By Paula Miraglia, Rolando Ochoa, Ivan Briscoe

Transnational organised crime (TOC) refers to a fluid and diversified industry that engages in illicit activities ranging from drug and human trafficking to drug smuggling, piracy and money laundering. Although it may affect strong states, conflict-affected and fragile states are especially vulnerable to the dynamics of TOC and may provide more favourable conditions for its development. The implications for those states are many and serious. This paper outlines the ways in which TOC has evolved in recent years and how policy might be adapted to take account of this evolution. It emphasises that TOC today is less a matter of organised cartels established in producer or end-user states, but increasingly characterised by fluid, opportunistic networks that may for example specialise in transport and logistics. The paper recommends tackling the problem through a comprehensive approach that considers TOC as but one element within a greater complex of cause and effect. This would entail a re-evaluation of many current assumptions about TOC and a reformulation of current policies.

Paris: OECD, 2012. 37p.

By Angel Rabasa, Christopher M. Schnaubelt, Peter Chalk, Douglas Farah, Gregory Midgette, Howard J. Shatz

In July 2011, President Barack Obama promulgated the Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime. In the letter presenting the strategy, the president stated that the expanding size, scope, and influence of transnational organized crime and its impact on U.S. and international security and governance represent one of the most significant challenges of the 21st century. Through an analysis of transnational criminal networks originating in South America, this report develops a more refined understanding of the operational characteristics of these networks; the strategic alliances that they have established with state and other nonstate actors; and the multiple threats that they pose to U.S. interests and to the stability of the countries where they operate. It identifies U.S. government policies and programs to counter these networks; the roles of the Department of Defense, the geographic combatant commands, component commands, and task forces; and examines how U.S. Army assets and capabilities can contribute to U.S. government efforts to counter these networks. The report also recommends reconsidering the way in which nontraditional national security threats are classified; updating statutory authorities; providing adequate budgets for the counternetwork mission; and improving interagency coordination.

Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2017. 214p.

By International Crisis Group

What’s new? The theft and illicit sale of fuel, known in Mexico as huachicoleo, experienced an enormous spike after 2010. Rising fuel prices and other unintended effects of energy reforms and security policies have attracted organised crime into this domain, driving up murder rates.

Why does it matter? President Andrés Manuel López Obrador made fighting fuel theft a central item on his anti-crime agenda. But although he has had some success, enduring progress toward stopping huachicoleo could be elusive, largely due to pervasive official corruption and the failure to promote licit alternatives for earning a living.

What should be done? The government should tackle collusion between state officials and criminal outfits by introducing external oversight over state energy and security institutions. Conflict mitigation plans tailored to violent regions should offer legal alternatives to illicit livelihoods, protect civilians through focused police or military deployments, and support local security and justice institutions.

Mexico City; New York: Brussels: International Crisis Groupm, 2022. 22p.

Read/Download

By June S. Beittel

Mexican transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) significantly influence drug trafficking in the United States and pose the greatest drug trafficking threat, according to the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration’s (DEA’s) annual National Drug Threat Assessment. These organizations control the market and movement of a wide range of illicit drugs destined for the United States; for this reason, they are commonly referred to as drug cartels and drug trafficking organizations (DTOs). These poly-criminal organizations also participate in extortion, human smuggling, arms trafficking, and oil theft, among other crimes. Homicide rate increases in Mexico are widely attributed to heightened DTO-related violence, often tied to territorial control over drug routes and criminal influence. Congress has tracked how Mexican TCOs affect security on the U.S.-Mexico border, perpetrate violence, and contribute to the U.S. opioid crisis. A major concern is the organizations’ trafficking of cocaine, heroin, methamphetamine, marijuana, and synthetic opioids, such as fentanyl. Many analysts assess that Mexican TCOs’ role in the production and trafficking of synthetic opioids into the United States has significantly expanded since 2018. According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, more than 106,000 overdose deaths occurred in the United States in 2021, more than 70% of which involved opioids, including fentanyl.

Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2022. 43p.

Edited by R. Forte

The policy paper (ed. Forte, R., Sapucca, 2013) offers a description of the situation of organized crime in the Western Balkans in general and in individual countries - Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro - as well as a focus on the recent legislation on the recovery and management of criminal assets in Bulgaria, used as a term of confrontation with the consolidated approach applied in Italy to such issues. It offers as well a feasibility analysis on the extension of the model to the Western Balkans.

Sofia, Bulgaria: Center for the Study of Democracy, 2013. 88p.

By Center for the Study of Democracy

Extortion racketeering has been long pointed out as the defining activity of organised crime. Although in recent years this crime has not been among the top listed organised crime threats in the strategic EU policy documents, it still remains ever present in European countries. The seriousness of the phenomenon has been recognised at the EU level and the crime has been listed in a number of EU legal acts in the field of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters.

The report Extortion Racketeering in the EU: A six country study of vulnerability factors analyses extortion racketeering forms and practices in six EU member states. The analysis disentangles the risk and the vulnerability factors for enterprises in two business sectors – agriculture and hospitality – as well as in the Chinese communities. Drawing on the results of the analysis, the report suggests new policies for tackling extortion racketeering in the EU.

Sofia, Bulgaria: Center for the Study of Democracy, 2016. 351p.

By Ernesto U. Savona and Matteo Anastasio

This study requested by the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE), aims to provide information on Organised Property Crime in the EU, by offering a strategic discussion on the Union policies on this topic and highlighting key recommendations for future action. The study proposes a holistic approach to the problem, adding new elements to existing measures.

Brussels: European Union, 2020. 50p.

By United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)

The COVID-19 pandemic has swept across the world, killing hundreds of thousands of people, and testing public healthcare systems to a breaking point. Many areas of economic activity have either been shut down by governments to halt the spread of the virus or have seen demand collapse. In many countries where organized criminal groups are prevalent, struggling private businesses – many unable to access enough public funds to keep them afloat – are more likely to seek out loans on the illicit market than they would be at other times. Businesses in the transport, hospitality, arts, retail, and beauty sectors are particularly vulnerable to infiltration by organized criminal groups (OCGs). As these businesses begin to reopen, some will find themselves either in the debt of OCGs, or directly controlled by them. The OCGs can seize control either through exchange of money for buying shares or by directly taking over operations. This generates more opportunities for criminal activity, including money laundering and trafficking activities, enabling OCGs to further expand their control and power over the licit economy.

Vienna: UNODC, 2020. 37p.

Edited by Ernesto U. Savona and Michele Riccardi

Aim of Project OCP – Organised Crime Portfolio (www.ocportfolio.eu) – is to carry out an exploratory study of the economics of organised crime in Europe, and in particular to address three research questions, which are covered by the three sections of the final report:

Where organised crime proceeds are generated, from which illicit markets (Part 1);

Where these proceeds are then invested in the legitimate economy, in which regions, assets and business sectors (Part 2);

The extent to which these proceeds are confiscated by European authorities (Part 3).

The project focuses on seven EU member states (Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom), represented by OCP partners, and for which provides an in-depth analysis. However, the report also presents a broader examination of the situation in Europe as a whole.

Trento: Transcrime – Università degli Studi di Trento. 2015 341p.

Edited by Ernesto U. Savona and Giulia Berlusconi

This research is an exploratory study on the infiltration of organised crime groups (OCGs) in legal businesses. Infiltration occurs in every case in which a natural person belonging to a criminal organisation or acting on its behalf, or an already infiltrated legal person, invests financial and/or human resources to participate in the decision-making process of a legitimate business. The main output of the research is a list of risk factors of OCG infiltration in legal businesses, i.e. factors that facilitate or promote infiltration. Risk factors are derived from an unprecedented cross-national comparative analysis of the vulnerabilities of territories and business sectors, criminal groups’ modi operan

Trento: Transcrime – Università degli Studi di Trento. 2015. 135p.

By Marco Dugato, Marco De Simoni and Ernesto U. Savona

This working paper aims at developing and testing a methodology for measuring Organized Crime (hereinafter OC) in a list of selected countries of the Latin American region. This study represents one of the first systematic attempts to obtain reliable and comparable measurement of OC presence and threats in the region. The outcomes will provide a more comprehensive view on how to measure and to analyze OC today in Latin America, taking into account the regional specificities of this phenomenon. Moreover, creating a valid measurement of OC has relevant policy implications, since valid indicators may improve the effectiveness of government and enforcement actions.

Milan: TRANSCRIME, 2014. 53p.

By National Research Council.

Tobacco use has declined because of measures such as high taxes on tobacco products and bans on advertising, but worldwide there are still more than one billion people who regularly use tobacco, including many who purchase products illicitly. By contrast to many other commodities, taxes comprise a substantial portion of the retail price of cigarettes in the United States and most other nations. Large tax differentials between jurisdictions increase incentives for participation in existing illicit tobacco markets. In the United States, the illicit tobacco market consists mostly of bootlegging from low-tax states to high-tax states and is less affected by large-scale smuggling or illegal production as in other countries. In the future, nonprice regulation of cigarettes - such as product design, formulation, and packaging - could in principle, contribute to the development of new types of illicit tobacco markets.

Understanding the U.S. Illicit Tobacco Market reviews the nature of illicit tobacco markets, evidence for policy effects, and variations among different countries with a focus on implications for the United States. This report estimates the portion of the total U.S. tobacco market represented by illicit sales has grown in recent years and is now between 8.5 percent and 21 percent. This represents between 1.24 to 2.91 billion packs of cigarettes annually and between $2.95 billion and $6.92 billion in lost gross state and local tax revenues.

Understanding the U.S. Illicit Tobacco Market describes the complex system associated with illicit tobacco use by exploring some of the key features of that market - the cigarette supply chain, illicit procurement schemes, the major actors in the illicit trade, and the characteristics of users of illicit tobacco. This report draws on domestic and international experiences with the illicit tobacco trade to identify a range of possible policy and enforcement interventions by the U.S. federal government and/or states and localities.

Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. 2015. 240p.

By Hernando Zuleta González

The increase in the area cultivated with coca in Colombia has cast doubt on the country’s anti-drug strategy and has encouraged skepticism about the possibility of a complete and definitive peace. Furthermore, this perception of failure has given rise to policy proposals based on the idea that illicit crops are a criminal issue, not a development one. This paper is a complete review of the available evidence and aims at organizing the information related to this debate and shedding light on the convenience or inconvenience of certain policies. There are six highly relevant facts: (i) With respect to reducing cocaine supply, the efforts in seizures and destruction of infrastructure are more efficient than the efforts in eradication. (ii) Seizures and destruction of infrastructure may help in reducing coca plantations. (iii) There is no evidence to support the hypothesis that the consumption of cocaine in Colombia has increased. (iv) Most regions of the country have seen a decrease in the amount of coca crops. However, at least one armed group is present in the regions where the cultivated area has increased. (v) Coca growing municipalities are, on average, poorer than the rest of the country. These municipalities have a low tax revenue, and reduced levels of connectivity and institutional development. (vi) The increase in the consumption of cocaine in the United States is concentrated in a specific age group and in certain states. This fact makes it difficult to relate the increase in consumption to an exogenous increase in the supply.

Bogotá, Colombia: Universidad de los Andes–Facultad de Economía–CEDE, 2019. 40p.

By Philip Keefer, Norman V. Loayza, and Rodrigo R. Soares

This paper reviews the unintended consequences of the war on drugs, particularly for developing countries, and weighs them against the evidence regarding the efficacy of prohibition to curb drug use and trade. It reviews the available evidence and presents new results that indicate that prohibition has limited effects on drug prevalence and prices, most likely indicating a combination of inelastic drug demand (due to its addictive properties) and elastic supply responses (due to black markets). This should turn the focus to the unintended consequences of drug prohibition. First, the large demand for drugs, particularly in developed countries, generates the possibility of massive profits to potential drug providers. This leads to the formation of organized crime groups, which use violence and corruption as their means of survival and expansion and which, in severe cases, challenge the state and seriously compromise public stability and safety. Second, prohibition and its derived illegal market impose greater costs on farmers than on drug traffickers. In many instances, this entails the transfer of wealth from poor peasants to rich (and ruthless) traders. Third, criminalization can exacerbate the net health effects of drug use. These consequences are so pernicious that they call for a fundamental review of drug policy around the world.

Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2008. 36p.

By Peter Reuter

The production of cocaine and heroin, the two most important drugs economically, has been concentrated in a small number of poor nations for 25 years. A slightly larger number of developing nations have been affected by large-scale trafficking in these two drugs. This paper reviews what is known about drug control programs and considers non-traditional options. The usual array of programs for suppressing drug problems, enforcement, treatment, harm reduction and prevention have been assessed almost exclusively in wealthy nations. Although treatment has been shown to be cost-effective, it is of minimal relevance for reducing the drug problems of nations such as Afghanistan, Colombia, Mexico or Tajikistan, which are primarily harmed by production and trafficking rather than consumption. Efforts to reduce drug production and trafficking have not been subject to systematic evaluation but the best interpretation of the available evidence is that they have had minimal effect on the quantities produced or trafficked. It is reasonable to conclude that international drug control efforts can do more to affect where these drugs are produced rather than the quantity. If that is the case, and given that spreading a specific level of production or trafficking to more rather than fewer nations probably decreases global welfare, it may be appropriate to consider a less aggressive stance to current producers and to make strategic decisions about the location of an industry producing a global bad.

Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2008. 38p.

By Daniel Mejia and Carlos Esteban Posada

The main purpose of this paper is to summarize the information currently available on cocaine production and trafficking. The paper starts by describing the available data on cocaine production and trade, the collection methodologies (if available) used by different sources, the main biases in the data, and the accuracy of different data sources. Next, it states some of the key empirical questions and hypotheses regarding cocaine production and trade and takes a first look at how well the data match these hypotheses. The paper states some of the main puzzles in the cocaine market and studies some of the possible explanations. These puzzles and empirical questions should guide future research on the key determinants of illicit drug production and trafficking. Finally, the paper studies the different policies that producer countries have adopted to fight against cocaine production and the role consumer countries play in the implementation of anti-drug policies.

Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2008. 62p.

By Daniel Mejía and Pascual Restrepo

This paper provides a thorough economic evaluation of the anti-drug policies implemented in Colombia between 2000 and 2006 under the so-called Plan Colombia. The paper develops a game theory model of the war against illegal drugs in producer countries. We explicitly model illegal drug markets, which allows us to account for the feedback effects between policies and market outcomes that are potentially important when evaluating large scale policy interventions such as Plan Colombia. We use available data for the war on cocaine production and trafficking as well as outcomes from the cocaine markets to calibrate the parameters of the model. Using the results from the calibration we estimate important measures of the costs, effectiveness, and efficiency of the war on drugs in Colombia. Finally we carry out simulations in order to assess the impact of increases in the U.S. budget allocated to Plan Colombia, and find that a three-fold increase in the U.S. budget allocated to the war on drugs in Colombia would decrease the amount of cocaine that successfully reaches consumer countries by about 17%.

Bogotá, Colombia: Universidad de los Andes–Facultad de Economía–CEDE, 2008. 60p.

By Juan Camilo Castillo

Experience from the last decade in Colombia and Mexico suggests that violence increases when governments achieve their objective of beheading and fragmenting drug trafficking organizations (DTOs). In this paper I provide a theoretical framework to understand this behavior. Drawing elements from industrial organization, I model DTOs as firms that collude by not attacking each other in order to increase their profits. DTOs always collude when they interact repeatedly; thus, previous analyses focusing on a static Nash equilibrium miss an important part of the dynamics between DTOs. I show that a peaceful equilibrium arises if there are only a few DTOs that care enough about the future. Policies resulting either in a larger number of DTOs or in more impatient leaders increase violence between DTOs without reducing supply. On the other hand, policies that reduce the productivity of DTOs, without directly attacking their leaders and fragmenting them, are more desirable since they can curb supply, although this comes at the cost of increased violence if the elasticity of demand is below a certain threshold. I calculate this threshold, which is a refinement of the value suggested by Becker et al. (2006) for consumer markets.

Bogotá, Colombia: Universidad de los Andes–Facultad de Economía–CEDE2013. 52p.

By Marcel Boyer and Rachidi Kotchoni

Connor and Lande (2006) conducted a survey of cartel overcharge estimates and found an average in the range of 31% to 49%. By examining more sources, Connor (2010b) finds a median of 23.3% for all type of cartels and a mean of 50.4% for successful cartels. However, the data used in these studies are estimates rather than true observations, since the true illegal profits of cartels are rarely observable. Therefore, these data are subject to model error, estimation error and publication bias. A quick glance at the Connor database reveals that the universe of overcharge estimates is asymmetric, heterogenous and contains a number of influential observations. Beside the fact that overcharge estimates are potentially biased, fitting a linear OLS model to the data without providing a careful treatment of the problems raised by the publication bias, outliers, asymmetry, and heterogeneity will necessarily produce distorted results. We conduct a meta-analysis of cartel overcharge estimates in the spirit of Connor and Bolotova (2006), but providing a sound treatment of the matters raised above. We find for cartels with initial overcharge estimates lying between 0% and 50%.a bias-corrected mean overcharge estimate of 13.6% with a median of 13.6% and for all cartels of all types a bias-corrected mean of 17.5% with a median of 14.1%

Paris: Institut de Polytechnic Paris, Département d'Économie de l'École Polytechnique, 2011. 60p.

By Marie-Laure Allain, Marcel Boyer, Rachidi Kotchoni and Jean-Pierre Ponssard

The determination of optimal fines to deter the formation or continuation of cartels is a major objective of competition policy. We provide an analysis of static and dynamic frameworks to characterize the restitution and deterrence properties of fines: cartel stability depends on their ability to prevent deviation by firms, while the benefit of a deviation depends on the fines to be imposed in case of detection by the antitrust authority. We show that the proper consideration of the dynamics of competition has a major impact on the determination of optimal dissuasive fines: our results suggest that a clear majority of fines imposed by the European Commission in recent years meet the deterrence objective.

Paris: Ecole Polytechnique Centre National De La Recherche Scientifique, 2011. 38p.