By Guillaume Nicaise, Kaunain Rahman

Our research highlights that integrating anti-corruption measures within sustainability reporting frameworks can enhance corporate transparency and contribute to reducing corruption risks. However, inconsistent global sustainability standards and enforcement challenges limit the effectiveness of these measures. We present evidence and practice from the development cooperation sector to support practitioners in navigating governance and accountability frameworks in the private sector. Main points ▪ Integrating anti-corruption measures within sustainability reporting frameworks can enhance corporate transparency and improve governance. ▪ Sector-wide collective action initiatives can be effective in raising integrity standards and facilitating knowledge sharing among organisations. ▪ However, inconsistent global sustainability standards, superficial requirements, and enforcement difficulties can undermine the effectiveness of sustainability reporting. ▪ Detailed and transparent sustainability reporting by organisations like the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the Swedish Development Cooperation (Sida), and the African Development Bank Group (AFDB) demonstrate the value of comprehensive anti-corruption measures in fostering accountability. ▪ These examples can help development professionals, aid donors, and policymakers who aim to improve governance frameworks and promote accountability in their practices.

Bergen, Norway: U4 is part of the Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI), 2025. 37p.

By Pablo Madriaza, Ghayda Hassan, Sébastien Brouillette-Alarie, Aoudou Njingouo Mounchingam, Loïc Durocher-Corfa, Eugene Borokhovski, David Pickup, Sabrina Paillé

Exposure to hate in online and traditional media: A systematic review and meta-analysis of the impact of this exposure on individuals and communities

Pablo Madriaza, Ghayda Hassan, Sébastien Brouillette-Alarie, Aoudou Njingouo Mounchingam, Loïc Durocher-Corfa, Eugene Borokhovski, David Pickup, Sabrina Paillé

The problem: People use social media platforms to chat, search, and share information, express their opinions, and connect with others. But these platforms also facilitate the posting of divisive, harmful, and hateful messages, targeting groups and individuals, based on their race, religion, gender, sexual orientation, or political views. Hate content is not only a problem on the Internet, but also on traditional media, especially in places where the Internet is not widely available or in rural areas. Despite growing awareness of the harms that exposure to hate can cause, especially to victims, there is no clear consensus in the literature on what specific impacts this exposure, as bystanders, produces on individuals, groups, and the population at large. Most of the existing research has focused on analyzing the content and the extent of the problem. More research in this area is needed to develop better intervention programs that are adapted to the current reality of hate.

Objective: The objective of this review is to synthesize the empirical evidence on how media exposure to hate affects or is associated with various outcomes for individuals and groups.

Search methods: Searches covered the period up to December 2021 to assess the impact of exposure to hate. The searches were performed using search terms across 20 databases, 51 related websites, the Google search engine, as well as other systematic reviews and related papers.

Selection criteria: This review included any correlational, experimental, and quasi-experimental study that establishes an impact relationship and/or association between exposure to hate in online and traditional media and the resulting consequences on individuals or groups.

Data collection and analysis: Fifty-five studies analyzing 101 effect sizes, classified into 43 different outcomes, were identified after the screening process. Initially, effect sizes were calculated based on the type of design and the statistics used in the studies, and then transformed into standardized mean differences. Each outcome was classified following an exhaustive review of the operational constructs present in the studies. These outcomes were grouped into five major dimensions: attitudinal changes, intergroup dynamics, interpersonal behaviors, political beliefs, and psychological effects. When two or more outcomes from the studies addressed the same construct, they were synthesized together. A separate meta-analysis was conducted for each identified outcome from different samples. Additionally, experimental and quasi-experimental studies were synthesized separately from correlational studies. Twenty-four meta-analyses were performed using a random effects model, and meta-regressions and moderator analyses were conducted to explore factors influencing effect size estimates.

Results: The 55 studies included in this systematic review were published between 1996 and 2021, with most of them published since 2015. They include 25 correlational studies, and 22 randomized and 8 non-randomized experimental studies. Most of these studies provide data extracted from individuals (e.g., self-report); however, this review includes 6 studies that are based on quantitative analysis of comments or posts, or their relationship to specific geographic areas. Correlational studies encompass sample sizes ranging from 101 to 6829 participants, while experimental and quasi-experimental studies involve participant numbers between 69 and 1112. In most cases, the exposure to hate content occurred online or within social media contexts (37 studies), while only 8 studies reported such exposure in traditional media platforms. In the remaining studies, the exposure to hate content was delivered through political propaganda, primarily associated with extreme right-wing groups. No studies were removed from the systematic review due to quality assessment. In the experimental studies, participants demonstrated high adherence to the experimental conditions and thus contributed significantly to most of the results. The correlational and quasi-experimental studies used consistent, valid, and reliable instruments to measure exposure and outcomes derived from well-defined variables. As with the experimental studies, the results from the correlation and quasi-experimental studies were complete. Meta-analyses related to four dimensions were performed: Attitudinal changes, Intergroup dynamics, Interpersonal behaviors, and Psychological effects. We were unable to conduct a meta-analysis for the "Political Beliefs" dimension due to an insufficient number of studies. In terms of attitude changes, exposure to hate leads to negative attitudes (d Ex = 0.414; 95% confidence interval [CI] = 0.005, 0.824; p < 0.05; n = 8 and d corr = 0.322; 95% CI = 0.14, 0.504; p < 0.01; n = 2) and negative stereotypes (d Ex = 0.28; 95% CI = -0.018, 0.586; p < 0.10; n = 9) about individuals or groups with protected characteristics, while also hindering the promotion of positive attitudes toward them (d exp = -0.227; 95% CI = -0.466, 0.011; p < 0.10; n = 3). However, it does not increase support for hate content or political violence. Concerning intergroup dynamics, exposure to hate reduces intergroup trust (d exp = -0.308; 95% CI = -0.559, -0.058; p < 0.05; n = 2), especially between targeted groups and the general population, but has no significant impact on the perception of discrimination among minorities. In the context of Interpersonal behaviors, the meta-analyses confirm a strong association between exposure to hate and victimization (d corr = 0.721; 95% CI = 0.472, 0.97; p < 0.01; n = 3) and moderate effects on online hate speech perpetration (d corr = 0.36; 95% CI = -0.028, 0.754; p < 0.10; n = 2) and offline violent behavior (d corr = 0.47; 95%CI = 0.328, 0.612; p < 0.01; n = 2). Exposure to online hate also fuels more hate in online comments (d = 0.51; 95% CI = 0.034-0.984; p < 0.05; n = 2) but does not seem to affect hate crimes directly. However, there is no evidence that exposure to hate fosters resistance behaviors among individuals who are frequently subjected to it (e.g. the intention to counter-argue factually). In terms of psychological consequences, this review demonstrates that exposure to hate content negatively affects individuals' psychological well-being. Experimental studies indicate a large and significant effect size concerning the development of depressive symptoms due to exposure (d exp = 1.105; 95% CI = 0.797, 1.423; p < 0.01; n = 2). Additionally, a small effect size is observed concerning the link between exposure and reduced life satisfaction(d corr = -0.186; 95% CI = -0.279, -0.093; p < 0.01; n = 3), as well as increased social fear regarding the likelihood of a terrorist attack (d corr = -0.206; 95% CI = 0.147, 0.264; p < 0.01 n = 5). Conversely, exposure to hate speech does not seem to generate or be linked to the development of negative emotions related to its content.

Author's conclusions: This systematic review confirms that exposure to hate in online and in traditional media has a significant negative impact on individuals and groups. It emphasizes the importance of taking these findings into account for policymaking, prevention, and intervention strategies. Hate speech spreads through biased commentary and perceptions, normalizing prejudice and causing harm. This not only leads to violence, victimization, and perpetration of hate speech but also contributes to a broader climate of hostility. Conversely, this research suggests that people exposed to this type of content do not show increased shock or revulsion toward it. This may explain why it is easily disseminated and often perceived as harmless, leading some to oppose its regulation. Focusing efforts solely on content control may then have a limited impact in driving substantial change. More research is needed to explore these variables, as well as the relationship between hate speech and political beliefs and the connection to violent extremism. Indeed, we know very little about how exposure to hate influences political and extremist views.

Campbell Syst Rev, 2025 Jan 16;21(1):e70018, doi: 10.1002/cl2.70018. eCollection 2025, 47.

By Axel Muganwa RUDAKUBANA (AMR

This Prevent Learning Review (hereafter ‘Review’) was commissioned to examine the Prevent involvement with Axel Muganwa Rudakubana (AMR) prior to the tragic attack which led to the loss of three young lives, which AMR is alleged to have committed, on 29 July 2024 in Southport. This is done with the aim of identifying effective practice, organisational learning opportunities and any further areas for development. It is fully recognised that at commencement of this review, prosecution has commenced with authorisation of charges. Criminal proceedings are therefore active (sub judice). The Reviewer is therefore mindful that the Review must not jeopardise or influence the ongoing judicial and coronial processes and has complied with guidance from the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) in undertaking the Review. AMR was referred to Prevent three times. The first referral was received from AMR’s teacher on 5 December 2019. The teacher reported a number of concerns regarding behaviours which included being excluded from his previous school for carrying a knife and searching for mass school shootings on the internet using his school account. After a discussion with Prevent officers (CTCOs) in which AMR accounted for his internet searches, the case was closed on the Prevent system on 31 January 2020. Acknowledgement is made that AMR is extremely vulnerable but there are no CT/DE concerns and appropriate agencies are already in place to support him. A second referral was received from AMR’s previous school on 01 February 2021. It was reported that a pupil had showed them [social media] posts by AMR which they were concerned about and felt AMR was being radicalised. The CTCO acknowledged the previous referral, however considered the [social media] posts to be not CT/DE relevant and the case was closed on 17 February 2021. A third referral was received from AMR’s teacher on 26 April 2021. It reported that AMR had been observed with internet tabs open during a lesson showing a search for London Bomb and seemed to have a passionate interest in Israel/Palestine conflict, MI5 and the IRA. The CTCO acknowledged the previous two referrals but considered that AMR’s needs were currently met outside of Prevent and there were no CT/DE concerns to address. The case was closed on 10 May 2021. Overall, the Reviewer considers there to have been a high level of compliance by the Prevent officers with process timescales, assessment completion and adherence to policy that were in place at the time. However, although processes and polices have been largely followed, it is the subjective decisions that have come into focus and AMR should have been referred to Channel. The Review identifies several areas for learning to strengthen risk assessments, particularly around understanding indicators of radicalisation where a coherent ideology is not present and recognising the potential risk from repeat referrals. A number of recommendations have been identified through this review. These include strengthening training and guidance, changes to terminology used within Prevent, and improving assurance processes.

Prevent (Homeland Security Group, Home Office) and Counter Terrorism Policing Headquarters , 2025. 55p.

By The New South Wales Law Reform Commission

A report on a review of the effectiveness of s93Z of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) in addressing serious racial and religious vilification in NSW. It provides two recommendations under sentencing and penalties. The report also outlines why some recommendations were not pursued. It does not make recommendations about the Anti-Discrimination Act 1997 (NSW).

The report found that communities have faced increasing levels of discrimination, vilification and other hate-based conduct, and that there has been a significant and sustained increase in vilification complaints received by Anti-Discrimination NSW. However, only a small proportion of individuals affected by vilification make a formal complaint. Concerns were raised, in particular, about an increase in online vilification.

Recommendations

The NSW Government should consider commissioning a review of the effectiveness of s 21A(2)(h) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW).

The NSW Government should consider measures, such as a new Law Part Code, to improve the collection of data on hate crimes when offences other than s 93Z are charged for hate-related incidents.

Sydney: The Commission, 2024. 135p.

By The Office of the eSafety Commissioner (Australia)

Online hate is one of the most prevalent forms of digital violence. It affects many internet users in Australia and globally, especially individuals from targeted groups, including sexually diverse individuals, Aboriginal and/or Torres Strait Islanders, individuals with disability, and those from other culturally and racially marginalised backgrounds. It can take the form of hateful posts or comments about a person based on discrimination or bias related to characteristics such as their sexual orientation, gender, race, disability, religion or ethnicity.

This report is the first in a series of two reports exploring encounters with online hate among adults in Australia. It explores the prevalence, nature and impact of online hate among adults who belong to one or more of the targeted groups, drawing on data from eSafety’s Australian Adults Online survey, conducted in November 2022.

Key findings

Adults who identify as sexually diverse, Aboriginal and/or Torres Strait Islander, with disability, and/or linguistically diverse are more likely to be targeted with online hate.

Adults from these targeted groups are more likely to experience online hate based on discrimination or bias related to at least one aspect of their identity.

Most targeted adults experience online hate on social media, with the hate most often perpetrated by a stranger.

Online hate has harmful effects on the wellbeing of adults from targeted groups.

A minority of targeted adults act after encountering online hate, but many refrain from acting because they don’t think anything will change.

Government of Australia, 2024. 72p.

By Angela E. Addae, Monica Cox

In 2022, Oregon legislators enacted Senate Bill 1510 (SB 1510). SB 1510 appropriated $10,000,000 to the Oregon Criminal Justice Commission (CJC) to create the Justice Reinvestment Equity Program (JREP). JREP is encompassed under the state’s Justice Reinvestment Initiative (JRI), which includes the Justice Reinvestment Program (JRP) established in 2013. The Oregon Legislature enacted JREP to “promote racial equity, reduce racial disparities, reduce recidivism and decrease a county’s utilization of imprisonment in a Department of Corrections institution, all while protecting public safety and holding offenders accountable.” JREP is administered by the Northwest Health Foundation Fund II (NWHF) and provides grant awards to culturally specific organizations and culturally responsive services, as defined in SB 1510. The Legislative Assembly directed the CJC to “evaluate the implementation of the Justice Reinvestment Equity Program and monitor the progress of subgrants provided by the Northwest Health Foundation Fund II under section 15 of this 2022 Act.” No later than September 30, 2024, the CJC must submit “a report detailing the progress of the evaluation . . . and include recommendations for additional evaluation needs.” The CJC convened an evaluation advisory group and contracted with two external researchers to facilitate the evaluation. Based on analyses of JREP administrative materials, surveys, secondary data, focus groups, interviews, and engagement with over 150 members of the JREP community, the evaluation advisory group proffers the following recommendations: 1. Support the adoption of community engagement practices that prioritize high levels of involvement, collaboration, and empowerment for all phases of JREP. 2. Provide robust support for equity-centric grantmaking, ensuring that grant administrators have the access, resources, flexibility, and time to effectively meet the diverse needs of grant recipients. 3. Implement leadership development and capacity-building initiatives that support emerging leaders and staff, particularly those with lived experience, to promote resiliency and sustainability among culturally specific organizations and culturally responsive programs. 4. Facilitate the creation and expansion of formal partnerships and collaborative frameworks between culturally specific organizations, culturally responsive programs, and state public safety institutions to promote shared goals and mutual accountability. 5. Develop and implement evaluative criteria that incorporate culturally grounded definitions of success, ensuring that the unique contributions of culturally specific organizations and culturally responsive programs are recognized and supported in legislative outcomes.

Salem: Oregon Criminal Justice Commission, 2024. 48p.

By Vasiliki Georgoulas-Sherry & Hanna Hernandez

Through the use of publicly available data from the National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS) to evaluate sex and racial disparities and disproportionalities, this report, which is part of a series of NIBRS reports, will endeavor to better understand more about the different demographic groups that are most impacted, and how these trends vary by time. Furthermore, this report will assess the demographic differences in the presence of bias motivation, the use of weapons and/ or force, and the presence of familiarity in victimization in NIBRS crimes against society (i.e., offenses that represent society’s prohibitions against certain activities, such as gambling, prostitution, and drug violations - these are typically victimless crimes.

Olympia: Washington State Statistical Analysis Center. 2024. 57p.

By Lauren Knoth-Peterson

Lawmakers are tasked with making decisions about important policy changes. When making these decisions, lawmakers consult a variety of information including discussions with key stakeholders, consideration of public testimony, and analysis of available data. Understanding the potential impacts of a policy change, good or bad, is necessary to make informed policy decisions. Increasingly, lawmakers have access to a variety of impact statements that serve to predict the likely effects of policy changes such as financial impact statements and health impact statements. This report provides an overview of a new type of impact statement – Racial and Ethnic Impact Statements (REISs) – which seek to anticipate the potential impacts of policy changes on different racial and ethnic groups. This report begins with a discussion of the purpose and use of REISs and an overview of the

different characteristics of the processes for producing REISs as implemented in other states. The report then discusses previous work regarding the use of REISs in Washington and provides a look at historical trends of disproportionality in arrests, convictions, and incarceration in Washington. This report concludes with an outline of the processes that the Public Safety Policy and Research Center (PSPRC) intends to use to begin producing REISs for proposed legislation involving criminal justice reforms starting in the 2025 Legislative Session as a service for the Sentencing Guidelines Commission (SGC). Currently, the production of REIS for the legislative session will be limited to the available capacity of the PSPRC. We expect that, in the first year, we will be able to produce statements for 3-5 legislative proposals per legislative session.

Olympia, WA: Washington State Office of Financial Management, Public Safety Policy & Research Center. 2025. 22p.

By Equal Justice Initiative

In 1865, after two and a half centuries of brutal enslavement, Black Americans had great hope that emancipation would finally mean real freedom and opportunity. Most formerly enslaved people in the United States were remarkably willing to live peacefully with those who had held them in bondage despite the violence they had suffered and the degradation they had endured. Emancipated Black people put aside their enslavement and embraced education, hard work, faith, and citizenship with extraordinary enthusiasm and devotion. By 1868, over 80 percent of Black men who were eligible to vote had registered, schools for Black children became a priority, and courageous Black leaders overcame enormous obstacles to win elections to public office. The new era of Reconstruction offered great promise and could have radically changed the history of this country. However, it quickly became clear that emancipation in the United States did not mean equality for Black people. The commitment to abolish chattel slavery was not accompanied by a commitment to equal rights or equal protection for African Americans and the hope of Reconstruction quickly became a nightmare of unparalleled violence and oppression. Between 1865 and 1876, thousands of Black women, men, and children were killed, attacked, sexually assaulted, and terrorized by white mobs and individuals who were shielded from arrest and prosecution. White perpetrators of lawless, random violence against formerly enslaved people were almost never held accountable—instead, they frequently were celebrated. Emboldened Confederate veterans and former enslavers organized a reign of terror that effectively nullified constitutional amendments designed to provide Black people equal protection and the right to vote. In a series of devastating decisions, the United States Supreme Court blocked Congressional efforts to protect formerly enslaved people. In decision after decision, the Court ceded control to the same white Southerners who used terror and violence to stop Black political participation, upheld laws and practices codifying racial hierarchy, and embraced a new constitutional order defined by “states’ rights.” Within a decade after the Civil War, Congress began to abandon the promise of assistance to millions of formerly enslaved Black people. Violence, mass lynchings, and lawlessness enabled white Southerners to create a

regime of white supremacy and Black disenfranchisement alongside a new economic order that continued to exploit Black labor. White officials in the North and West similarly rejected racial equality, codified racial discrimination, and occasionally embraced the same tactics of violent racial control seen in the South.

It was during Reconstruction that a century-long era of racial hierarchy, lynching, white supremacy, and bigotry was established—an era from which this nation has yet to recover. Most Americans know very little about the Reconstruction era and its legacy. Historians have frequently overlooked this critical 12-year period that has had profound impact on life in the United States. Our collective ignorance of what happened immediately after the Civil War has contributed to misinformed stereotypes and misguided false narratives about who is honorable and who is not and has allowed bigotry and a legacy of racial injustice to persist. In 2015, the Equal Justice Initiative issued a new report that detailed over 4,400 documented racial terror lynchings of Black people in America between 1877 and 1950. We now report that during the 12- year period of Reconstruction at least 2,000 Black women, men, and children were victims of racial terror lynchings. Thousands more were assaulted, raped, or injured in racial terror attacks between 1865 and 1876. The rate of documented racial terror lynchings during Reconstruction is nearly three times greater than during the era we reported on in 2015. Dozens of mass lynchings took place during Reconstruction in communities across the country in which hundreds of Black people were killed. Tragically, the rate of unknown lynchings of Black people during Reconstruction is also almost certainly dramatically higher than the thousands of unknown lynchings that took place between 1877 and 1950 for which no documentation can be found. The retaliatory killings of Black people by white Southerners immediately following the Civil War alone likely number in the thousands. EJI presents this report to provide context and analysis of what happened during this tragic period of American history and to describe its implications for the issues we face today. We believe our nation has failed to adequately address or acknowledge our history of racial injustice and that we must commit to a new era of truth-telling followed by meaningful efforts to repair and remedy the continuing legacy of racial oppression. We hope this report sparks much needed conversation and encourages communities to join us in the important task of advancing truth and justice.

Montgomery, AL Equal Justice Initiative, 2021. 119p.

By Ece Kocabıçak

Recent decades have witnessed both a renewed energy in feminist activism and widespread attacks taking back hard-won rights. Despite powerful feminist movements, the Covid-19 pandemic has significantly undermined the progress women have struggled for decades to achieve; how can this be? What explains this paradox of a strong feminist movement coexisting with stubborn patriarchal arrangements? How can we stop the next global catastrophe initiating a similar backlash? This book suggests that the limitations of social theory prevent feminist strategies from initiating transformative changes and achieving permanent gains. It investigates the impact of theoretical shortcomings upon feminist strategies by engaging with two clusters of work: ungendered accounts of capitalist development and theories on gendered oppression and inequality. Decentring feminist theorising grounded in histories and developments of the global North, the book provides an original theory of the patriarchal system by analysing changes within its forms and degrees as well as investigating the relationship between the gender, class and race-ethnicity based inequalities. Turkey offers a case that challenges assumptions and calls for rethinking major feminist categories and theories, thereby shedding light on the dynamics of social change in the global South. The timely intervention of this book is, therefore, crucial for feminist strategies going forward. The book emerges at the intersections between Gender, International Development, Political Economy, and Sociology and its main readership will be found in, but not limited to, these disciplinary fields. The material covered in this book will be of great interest to students and researchers in these areas as well as policy makers and feminist activists. Since publication it has been nominated for the prestigious 2023 British Sociological Association's Philip Adams Memorial Prize.

Abington, Oxon, UK; New York: Routledge, 2023. 208p.

By Anita Say Chan

Predatory Data illuminates the connections between the nineteenth century’s anti‑immigration and eugenics movements and today’s sprawling systems of techno-surveillance and algorithmic discrimination. Historical and globally multisited, the book examines how dispossession, misrecognition, and segregation are being magnified by dominant knowledge institutions in the Age of Big Data. Technological advancement has a history, including efforts to chart a path for alternative futures. Anita Say Chan explores these important parallel stories of defiant refusal and liberatory activism, such as how feminist, immigrant, and other minoritized actors worked to develop alternative data practices. Their methods and traditions, over a century old, continue to reverberate through global justice‑based data initiatives today. Predatory Data charts a path for an alternative historical consciousness grounded in the pursuit of global justice. “Anita Say Chan highlights the power of community‑based alternatives to extractive data that are rooted in feminist, people of color, and Indigenous perspectives.

Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 2025. 263p.

By Éloi Laurent

This is an open access title available under the terms of a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 License. It is free to read, download and share on Elgaronline.com. This innovative book promotes a holistic, pragmatic and proactive approach to just transitions. Arguing that justice is both a goal and condition of transitions it rearticulates environmental and social challenges and rethinks the policies designed to overcome them

Cheltenham, UK · Northampton, MA: E. Elgar Press, 2024. 136p.

By Noor Huda Ismail

SYNOPSIS

The rapid spread of extremist ideologies through social media, combined with global conflicts and the manipulation of religious content, plays a significant role in online radicalisation. The emotional amplification of conflicts and the distortion of religious teachings underscore the urgent need for stronger social media regulation, enhanced digital literacy, and access to authentic religious guidance. To effectively combat radicalisation, a comprehensive and multi-faceted approach is essential to protect individuals and societies from the harmful effects of extremist ideologies in the digital age.

COMMENTARY

In November 2024, three Singaporeans, influenced by online radicalisation, were detained under the Internal Security Act for attempting to engage in armed violence overseas. Unlike the usual recruitment methods, they were self-radicalised through digital content, particularly those related to the Israel-Hamas conflict.

This incident underscores the growing role social media plays in the spread of extremist ideologies, where radicalisation occurs rapidly through videos, memes, and encrypted messages. The digital age accelerates radicalisation, often making it difficult to detect until violent actions ensue.

So, what makes the digital age uniquely dangerous in terms of radicalisation? How do global conflicts like that between Israel and Hamas contribute to this trend? And, most importantly, how is religious content being distorted to fuel extremism in this age of instant communication?

S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, NTU Singapore, 2025. 5p.

By The Australian Human Rights Commission

A study is being undertaken into the prevalence, nature and impact of racism in Australian universities for both staff and students, at the individual and systemic level. This interim report outlines how this will be done and provides initial insights reflecting stakeholder feedback, emerging themes and early issues for consideration. It highlights a range of concerns from both students and staff in relation to their experience of racism on university campuses.

Racism in universities is a long-standing problem, with research showing it is a persistent and systemic issue for students and staff from First Nations and other negatively racialised backgrounds. The severity of recent incidents of antisemitism and Islamophobia combined with other experiences of racism across different groups, creates an urgent need to act decisively.

The findings reveal trends in racism and structural discrimination with significant impacts on wellbeing, participation and performance. At the conclusion of the study, the Commission will deliver comprehensive research findings and recommendations on how to effectively address and reduce racism, in all its forms, at universities.

Key findings

First Nations students and staff – Indigenous participants report enduring structural and interpersonal racism.

Jewish students and staff – Jewish students and staff cited a rise in antisemitism including extremist propaganda, intimidation and exclusion.

Palestinian, Arab, and Muslim students and staff – participants described hostility, threats and discriminatory practices, including restrictions on cultural expression and prayer spaces.

African and Asian students and staff – African students and staff frequently encountered severe racism, often feeling the need to moderate their natural ways of expressing themselves. Asian participants reported being stereotyped as high achieving but limited to specific academic disciplines.

International students – reports of exclusion, social isolation and fears of visa repercussions were common. Many felt reduced, viewed as ‘cash cows’ for universities.

Sydney: Australian Human Rights Commission, 2024. 137p

Edited by María do Mar Castro Varela and Barış Ülker

How is tolerance reflected in urban space? Which urban actors are involved in the practices and narratives of tolerance? What are the limits of tolerance? The edited volume answers these questions by considering different forms of urban in/exclusion and participatory citizenship. By drawing together disparate yet critical writings, Doing Tolerance examines the production of space, urban struggles and tactics of power from an interdisciplinary perspective. Illustrating the paradoxes within diverse interactions, the authors focus on the conflict between heterogeneous groups of the governed, on the one hand, and the governing in urban spaces, on the other. Above all, the volume explores the divergences and convergences of participatory citizenship, as they are revealed in urban space through political, socio-economic and cultural conditions and the entanglements of social mobilities.

Verlag Barbara Budrich: Opladen • Berlin • Toronto 2020. 278p.

By Liam Duffy

Salman Rushdie finally sensed that normality was returning to his life, some 33 years after Ayatollah Khomeini’s four paragraph fatwa called for his murder. “Nowadays my life is very normal again,” he told German magazine Stern in an interview over the summer of 2022. Just two weeks later, he was knifed multiple times on stage in Chautauqua, New York. Having evaded the fatwa’s enforcers for so long, one had finally penetrated the layer of secrecy and security which had followed Rushdie for his own protection all those years. Rushdie survived, but has lost sight in one eye and the use of one of his hands. The story which led to this point is by now well known. On Valentine’s Day 1989, Ayatollah Khomeini, the Supreme Leader of Iran, called for the British-Indian author’s death in a fatwa, offering financial and spiritual reward to any Muslim willing to carry out the murder. The assassination order also extended to anyone connected to the publication and promotion of Rushdie’s novel, The Satanic Verses. There are various elements to the novel that were perceived to be insulting to Islam and the Prophet Muhammad. These will not be detailed at length here, save to say that the novel’s title refers to verses in the Quran which were relayed to Muhammad as the word of God, but later revealed to be a deceptive ploy by the devil. In English, these verses were sometimes referred to as the Satanic verses. The novel itself recounts and reimagines episodes in the life of Muhammad. Although the novel’s publication was met with protest in various parts of the world (including the United Kingdom), it was Khomeini’s fatwa that ignited the affair into a global controversy. It transformed not only Rushdie’s life but the relationship between the West and the Muslim world, as well as between Western states and their growing Muslim populations. As Kenan Malik put it in From Fatwa to Jihad: “With his four-paragraph pronouncement, the ayatollah had transcended the traditional frontiers of Islam and brought the whole world under his jurisdiction. At the same time, he helped relocate the confrontation between Islam and the West, which until then had been played out largely in the Middle East and south Asia, into the heart of western Europe. For the West, Islam was now a domestic issue.” This is not to mention the impact on the individuals concerned. There were attempts on the lives of publishers, promoters, and translators in Japan, Italy, Turkey, and Norway. The first assassin to successfully complete his task murdered Hitoshi Igarashi, Japanese translator of The Satanic Verses, in a frenzied attack outside of his office at Tsukuba University in 1991. Like so many of these incidents, the perpetrator was able to slip away and never face justice. The most tragic episode of the affair would unfold in Anatolia, Turkey, where a riled-up crowd would set the Madimak Hotel ablaze, targeting a secularist activist who had translated excerpts of The Satanic Verses in a newspaper. Their target, Aziz Nesin, would escape the inferno but 37 people would not. Owing to the fatwa, Rushdie spent much of his life in hiding, always on the move, with his public appearances tightly controlled. But just as the fatwa was fading from memory, it remained every bit as valid—and lethal—as the day it was pronounced. As The Atlantic’s Graeme Wood explains, “fatwas cannot be rescinded posthumously,” and so the bounty still “hung in the air like a putrid smell, inhaled deeply for inspiration by devout followers of Khomeini and his successors.” The fatwa also helped set the precedent for later blasphemy affairs and controversies. To Hassan Nasrallah, the secretary-general of Hezbollah, there was little doubt that later blasphemy affairs were connected. During the fallout from the 2005 Jyllands-Posten cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad, he complained that “if any Muslim had carried out the fatwa of Imam Khomeini against the apostate Salman Rushdie, those despicable people would not have dared to insult the Prophet Muhammad.” The logic of the fatwa, and of the violence was not only punishment, but deterrence. The fatwa would also cross the sectarian divide in Islam. Part of its logic was for the Shia regime in Tehran to assert itself over their Sunni rivals in Saudi Arabia for de facto leadership of global Islam. This did not stop the Shia regime’s power play from energizing Sunni Islamist movements the world over, including the indirect empowerment of legal, non-violent Islamist groups in the West. As Western governments scrambled for interlocutors with the suddenly vocal “Muslim community,” offshoots of organizations like the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood or Jamaat-e-Islami were happy to fill that hole. As will be returned to later in the discussion, on blasphemy too, one sees the ideological distance between jihadists and other Islamist movements reduce. After the initial round of violence connected to The Satanic Verses, much of which bears the fingerprints of the regime in Tehran and its proxies, the Sunni jihadists of al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (IS) would later lead the bloodshed against blasphemers. Islamists of all stripes and from across the spectrum of non-violence to violent jihadists would, at various times, jostle to take the initiative on blasphemy disputes and position themselves as the true defenders of Islam. On some occasions and for political expediency, they would take the backseat in blasphemy affairs, waiting for the right moment to capitalize. This demonstrates that for all their professed zeal and the alleged offence taken, strategic thinking can in some cases take precedence, even when it comes to insulting Islam. Allegations of insulting Islam and the Prophet Muhammad have often carried dire and bloody consequences globally. The Jyllands-Posten cartoons affair, for instance, sparked rioting and unrest around the world in which hundreds died. Other events have reverberated similarly, such as the demonstrations, violence, and internet blackouts which greeted the uploading of a trailer for the film The Innocence of Muslims to YouTube. This report will focus on the bloody consequences of those allegations and accusations against individuals and institutions in the West, detailing both the plots and the successful attacks directed against those perceived to have insulted Islam and the Prophet. Also included are those plots where blasphemy has been cited as the motivation, but their target is not the alleged transgressor.

New York: The Counter Extremism Project (CEP) , 2023. 46p.

By Global Project Against Hate and Extremism (GPAHE)

Post-war far-right movements have primarily been concerned with domestic issues, preferring to focus on national sovereignty over foreign entanglements, and interested predominantly in their particular domestic landscape. This is in contrast to traditional left-wing movements, particularly socialists and communists, which historically organized across borders.

But things have fundamentally changed in recent years, as an extensive far-right international network has developed over the past two decades. Nowadays, campaigns undertaken in one country by far-right groups and influencers leap quickly across borders and are adopted wholesale by others on the far right.

Key to this policy and campaign coordination are transnational far-right conferences, where movement leaders and supporters from multiple countries share their ideas. Through these interactions, relationships among far-right actors have deepened, creating a truly transnational movement that shares ideological positions, policy preferences, targets, tactics, and strategies. The support this transnational network provides has contributed to the global spread of far-right extremist ideologies.

Far-right activists are forthright about their global ambitions, which often target marginalized communities, restrict human rights, and push for more illiberal democratic systems.

To gain further insight into the far right, the Global Project Against Hate and Extremism (GPAHE) compiled a dataset of speakers and organizations involved in far-right conferences held between 2000 and 2024. The dataset includes 3,000 individuals representing 1,800 organizations, and 302 conferences that occurred in 35 countries during this 24-year time period.

In the 302 events analyzed, there were speakers from nearly every country in North America, South America, and Europe, as well as a significant number of participants from parts of Africa and Asia. Though the dataset is large, it still likely underrepresents the true number of events and participants during that period, since GPAHE only looked at speakers, not all attendees.

GPAHE’s data reveals a startling — and strengthening — network of events and speakers that has helped spread a global pandemic of far-right extremism.

Many of those conferences have continued over years, if not decades, expanding their audiences and demonstrating that far-right ideologies increasingly transcend national borders.

Birmingham, AL: Global Project Against Hate and Extremism (GPAHE) 2024.

By Ioli Filmeridis, Rachel Hodel, Thomas Oliver,

Targeted threats, harassment, and the perpetration of physical violence against elected officials are increasingly prevalent around the world. The United States and Southern California are no exception. Local leaders - the most foundational representatives of the democratic processes that undergird our system of government - face unprecedented levels of uncivil and anti- democratic threats, harassment, and attacks. 1 The language, actions and mobilization targeting elected officials is often intended to

intimidate and silence individuals and can lead to their resignation, self-censorship, or disengagement from public meetings and interactions with constituents. The tactics are often purposeful, intended to achieve a political goal with a chilling effect on politics and policy. This type of political violence (the use of force or violence to achieve political objectives) has been increasingly common and prevalent, marked by an increase in threats against public officials at all levels of government. 2 By nearly all measures, political violence is considered to be more acceptable in the US than it was five years ago. 3 Faith in the government's ability to resolve issues and ‘do the right thing’ has declined to the lowest levels in over 70 years. 4 This disillusionment and polarization is concomitant with the rising number of threats targeting public officials. 5 According to the United States Capitol Police, the number of threats targeting members of Congress went up 45% between 2018 and 2022 (from 5,206 to 7,501 over five years),

requiring additional investment of resources and funding to investigate, protect and mitigate threats. Other research reveals a spike in federal charges in response to threats made against public officials - almost doubling between 2016 and 2022. During the 2013- 2016 period there were 38 federal charges per year, in the subsequent six-year period this reached 62 charges per year. Initial research for 2023 and 2024 has recorded an even higher number of charges.

San Diego: University of San Diego, Kroc Institute for Peace and Justice. 2024. 51p.

By Elena B. Stavrevska, Nattecia Nerene Bohardsingh, María Dolores Hernández Montoya, Tania Cecilia Martínez, Briana Mawby and Aliza Carns

Violence has traditionally been viewed through the lens of armed conflict or specific, concrete violent incidents. However, it is necessary to understand that violence may be a chronic phenomenon— a persistent, deeply ingrained aggression affecting daily lives. Chronic violence, as conceptualized in the work of authors including Tani Adams and Jenny Pearce, is embedded in societal structures, often perpetuated by socio-economic disparities, political instability and cultural norms. This report contributes to the study of chronic violence in three distinct ways: this

research centers gendered experiences and perspectives on chronic violence; the findings are based on the insights and research of authors living in contexts experiencing chronic violence; and the report focuses primarily on the connection between national- and international-level policies and frameworks to address chronic violence. Women and marginalized gender groups experience a particular type of chronic violence, stemming from deeply rooted patriarchal structures. These experiences, while diverse, share a common thread: they are manifestations of systemic oppression and inequality, from domestic violence to broader societal discrimination. The report makes the case for reconceptualizing violence in the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) and gender equality fields, building upon feminist conceptions of the continuum of violence to recognize that societal structures, systemic discrimination and even pervasive cultural norms can be sources of violence. This comprehensive view has significant implications for policy, demanding multisectoral strategies that address not just symptoms but the root causes. This report illuminates the pervasive issue of chronic violence, especially its gendered dimensions, and advocates for comprehensive approaches to understanding and addressing it. Multidimensional strategies, inclusive policies and a global commitment are needed to elevate women’s roles across sectors, from community development to high-level peace negotiations. Understanding the deep intricacies of violence can serve as the bedrock for constructing sustainable, equitable peace. The analysis presented here reveals the following key findings: iv Chronic violence is pervasive and endemic, not episodic. Chronic violence affects women and LGBTQ+ people in distinct ways. A nuanced understanding of violence is necessary. Women are key actors in addressing chronic violence. Holistic, people-centered approaches at the international, national and local levels are imperative.

San Diego:

Joan B. Kroc Institute for Peace & Justice, University of San Diego,

2023, 74p.

By David J. Bier

In “The Lifetime Fiscal Impact of Immigrants” (2024), the Manhattan Institute (MI) constructed a sophisticated model to estimate the likely lifetime fiscal e!ect of new immigrants on the US federal budget. MI concludes that the average immigrant will be fiscally positive a modest $10,000 in present value over a lifetime but that immigrants without a bachelor’s degree will be extremely fiscally negative. MI projects that the recent increase in migration will cost the federal government over $1.1 trillion over a century. A careful review of MI’s model finds that this result hinges on several unlikely assumptions, such as new arrivals causing large, immediate increases in defense spending, and no increase in corporate tax payments. When more realistic assumptions are adopted, MI’s model indicates that young, low-skilled immigrants will produce a positive lifetime contribution to the federal budget. For instance, the fiscal e!ect for a 22-year-old high school dropout changes from a negative $315,000 to a positive $45,000. After making revisions, including accounting for lower rates of benefits usage by immigrants, the model predicts the new group of unlawful entrants will likely be positive an aggregate $4.9 trillion.

Cato Institute, Working Paper, no 82

Washington, DC: Cato Institute 2024. 22p.