By Anine Kriegler

Cannabis legalization has the potential to weaken organized crime, but it can just as easily strengthen it unless a balance is found between restriction and liberalization, coordinated across both the supply and demand sides of the market. South Africa’s current cannabis policy lacks coherence, with reforms driven more by legal challenges than by strategic policymaking, posing challenges in effectively countering organized crime.

This paper summarizes the history and status of cannabis decriminalization in South Africa and draws on a review of literature to identify a key set of variables that determine the impact of legalization on organized crime: the type and degree of restrictiveness of the new regulations; various cultural, socio-economic, and political factors; features of the criminal justice system; and the structure and nature of criminal organization in the illegal cannabis market.

Reflections are provided on what these suggest about the likely impact of South African cannabis legalization on organized crime, and potential lessons and recommendations are proposed for effective policy reform in South Africa, as well as guidance for similar decision-making in other contexts.

Effective reform requires integrating marginalized communities and black-market participants into the legal market, along with considerations for managing legal supply, strategic enforcement against criminal gangs, and public health education to ensure a comprehensive approach to reducing organized crime. A phased implementation of regulatory frameworks, ongoing monitoring, and investment in data collection are essential to assess and optimize the impact of legalization on organized crime. Geneva: SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime , 2024. 29p.

By Pascal Tanguay

Elections in 2023 have brought a new government to power, headed by Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin, who declared in late September that his government intends to achieve in the next six months a partial reversal of the reforms, recriminalizing recreational use and leaving the medical market as the sole legal arena.

Through a methodical data collection process involving key informant interviews and literature reviews, this report sheds light on the substantial impacts of such policy changes, especially on the illicit markets and organized crime networks. Informed by these insights, the GI-TOC has formulated preliminary policy recommendations to secure a resilient Thai cannabis market that is as balanced as it is sustainable.

Geneva, SWIT: The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC),  2024. 34p.

By Andres Martinez-Fernandez

Key Points

• Corruption is an urgent challenge in Mexico that undermines political stability, economic development, the rule of law, efforts to combat organized crime, and the effectiveness of public services.

• Corruption in Mexico’s security forces is a key contributor to the sharp rise of organized criminal violence and severely handicaps US-Mexico security cooperation against drug cartels.

• President Andrés Manuel López Obrador’s emphasis on combating money laundering and his empowerment of Mexico’s Financial Intelligence Unit are positive developments for the government’s anti-corruption efforts. However, an increasingly hostile stance to US-Mexico security cooperation, the politicization of investigations, neglect of independent institutions, and inattention to cartel corruption are all concerning.

• The US should use a combination of diplomatic engagement, expanded cooperation against money laundering, and unilateral enforcement actions to restore trust and the effectiveness of bilateral security and anti-corruption cooperation while pushing Mexico to address its anti-corruption blind spots.

Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 2021. 32p.

By Andres Martinez-Fernandez

Key Points

• National Liberation Army (ELN) guerrillas remain a potent challenge for regional security and development. The ELN is growing in Colombia and Venezuela, thanks to its involvement in illegal mining, now the most important revenue source for the guerrilla group.

• The ELN’s illegal mining remains virtually unrestricted in Venezuela, thanks to the Nicolás Maduro regime’s complicity. At the same time, despite the Colombian government’s recent efforts, illegal mining continues to take place throughout Colombia, benefiting armed groups like the ELN.

• To cut off the ELN from this vital revenue source, the United States and Colombia must work to expand the presence of the state in areas affected by illegal mining, formalize artisanal miners, strengthen the state’s enforcement and investigatory capacities, and isolate Venezuela from global gold markets.

Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 2019. 12p.

By Katharina Kru¨sselmannI, Pauline Aarten, Marieke Liem

Background

Higher availability of firearms has been connected to higher rates of interpersonal violence in previous studies. Yet, those studies have focused mainly on the United States, or used aggregated international data to study firearm violence. Whether those aggregated findings are applicable to understanding the phenomenon in continental Europe specifically remains unclear. The aim of this systematic review is to bring together all studies that exclusively use European data.

Methods

Nine databases were searched, resulting in more than 1900 individual studies. These studies were assessed on relevance and eligibility for this study, based on their title, abstract and full text. Information on study characteristics, operationalizations of main concepts and study results were extracted from the six eligible studies.

Results

Four studies assessed the impact of firearm restrictive regulations on the rate of firearm homicides. Two other studies correlated rates of firearm availability and -violence. Results vary: some studies show a clear decline once availability of firearms is restricted, while others indicate a limited effect on only a very specific subgroup, such as female victims, or national guards with weapons at home. Moreover, studies used various operationalizations for firearm availability, thereby decreasing the comparability of findings.

Conclusion

Empirical research exclusively using European data is still lacking. To increase comparability of future studies, methodological inconsistencies and regional gaps need to be overcome. Assessing how firearm availability can be measured with reliable and valid proxies across countries will be a crucial first step to improve future research on the link between firearms and firearm violence.

PLoS One. 2021 Apr 14;16(4):e0248955. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0248955. PMID: 33852590; PMCID: PMC8046231.

By Astrid De Schutter and Nils Duquet

This report discusses the connection between drug trafficking and firearms trafficking, focusing on systemic drug-related gun violence. It also examines the societal impact of this violence within the EU. For those interested in understanding the complex nexus between firearms trafficking, drug trafficking, and the resulting violence, this report provides valuable insights and analysis.

The analysis responds to a need for further research into the issue, at a time of rising drug-related violence in Europe. On average, over a quarter (28%) of the firearms seizures in Europe are estimated to have occurred in the context of drug trafficking, with this figure close to a half (44%) in some EU Member States (UNODC). The UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs has emphasised the need to address the links between the illicit trafficking in drugs and firearms. In Resolution 65/2, it encouraged states to take appropriate measures to prevent and combat these links, by enhancing border control management, information exchange and international operational cooperation.

The report identifies the Balkan route as a key transit route for firearms and drugs into the EU. Weapons and drugs are often smuggled along this route as part of multi-commodity transfers, or hidden in vehicles. The Western Balkans are an important source region of firearms trafficking into the EU. The arms moved from this region are often 'conflict legacy weapons' (e.g. from conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and the Albanian civil war). Firearms are often smuggled together with drugs by the same criminal networks or, at least, along well-established drug-trafficking routes.

The analysis shows how firearm traffickers have significantly exploited legal loopholes over the past 20 years to legally acquire weapons unable to fire live ammunition (e,g. alarm weapons, deactivated acoustic expansion weapons, small-calibre firearms) and convert them into live-firing weapons. The ease with which these weapons can be legally purchased and converted has strongly impacted the criminal availability of firearms in several EU countries. In various Member States, a higher availability of trafficked firearms on the illicit market has triggered drug-related gun violence.

In 2019, the EMCDDA and Europol noted that the criminal use of firearms by organised crime groups (OCGs) involved in European drug markets appeared to be increasing. Europol found that the use of drug-related violence has escalated in recent years, particularly linked to the cannabis and cocaine trade (SOCTA, 2021).

The report takes an in-depth look at the use of gun violence at the wholesale level of the drug distribution chain and the local consumer market. Violence appears generally less evident at the production and wholesale level than the consumer level of the drug market. Most of the drug-related gun violence at wholesale level in Europe is connected to cocaine. The recent shift from a few large networks dominating the cocaine market to a larger number of smaller competing networks may explain the upsurge in violence.

The local consumer market accounts for most of the visible drug-related gun violence. Many actors involved in this violence are young adults using guns as a means to advance their criminal career. Open drug markets — where buyers can purchase products without prior introduction to the seller — are more prone to violence than closed markets, which are built on relationships of trust between buyer and seller.

Finally, the report looks at the broader impact of firearms trafficking and associated violence in the drug trade on society as a whole. Residents or individuals working in the community may be threatened or extorted. Drug criminals may target innocent victims through cases of mistaken identity. And there may be spill-over effects, when violence moves beyond the criminal milieu (e.g. to Ministers, journalists).

The report underlines the need for sound intelligence on these security phenomena, including better ballistics data, law enforcement information and intelligence on firearms trafficking and criminal shootings. Such data and information are crucial to adequately inform evidence-based initiatives, support targeted law enforcement actions and evaluate policies. The study contributes towards a better understanding of drug-related gun violence in the EU and supports appropriate policy responses to prevent this type of violence.

Lisbon: European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction. 2023. 57p.

By Zenobia Ismail and Robin Richards

State capture occurs when a small number of elites in the public and private sectors collude to modify rules, policies and legislation for their own benefit at the expense of the public interest. The term emerged in the 1990s to describe relations between the state and the private sector in Eastern European states that were transitioning away from communism. In South Africa, state capture became a prominent topic in the media in 2016 following widespread allegations that several state-owned enterprises and other agencies, including South African Airways, Electricity Supply Commission of South Africa (ESKOM), South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC), Denel (arms manufacturer), South African Revenue Service (SARS) and the State Security Agency, were “captured” by individuals with close ties to the then president of South Africa, Jacob Zuma.

The literature on state capture tends to focus on the close relations and exchange of favours among key actors in the public and private sectors. It does not provide detailed accounts of how institutions are captured or the consequences of this for the functioning of the institution. In order to deepen the evidence on state capture, this study provides a detailed account of the impact of state capture on the capacity of one state agency, SARS. The research examines the capacity of SARS to detect, investigate and prevent tax and financial crime and how this changed as a result of state capture.

There were three key components of the so-called capture of SARS:

• Infiltration of the organisation by new employees aligned to politicians associated with state capture. This included Tom Moyane, appointed by Zuma as the new Commissioner of SARS in 2014;

• Allegations in the media which cast doubt on the integrity of the institution and its leaders. These included aspersions regarding an alleged ‘rogue unit’ in SARS which exceeded its legislative authority to investigate tax and financial crimes. These accusations undermined the integrity of some senior managers at SARS and enabled them to be suspended pending investigation;

• Organisational change and staff purges that further weakened the institution. Moyane, with the help of the local office of the consulting firm Bain International, introduced a sweeping restructuring of SARS. During the restructuring process, key units that were responsible for detecting and investigating financial crimes pertaining to the illicit economy were disbanded. There were staff purges and an organisational climate of intimidation, which contributed to widespread resignations. Consequently, SARS lost much of its human capacity to detect and investigate tax and financial crimes. Likewise, information technology systems that were used to detect or investigate tax or financial crimes were dismantled or altered under the guise of improvement.

This study contributes to the literature on state capture by providing evidence of the detrimental impact of state capture on institutions and the public interest. It suggests that the lack of similar detailed case studies may lead to an underestimation of the negative impact of state capture for institutions in the public sphere. The study illuminates the unintended consequences of state capture on institutions. The integrity of SARS as the receiver of revenue has been tarnished; this is expected to lead to taxpayer apathy and a decline in direct and indirect tax revenue. This prediction does not bode well for national development which is a critical function of the South African state. The study suggests that state capture will undermine economic development in South Africa.

SOC ACE Research Paper No. 12. Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham, 2023. 42p.

By Tena Prelec

In recent years, concerns have grown regarding information manipulation, particularly in relation to the disinformation tactics employed by authoritarian regimes. Our research delves into the intriguing, lesser-explored realm of organised crime (OC) groups' involvement in shaping information landscapes. Drawing from Nicholas Barnes' 'political criminality' concept, we investigate how OC crime groups manipulate information in Eastern Europe, including Ukraine, Russia, Moldova (Transnistria), and Albania.

We explore the impact of evolving technology on OC groups' narrative-shaping abilities, their media ownership, and their role in the global political economy of offshore finance. This research offers a deeper understanding of the threats associated with information manipulation by non-state actors. It also presents an analytical framework for future studies. Dive into the full report to uncover the hidden facets of this intriguing topic in today's world.

SOC ACE Research Paper 22. Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham, 2023. 44p.

By Liam O’Shea, Gonzalo Saiz & Alexia Anna Hack (RUSI); and Olivia Allison (Independent).

The research highlights the correlation between a third country’s support for or opposition to sanctions and the extent of its geopolitical alignment with senders or targets. It finds that SEA is more likely when a third country is economically reliant on the target country, has interests in engaging in SEA and has the trade and commercial capacities to do so – particularly in professional advisory, financial services, shipping and logistics sectors. In these cases, there is likely to be a significant role for a range of private commercial actors within these sectors with economic interests in engaging in SEA. This suggests that policymakers combatting SEA should prioritise economies reliant on these sectors and promote improved sector regulation and enforcement measures.

More broadly, the research suggests that focusing on the role of third countries in SEA by industry sector, rather than just by country, may help to identify more tailored countermeasures. This approach, and the specific nuances and features of particular types of SEA, enables more focused follow-on analysis and potentially more targeted policy responses.

The report examines thirteen third countries (Armenia, Cyprus, Czechia, Georgia, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Malta, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, South Africa, Spain, Türkiye and the UAE), involved in SEA relating to sanctions imposed on Russia since the Ukraine invasion. It draws from literature, data analysis of media reports, blogs, forums and other open-source information as well as trade and shipping data, spanning from February 2022 to February 2023.

Sanctions are an important tool for exerting influence internationally yet understanding of the impact of sanctions evasion or avoidance (SEA) and third-country involvement remains limited. In this study, third countries are defined as distinct from ‘senders’ and ‘targets’ of sanctions regimes and aims to shed light on their role in SEA.

SOC ACE Research Paper No 21. Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham, 2023. 35p.

By: Dr Erica Marat (NDU) and Dr Alexander Kupatadze (KCL).

This paper examines the practices used to evade sanctions imposed on Russia after its invasion of Ukraine in 2022, focusing on the import–export operations of Russia, Belarus, Georgia, and Kazakhstan. The research finds that sanctions have not cut supplies to Russia but have instead empowered informal trade networks and intermediaries. Georgia and Kazakhstan have indirectly benefited from the increased transiting trade; however, the impact on the shadow economy and traditional organised crime has been minimal because sanctions-busting is not illegal in these countries. In the aftermath of Russia’s invasion in Ukraine, a conspicuous surge in trade anomalies and import- and export-related red flags has been observed. In many instances, these irregularities can be definitively attributed to strategies employed to circumvent sanctions. The Western focus has been on restricting the re-exports of sanctioned goods to undermine Russia’s military apparatus. However, third-party states, such as Georgia and Kazakhstan, play a significant role in enabling Russia to sustain its international trade activities, yielding substantial financial gains for the country’s military expenditure.

Our research underscores the complexity and challenges of enforcing international sanctions and preventing sanctions evasion. It shows that the sanctions have not been as effective as hoped in cutting off Russia from the global economy, and that Russia has been able to find ways to circumvent them. The paper highlights the need for more concerted efforts and cooperation among Western states, private companies based in the West, and third-party states, to mitigate and prevent sanctions-busting activities.

Future research could expand to include more countries and examine the broader implications of sanctions. It could also examine the extent to which organized crime, such as cybercrime and trade-based money laundering, are linked to sanctions evasion. This research would build on the recommendations of this paper by developing more specific strategies for detecting and preventing sanctions evasion, including the use of new technologies and data analysis techniques.

Research Paper No. 18 University of Birmingham. 2023. 47p.

By David Lewis and Tena Prelec

This paper provides an analytical overview of how Russian actors and proxies are using illicit financial flows (IFF) to support Russian foreign policy goals. It shows how Russia has used illicit finance to fund political interference campaigns, promote disinformation, and support military operations outside Russia, including the international activities of the Wagner network.

IFF includes a wide range of illicit and illegal cross-border financial activities, including high-level corruption, money-laundering, and sanctions evasion. Illicit finance played a significant role in Russian foreign policy pre-2022 invasion of Ukraine. Subsequent international sanctions against Russia have further amplified Moscow's reliance on illicit business and financial practices.

Russia has become increasingly reliant on IFF in three important areas:

• First, IFF facilitates sanctions evasion and is central to Russia’s efforts to source weapons and dual-use technology.

• Second, IFF is used to fund political interference and information operations globally, with an increasing trend towards activities in the Global South.

• Third, IFF supports Russia's involvement in armed conflicts, through the funding of paramilitary forces such as Wagner and commercial deals that accompany Russian military activities in the Middle East and in Africa.

Unless effectively countered, Russia's growing use of illicit financial and economic tools will give it an advantage in its war against Ukraine. The Wagner network demonstrates how illicit financial networks can support military proxies in ways that pose a serious threat to international security.

An effective response to illicit finance requires a holistic approach, combining effective sanctions with systematic efforts to tackle money-laundering and illicit finance in key financial and logistical hubs, including in the UK and other Western countries.

SOC ACE Research Paper No 17. University of Birmingham. 2022. 43p.

By Maria Nizzero

The imposition of sanctions against the ‘oligarchs’ following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has triggered a policy conversation about the potential to move ‘from freeze to seize’: achieving permanent confiscation of assets that are currently temporarily frozen under sanctions. Acting against the oligarchs’ assets represents a way for the UK government to both reaffirm its intention to support Ukraine, and to show that the UK is no longer a haven for the proceeds of patronage, bribery or corruption. However, the UK’s asset recovery mechanisms have previously fallen short when dealing with the challenges related to seizing such proceeds, such as the difficult nature of investigating alleged historical criminality and corruption at the root of the wealth, the vast resources available to those who to manage to hide their assets and, if needed, to prove their licit origin, and the provenance of wealth in uncooperative jurisdictions. In addition, while the intention to move ‘from freeze to seize’ is high on the government’s agenda and has been reflected in several parliamentary debates and the Economic Crime Bill presented in September 2022, there are concerns that such political interest and pressure to act quickly should, however, come with proposals that do not undermine the UK’s status as a rule-of-law jurisdiction and a supporter of fundamental human rights. This paper explores alternative asset recovery mechanisms that could help respond to the immediate policy goal surrounding Russian-linked sanctioned assets and contribute to strengthening the broader asset recovery framework in the UK for the longer term. It sets out the current challenges related to confiscation of proceeds of grand corruption and explores the limitations of UK civil recovery mechanisms when seeking to tackle such proceeds. Given these challenges, the research looks at examples of three alternative mechanisms across four jurisdictions – Australia, Switzerland, Ireland and Italy – weighing their potential and limitations in relation to issues such as a lower standard of proof or reversed burden of proof, as well as reframing around ‘societal danger’, and their legal applicability in UK legislation. With these factors and the broader findings of the research in mind, this paper concludes with a set of recommendations for UK policymakers, which apply equally to the global debate, when thinking about reforming the country’s asset recovery mechanisms. While it does not intend to categorically push for one model to be adopted over others, as developing legislative mechanisms to facilitate the permanent confiscation of kleptocratic proceeds is a challenge that goes well beyond the UK,1 the paper suggests considering amendments to the current asset recovery mechanisms that take account of the social damage and national security interests affected by criminals, and kleptocrats in particular. This is a key gap in UK legislation, and these concepts need to both be included in asset recovery legislation and have full buy-in from the government and law enforcement. Alongside this, some adjustments to existing legislation to include certain elements, such as a full reverse burden of proof and, most importantly, appropriate resourcing of law enforcement, will improve the odds of recovering proceeds of crime in the UK.

SOC ACE Research Paper No. 16. Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham.2023. 35p.

By Cathy Haenlein, Sasha Erskine, Elijah Glantz and Tom Keatinge

Sanctions are increasingly being used to tackle a range of specific issues. These include sanctions that respond to human rights abuses, combat corruption and address malicious cyber activity. As sanctions use has broadened, the question of their application to organised criminal activity is increasingly raised; yet the use of sanctions for this reason has remained limited to a specific set of issuers, notably the US, and more recently, the UN. In the UK, the government has advanced its vision of an ambitious post-Brexit independent sanctions regime, with the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 allowing sanctions use ‘in the interests of national security’ (HMG, 2018). New regimes addressing human rights and corruption have emerged. With serious and organised crime deemed a national security threat by the UK government, there is a case to add a sanctions regime to address this particular threat (HMG, 2018). The National Crime Agency itself has called for a legislative amendment to reference serious and organised crime as grounds for sanctions use (HMG, 2021). However, little research or evaluation has been undertaken to assess the impact of sanctions on organised crime. With US sanctions used over almost three decades to disrupt cross-border trafficking, the lack of a body of rigorous relevant research is a key shortcoming. Similarly, few past initiatives have sought to assess the lessons these experiences hold for future sanctions issuers in this space. With interest mounting in the potential use of organised crime-related sanctions, this represents a critical limitation. In seeking to address the gap, this paper reviews existing evidence on the use and impact of sanctions to disrupt organised criminal activity. It focuses on two case studies, Colombia and Libya, in differing regions of the world and with different exposure to organised crime-focused sanctions. While Colombia tops the list of states globally for organised crime-focused sanctions on individuals and entities in its territory (with the third-highest number of relevant listings since 2016), Libya’s exposure is more recent and limited. Libya nonetheless has experience of listings under UN and US country regimes relating to fuel smuggling, people smuggling and human trafficking. Here, it differs markedly from Colombia, which is the epitome of the historic US approach to narcotics-related sanctions. This paper analyses organised crime-related sanctions data, examines the current state of knowledge relating to the implementation and impact of these sanctions, and draws on the tw wo case studies. It identifies a number of factors that influence the effectiveness of organised crime-focused sanctions, including:

• The extent to which the host government of the sanction’s target is willing to cooperate with the sanction’s issuer.

• The extent to which the issuance of sanctions is embedded within a coherent broader strategic approach.

• The overarching focus of the regime within which relevant designations are made.

• The need for clear objectives when applying sanctions.

• Resourcing and engagement of key agencies in both the country of issuance and the target’s host country.

• Divergent levels of vulnerability of key actors across the related illicit trade chain. With these factors and the broader findings of the research in mind, this paper concludes with a set of ten considerations for those countries that may, in the future, consider introducing organized crime-focused sanctions.

SOC ACE Research Paper No. 1. Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham. . 2022. 51p.

Edited by: Melissa Demian

The introduction of village courts in Papua New Guinea in 1975 was an ambitious experiment in providing semi-formal legal access to the country’s overwhelmingly rural population. Nearly 50 years later, the enthusiastic adoption of these courts has had a number of ramifications, some of them unanticipated. Arguably, the village courts have developed and are working exactly as they were supposed to do, adapted by local communities to modes and styles consistent with their own dispute management sensibilities. But with little in the way of state oversight or support, most village courts have become, of necessity, nearly autonomous.

Village courts have also become the blueprint for other modes of dispute management. They overlap with other sources of authority, so the line between what does and does not constitute a ‘court’ is now indistinct in many parts of the country. Rather than casting this issue as a problem for legal development, the contributors to Grassroots Law in Papua New Guinea ask how, under conditions of state withdrawal, people seek to retain an understanding of law that holds out some promise of either keeping the attention of the state or reproducing the state’s authority.

Canberra: ANU Press, 2023. 210p.

By Michael McLaggan

Prominent throughout the world, illicit financial flows (IFFs) not only undermine the ability of states to collect revenue, but they also pose challenges to governance and the rule of law and provide avenues for the funding of further illicit activity. Although a global occurrence, IFFs may manifest differently at the regional level, making a uniform approach difficult. This calls for a model that is more inclusive of different types of flows than traditional understandings of IFFs, which tend to focus on financial flows within the formal system. In regions such as East and southern Africa, where informality is much higher than in the developed nations of the ‘global north’, the greater focus on formal systems does not find the same degree of applicability. This is not to downplay the necessity of observing and countering formal financial flows of an illicit nature but rather to emphasise the need to pay greater attention to informal and trade flows, which are prolific in less developed regions. This paper draws on extensive research by the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC) – in particular, the Observatory of Illicit Economies in East and Southern Africa – in addition to research by other international organisations, to analyse whether the ‘IFFs pyramid’ proposed by the GI-TOC (Reitano, 2022) is applicable to and useful for researchers seeking to understanding illicit financial flows in various settings around the world but especially in regions where greater levels of informality exists, such as East and southern Africa. The paper finds that the pervasive informality of markets in the East and southern African region, and their abuse by criminal actors, means that greater attention to IFFs is necessary in this sphere. Common also is the use of illicitly acquired, or otherwise illicitly traded commodities, in barter (that is, goods for goods) markets. Identified as particularly relevant is the pernicious influence of state-embedded actors, who often play substantial roles in the facilitation of IFFs and act as obstacles to policies to address them. Furthermore, vested interests of criminal actors in keeping certain industries and markets informal serve as barriers to formalisation and highlight the greater need to pay attention to informal financial flows especially. The due consideration to trade and informal flows is what makes the IFFs pyramid a useful model for understanding these flows in both global and regional settings. At the very least, the pyramid model highlights the need for holistic approaches and policy reform when considering IFFs in less developed regions.  

Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham. 2024, 33pg

By Prem Mahadevan, Maria Khoruk, Alla Mohammad Mohmandzai and Ruggero Scaturro

How will the new Taliban regime change Afghanistan’s illicit drug landscape in the coming years? Are the Taliban genuinely committed to combating the flow of narcotics within and outside Afghanistan, as signalled by the ban on opium cultivation issued by the Taliban leadership in April 2022?

Based on field research coordinated by the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC) in the Afghan provinces of Helmand and Nangarhar, this paper analyses the changes to the Afghan drug economy since the Taliban’s return to power on 15 August 2021, documenting the adaptation of local actors engaged in the opium economy to the events that had a profound impact on their lives. Historical analysis supplements the field research findings and aids our understanding of the shifting conditions of the illicit drug economy in Afghanistan. Given the institutional weakness of Afghan statehood after nearly five decades of civil war, the GI-TOC’s approach represents a collation of provincial and district-level assessments rather than a comprehensive country-wide assessment.

This research paper outlines the complexities of local conditions and reveals a regime fragmented among varied interests and power structures, seeking to reconcile the profitability of the drugs trade with the strive for legitimacy.

University of Birmingham, Research Paper No. 27. 2023, 31pg

By Atanas Rusev, et al.

Organized property crime is considered to be a significant criminal market affecting virtually all members states of the European Union. Organized property crime is reportedly being committed by highly mobile organized crime groups (MOCG). These groups have been engaging in various forms of property crime, such as motor vehicle theft throughout Europe. At European level, ongoing initiatives are supporting member states in the fight against organized property crime. Nonetheless, to date still little is known on the logistical processes of motor vehicle theft across EU member states and in Europe as a whole. Within this context, this project aims at enhancing the knowledge of organized property crime in the form of motor vehicle crime, which includes motor vehicle theft and the sale of stolen vehicle parts.

Vehicle Crime Barrier, 2023, 46p.

By: Atanas Rusev, Tihomir Bezlov, Flamma Terenghi

Organized property crime is a pervasive issue across all EU Member States, demanding immediate and collective action. V-BAR specifically targets one aspect of organized property crime: motor vehicle crime, encompassing theft and the illicit trade of stolen vehicle parts. Despite a decline in vehicle theft, the overall prevalence of motor vehicle crime remains alarmingly high. This comprehensive report outlines V-BAR’s objectives in enhancing operational cooperation between EU law enforcement authorities and private partners to combat the menace posed by mobile organized crime groups involved in vehicle theft. Additionally, the report delves into an extensive investigation of motor vehicle theft trends within six EU countries, namely Belgium, Bulgaria, Germany, France, and The Netherlands, providing valuable insights for combating this form of criminal activity.

CrimRxiv. https://doi.org/10.21428/cb6ab371.af77f1d4 2023.

By Organization of American States , Department against Transnational Organized Crime

The illegal gold trade is a growing and significant challenge in Ecuador. The spread of illegal gold mining activity has brought surges of violence and instability to remote areas while attracting organized crime, at the local and international level, and triggering an increase in money laundering and contraband. Concern regarding the disruptive and harmful impact of illegal gold mining, as well as the government’s desire to develop and expand Ecuador’s mining sector away from its reliance on small-scale and artisanal operations, have also led to a renewed focus on the challenges posed by illegal mining. There is reason to believe that the illegal gold trade and its associated criminal networks are less entrenched and developed in Ecuador than in neighboring Peru and Colombia. However, there are significant challenges facing the government as it works to combat illegal mining activity, which is increasingly accelerated by illicit cross-border contraband flows and unique vulnerabilities to money laundering activity.

Washington, DC: OAS, 2021. 46p.

By Transnational Alliance to Combat Illicit Trade (TRACIT)

The Philippines, with its strategic location in the heart of Southeast Asia and its dynamic economy, is one of the fastest-growing economies in Southeast Asia, and a leader in the Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN). However, the country’s position as a vital maritime gateway in the region, coupled with its robust economic activities, has rendered it susceptible to a spectrum of illicit practices. From counterfeit goods flooding local markets to the underground movement of smuggled products, the illegal wildlife trade, and the intricate networks of money laundering, the Philippines faces significant challenges in its ongoing battle against these illicit activities

New York: The Transnational Alliance to Combat Illicit Trade (TRACIT), 2023. 48p.