By David Klinger

What's it like to have official sanction to shoot and kill? In this brilliantly written, controversial, and compelling book, author David Klinger - who himself shot and killed a suspect during his first year as an officer in the Los Angeles Police Department - answers this and many other questions about what it's like to live and work in the place where police officers have to make split-second decisions about life and death: The Kill Zone.

Klinger, now a university professor, writes eloquently about what happens when police officers find themselves face-to-face with dangerous criminals, the excruciating decisions they have to make to shoot or to hold their fire, and how they deal with the consequences of their choices.

San Francisco. Jossey-Bass. 2004. 304p.

By Kwong, Jamie

From the document: "Climate change could have mission-altering impacts on the U.S. nuclear deterrent. This paper examines the range of climate change challenges and threats that could detrimentally affect each leg of the U.S. nuclear triad in different and increasingly serious ways. In doing so, the paper helps to advance broader, ongoing efforts to account for climate change in U.S. national security policies. It also aims to inform and help initiate a larger conversation about the vulnerabilities of all nuclear weapons programs to climate change. Gaining greater clarity about these vulnerabilities now is essential to mitigating the worst effects of climate change on nuclear weapons in the future."

Washington. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 2023. 52p.

By United States. Office Of The Director Of National Intelligence; Intelligence Community (U.S.)

From the document: "Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, and in the wake of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act passed by Congress in 2004, Director of National Intelligence John D. Negroponte signed out the Intelligence Community's (IC) first National Intelligence Strategy. The strategy explained that the Intelligence Community's clear charge was to: [1] Integrate the domestic and foreign dimensions of U.S. intelligence so that there are no gaps in our understanding of threats to our national security; [2] Bring more depth and accuracy to intelligence analysis; and [3] Ensure that U.S. intelligence resources generate future capabilities as well as present results. Now, almost twenty years after our first strategy was issued, the Intelligence Community's charge remains just as clear, even as the strategic environment has changed dramatically. The United States faces an increasingly complex and interconnected threat environment characterized by strategic competition between the United States, the People's Republic of China (PRC), and the Russian Federation, felt perhaps most immediately in Russia's ongoing aggression in Ukraine. In addition to states, sub-national and non-state actors--from multinational corporations to transnational social movements--are increasingly able to create influence, compete for information, and secure or deny political and security outcomes, which provides opportunities for new partnerships as well as new challenges to U.S. interests. In addition, shared global challenges, including climate change, human and health security, as well as emerging and disruptive technological advances, are converging in ways that produce significant consequences that are often difficult to predict. [...] The six goals outlined in this National Intelligence Strategy have emerged as our understanding of the kinds of information, technology, and relationships needed to be effective in the future has expanded."

Washington. United States. Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Intelligence Community (U.S.). 2023.

By Goldberg, Zach

From the document: "Recently, there has been a dramatic increase in media and public attention to police brutality and racial bias. By some measures, the volume of media references to these topics has been greater over the past decade than ever before. Google search behavior shows that Americans are consuming this messaging ('Figure 1'), and their attitudes toward police--particularly Democrats' and liberals' attitudes--have responded accordingly. Confidence in police has never been lower, while antipolice sentiment, perceptions of police brutality and racism, and support for defunding the police have never been higher. So much have perceptions of racist policing grown that, as of 2021, more than half (52%) of Democrats felt that levels of racism were greater among police officers than other societal groups (up from 35% in 2014). Fears of the police among black Americans have increased to the point that, in 2020, roughly 74% of black respondents to a Quinnipiac University poll said that they 'personally worry' about being the victim of police brutality, compared with 64% and 57% who said so in 2018 and 2016, respectively. Yet these trends in media coverage and public perceptions seem divorced from empirical reality. A stark illustration of this was provided by a nationally representative survey conducted in 2019 by the Skeptic Research Center, which found that nearly 33% of people--including 44% of liberals--thought that 1,000 or more unarmed black men 'alone' were killed by police in 2019. In fact, according to the Mapping Police Violence (MPV) database, 29 unarmed black (vs. 44 white) men were killed by police that year."

NY. Manhattan Institute for Policy Research. 2023. 50p.

By Yadav, Kamya; Riedl, Martin J.; Wanless, Alicia; Woolley, Samuel C.

From the document: "Companies, politicians, and governments are constantly working to motivate audiences to think and act favorably toward them. Think of a billboard promoting a fast-food chain, a political campaign video on YouTube, or a government-led polio vaccination drive. But some influence operations go too far and undermine democracy, which depends on the integrity of information. Can influence operations be assessed to distinguish those that are acceptable from those that are not? This paper explores three potential criteria--transparency in origins, quality of content, and calls to action--to assess the acceptability of an influence operation in the context of democracies."

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 2023. 30p.

By United States. Department Of Defense

From the document: "The Department of Defense (DoD) is at a pivotal moment in biodefense as it faces an unprecedented number of complex biological threats (biothreats). This inaugural DoD Biodefense Posture Review (BPR) initiates key reforms--built on the foundations of the 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS), the October 2022 National Biodefense Strategy and Implementation Plan for Countering Biological Threats, Enhancing Pandemic Preparedness, and Achieving Global Health Security (NBS); and lessons learned from the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic response--to posture DoD to counter biothreats through 2035. Developments in biological technology (biotechnology) are driving an increase in the scope and diversity of biothreats that DoD could face in the next decade. Additionally, as the planet's climate continues to change and its population grows, emerging infectious diseases are expected to develop and spread more frequently and potentially threaten DoD's readiness to achieve and maintain its national defense goals. The COVID-19 pandemic response presented opportunities for DoD to both improve its overall preparedness and posture, as well as to reinforce and reimagine its role in support of the broader U.S. Government and our allies and partners."

Washington D.C. United States. Department of Defense. 2023. 56p.

USED BOOK. MAY CONTAIN MARK-UP

Edited by Ori Swed and Thomas Crosbie

FROM THE PREFACE: “This book started as a known unknown. We knew and admired the rich body of work being produced by political scientists, international relations scholars, legal scholars and historians (as well as a handful of sociologists) on the emerging private military and security industry. We knew about and were concerned with the political consequences of this development, with its nasty barbs of undermining legitimacy, stability and professionalism in the conduct of war and security operations. And we knew that we didn't know what this meant from a sociological perspective. With time, this known unknown transformed before our eyes into an unknown known. In other words, we realized that many of our fellow sociologists were as concerned as we were with establishing and promoting a sociological perspective on the privatization of security. The problem changed from one of disciplinary neglect to one of disciplinary resistance. In The Sociology of Privatized Security, we present a collection of nine chapters written by more than a dozen sociologists on a topic that is widely discussed in the public sphere but almost absent from the discipline. The book came about for that very reason: we want to bring this important topic into disciplinary discussion, to push our collcagues to take seriously the global trend toward privatizing security and military affairs as something that really matters to contemporary societies and to social life…”

NY. Palgrave Macmillan. 2009. 292p.

By Edmund F. McGarrell Stephen Oliphant Alaina De Biasi Julie M. Krupa

Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN) is a national program that seeks to reduce levels of gun and gang crime, and violent crime generally. The Eastern District of Michigan has participated in PSN since its outset in 2001. Although the Eastern District has included attention to violent crime in multiple communities, Detroit has been a primary target area throughout the years of PSN. PSN is a grant supported program by the Bureau of Justice Assistance, U.S. Department of Justice. This report summarizes the implementation and impact of the grant supported program that was funded in fiscal year 2018. During this period, the PSN team focused on Detroit Police Department’s 9th precinct, with targeted enforcement in specific hotspot areas. PSN Detroit relied upon a multi-agency team and followed a comprehensive strategy of targeted enforcement, intervention with at-risk individuals, and youth-focused prevention. The PSN initiative, like law enforcement operations nationally, was significantly affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. This added to the complexity of the evaluation and makes some of our research findings tentative. With this qualification in mind, we find support for the positive impact of PSN. Specifically, following the implementation of PSN in the 9th precinct until the shutdowns associated with the impact of the pandemic in March 2020, the 9th precinct witnessed a decline from 13.6 shooting victimizations per month to 11.9 per month (-12.5%). During this same period, Detroit’s other precincts witnessed a total increase from 63.8 to 72.6 (+13.7%), or an average per precinct increase from 6.3 to 7.3 per month. When examining the specific hotspot areas, we observed a decline of 2.6 shooting victimizations per month in the hotspot zone when compared to a comparison area drawn from parts of the city that did not experience PSN.

These trends were interrupted by the onset of the pandemic, as well as the period of social unrest and protest following the death of George Floyd in Minneapolis. The pandemic had a serious effect in Detroit with the Police Department experiencing significant personnel losses due to illness and quarantine, and the suspension of court operations. As was the case nationally, violent crime increased in Detroit and in the 9th precinct in 2020 and the first half of 2021. In the last quarter of 2021 and the first quarter of 2022, the 9th precinct again witnessed welcome declines in shooting victimizations. These declines were also observed citywide and were particularly noteworthy in the specific PSN target areas within the 9th precinct. The PSN team’s strategy of supporting a focused multi-agency enforcement team, while leveraging comprehensive intervention and place-based strategies appears to have enhanced public safety in Detroit.

Lansing: Michigan Justice Statistics Center, School of Criminal Justice. Michigan State University 2022. 30p.

By Gilding, Simeon

From the document: "It seems like an age since we worried about China's dominion over the world's 5G [fifth generation] networks. These days, the digital authoritarian threat feels decidedly steampunk--Russian missiles powered by washing-machine chips and stately Chinese surveillance balloons. And, meanwhile, our short attention spans are centred (ironically) on TikTok--an algorithmically addictive short video app owned by Chinese technology company ByteDance. More broadly, there are widespread concerns that 'large language model' (LLM) generative AI such as ChatGPT [Chat Generative Pre-Trained Transformer] will despoil our student youth, replace our jobs and outrun the regulatory capacity of the democracies. [...] This report is broken down into six sections. The first section highlights our dependency on AI-enabled products and services. The second examines China's efforts to export AI-enabled products and services and promote its model of digitally enabled authoritarianism, in competition with the US and the norms and values of democracy. This section also surveys PRC [People's Republic of China] laws compelling tech-sector cooperation and explains the nature of the threat, giving three examples of Chinese AI-enabled products of potential concern. It also explains why India is particularly vulnerable to the threat. In the third section, the report looks at the two key democratic responses to the challenge of AI: on the one hand, US efforts to counter both China's development of advanced AI technologies and the threat from Chinese technology already present in the US digital ecosystem; on the other, a draft EU Regulation to protect the fundamental rights of EU citizens from the pernicious effects of AI. The fourth section of the report proposes a framework for triaging and managing the risk of China's authoritarian AI-enabled products and services embedded in democratic digital ecosystems. The final section acknowledges complementary efforts to mitigate the PRC threat to democracies' digital ecosystems."

By UNITED STATES. CYBERSECURITY & INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY AGENCY

From the document: "Our nation is at a moment of opportunity. The '2023 U.S. National Cybersecurity Strategy' outlines a new vision for cybersecurity, a vision grounded in collaboration, in innovation, and in accountability. Now is the moment where our country has a choice: to invest in a future where collaboration is a default rather than an exception; where innovation in defense and resilience dramatically outpaces that of those seeking to do us harm; and where the burden of cybersecurity is allocated toward those who are most able to bear it. We must be clear-eyed about the future we seek, one in which damaging cyber intrusions are a shocking anomaly, in which organizations are secure and resilient, in which technology products are safe and secure by design and default. This is a shared journey and a shared challenge, and CISA [Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency], as America's cyber defense agency, is privileged to serve a foundational role in the global cybersecurity community as we achieve measurable progress to our shared end state. [...] We must change how we design and develop technology products, such that exploitable conditions are uncommon and secure controls are enabled before products reach the market. We must quickly detect adversaries, incidents, and vulnerabilities, and enable timely mitigation before harm occurs. We must help organizations, particularly those that are 'target rich, resource poor,' take the fewest possible steps to drive the most security impact."

United States. Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency. 2023. 36p.

By Bernadette C. Hohl, Michelle C. Kondo, Sandhya Kajeepeta, John M. MacDonald, Katherine P. Theall, Marc A. Zimmerman, and Charles C. Branas

Violence is a leading cause of death and disability in the United States and abroad, with far-reaching consequences for individuals and communities. Interventions that address environmental and social contexts have the potential for greater populationwide effects, yet research has been slow to identify and rigorously evaluate these types of interventions to reduce violence. Several urban communities across the US are conducting experimental and quasi-experimental community-based research to examine the effect of place-based interventions on violence. Using examples from Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Flint, Michigan; Youngstown, Ohio; and New Orleans, Louisiana, we describe how place-based interventions that remediate vacant land and abandoned buildings work to reduce violence. These examples support the potential for place-based interventions to create far-reaching and sustainable improvements in the health and safety of communities that experience significant disadvantage. These interventions warrant the attention of community stakeholders, funders, and policy makers.

Health Affairs 38, NO. 10 (2019): 1687–1694

By Shana Conroy, Cristine Rotenberg, McKenzie Haringa and Sarah Johnston-Way

The Safe Cities profile series provides the most recent data on community safety and crime, and other social characteristics, for Canada’s census metropolitan areas (CMAs). Key indicators include community safety and sense of belonging, self-reported experiences of victimization, and police-reported crime—which are based on results from the General Social Survey on Canadians’ Safety (Victimization), the new Survey of Safety in Public and Private Spaces, and the Uniform Crime Reporting Survey. To complement community safety and crime data, CMA-level statistics from supplementary data sources are also provided, including population and demographics; education, employment and income; and housing and families. Efforts to promote community safety and well-being are central to Canada’s actions to achieve the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which are part of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. The SDGs provide a shared blueprint for peace and prosperity, and they were adopted by all United Nations Member States in 2015. The SDGs mark an urgent call for action by all countries—both developing and developed—in a global partnership to address safety and security issues at home and abroad. They include a focus on ending inequality and gender-based violence while promoting sustainable cities, communities and institutions in the pursuit of peace and justice (Employment and Social Development Canada 2019).

Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 2021. 361p.

By Nora Ruth Libertun de Duren

Landlocked in the center of South America, Bolivia experienced rapid urbanization only in recent decades. Its urban population became a majority in the 1990s, almost three decades later than the rest of Latin America’s southern cone. However, the country has made up for lost time since then with a very sharp transition from a rural to an urban society. The 2012 urbanization rate was 6.75 percent, more than four times the average for the rest of the region. Currently, one in three urban residents in Bolivia is a rural migrant who arrived in a city between 2006 and 2011 (Trohanis, Zaengerling, & Sanchez-Reaza, 2015). By 2025, three-quarters of Bolivia’s projected 14 million people will live in cities (UN-DESA, 2012). As in many developing countries, the majority of rural migrants in Bolivia settle in informal neighborhoods in peripheral areas of the country’s largest cities. It is estimated that 45 percent of Bolivia’s urban residents reside in an informal neighborhood (IDB, 2016). The housing units in these neighborhoods often resemble rural dwellings; they are usually self-built, and they are not connected to basic services such as water and sanitation. The neighborhoods frequently have unpaved, fuzzily demarcated, and unlighted roads of diverse widths. Accordingly, property boundaries among residents are blurry and may lead to conflicts among neighbors. Nevertheless, lack of formal titles does not preclude the existence of an active real estate market (Birch et al., 2016). Properties are traded and leased. There is an important income inequality within informal neighborhood residents; those who rent tend to be significantly poorer than those who own property (Talukdar, 2018). Typically, informal neighborhoods residents are more exposed to violence and insecurity, given that police and firemen do not often service these neighborhoods (Perlman, 2010). While there are no official crime statistics in Bolivia for these neighborhoods, residents report a high sense of insecurity (Gamboa, 2014); a phenomenon seen in informal neighborhoods in other countries, too (Parks, 2014). Also, while there are no formal statistics on violence against women, its main risk factors. -family history, early cohabitation, alcohol abuse, and low level of education- (Klugman et al., 2014)- are highly prevalent in informal neighborhoods (McIlwaine, 2013).

World Development Perspectives. Volume 19, September 2020, 100231

By Steven M. Chermak, Joshua D. Freilich and Zachary Shemtob

This article examines issues related to training as it pertains to domestic terrorism in general and responding to far-right extrem- ists in particular. First, it hightlights current training practices and training focused on the far right. Second, it details knowledge about the nature and extent of the threat posed by far-right extremists. Third, a review of the empirical research indicates that training could be enhanced if three key issues are emphasized: Future training should promote a better understanding of the contours of the far right; discuss the unique geographic, crime-incident, and structural characteristics of the far right; and describe the need to examine all ideologically motivated crimes, regardless of whether they are also defined as terrorist. The conclusion discusses how training could be enhanced by strategically integrating the existing knowledge base.

Sage. Criminal Justice and Behavior. Vol. 36 No. 12, December 2009 1305-1322 DOI:0.1177/0093854809345630

By Edmund F. McGarrell Stephen Oliphant Alaina De Biasi Julie M. Krupa

Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN) is a national program that seeks to reduce levels of gun and gang crime, and violent crime generally. The Eastern District of Michigan has participated in PSN since its outset in 2001. Although the Eastern District has included attention to violent crime in multiple communities, Detroit has been a primary target area throughout the years of PSN. PSN is a grant supported program by the Bureau of Justice Assistance, U.S. Department of Justice. This report summarizes the implementation and impact of the grant supported program that was funded in fiscal year 2018. During this period, the PSN team focused on Detroit Police Department’s 9th precinct, with targeted enforcement in specific hotspot areas. PSN Detroit relied upon a multi-agency team and followed a comprehensive strategy of targeted enforcement, intervention with at-risk individuals, and youth-focused prevention. The PSN initiative, like law enforcement operations nationally, was significantly affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. This added to the complexity of the evaluation and makes some of our research findings tentative. With this qualification in mind, we find support for the positive impact of PSN. Specifically, following the implementation of PSN in the 9th precinct until the shutdowns associated with the impact of the pandemic in March 2020, the 9th precinct witnessed a decline from 13.6 shooting victimizations per month to 11.9 per month (-12.5%). During this same period, Detroit’s other precincts witnessed a total increase from 63.8 to 72.6 (+13.7%), or an average per precinct increase from 6.3 to 7.3 per month. When examining the specific hotspot areas, we observed a decline of 2.6 shooting victimizations per month in the hotspot zone when compared to a comparison area drawn from parts of the city that did not experience PSN.

These trends were interrupted by the onset of the pandemic, as well as the period of social unrest and protest following the death of George Floyd in Minneapolis. The pandemic had a serious effect in Detroit with the Police Department experiencing significant personnel losses due to illness and quarantine, and the suspension of court operations. As was the case nationally, violent crime increased in Detroit and in the 9th precinct in 2020 and the first half of 2021. In the last quarter of 2021 and the first quarter of 2022, the 9th precinct again witnessed welcome declines in shooting victimizations. These declines were also observed citywide and were particularly noteworthy in the specific PSN target areas within the 9th precinct. The PSN team’s strategy of supporting a focused multi-agency enforcement team, while leveraging comprehensive intervention and place-based strategies appears to have enhanced public safety in Detroit.

Lansing: Michigan Justice Statistics Center, School of Criminal Justice. Michigan State University 2022. 30p.

By Foster & Associates

  In January 2022 York Regional Police (YRP or ‘the Service’) contracted Foster & Associates to ‘review and report on the provision of recommendations and best practices to enable York Regional Police to build and improve relationships with Black, Indigenous and other racialized communities’. The York Regional Police Board (YRPB or ‘Board’) identified recommendations made at its meeting on September 23, 2022 with the Black community and developed a list of 51 recommendations in total, 43 of which fell within the responsibilities of the Service. A preliminary document was tabled by the Chief with the Board on April 14, 2021 that identified activities already undertaken and in progress, signaling the intent to continue consulting with the Black community to advance positive change that builds trust and confidence in policing  

  Foster & Associates, 2023. 98p.  

by The U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans

The rapid growth of e-commerce has revolutionized the way goods are bought and sold, allowing for counterfeit and pirated goods to flood our borders and penetrate our communities and homes. Illicit goods trafficked to American consumers by e-commerce platforms and online third-party marketplaces threaten public health and safety, as well as national security. This illicit activity impacts American innovation and erodes the competitiveness of U.S. manufacturers and workers.

“Combating Trafficking in Counterfeit and Pirated Goods,” was prepared by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans. The report uses available data, substantial public input, and other information to develop a deeper understanding of how e-commerce platforms, online third-party marketplaces, and other third-party intermediaries facilitate the importation and sale of massive amounts of counterfeit and pirated goods. The report identifies appropriate administrative, statutory, regulatory, and other actions, including enhanced enforcement measures, modernization of legal and liability frameworks, and best practices for private sector stakeholders. These strong actions can be implemented swiftly to substantially reduce trafficking in counterfeit and pirated goods while promoting a safer America.

American consumers shopping on e-commerce platforms and online third-party marketplaces now face a significant risk of purchasing counterfeit or pirated goods. To build upon existing efforts to combat the flow of counterfeit goods, DHS – in consultation with the U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement – produced a series of proposals, which are found in “Stopping Counterfeit Trafficking on E-Commerce Platforms Through Fines and Civil Penalties,” to equip the U.S. Government with a strong framework of authorities to more easily conduct enforcement in the e-commerce environment and combat the flow of illicit goods entering the United States. These proposals range from improving information sharing and allowing summary forfeiture of IPR-infringing goods, to allowing the U.S. Government to seek injunctive relief and adapting fines to the e-commerce environment.

Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security , 2020. 84p.

By Steven Kemp, David Buil-Gil , Fernando Miró-Llinares and Nicholas Lord3

Although it is known that businesses report cybercrime to public authorities at a low rate, and this hinders prevention strategies, there is a lack of research on companies’ decisions to report cyber victimisation. This paper analyses the UK Cyber Security Breaches Survey to explore factors associated with cybercrime reporting by businesses. Results indicate that the type of cybercrime is relevant to the reporting decision, and that the likelihood of reporting increases when cybersecurity incidents generate negative impacts and when the company places high priority on cybersecurity. However, we find no association between having cybersecurity insurance and reporting. Finally, while having outsourced cybersecurity management is associated with reporting to anyone outside the organisation but not to public authorities, inhouse cybersecurity teams seem more inclined to report to public authorities. Findings are discussed in relation to the role of the private cybersecurity sector and the criminal justice system in combatting cybercrime.

Criminology and Criminal Justice, 2021.

By Kayla A. Wanamaker

Cybercrime – crimes where the Internet and information technology (IT) are used, such as hacking, virus dissemination, and organized crime – is a growing concern for governments, organizations, individuals and businesses worldwide. Research conducted in the United States, United Kingdom and Canada has concluded that cybercrime and cyber security incidents are underreported to law enforcement. The reasons why this is the case, however, are not well known, especially within a Canadian context. As such, the goal of the current study was to examine the phenomenon of underreporting of cyber security incidents to police services using data from the 2017 Canadian Survey of Cyber Security and Cybercrime that was administered to Canadian businesses. Results indicated that while just over 20% of businesses experienced cyber-related incidents, only about 10% are reporting these incidents to the police. Businesses did not report incidents because they were resolved internally or through an IT consultant, or were thought to be too minor to report to police. Risk management, formal training, and sharing best practices were found to be related to businesses’ likelihood of reporting incidents to police. Larger businesses were more likely to report cybercrime to police when they implemented less security measures, whereas scores on security measures were not related to police reporting for small businesses. Results suggest a need to increase awareness of the frequency of cybercrime, as well as the availability of formal training options on cyber-related issues. They also underscore the importance of having enhanced cyber security protocols in place.

Ottawa: Public Safety Canada, 2019. 16p.

By The White House

President Biden has made clear that all Americans deserve the full benefits and potential of our digital future. The Biden-Harris Administration’s recently released National Cybersecurity Strategy calls for two fundamental shifts in how the United States allocates roles, responsibilities, and resources in cyberspace:

1. Ensuring that the biggest, most capable, and best-positioned entities – in the public and private sectors – assume a greater share of the burden for mitigating cyber risk

2. Increasing incentives to favor long-term investments into cybersecurity

Today, the Administration is announcing a roadmap to realize this bold, affirmative vision. It is taking the novel step of publishing the National Cybersecurity Strategy Implementation Plan (NCSIP) to ensure transparency and a continued path for coordination. This plan details more than 65 high-impact Federal initiatives, from protecting American jobs by combatting cybercrimes to building a skilled cyber workforce equipped to excel in our increasingly digital economy. The NCSIP, along with the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law, CHIPS and Science Act, Inflation Reduction Act, and other major Administration initiatives, will protect our investments in rebuilding America’s infrastructure, developing our clean energy sector, and re-shoring America’s technology and manufacturing base.

Washington, DC: White House, 2023. 57p.