By The International Crisis Group

Myanmar’s Shan State and Laos’s Bokeo province, which straddle the Mekong River, have emerged as a contiguous zone of vibrant criminality, much of which is beyond the reach of national authorities. Unregulated casinos, money laundering, drug production and trafficking, online scamming operations, and illegal wildlife trade all thrive, entrenching corruption, weakening governance and damaging the bonds that create community. The criminal networks involved have regional – in some cases, global – reach and can rapidly shift from one jurisdiction to another to minimise risks to their operations. A coordinated regional approach is thus vital for tackling them. But geopolitical competition between China and the U.S. complicates coordination. Regional states continue to rely heavily on unilateral criminal justice responses, but collaborative law enforcement is needed, as are multi-state efforts to ameliorate the governance and socio-economic problems that allow these criminal syndicates to prosper. Ideally, these efforts would involve agencies with migration, development and other relevant expertise. Parts of the Mekong, particularly the 100km section that forms the Myanmar-Lao border, have long been a frontier of unregulated and illicit trade, far from centres of power and commerce. Given its importance as a conduit between China and South East Asia, in recent decades governments have aspired for the Mekong to become a major transport route. But along with physical obstacles – sandbanks, shoals and rapids – insecurity has impeded riverborne trade, most commonly in the form of piracy and extortion of boats plying the route. The situation came to a head in October 2011, when thirteen Chinese merchant mariners were murdered – the deadliest attack on Chinese nationals abroad since World War II. China pinned the blame on Myanmar pirates, whose leader it captured in Laos and executed following a complex extra-territorial police operation. (It later emerged that others may have been primarily responsible.) Beijing then initiated joint gunboat patrols with neighbouring countries, allowing it to project force down the Mekong. While these actions put an end to piracy on this key stretch of river, they did not deter other forms of crime. Since 2o11, the territories on the Myanmar and Lao sides of the Mekong have emerged as hotbeds of illegal activity, from drug production and trafficking to online gambling, money laundering and cyber-scam operations that often use captive workers from around the world. Not only do transnational criminal organisations operating in this zone benefit from lax or non-existent regulations, but they also take advantage of its multi-jurisdictional character, quickly shifting operations from one place to another to evade crackdowns. Coordinated law enforcement across the region is crucial if governments want any chance of tackling these expanding criminal activities, but other capabilities must also be brought to bear. Authorities in the region need to acknowledge that any solution to this transnational problem will involve government agencies from several jurisdictions – as opposed to the typical security or police approach that treats immediate symptoms, but not the fundamental causes of the problem, including weak governance and rampant corruption, not to mention a willingness or desire of some jurisdictions to court illicit investments.

Bangkok/Brussels, International Crisis Group, 2023. 40p. Asia Report N°332 | 18 August 2023

By Stephen Merchant, Greg Wilson

In 2023 the Government commissioned a ‘first principles’ independent review of the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission (ACIC) and associated Commonwealth law enforcement arrangements.

The review assessed the effectiveness of the ACIC’s legislative framework and found that comprehensive reform was needed to ensure ACIC could operate effectively as Australia’s national criminal intelligence agency. The review recommended ACIC shift away from its existing law enforcement and investigative functions towards providing unique intelligence on serious and organised crime to Commonwealth, state and territory law enforcement agencies.

The independent review’s recommendations set out a blueprint to transform the ACIC in response to the significant and ongoing threat of serious and organised crime. The Government has agreed or agreed in-principle with 27 of the 29 recommendations - as set out in the government response.

Key recommendations

• Undertake robust legislative reforms to address significant deficiencies in the existing legislative frameworks and ensure the ACIC has appropriate powers for the collection of intelligence.

• Incorporate appropriate oversight and safeguards for the ACIC, including in relation to its use of coercive powers.

• Reinvigorate national governance and coordination arrangements for responding to serious and organised crime.

• Reinforce the independence of the Australian Institute of Criminology.

BARTON, ACT : Attorney-General's Department (Australia), 2024. 68p.

By Tse Yang Lim, Huiru Dong, Erin Stringfellow, Zeynep Hasgul, Ju Park, Lukas Glos, Reza Kazemi, and Mohammad S Jalali

Fentanyl and its analogs contribute substantially to drug overdose deaths in the United States. There is concern that people using drugs are being unknowingly exposed to fentanyl, increasing their risk of overdose death. This study examines temporal trends and spatial variations in the co-occurrence of fentanyl with other seized drugs.

Methods

We identified fentanyl co-occurrence (the proportion of samples of non-fentanyl substances that also contain fentanyl) among 9 substances or substance classes of interest: methamphetamine, cannabis, cocaine, heroin, club drugs, hallucinogens, and prescription opioids, stimulants, and benzodiazepines. We used serial cross-sectional data on drug reports across 50 states and the District of Columbia from the National Forensic Laboratory Information System, the largest available database on the U.S. illicit drug supply, from January 2013 to December 2023.

Findings

We analyzed data from 11,940,207 samples. Fentanyl co-occurrence with all examined substances increased monotonically over time (Mann-Kendall p < 0.0001). Nationally, fentanyl co-occurrence was highest among heroin samples (approx. 50%), but relatively low among methamphetamine (≤1%), cocaine (≤4%), and other drug samples. However, co-occurrence rates have grown to over 10% for cocaine and methamphetamine in several Northeast states in 2017–2023.

Interpretation:

Fentanyl co-occurs most commonly with heroin, but its presence in stimulant supplies is increasing in some areas, where it may pose a disproportionately high risk of overdose.

Lancet Reg Health Amicas, . 2024 Sep 27;39:100898. doi: 10.1016/j.lana.2024.100898

By Nicolás Zevallos Trigoso, Jaris Mujica, and Christian Campos Vásquez

Coca legalization in Peru could reshape the economy, drug control policies, and even the influence of organized crime, but the implications are complex. This report explores how moving from prohibition to a regulated market affects not only the legal framework but also the ground reality for coca growers, consumers, and law enforcement. Legalization doesn’t just mean lifting restrictions; it involves constructing a regulatory structure that acknowledges coca as both a cultural staple and a consumer good.

The study reveals that while legalization could reduce the criminalization of coca production, it also creates new challenges. Ensuring a legal supply chain for coca derivatives, from cultivation to sale, demands extensive state oversight—a task complicated by limited resources and a history of challenges with other legal commodities like timber and gold. Moreover, organized crime could exploit the gaps in regulation, adapting to the legal framework while maintaining parallel illegal operations.

The analysis dives into four major areas of impact: changes in drug policy, shifts in organized crime dynamics, effects on the local economy of coca growers, and potential shifts in consumer patterns. The findings suggest that legalization could reduce repressive policing but require intensified regulatory control, putting immense pressure on Peru’s state capacity. Organized crime may also adapt to the new structures, blending illegal activities with legal coca businesses.

This study also highlights lessons from other industries that have moved from illicit to regulated markets, providing a balanced view of possible outcomes. While coca legalization could offer a path away from prohibition’s punitive approach, the transition to a regulated market could mean ongoing challenges.

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2024 24p.

By Max Daly ̵ Patrick Shortis

There has been a groundbreaking shift in the global drug trade, pioneered in Russia and now spreading globally. Unlike traditional drug trafficking models, this system leverages darknet markets and cryptocurrency for anonymous transactions, allowing buyers to retrieve drugs from hidden physical locations, or “dead drops,” rather than direct exchanges. Driven by large platforms such as Kraken, Mega, and Blacksprut, Russian darknet markets control 93% of the global share, generating approximately $1.5 billion in revenue in 2023 alone. This dominance marks a new era for organized crime, with Russia’s digital drug economy vastly surpassing traditional Western darknet markets in scope and influence.

The rise of Russia’s dead drop drug trade stems from several unique national factors: restrictive anti-drug policies, strained Western trade relations, and a strong technological foundation. Enabled by these conditions, the dead drop model has reshaped how drugs are distributed in Russia. Drug transactions now involve no face-to-face interactions; instead, orders are placed online, paid for with cryptocurrency, and retrieved from secret locations across cities within hours. This system, offering convenience and anonymity, has seen synthetic drugs—especially synthetic cathinones like mephedrone—overtake traditional imported substances like cocaine and heroin in Russia. As the report highlights, these potent synthetic drugs are cheap, easy to manufacture, and readily distributed through Russia’s vast delivery networks.

The report further underscores the severe social impacts of this model on Russian society, particularly among young people. Youth are drawn into this high-tech drug economy, often working as couriers or “kladmen” for online shops—a job that comes with high risks, including violence, criminal charges, and addiction. Violence has become endemic in the system, with enforcers, known as “sportsmen,” meting out harsh punishments for couriers suspected of theft or negligence. This pervasive violence, combined with the easy availability of highly addictive synthetic drugs, is fueling a public health crisis and contributing to rising incarceration rates among young Russians.

Beyond Russia, the report warns that this drug trade model is now expanding across borders, posing public health and security risks. It’s affecting Russian youth heavily, leading to violence, criminalization, and increased synthetic drug dependence. Understanding Russia’s darknet markets offers insight into the future of drug trafficking worldwide. Authorities and international bodies must adapt to address the growing influence of this high-tech, anonymous, and highly organized trade system.

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2024. 53p.

By Phil Williams

By 2040, organized crime may thrive like never before, exploiting climate crises, geopolitical conflicts, and technological advancements. Our latest report reveals a chilling forecast where criminal networks operate as shadow governments, shielded by authoritarian regimes and empowered by rapid technological evolution.

This “fifth wave” of organized crime, as coined by author Phil Williams, will capitalize on scarcity markets, leveraging disruptions in essential resources like water, minerals, and energy caused by climate change. Criminal networks are expected to infiltrate legitimate markets, blurring lines between lawful and illicit activities and using scarcity as a driving force for growth.

The report suggests that by leveraging emerging tools such as artificial intelligence, autonomous vehicles, and 5G technology, criminal organizations will achieve new levels of sophistication, making it difficult for law enforcement to counter their reach and resilience. Meanwhile, geopolitical tensions are likely to exacerbate the situation, as some authoritarian regimes utilize criminal networks as extensions of state power, offering them safe havens and strategic support in exchange for destabilizing activities abroad.

The findings raise urgent questions about global readiness to combat organized crime’s possible evolution. “The Fifth Wave” challenges policymakers, law enforcement agencies, and international organizations to rethink their approach to organized crime in a rapidly shifting world. It underscores the importance of proactive strategies that go beyond traditional crime-fighting tactics, advocating for comprehensive international collaboration, adaptive policy-making, and innovative technology to address this deeply entrenched threat.

As crime increasingly infiltrates legal economies, emerging as a powerful economic and social force, international collaboration and innovative strategies will be vital to mitigate this emerging threat. This threat requires an unprecedented global response.

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2024. 30p.

By Tse Yang Lim , Huiru Dong , Erin Stringfellow , Zeynep Hasgul , Ju Park , Lukas Glos , Reza Kazemi , Mohammad S Jalali 

Fentanyl and its analogs contribute substantially to drug overdose deaths in the United States. There is concern that people using drugs are being unknowingly exposed to fentanyl, increasing their risk of overdose death. This study examines temporal trends and spatial variations in the co-occurrence of fentanyl with other seized drugs.

Methods

We identified fentanyl co-occurrence (the proportion of samples of non-fentanyl substances that also contain fentanyl) among 9 substances or substance classes of interest: methamphetamine, cannabis, cocaine, heroin, club drugs, hallucinogens, and prescription opioids, stimulants, and benzodiazepines. We used serial cross-sectional data on drug reports across 50 states and the District of Columbia from the National Forensic Laboratory Information System, the largest available database on the U.S. illicit drug supply, from January 2013 to December 2023.

Findings

We analyzed data from 11,940,207 samples. Fentanyl co-occurrence with all examined substances increased monotonically over time (Mann-Kendall p < 0.0001). Nationally, fentanyl co-occurrence was highest among heroin samples (approx. 50%), but relatively low among methamphetamine (≤1%), cocaine (≤4%), and other drug samples. However, co-occurrence rates have grown to over 10% for cocaine and methamphetamine in several Northeast states in 2017–2023.

Interpretation: 

Fentanyl co-occurs most commonly with heroin, but its presence in stimulant supplies is increasing in some areas, where it may pose a disproportionately high risk of overdose.

Lancet Reg Health Amicas, 2024 Sep 27;39:100898. doi: 10.1016/j.lana.2024.100898

By Dardan Kocani

Despite efforts to prevent illicit finance – such as the adoption of international frameworks, Financial Action Task Force (FATF) standards and the EU’s anti-money laundering (AML) directives – financial institutions in the Western Balkans remain highly vulnerable to sophisticated criminals and the inherent risks in the formal financial system. Financial institutions such as banks, microfinance institutions, cryptocurrency services and money transfer services are frequently exploited by criminals to move illicit money across borders.

This report delves into the structural weaknesses and vulnerabilities that facilitate money laundering in the Western Balkans. One major insight is the impact of cryptocurrency, where regulatory shortcomings enable anonymous, cross-border transactions that are hard to trace. Financial technology, while promising innovation, also introduces fresh risks, especially where compliance and monitoring frameworks have yet to catch up. With no centralized registry for politically exposed persons (PEPs) or beneficial owners, financial institutions often lack critical information, inadvertently providing cover for criminal actors.

The study identifies specific methods used to launder money, such as smurfing through bank accounts, taking out suspicious bank loans, engaging in real estate purchases, and employing frontmen. Notable cases in the region expose systemic vulnerabilities in banks, where criminal actors leverage insider support or regulatory gaps to move substantial amounts undetected. Furthermore, public-private partnerships in AML enforcement remain insufficient, creating weak links that are frequently exploited.

This report provides strategic recommendations for governments, financial institutions and non-state actors in the region to address these gaps, emphasizing the need for robust inter-agency collaboration, stronger regulatory frameworks, and consistent training for AML officers. The region needs a heightened, collaborative effort to prevent local financial institutions from becoming conduits for transnational organized crime and dirty money laundering.

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC)’s Observatory of Illicit Economies in South Eastern Europe. 2024. 40p.

By The  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)

Gender-based violence against women and girls and its most extreme manifestation —femicides, feminicides, or gender-related killings of women and girls—1 are a dramatic illustration of the persistent structural challenges of gender inequality that affect women and girls in Latin America and the Caribbean. Bulletin No. 3 on feminicide violence presents the official statistics submitted by the region’s countries to the Gender Equality Observatory for Latin America and the Caribbean on cases of femicides, feminicides and gender-related killings of women reported in 2023. This bulletin is part of the UNiTE by 2030 to End Violence against Women campaign of the Secretary General of the United Nations, aimed at preventing and eliminating gender-based violence against women and girls worldwide. The campaign calls on governments, civil society organizations, women’s organizations, youth, the private sector, the media, and the entire United Nations system to join forces and tackle the global pandemic of violence against women and girls. The publication of this third bulletin coincides with the commemoration of two key milestones in the process of garnering commitments from States to guarantee the human rights of women and girls and the right to a life free of violence: the thirtieth anniversary of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, adopted at the Fourth World Conference on Women in 1995, and the thirtieth anniversary of the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication of Violence against Women (Convention of Belém do Pará), the first human rights treaty to establish the right of women to a life free of violence in both the public and private sphere, and to identify gender-based violence against women as a violation of human rights. The standards and commitments established in these instruments are also reflected in the Regional Gender Agenda, which consolidates agreements signed by governments at different sessions of the Regional Conference on Women in Latin America and the Caribbean since 1977 (see diagram 1). Another key instrument in the region is the Montevideo Consensus, adopted at the first meeting of the Regional Conference on Population and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean. The Consensus is a robust road map to promote the safeguarding of sexual and reproductive rights, gender equality and a rights-based approach (ECLAC, 2013).   

Bulletin No, 3 Santiago de Chile; Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) , 2024. 20p.

By Dardan Kocani

Despite efforts to prevent illicit finance – such as the adoption of international frameworks, Financial Action Task Force (FATF) standards, and the EU’s anti-money laundering (AML) directives – financial institutions in the Western Balkans remain highly vulnerable to sophisticated criminals and the inherent risks in the formal financial system. Financial institutions such as banks, microfinance institutions, cryptocurrency services, and money transfer services are frequently exploited by criminals to move illicit money across borders. This report delves into the structural weaknesses and vulnerabilities that facilitate money laundering in the Western Balkans. One major insight is the impact of cryptocurrency, where regulatory shortcomings enable anonymous, cross-border transactions that are hard to trace. Financial technology, while promising innovation, also introduces fresh risks, especially where compliance and monitoring frameworks have yet to catch up. With no centralized registry for politically exposed persons (PEPs) or beneficial owners, financial institutions often lack critical information, inadvertently providing cover for criminal actors. The study identifies specific methods used to launder money, such as smurfing through bank accounts, taking out suspicious bank loans, engaging in real estate purchases, and employing frontmen. Notable cases in the region expose systemic vulnerabilities in banks, where criminal actors leverage insider support or regulatory gaps to move substantial amounts undetected. Furthermore, public-private partnerships in AML enforcement remain insufficient, creating weak links that are frequently exploited. This report provides strategic recommendations for governments, financial institutions, and non-state actors in the region to address these gaps, emphasizing the need for robust inter-agency collaboration, stronger regulatory frameworks, and consistent training for AML officers. The region needs a heightened, collaborative effort to prevent local financial institutions from becoming conduits for transnational organized crime and dirty money laundering.

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC)’s Observatory of Illicit Economies in South Eastern Europe.  2024. 40p.

By  J. R. Mailey   

Over the past decade, Iran has turned to criminal markets as a strategic tool to pursue its geopolitical goals. Isolated by international sanctions, Iran has forged extensive ties with criminal networks across the globe to fund armed groups, procure materials for its nuclear program, and evade sanctions. This report uncovers how Iran’s proxies, such as Hezbollah and militias in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Lebanon and Palestine are critical to Tehran’s influence. Iran supplies these groups with weapons, training, and funds, while criminal networks help smuggle oil, launder money, and move illicit goods across borders. This strategy has enabled Iran to weaken its adversaries without engaging in direct military confrontation. One of the most striking findings of the report is how Iran’s use of criminal proxies allows it to maintain plausible deniability. Tehran’s regime has relied on these illicit actors to conduct operations ranging from assassinations and abductions of critics to sabotage and terror attacks—all while skirting direct accountability. The report also highlights how criminal networks have been key to helping Iran circumvent widespread sanctions. By collaborating with middlemen and transnational crime organizations, Iran has continued to smuggle its oil and accumulate foreign currency. These criminal partnerships have enabled Tehran to access global markets, finance proxy wars, and strengthen its military capabilities through illicit means. The study provides detailed case studies on Iran’s operations and offers a range of recommendations to counter Tehran’s criminal statecraft. By identifying pressure points and vulnerabilities within these illicit networks, the report outlines steps that can be taken to expose and disrupt Iran’s activities.

GENEVA:  GLOBAL INITIATIVE AGAINST TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME. 2024. 59P.

By Juan José Palacios Vega, Manuel Martín Brañas, Sydney Silverstein, Ricardo Zárate Gómez, Nicholas Kawa, Margarita del Águila Villacorta

In recent decades, drug crop eradication and drug trafficking interdiction have pushed drug crop cultivation into new areas of the Amazonian rainforest. The presence of the drug industries in these regions—followed by alternative development programs that aim to substitute illicit drug crops with commodity crops like cacao—has transformed forest ecologies, risking loss to both biodiversity and cultural ecosystem services (CES) for surrounding communities. In the last ten years, forest loss linked to the increase in cultivation of commodity crops—both licit and illicit—has been monitored, generating extensive geospatial data. However, the spatiotemporal impacts on key plant species utilized by indigenous communities who have recently shifted to drug crop and commodity agricultural production remain poorly understood. In this paper, we use geospatial modeling to explore the potential impacts of drug crop cultivation and alternative development programs on the CES of Ticuna indigenous communities of the Peruvian Amazon. We analyze the spatiotemporal impact of drug and commodity crop cultivation on three culturally significant species of the genus Ischnosiphon, known locally as dexpe or huarumá, by generating a model of the potential distribution of the three species. The rate of increase of legal and illegal crops was also calculated and the spatiotemporal impact was measured and represented using spatial analysis techniques. Our analysis finds that, between 2010 and 2020, the increase in both illicit and licit commodity crop cultivation is correlated with changes in the distribution of huarumá species, which in turn affects the cultural ecosystem services of Ticuna communities.

Journal of Illicit Economies and Development, 6(1): pp. 93–111. 

By Thiago Canettieri

This paper presents an analysis of the relationship between peripheral urbanization, informal real estate markets, and criminal activities in Belo Horizonte, Brazil. The study, based on ethnographic research conducted in two different peripheral areas of the city, reveals a clear connection between crime and the land market in these areas. The paper highlights how criminal agents exploit land properties to promote their illicit economic activities in peripheral contexts of the city. The unique pattern of peripheral urbanization creates opportunities for illicit agents to manage, control, and commodify spaces of informality, thereby facilitating their illegal activities. The main findings of the study underscore the significant impact of criminal activities on land markets, particularly the role of violence, coercion, and social legitimacy in the actions of criminals in real estate markets. The study also sheds light on the impact of informal real estate markets on the lives of people living in peripheral areas. By revealing the connections between crime, land market dynamics, and urbanization processes, this study significantly contributes to a deeper understanding of the complexities at play in peripheral areas of Belo Horizonte.

Journal of Illicit Economies and Development, 6(1): pp. 129–144. DOI: 

By Adrian Robert Bazbauers and Anthea McCarthy-Jones

 The spread of illicit activity across the global economy presents significant challenges to international development. Despite the well-recognized global incidence of corruption, fraud, and money laundering in development-focused investment projects, the responses of the multilateral development banks (MDBs) to these threats remain understudied. Our article offers the first comprehensive study into the comparative historical emergence and evolution of MDB responses to illicit activity. By identifying and analyzing critical junctures in this history, we argue that the MDBs have tended to approach illicit activity as prohibited practices rather than criminal acts. We contend that this is an intentional choice made by the MDBs that absolves these organizations from any real responsibility in minimizing illicit activity, finding their concern to be ensuring contractual compliance in their lending operations rather than curtailing criminal behavior and their preference to be resolving contractual deviations in-house as opposed to coordinating with local jurisdictions and law enforcement agencies.

Journal of Illicit Economies and Development, 6(1): pp. 112–128.

By Vivian Mateos Zúñiga and David A. Shirk

Scholars and legalization advocates have argued that the legalization of cannabis would help curb drug flows from Mexico and weaken criminal organizations south of the border. However, there is little empirical research examining how the legalization of cannabis for medical and recreational purposes at the state-level in the United States has affected production levels and flows of cannabis from Mexico. To examine the theory that drug legalization reduces the incentives and profits for international drug trafficking organizations (DTOs), the authors draw on a mixed methodological approach that includes descriptive and inferential statistical analysis of data from the U.S. State Department, archival research using primary and open-source documents from U.S. and Mexican government and media sources, and interviews with U.S. officials and security experts to analyze trends in seizures and legalization. Drawing on this information, we employ a series of statistical tests to examine the relationship of greater legal access to cannabis in U.S. states—measured by the percentage of the population living in states with access to legalized medical or recreational marijuana over time—to illegal eradication and seizures of drugs by Mexican government and U.S. border authorities. We use this measurable outcome as a proxy for illicit drug production and transshipment in Mexico. We find a substantial and statistically significant decrease in the amounts of cannabis apprehended by Mexican and U.S. border authorities in relation to the rate of legalization in the United States using our measurements of drug legalization. At the same time, the authors find additional statistically significant evidence that, as legal access to cannabis has increased, flows of other illicit drugs increased simultaneously, suggesting that criminal organizations have diversified into other drugs to remain profitable, particularly heroin and methamphetamine. Our findings do not find any evidence that cocaine has been significantly affected, for reasons we discuss.   

Volume 19, Number 1 January 2022 San Diego: Justice in Mexico, University of San Diego, 2022.

By Albin Stenström, Felipe Estrada, Henrik Tham

Drug use was criminalized in Sweden in 1988 with the aim of reducing the number of consumers and drug-related risks and harms. Imprisonment was introduced into the penalty scale in 1993 to improve the legislation’s effectiveness. The criminalization has never been evaluated. Method: Goal-attainment evaluation based on a range of indicators from surveys, case-finding estimates, healthcare and cause-of-death data, and crime statistics. Comparative drug policy analysis is conducted with other Nordic countries. Results: The criminalization is not followed by a reduced or more expensive drug supply, reduced consumption levels, problematic drug use or healthcare needs, or fewer drug-related deaths. Most of the indicators instead show the opposite. Control costs are high, and trends are no better than those of other Nordic countries, despite Sweden’s more repressive drug policy. Conclusion: Criminalization emerges as an ineffective, expensive, and harmful means of dealing with the drug problem.

International Journal of Drug Policy Volume 133, November 2024, 104573

By Kellie Moss, Kristy Warren

Prisoners in Guyana have been protesting about living conditions and an overtly punitive environment since British colonial rule (1814–1966). Drawing upon official investigations, colonial records and newspaper reports, this article analyses some of the key features of resistance, including uprisings, escapes and everyday breaches of prison rules from the 19th century to the present day. It argues that Guyanese society is still impacted by the punitive nature of colonial plantation society which compels and informs prisoner experiences and responses in the nation's prisons today.

The Howard Journal of Crime and JusticeVolume 63, Issue 4: Colonialism and its aftermaths in prisons in Guyana Dec 2024 Pages 355-480

By Katrien Luyten with Alessia Rossi

The EU has made substantial progress in terms of protecting its citizens since the early 1990s. This has often been in response to dramatic incidents, such as murders committed by the mafia or other organised crime groups or big money-laundering scandals, or to negative trends, such as the steep increase in migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings following the 2015 migration crisis. More recently, it was necessary to respond to the sharp rise in cybercrime, fraud and counterfeiting during the coronavirus pandemic. Criminal organisations continue to pose big risks to the EU's internal security. A rising number of organised crime groups are active in EU territory, often with cross-border reach. Organised crime is furthermore an increasingly dynamic and complex phenomenon, with new criminal markets and modi operandi emerging under the influence of globalisation and new technologies in particular. While the impact of serious and organised crime on the EU economy is considerable, there are also significant political and social costs, as well as negative effects on the wellbeing of EU citizens. As organised crime has become more interconnected, international and digital, Member States – which remain responsible for operational activities in the area of police and judicial cooperation –rely increasingly on cross-border and EU-level cooperation to support their law enforcement authorities on the ground. Recognising the severity of the problem and the need for coordinated action, the EU has initiated several measures to encourage closer cooperation between Member States; it has furthermore adopted common legal, judicial and investigative frameworks to address organised crime. The European Parliament has made fighting organised crime a political priority and helped shape the relevant EU legislation. Future EU action will focus on implementing existing rules, improving operational cooperation – even beyond the EU's boundaries – and information-sharing, while also addressing some of the main criminal activities of organised crime groups. Furthermore, the EU aims to make sure that crime does not pay. This is an updated version of a briefing from September 2020

Brussels: EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service,  2022. 12p.

By Robert Flummerfelt

The Kahuzi-Biega National Park in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, a protected area and UNESCO World Heritage site that has received funding and material support from the German and US governments among other international supporters, has long been celebrated as one of the most biodiverse places on the planet. However, park authorities there have engaged in a three-year program of violent forced expulsions targeting the original human inhabitants of the park—the indigenous Batwa of Kahuzi-Biega, who are among the most marginalized groups in the country. This report, To Purge the Forest by Force, documents the highly organized, grievous and widespread human rights abuses jointly carried out by park guards and Congolese Army soldiers against Batwa between 2019 and 2021. In October 2018, after four decades of broken promises of resettlement, reparations and justice from the Congolese government and other stakeholders, segments of Batwa communities returned to the park, rebuilding villages on their ancestral lands. Their return was met with swift and devastating violence by park authorities. The report presents evidence of park guards and soldiers conducting three large-scale operations between 2019-2021, targeting at least seven highly populated Batwa-inhabited villages inside the park, along with numerous smaller-scale evictions and acts of repression. Among other abuses, dozens of Batwa have been killed, injured, arbitrarily detained or subjected to violent group rape, in what amounts to a systematic campaign of violence designed to terrorize Batwa and drive them out of the park. These large-scale operations are illustrative flashpoints in the decades-long process of marginalization and brutalization visited upon Batwa in the name of conservation. Ongoing violence is rooted in the original expulsion from their ancestral homeland to pave the way for the creation of the park in the 1970s, forcing an already marginalized indigenous community into decades of grinding impoverishment, landlessness and displacement. The story of the Batwa of Kahuzi-Biega is not an isolated incident. Instead, it is emblematic of the widespread, systemic violence inherent in the rigidly colonial conservation model widely used in East and Central Africa, funded and facilitated by a network of international entities, with deadly consequences for indigenous peoples and local communities living in the vicinity of protected areas. The tragic events detailed in this report have been made possible by a culture of impunity that devalues indigenous life in service of a highly militarized approach inherent in the ‘fortress conservation’ model, excluding the land’s original inhabitants in violation of international law.

London: Minority Rights Group International, 2022. 92p.

By Tatiana Zárate-Barrera

This paper estimates the non-monotonic effects of air pollution on criminal activity in a developing country setting and provides empirical evidence on the potential behavioral responses mediating this relationship. To do so, I combine daily administrative data on crime, air pollution, and sentiment polarity from millions of social media posts in Mexico City between January 2017 and March 2020. The identification strategy relies on highly dimensional fixed-effect models, non-parametric estimations of dose-response functions, and an instrumental variable approach that employs wind speed and wind direction as instruments for air pollution. My results suggest a causal and inverted U-shape relationship between air pollution and crime. Specifically, there is an inflection point after which marginal increases in air pollution negatively affect criminal activity. Exploring the mechanisms behind this relationship, I find that air pollution has the power to shape people’s emotional states and mobility patterns. These results provide important insights for developing countries where pollution levels are dangerously high, and crime is still one of the most pressing issues. In particular, under certain circumstances, environmental regulation tailored to reduce air pollution must consider the presence of behavioral responses and these non-linear interactions with criminal activity in their design. 

Unpublished paper, 2021. 48p.