Issuance Law, and the Innovation and Manufacture of Technologies Promotion Law. These laws aim to provide a supportive environment for individuals and businesses engaging in transactions involving digital currencies while fostering innovation and technology manufacturing within the nation.

As a result, El Salvador is poised to become a leading proponent of emerging technologies across various sectors of its economy. Due to the dynamic nature of the subject matter and the ongoing efforts to standardize these frameworks internationally, the report identifies additional areas that may still require regulation.

The second half of the report analyzes VAs in El Salvador from an AML/CFT perspective. The report approaches these issues from the perspective of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), which states that “the cornerstone (…) is the risk-based approach which emphasizes the need for countries to identify and understand the money laundering (ML) and terrorism financing (TF) risks they are exposed to.”

Understanding risks enables countries such as El Salvador to take mitigating measures and to deploy limited resources effectively. In this regard, the report analyzes financial crime risks for the most common predicate offenses for ML in El Salvador, considering drug trafficking, extortion, migrant smuggling, and misappropriation of public funds (peculado). The report also assesses financial crime risks related to specific operational features or developments within El Salvador’s VA ecosystem.

The report concludes with policy recommendations that can help El Salvador to maximize the benefits and minimize the risks associated with financial innovation. Key recommendations include:

Policymakers in El Salvador should urgently adopt reforms strengthening AML/CFT as well as ensuring robust oversight over VAs. These reforms are particularly important in light of El Salvador’s upcoming Mutual Evaluation.

The Government of El Salvador, and specifically the Central Reserve Bank (BCR) and the National Commission of Digital Assets (NCDA), should engage with the legal and business community in developing regulations and technical standards according to need and practice for the Bitcoin Law and Digital Assets Issuance Law, following international best practices.

Lawyers and law firms advising companies wanting to operate in El Salvador should enhance compliance mechanisms to verify client backgrounds to prevent criminal actors from entering the national financial system.

All relevant government agencies should ensure transparency and access to public information, including contractual and operational processes, fraud and mismanagement investigations, and the use of public funds, per domestic laws and international standards.

The BCR should incorporate information on government Bitcoin purchases into the Balance of Payments and other similar documents.

The Superintendence of the Financial System (SSF) should require that Chivo Wallet collect information on legal persons opening Chivo Wallet accounts in line with the requirements for legal persons to open other types of financial accounts. In addition, Chivo Wallet should maintain beneficial ownership information for legal persons using Chivo Wallet, in line with FATF Recommendation 15’s interpretive guidance and similar to the requirements for financial institutions.

Considering that financial institutions and other obligated entities submit suspicious transaction reports (STRs) for crypto transactions, the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) of El Salvador and other government authorities should provide education and training opportunities to the financial sector and other obligated entities regarding identification of red flag indicators in crypto transactions. This will help to ensure that STRs contain relevant information and reflect an informed understanding of the risks.

Washington, DC: Global Financial Integrity 2023. 63p,

By Paul Pazen, Thomas Young, DJ Summers and Cooper Pollard

Colorado’s crime rate is not back to its pre-pandemic level. Both local and state authorities are currently attempting to find policy solutions.

Some localities have created policies and procedures that go beyond state guidelines in an effort to control crime. The City of Aurora implemented mandatory minimum sentencing guidelines for auto theft in 2022, for example, the year that Colorado’s and Aurora’s auto theft rates were highest. This policy led to a decrease in the auto theft rate in the city beyond what was seen statewide. In 2023, state lawmakers tried to address auto theft with passage of SB23-097. This bill did not implement mandatory minimum sentences, but instead made it a felony to commit auto theft regardless of the value of the vehicle. The law went into effect on July 1, 2023.

Using Aurora’s experience as a guide, CSI attempted to assess what the economic savings would be if the state were to experience the same decrease in auto theft, shoplifting, and overall crime that Aurora did after implementing its ordinance.

Key Findings

The share of auto theft in Aurora was 19% in July 2022. Since the passage of Aurora’s ordinance, known as “Mandatory Minimum Sentences for Motor Vehicle Theft,” the share averaged 16% from August 2022 through December 2024, representing a three percentage point decrease from the pre-August 2022 period.

A market model predicting auto theft in Aurora suggests there were 723 fewer auto thefts in Aurora from August 2022 to December 2024, a 6% decline relative to other large cities in the state.

For automobile crime, a 6% decline equates to $16.3 million in economic savings for Aurora from August 2022 through December 2024. For the largest city in the state, Denver, the economic savings would be $37.3 million over the same 29 months.

In contrast to Aurora’s experience, initial model results on the state impact from its 2023 effort was less pronounced at a 3% reduction in auto theft.

If Aurora’s experience is indicative of the potential savings of a similar statewide approach to crime, a 6% decline in crime statewide for all reported criminal offenses would have equated to $1.8 billion in economic savings in 2024, or roughly $774 per Colorado household.

Changes in local crime are not uniform across the state, however. The change in crime over the past five years varies widely by city and county.

Greenwood Village, CO : Common Sense Institute, 2025, 18p

By Joseph R Friedman, Daniela Abramovitz, Britt Skaathun, Gudelia Rangel, Alicia Harvey-Vera, Carlos F Vera, Irina Artamonova, Sheryl Muñoz, Natasha K Martin, William H Eger ...

Background

Illicitly manufactured fentanyl (IMF) increases overdose mortality, but its role in infectious disease transmission is unknown. We examined whether IMF use predicts hepatitis C virus (HCV) and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) incidence among a cohort of people who inject drugs (PWID) in San Diego, California and Tijuana, Mexico.

Methods

PWID were recruited during 2020–2022, undergoing semi-annual interviewer-administered surveys and HIV and HCV serological rapid tests through 2024. Cox regression was conducted to examine predictors of seroconversion considering self-reported IMF use as a 6-month lagged, time-dependent covariate.

Results

Of 398 PWID at baseline, 67% resided in San Diego, 70% were male, median age was 43 years, 42% reported receptive needle sharing, and 25% reported using IMF. HCV incidence was 14.26 per 100 person-years (95% confidence interval [CI]: 11.49–17.02), and HIV incidence was 1.29 (95% CI: .49–2.10). IMF was associated with HCV seroconversion, with a univariable hazard ratio (HR) of 1.64 (95% CI: 1.09–2.40), and multivariable HR of 1.57 (95% CI: 1.03–2.40). The direction of the relationship with HIV was similar, albeit not significant (HR 2.39; 95% CI: .66–8.64).

Conclusions

We document a novel association between IMF and HCV seroconversion among PWID in Tijuana–San Diego. Few HIV seroconversions (n = 10) precluded our ability to assess if a similar relationship held for HIV. IMF's short half-life may destabilize PWID—increasing the need for repeat dosing and sharing smoking materials and syringes. New preventive care approaches may reduce HCV transmission in the fentanyl era.

Clinical Infectious Diseases, cia e372, 2024.

By Vasiliki Georgoulas-Sherry & Hanna Hernandez

Data is needed to understand and assess the demographic differences—and at times, disparities and disproportionalities—in how the criminal justice system serves our communities and administers justice. Understanding these disparities and disproportionality in the criminal justice system is crucial for addressing systemic inequities. Disparities and disproportionalities within the criminal justice system are present in all stages of the criminal justice system, from arrest to incarceration (Brame et al., 2014; Kim & Kiesel, 2018; Kovera, 2019; Monk, 2019). This topic continues to draw significant attention from a variety of resources such as local, state, and federal government agencies, advocacy groups, policymakers and lawmakers, researchers and scholars, and the community. Evaluating these disparities and disproportionality is critical for addressing systemic inequalities and promoting fairness in the administration of justice. To respond to these impacts, the Criminal Justice Research & Statistics Center. the Washington Statistical Analysis Center (SAC) applied for and received the 2023 State Justice Statistics (SJS) grant from the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) to assess this work. Through the use of publicly available data from the National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS) to evaluate sex and racial disparities and disproportionalities, this report, which is part of a series of NIBRS reports, will endeavor to better understand more about the different demographic groups that are most impacted, and how these trends vary by time. Furthermore, this report will assess the demographic differences in the presence of injury, the presence of bias motivation, the use of weapons and/ or force, and the presence of familiarity in victimization in NIBRS crimes against property (i.e., criminal acts that destroy or deprive another's property against the owner's will - generally considered less serious than crimes against persons, but they can still be felonies).

Olympia: Washington State Statistical Analysis Center, 2024. 74p.

By The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime

The influx of weapons to Ukraine after Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, added to an already large reservoir of weapons in the country (especially since the outbreak of the conflict in 2014), raised concern over the spread of these weapons in the hands of criminals further in Western Europe, and the possible effect on organized criminal activities.

Both Ukraine and Ukraine’s Western partners have been aware of the political and criminal risks of arms diversion, and have put in place strict oversight mechanisms to track the delivery of weapons. According to Vadym Dzyubynskyi, head of criminal investigation at the Ukrainian National Police:

• All lost and stolen weapons, which currently number 593 000, are all accounted for, numbered, and our European partners know about these weapons. If such a weapon emerges in any country in Europe or the world, we will immediately understand that it is a drop-in and a fake, that it is the work of Russian special services for disinformation and narratives about Ukraine.

Ukrainian soldiers interviewed in February 2024 all spoke of strict standards over weapons, both during and at the end of their service. But in this nervous climate, any official shortcomings have been heavily scrutinized. And although not directly connected to weapons diversion, corruption scandals over military procurement in Ukraine have fed into concerns over the accountability of materiel in the war. Parsing the true risk has become essential to deepen the discussion beyond the headlines.

In order to provide insight into this issue, in 2023 the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC) established an arms monitoring programme (‘the Monitor’) to track the flows of weapons out of Ukraine and into Europe.

At the heart of the project was the collection of black market prices for weapons both in Ukraine and in Europe, on the assumption that a comparison of prices in different countries, and an analysis of changes in those prices, would help shed light on the nature of supply and demand at the national and transnational level. This data has been sourced from underworld contacts and law enforcement in various countries. Qualitative interviews with underworld sources, law enforcement, journalists, activists and others have helped flesh out the data picture with regard to demand for weapons among criminals, appetite for risk and potential drivers and barriers. In addition, the Monitor collected information on seizures and official reports on firearms, and commissioned a survey of dark web marketplaces.

GI-TOC ARMS MONITORING PROJECT , 2024. 76p.

By Jonathan P. Caulkins

Background and aims: Multiple countries are considering revising cannabis policies. This study aimed to measure long-term trends in cannabis use in the United States and compare them with alcohol use.

Design and setting: Secondary analysis of United States general population survey data.

Participants: The national surveys had a total of 1 641 041 participants across 27 surveys from 1979 to 2022.

Measurements

Rates of use reported to the US National Survey on Drug Use and Health and its predecessors are described, as are trends in days of use reported. Four milepost years are contrasted: 1979 (first available data and end of relatively liberal policies of the 1970s), 1992 (end of 12 years of conservative Reagan-Bush era policies), 2008 (last year before the Justice Department signaled explicit federal non-interference with state-level legalizations) and 2022 (most recent data available).

Findings

Reported cannabis use declined to a nadir in 1992, with partial recovery through 2008, and substantial increases since then, particularly for measures of more intensive use. Between 2008 and 2022, the per capita rate of reporting past-year use increased by 120%, and days of use reported per capita increased by 218% (in absolute terms from the annual equivalent of 2.3 to 8.1 billion days per year). From 1992 to 2022, there was a 15-fold increase in the per capita rate of reporting daily or near daily use. Whereas the 1992 survey recorded 10 times as many daily or near daily alcohol as cannabis users (8.9 vs. 0.9 M), the 2022 survey, for the first time, recorded more daily and near daily users of cannabis than alcohol (17.7 vs. 14.7 M). Far more people drink, but high-frequency drinking is less common. In 2022, the median drinker reported drinking on 4–5 days in the past month, versus 15–16 days in the past month for cannabis. In 2022, past-month cannabis consumers were almost four times as likely to report daily or near daily use (42.3% vs. 10.9%) and 7.4 times more likely to report daily use (28.2% vs. 3.8%).

Conclusions

Long-term trends in cannabis use in the United States parallel corresponding changes in cannabis policy, with declines during periods of greater restriction and growth during periods of policy liberalization. A growing share of cannabis consumers report daily or near daily use, and their numbers now exceed the number of daily and near daily drinkers.

Addiction, Volume119, Issue9, September 2024, Pages 1648-1652

By The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

The third edition of the World Wildlife Crime Report probes recent trends in the illicit trafficking of protected species of wild fauna and flora and provides a broad assessment of current knowledge about the causes and implications of associated crime at a global level. As was the case for the first two editions published in 2016 and 2020, research carried out for this report included quantitative assessment of global wildlife trafficking and a series of in-depth case studies. An additional emphasis for this edition is on systematic analysis of wildlife crime harms and impacts, factors driving crime trends and the evidence for what remedial interventions work best.

The report concludes that wildlife trafficking persists worldwide despite two decades of concerted action at international and national levels. There are signs of progress in reducing the impacts of trafficking for some iconic species, elephants and rhinoceros, for which a combination of efforts from both the demand and supply side have yielded positive outcomes. However, UNODC’s assessment of available evidence gives no confidence that wildlife trafficking overall is being substantially reduced.

The global scope and scale of wildlife crime remain substantial with seizures during 2015–2021 indicating an illegal trade in 162 countries and territories affecting around 4,000 plant and animal species. Beyond the immediate conservation threat to target species, population reductions caused by wildlife trafficking can play a role in triggering ecosystem-level impacts by disturbing interdependencies between different species and undermining related functions and processes, including those important to climate change resilience and mitigation. Wildlife crime also threatens the socioeconomic benefits people derive from nature, whether as a source of income, employment, food, medicine or other values. It further corrodes good governance and the rule of law through corruption, money-laundering and illicit financial flows.

The report notes that transnational organized crime groups are active in some illicit wildlife markets, where they exploit inconsistencies and weaknesses in regulation and enforcement, adapting their methods and routes continuously to evade detection and prosecution. Corruption also plays a key role in undermining regulation and enforcement actions against wildlife trade.

The 2024 World Wildlife Crime Report tracks all these issues, trends and more

Vienna: UNODC, 2024. 169p.

By  Susan Olzak

Scholars document that attitudes toward guns and gun policy reflect deeply entrenched cultures that overlap with ideological affiliations and party politics. Does exposure to dramatic events such as school shootings and protests regarding gun control affect these patterns? I first argue that school shootings are significant triggering events that will become associated with attitudes favoring gun restrictions. The second argument holds that rising protests by one’s opponent can be transformed into mobilizing opportunity by a focal group. To examine these ideas, I combine information from a national exit poll data on respondents’ attitudes on gun policy with state-level information on the counts of recent school shootings, gun-policy protest, existing laws restricting gun use, and membership in the National Rifle Association. To minimize bias, the analysis of public opinion applies Coarsened Exact Matching techniques followed by analysis using mixed-level logit. The second analysis uses data on gun control protests, school shootings, and NRA memberships in states over time. Results show that conservatives (but not liberals) exposed to more school shootings favor more restrictive gun policies. The second, longitudinal analysis found that there is a significant interaction effect between increases in school shootings and gun control protests that diminishes NRA memberships significantly.

Unpublished paper. 2022. 49p.

By The International Crisis Group 

Over half a century on from the declaration of a “war on drugs”, Latin America is struggling to manage the eruption of violence tied to the narcotics trade. Though drugrelated organised crime has brought notorious peaks of violence in the past, above all in Colombia and Mexico, never has it spread so wide, and rarely has it penetrated so deeply into states and communities. Criminal groups have splintered, multiplied and diversified, adding lethal synthetics like fentanyl to the traditional plant-based supply of marijuana, cocaine and heroin, as well as moving into new rackets like extortion. Where communities are poor and unprotected, criminal groups act as employers and overlords; where state officials are present, they coerce and corrupt them. With Washington pushing for a fresh military-led crackdown on drug cartels, perhaps involving U.S. forces, Latin American leaders face difficult decisions. Despite the pressure to comply, experience suggests that a balance of improved policing, alternative livelihoods, gun control and, under specific conditions, negotiations would be more effective in reducing violence. The map of the drug trade in Latin America has been transformed in the decades since supply routes from the Andes to the U.S. first emerged. Demand for narcotics outside the region remains at record highs, with newer markets booming – particularly for cocaine in Europe and fentanyl in the U.S. At the same time, waves of U.S.- backed law enforcement, based on capture and extradition of crime bosses (known as kingpins), drug seizures and forced eradication have revolutionised the supply chain. Although Colombia and Mexico remain at the heart of the drug business, a main route to the U.S. and Europe runs down the Pacific, passing through countries that were largely untouched by illicit trafficking such as Costa Rica and Ecuador. Each of these has seen rates of violence rise sharply; in 2024, Ecuador was South America’s most violent nation. Across the region, surges of bloodshed have marked the new hubs of a fast-shifting, hyper-violent drug trade. Understanding how this rolling crime wave came about is fundamental to arresting it. Drug-related organised crime has adapted to the threat posed by law enforcement by becoming more flexible and resilient. In place of hierarchical syndicates that could be dismantled once their leaders were identified, the trade increasingly functions through networks of providers who subcontract each step of the route to lower tiers of operators. High-level financiers engage sophisticated international traffickers, who oversee drug exports to user markets. These in turn partner with national and local crime groups to meet the orders. National groups manage production or ensure safe passage of the drug along a particular trafficking corridor. At the local level, urban gangs are contracted by larger criminal allies for small-scale logistical services like smuggling drugs through ports. All the layers of these networks have learned that capturing state officials is a business asset. Using a mix of threats and payoffs, they target police officers, judges, prosecutors and politicians who can ensure that business runs smoothly, without the risk of arrest or seizure of shipments. Likewise, prisons in some of Latin America’s roughest settings are run by inmates, who manage their criminal enterprises behind bars and carry out vendettas against rivals inside and outside.

Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2025. 51p.

By Jonathan Lusthaus

Cybercrime is not a solely technical subject but one that involves human offenders who are susceptible to social scientific study. Yet, despite calls for cybercrime research to be mainstreamed, the topic remains a niche area within legal studies and the social sciences. Drawing on the most significant findings over recent years, this review aims to make the subject more accessible to a wide range of scholars by softening some of the perceived boundaries between conceptions of cybercrime and conventional crime. It examines these key themes in the literature: definitions and categories of cybercrime, cybercrime marketplaces, the governance of cybercrime, the importance of “place” within the world of cybercrime, cybercriminal networks, a discussion of what is new or old about cybercrime, and how we should define the concept going forward. The empirical literature on these themes suggests a simple definition is most appropriate: Cybercrime is crime that uses digital technology in a significant way.

Annual Review of Law and Social Science, Vol. 20 (2024), pp. 369–385

By Shawn Davies, Garoun Engström, Therése Pettersson, and Magnus Öberg

This article examines trends in organized violence based on new data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). In 2023, fatalities from organized violence decreased for the first time since the rapid increase observed in 2020, dropping from 310,000 in 2022 to 154,000 in 2023. Despite this decline, these figures represent some of the highest fatality rates recorded since the Rwandan genocide in 1994, surpassed only by those of 2022 and 2021. The decrease was primarily attributed to the end of the conflict in Ethiopia’s Tigray region, which accounted for about 60% of battle-related deaths in both 2022 and 2021. Despite this positive development, the number of active state-based armed conflicts increased by three in 2023, reaching the highest level ever recorded by the UCDP, totaling 59. Non- state conflicts and one-sided violence decreased in 2023 when compared to 2022, evident in both the reduction of the active conflicts/actors and the decrease in fatalities attributed to these forms of violence. However, despite this overall decrease, fatalities resulting from non-state conflicts remained at historically high levels in 2023. Analysis of non-state conflict data spanning the past decade reveals that it comprises the ten most violent years on record. Organized crime groups have predominantly fueled this escalation. Unlike rebel groups, organized crime groups typically lack political goals and are primarily motivated by economic gain. Conflicts between these groups tend to intensify around drug smuggling routes and in urban areas, driven by shifts in alliances and leadership dynamics among the actors.

Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 61(4), 2024, 673­ –693 pages

By Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo

Three categories of organised groups that exploit advances in information and communications technologies (ICT) to infringe legal and regulatory controls: (1) traditional organised criminal groups which make use of ICT to enhance their terrestrial criminal activities; (2) organised cybercriminal groups which operate exclusively online; and (3) organised groups of ideologically and politically motivated individuals who make use of ICT to facilitate their criminal conduct are described in this article. The need for law enforcement to have in-depth knowledge of computer forensic principles, guidelines, procedures, tools, and techniques, as well as anti-forensic tools and techniques will become more pronounced with the increased likelihood of digital content being a source of disputes or forming part of underlying evidence to support or refute a dispute in judicial proceedings. There is also a need for new strategies of response and further research on analysing organised criminal activities in cyberspace.

Springer Science + Business Media, LLC, 2008, 26p.

By Anita Lavorgna, and Anna Sergi

This paper, based on discourse analysis of policy documents, departs from a critique of the juxtaposition of the terms “serious” and “organised” in policies against organised crime in the UK. The conceptualisation of organised crime as national security threat supports our hypothesis that a similar critique can be applied to the emerging narrative of cyber-organised crime in the country. We argue that, whereby organised crime has become essentially “serious” as consequence of its characterisation as a national security threat, cyber crime is becoming “organised” in the policy narrative because of its seriousness. The seriousness and organisation of cyber crime justifies its inclusion within the national security agenda, thus accessing the procedural benefits of criminal intelligence assigned to national security threats. The implications associated to the evolution of such narratives in policy-making need to be assessed while policies are still developing.

International Journal of Cyber Criminology, 2016, 18p.

By Daniel Tolstrup, Sarah T. Roberts, Ruth Deya, George Wanje, Juma Shafi, Jocelyn R. James, Geetanjali Chander, R. Scott McClelland, Susan M. Graham

Aim

Unhealthy alcohol use is often correlated with experiences of intimate partner violence (IPV). We investigated how different types of IPV (sexual, physical, emotional, and financial) were associated with unhealthy alcohol use among women engaged in sex work in Mombasa, Kenya.

Methods

This cross-sectional study included 283 HIV-negative women who engaged in sex work recruited from an ongoing cohort study. Modified Poisson analysis was used to assess associations between recent (≤ 12 months) or past (> 12 months) experiences of sexual, physical, emotional, or financial IPV and unhealthy alcohol use defined as an Alcohol Use Disorders Identification Test score ≥ 8.

Results

Among 283 participants, 34.6 % had unhealthy alcohol use. Physical (62.5 %), emotional (60.4 %), and financial (66.4 %) IPV occurred more frequently than sexual IPV (43.8 %). Adjusted risk ratios (ARR) for relationships between physical and financial IPV and unhealthy alcohol use were elevated but not statistically significant. Compared to participants who had not experienced sexual IPV, those who had experienced recent or past sexual IPV had an increased risk of unhealthy alcohol use (ARR 1.56, 95 % confidence interval [1.09, 2.23] and ARR 1.48, 95 % confidence interval [0.97, 2.25], respectively).

Conclusion

Sexual IPV was associated with unhealthy alcohol use among Kenyan women who engage in sex work. Physical, emotional, and financial IPV were also highly prevalent in the study population, though not associated with unhealthy alcohol use. These findings affirm the potential benefit of providing integrated IPV and alcohol treatment services focused on recovery after experiences of IPV for this vulnerable population.

Drug and Alcohol Dependence Reports, Volume 14, March 2025, 7p.

By Cintya Lanchimba, Juan Pablo Díaz-Sánchez and Franklin Velasco

Introduction: This econometric analysis investigates the nexus between household factors and domestic violence. By considering diverse variables encompassing mood, depression, health consciousness, social media engagement, household chores, density, and religious affiliation, the study aims to comprehend the underlying dynamics influencing domestic violence. Methods: Employing econometric techniques, this study examined a range of household-related variables for their potential associations with levels of violence within households. Data on mood, depression, health consciousness, social media usage, household chores, density, and religious affiliation were collected and subjected to rigorous statistical analysis. Results: The findings of this study unveil notable relationships between the aforementioned variables and levels of violence within households. Positive mood emerges as a mitigating factor, displaying a negative correlation with violence. Conversely, depression positively correlates with violence, indicating an elevated propensity for conflict. Increased health consciousness is linked with diminished violence, while engagement with social media demonstrates a moderating influence. Reduction in the time allocated to household chores corresponds with lower violence levels. Household density, however, exhibits a positive association with violence. The effects of religious affiliation on violence manifest diversely, contingent upon household position and gender. Discussion: The outcomes of this research offer critical insights for policymakers and practitioners working on formulating strategies for preventing and intervening in instances of domestic violence. The findings emphasize the importance of considering various household factors when designing effective interventions. Strategies to bolster positive mood, alleviate depression, encourage health consciousness, and regulate social media use could potentially contribute to reducing domestic violence. Additionally, the nuanced role of religious affiliation underscores the need for tailored approaches based on household dynamics, positioning, and gender.

Front. Psychiatry, 2023, 13p.

By Ruggero Scaturro | Giorgio Fruscione

In the Western Balkans, religious radicalization gained international attention in the early 2010s, with around 1 000 people travelling to Syria and Iraq to join jihadist groups between 2012 and 2016. The roots of this radicalization trace back to the Yugoslav wars, the presence of mujahideen networks in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Islamist charities spreading Salafi jihadism in the 1990s.

However, not all fighters from the Western Balkans are religiously motivated. Between 2014 and 2021, around 300 people fought in eastern Ukraine, mainly for political reasons, with Serbia being a major source of combatants supporting pro-Russian separatists. Since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, this trend has resurged, with more individuals reportedly joining mercenary units like the Wagner Group.

Instability in the Western Balkans has also fuelled the spread of organized crime beyond the region, first across Europe and later to other continents. In the 1990s, the Yugo Mafia gained significant media attention in Northern Europe. Meanwhile, violent extremists from the Western Balkans maintain transnational connections through diaspora networks and using online platforms.

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2025. 45p.

By The Australian Law Reform Commission

Sexual violence is one of the most common and serious harms confronting Australia today. When it comes to sexual violence and the justice system there are significant challenges. 9 out of 10 women who have experienced sexual violence do not report to the police. Where there is engagement with the justice system, between 75–85% of reports to police do not proceed to charge. Even fewer reports proceed to court. Once in court, many people report experiencing the justice system as re-traumatising.

This report examines a range of issues with the aim of strengthening and harmonising sexual assault and consent laws in Australia and considers ways to promote just outcomes for people who have experienced sexual violence, including minimising retraumatisation.

The report's 64 recommendations seek to ensure that more people who have experienced sexual violence can access the justice system, meaningfully engage with it and reach a just outcome.

Key findings

Under-engagement with the justice system to be the most significant problem with the justice system’s response to sexual violence.

The justice system is failing to meet the twin goals of access to justice and accountability: it is not supporting those who have experienced sexual violence to engage with the justice system, nor holding those who use sexual violence to account.

Key recommendations

The Australian Government, together with state and territory governments, should fund relevant organisations (including sexual violence services, community legal centres, Aboriginal Community Controlled Organisations, Legal Aid Commissions, and participating legal firms) to provide independent legal services, justice system navigators, and safe places to disclose.

The Australian Government should commission a national inquiry to address the impact of factors such as mandatory sentencing provisions, sentencing discount regimes, and consequences following conviction (such as sex offender registration) on sexual offence matters proceeding to trial rather than resolving via guilty pleas, and measures that may promote early resolution.

The National Judicial College of Australia should be funded to manage and staff an ongoing research team and locate a member of the research team in each of the trial courts to coordinate the building of a shared evidence base.

Flinders Lane, VIC: Australian Law Reform Commission 2025. 72p.

By The World Economic Forum

In a complex cyberspace characterized by geopolitical uncertainties, widening cyber inequity and sophisticated cyberthreats, leaders must adopt a security-first mindset. While the 2024 edition of the Global Cybersecurity Outlook highlighted the growing inequity in cyberspace, this year’s report shines a light on the increasing complexity of the cyber landscape, which has profound and far-reaching implications for organizations and nations. This complexity is driven by a series of compounding factors: – Escalating geopolitical tensions are contributing to a more uncertain environment. – Increased integration of and dependence on more complex supply chains is leading to a more opaque and unpredictable risk landscape. – The rapid adoption of emerging technologies is contributing to new vulnerabilities as cybercriminals harness them effectively to achieve greater sophistication and scale. – Simultaneously, the proliferation of regulatory requirements around the world is adding a significant compliance burden for organizations. All of these challenges are exacerbated by a widening skills gap, making it extremely challenging to manage cyber risks effectively.

Geneva, SWIT: World Economic Forum , 2025. 49p.

By Dean J. Connolly, Santino Coduri-Fulford c, Katherine Macdonald , Gail GilchristLuke Muschialli

Sexualised drug use (SDU) is a highly prevalent phenomenon of increasing public health significance in communities of men who have sex with men (MSM). This prospectively registered PRISMA-ScR-adherent systematic scoping review examines the current state of knowledge surrounding violence amongst MSM in the context of SDU. A broad search was conducted across four databases, with no restrictions. Studies citing or cited by all database-identified records retained for full-text review were retrieved and screened. Three journals were hand searched across the past five years, and three searches were conducted on Google Scholar. In addition, 13 key opinion leaders were contacted via email to request any additional published or unpublished data. The twentyeight studies included in the final synthesis reported mostly qualitative data from geographically diverse nonrepresentative samples, predominantly relating to sexual violence with other typologies seldom investigated or reported. Although quantitative data were limited, sexual violence appeared common in this context and was directly associated with impaired mental health and suicidality. Some participants reported first- or second-hand accounts of non-consensual administration of incapacitating doses of GHB/GBL to men who were subsequently raped. This was frequently perpetrated by men whose age, status, or financial privilege afforded them power over their victims. While reports from some participants suggested context-specific blurring of the lines of consent, a few quotes demonstrated a dearth of knowledge surrounding the centrality of consent in lawful sex. Given the historical denigration of MSM, any efforts to further investigate or address this issue must be community-led.

International Journal of Drug Policy

Volume 136, February 2025, 104706