The Open Access Publisher and Free Library
12-weapons.jpg

WEAPONS

WEAPONS-TRAFFICKING-CRIME-MASS SHOOTINGS

Posts in social sciences
Web Trafficking: Analysing the Online Trade of Small Arms and Light Weapons in Libya

By N.R. Jenzen-Jones and Ian McCollum

Access to arms and munitions in Libya continues to be critical to both non-state and state-supported armed groups across the ideological spectrum, as well as to individuals. Firearms play an important role in everyday life for many Libyans, often serving a dual-purpose role for those associated with militia units. Regardless of their affiliation, many Libyans keep firearms to defend their homes and businesses, and for personal protection outside the home. Distrust of the rival governments; their militias; the police and armed forces; and various tribal, ethnic, and other groups is widely expressed.1 These sentiments are echoed in mainstream media reporting and academic research from 2012 to the present.

Geneva: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, 2017. 112p.

At the Crossroads of Sahelian Conflicts: Insecurity, Terrorism, and Arms Trafficking in Niger

By Savannah de Tessières

This Report from the Small Arms Survey’s Security Assessment in North Africa (SANA) project examines insecurity, terrorism, and trafficking in Niger.The Sahel hosts multiple conflicts with myriad armed actors destabilizing the entire region. Positioned at the heart of this region, Niger sits at the crossroads of terrorism, trafficking, and conflict. The Nigerien state has great difficulty in guaranteeing domestic security, which has a devastating impact on social and economic development, in addition to it reinforcing tensions and fueling local conflicts. Older tensions become locked into new insecurity dynamics, such as terrorism, further complicating any future resolutions. Armed banditry, trafficking of weapons and drugs, violent community disputes, and the rise in terrorist attacks are all symptomatic of the State’s struggles. At the Crossroads of Sahelian Conflicts: Insecurity, Terrorism, and Arms Trafficking in Niger, authored by Savannah de Tessières, a senior consultant to the Survey, draws on extensive fieldwork in the regions of Agadez, Diffa, and Niamey. This included examinations of arms and ammunition seized across the country, as well as dozens of interviews with national and international government and security officials, civil society representatives, gold diggers, former rebels, and other experts.

Geneva: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, 2008. 114p.

From Legal to Lethal: Converted Firearms in Europe

By Nicolas Florquin and Benjamin King

Criminals purchase weapons unable to fire live ammunition legally and at low costs across Europe, converting them into lethal firearms with little to no training or expertise. The Small Arms Survey report From Legal to Lethal: Converted Firearms in Europe provides a detailed examination on the topic. Users of converted firearms include petty criminals, organized crime groups, and terrorist actors. Certain conversion techniques require some level of technical skills, but converters also make use of online, open-source tutorials to convert weapons relatively easily. While Europe has faced a range of converted weapons over the past decades, two main types of readily convertible firearms have entered into the illicit arms market in recent years: Slovak-origin acoustic expansion weapons (AEWs)—as used by Amedy Coulibaly in the Montrouge and Hypercacher Paris attacks in 2015; and Turkish-manufactured alarm pistols—currently the most prevalent converted firearm in Europe.

Geneva: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, 2018. 70p.

Weapons Compass: Mapping Illicit Small Arms Flows in Africa

By Nicolas Florquin, Sigrid Lipott, Francis Wairagu

In the first-ever continental analysis of illicit arms flows in Africa, the African Union Commission and the Small Arms Survey identify the scale, availability, characteristics, and supply patterns of illicit small arms in Africa. The African Union (AU) Master Roadmap of Practical Steps to Silence the Guns in Africa by Year 2020 was adopted in January 2017 and sets out practical steps to address the underlying drivers of conflict as well as the tools and enablers of violence. Preventing the illicit flows of weapons within Africa, including to conflict zones, is a vital component of the AU Roadmap, and this report aims to provide AU member states with a synthesis of relevant information on the topic. Weapons Compass: Mapping Illicit Small Arms Flows in Africa finds that cross-border trafficking by land is the most prominent type of illicit arms flow affecting countries on the continent. The weapons trafficked comprise both those sourced from within the continent—such as legacy weapons recycled from earlier conflicts and weapons diverted from national stockpiles—as well as arms sourced from other parts of the world, including embargo-breaking transfers from the Middle East and Eastern Europe. The report provides practical recommendations for AU member states to tackle illicit arms flows by noting specific assessments that can be generated to fill knowledge gaps; practical guidance and tools to develop; and ways in which to support and coordinate the implementation of those recommended actions.

Geneva: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, 2019. 100[p.

Making the Rounds: Illicit Ammunition in Ukraine

By Matt Schroeder and Olena Shumska

Making the Rounds: Illicit Ammunition in Ukraine finds that thousands of hand grenades, rockets, mortar rounds, landmines, and tins of firearms cartridges have proliferated throughout Ukraine, including to areas located far from the conflict zone in the east. Presenting findings from a comprehensive review of imagery and information on illicit ammunition trafficked to, from, and within Ukraine, the report includes an analysis of markings on more than 1,600 seized hand grenades, shoulder-fired rockets, ammunition tins, and anti-personnel landmines. The report reveals the types and sources of illicit ammunition in the country, as well as the modes of transport and smuggling techniques used by Ukrainian arms traffickers and their co-conspirators abroad. The analysis shows that the overwhelming majority of the 1,600 items analyzed were Soviet-designed models produced in Eastern European and Soviet factories prior to the dissolution of the USSR. Curbing the threat to local and regional security posed by this ammunition requires a long-term, coordinated effort by Ukrainian authorities and the international community.

Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2021. 68p.

The West Africa–Sahel Connection: Mapping Cross-border Arms Trafficking

ByFiona Mangan and Matthias Nowak

This Briefing Paper from the Small Arms Survey maps cross-border arms trafficking in West Africa and the Sahel through case studies on Niger, Mali, Guinea-Bissau, and the two tri-border areas of Burkina Faso–Côte d’Ivoire–Mali, and Ghana–Côte d’Ivoire–Burkina Faso. The study reveals that highly organized trafficking networks move sizable arms quantities across large areas of land north of the Niger River. Arms trafficking south of the river is more characterized by lower-level arms flows and local intermediaries engaging in so-called ‘ant trade’. Actors range from long-established criminals, corrupt officials, and organized trafficking rings, to tribal networks and low-level transporters. Based on field research, The West Africa–Sahel Connection: Mapping Cross-border Arms Trafficking analyzes the links between illicit arms trafficking and other forms of trafficking and organized crime in the region. The study also looks into the impacts of such arms trafficking as well as the responses to it.

Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2019. 24p.

Stray Bullets: The Impact of Small Arms Misuse in Central America

By William Godnick, with Robert Muggah and Camilla Waszink

This paper provides a review of the impact of small arms and light weapons in Central America in the years following the end of the armed hostilities of the 1980s and early 1990s. In this instance, ‘Central America’ refers to the Spanish-speaking countries of the isthmus—Costa Rica, Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Panama. The definition of small arms and light weapons used here is the one set out by the UN (1997), and covers a wide range of weaponry, including commercial firearms and military weapons that can be used by an individual soldier or small crew.1 ‘Small arms’, ‘firearms’, and ‘weapons’ are used more or less interchangeably in the paper. Military and civilian firearms are the principal focus, but because of the type of violence affecting present-day Central America, other weapons such as hand grenades and home-made pistols are also discussed. Homicide rates, and more specifically firearm-related homicide rates, are the primary indicators used to gauge the impact of weapons on Central American societies. Other indicators given more anecdotal consideration here include armed crime and injury rates, the growth in the private security industry, the costs of firearm-related violence to the public health system, the impact of such crimes on the economy and the effects of armed violence on governance in remote rural areas.

Geneva: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International Studies, 2002. 51p.

Missing Pieces: Directions for reducing gun violence through the UN process on small arms control

By Kate Buchanan

This publication identifies a number of areas where additional steps are needed to tackle the availability and misuse of small arms. It points to promising policy initiatives, draws on lessons learned, and sets out recommendations for action. The main themes addressed are:- Preventing misuse- Controlling supply- Providing assistance to survivors of gun violence- Focusing on gender- Taking guns and ammunition out of circulation- Addressing the demand for small arms- Justice and security sector governance. This publication is designed specifically for government representatives, to provide a compelling people-centred agenda for the next phase of multilateral small arms activity, and will be widely distributed in the lead-up to the UN Review Conference on small arms.

Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 162p.

Gun-Running in Papua New Guinea: From Arrows to Assault Weapons in the Southern Highlands

By Philip Alpers

This field study focuses on PNG's Southern Highlands Province, a conspicuous hot spot for armed violence and gun-related injury. It provides a preliminary tally of illegal high-powered guns in parts of the province seen as particularly vulnerable to armed violence, and documents the profound disruption wrought by their misuse. Tribal fighters, mercenary gunmen, and criminals provide details of their illicit firearms and ammunition, trafficking routes, and prices paid. The most common illegal assault weapon is the Australian-made self-loading rifle, followed by the US-made M16, both of which are sourced primarily from PNG Defence Force stocks. Many of the remainder are AR-15s obtained from the PNG police.

Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2005. 138p.

A Study of Pre-Attack Behaviors of Active Shooters in the United States Between 2000 and 2013

By James Silver; Andre Simons; and Sarah Craun

"In 2017 there were 30 separate active shootings in the United States, the largest number ever recorded by the FBI during a one-year period. With so many attacks occurring, it can become easy to believe that nothing can stop an active shooter determined to commit violence. [...] Faced with so many tragedies, society routinely wrestles with a fundamental question: can anything be done to prevent attacks on our loved ones, our children, our schools, our churches, concerts, and communities? There is cause for hope because there is something that can be done. In the weeks and months before an attack, many active shooters engage in behaviors that may signal impending violence. While some of these behaviors are intentionally concealed, others are observable and -- if recognized and reported -- may lead to a disruption prior to an attack. Unfortunately, well-meaning bystanders (often friends and family members of the active shooter) may struggle to appropriately categorize the observed behavior as malevolent. [...] Once reported to law enforcement, those in authority may also struggle to decide how best to assess and intervene, particularly if no crime has yet been committed. By articulating the concrete, observable pre-attack behaviors of many active shooters, the FBI hopes to make these warning signs more visible and easily identifiable. This information is intended to be used not only by law enforcement officials, mental health care practitioners, and threat assessment professionals, but also by parents, friends, teachers, employers and anyone who suspects that a person is moving towards violence."

Washington, DC: U.S.. Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2018. 30p.

Cashing in on Guns: Identifying the Nexus between Small Arms, Light Weapons and Terrorist Financing

By Tanya Mehra, Méryl Demuynck, Colin P. Clarke, Nils Duquet, Cameron Lumley, Matthew Wentworth

This report presents the main findings of ICCT’s year-long research project on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) as a source of terrorism financing. Chapters 2 and 3 take a regional focus and explore this phenomenon in respectively West Africa and the Middle East. Chapter 4 then investigates the possible role that DDR programmes can play in reducing SALW flows. Chapter 5 assesses the existing legal and policy frameworks from a multitude of angles. Chapter 6 reflects on the short and long-term implications the possession and identified use of SALW by terrorist groups has for Europe. The final chapter considers the various direct and indirect ways through which terrorists are ‘Cashing in on Guns’, and lists a number of policy recommendations for the EU to take a step forward in addressing this phenomenon.

The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2021. 147p.

Final Report of the Federal Commission on School Safety

By The Federal Commission on School Safety

Communities across the country are responding to school violence with a number of measures, including assigned school resource officers (SRO). School administrations, law enforcement agencies, families, and community stakeholders are diligently working to protect children and education personnel from school attacks. The National Police Foundation (NPF), in collaboration with the COPS Office, created the Averted School Violence (ASV) database in 2015 as a platform for law enforcement, school staff, and mental health professionals to share information about ASV incidents and lessons learned with the goal of mitigating and ultimately preventing future injuries and fatalities in educational institutions. The database includes school incidents beginning with the Columbine High School attack (1999) and continuing to the present day. The NPF has partnered with stakeholder groups National Association of School Resource Officers (NASRO) and the International Association of Campus Law Enforcement Administrators (IACLEA) to conduct research and analysis on improving school safety. This report examines a dozen case studies of targeted violence incidents thwarted by the positive and often heroic actions of classmates, school administrators, SROs, and law enforcement agencies. It also includes recommendations and lessons learned from all cases in the ASV database. In addition, a companion publication entitled Targeted Violence Averted: College and University Case Studies presents information on post-secondary averted violence incidents and lessons learned to support student safety.

Washington, DC: Department of Education, Department of Health and Human Services, Department of Homeland Security and Department of Justice, 2018. 180p.

School Resource Officers: Averted School Violence Special Report

By Jeff Allison, Mo Canady, and Frank G. Straub

Tuesday, April 20, 1999, was sadly the last day of school for the seniors of Columbine High School in Littleton, Colorado. On that day, two 12th-grade students armed with a semiautomatic pistol, two shotguns, and a rifle murdered a teacher and 12 of their fellow students; an additional 21 people were injured by gunfire, and three were injured escaping from the school. The perpetrators took their own lives in the school library where they had killed most of their victims. At the beginning of the attack, one of the shooters exchanged gunfire outside with the school resource officer (SRO). While the Columbine shooting inarguably contributed to the expanded deployment of SROs in schools, it was not the advent of school-based law enforcement in the United States. There are indications in the research literature that Flint, Michigan, assigned a police officer to its schools in 1953, and the Fresno (California) Police Department first assigned plainclothes officers to its elementary and middle schools in 1968 (West and Fries 1995). The Fresno initiative was an attempt to enhance police-community relations specifically with youth. The federal impetus for increasing the number of SROs can be traced in part to the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 as well as the Gun-Free Schools Act of 1994. The Cops in School program, funded by the U.S. Department of Justice Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS Office), grew out of the former statute. The latter statute was enacted in response to juvenile and gang violence. Soon after the tragedy at Columbine, which at the time was the worst mass casualty shooting at a school in the United States, the U.S. Department of Education (DoED) and the U.S. Secret Service undertook a study of past school shootings to identify factors that might help prevent future targeted school attacks (Vossekuil et al. 2004). The key recommendation from that study was that all schools should establish behavior threat assessment teams. The report recommended that school administrators, law enforcement officers (especially SROs), teachers, and counselors participate in these teams to address concerning behavior by members of the school community.

Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services. 2020. 44p.

Five Misconceptions About School Shootings

By Peter Langman, Anthony Petrosino, and Hannah Sutherland

School shootings are the subject of debate in the media and in communities across the United States, and there is much discussion about prevention and the root causes of such attacks. But what does research say about these tragic events and their perpetrators? Do all shooters fit a specific profile? And what meaningful steps can schools and communities take to reduce the likelihood of these events? In concise, clear language, this research brief, produced by the WestEd Justice & Prevention Research Center, describes and refutes five common misconceptions about school shootings and suggests an evidence-based strategy to reduce the probability of attacks. The authors conclude that schools and communities are better served when presented with a balanced perspective informed by the wealth of available research about perpetrators, their varying motivations, and pre-attack behaviors.

San Francisco, CA: WestEd Justice and Prevention Research Center, 2018. 5p.

Policy Solutions to Address Mass Shootings

By Michael Rocque, Grant Duwe, Michael Siegel, James Alan Fox, Max Goder-Reiser, and Emma E. Fridel

In the past decade, mass shootings, particularly those that take place in public areas, have increasingly become part of the national conversation in the United States. Mass public shootings instill widespread fear, in part because of their seeming randomness and unpredictability. Yet when these incidents occur, which has been with somewhat greater frequency and lethality as of late, public calls for policy responses are immediate. In this policy brief, we review efforts to evaluate the effect of gun control measures on mass public shootings, including a discussion of our recently published study on the relationship between state gun laws and the incidence and severity of these shootings. The findings of this work point to gun permits and bans on large capacity magazines as having promise in reducing (a) mass public shooting rates and (b) mass public shooting victimization, respectively. Interestingly, however, most gun laws that we examined, including assault weapon bans, do not appear to be causally related to the rate of mass public shootings.

Albany, NY: Rockefeller Institute of Government, 2021. 20p.

The Way of the Gun: Estimating Firearms Traffic Across the U.S. Mexico Border

By Topher McDougal, David A. Shirk, Robert Muggah and John H. Patterson

Mexico is experiencing a surge in gun-related violence since 2006. Yet Mexico does not manufacture small arms, light weapons or ammunition in sizeable quantity. Moreover, Mexico has some of the most restrictive gun legislation in the world. It is assumed that a considerable proportion of weapons in Mexico are illegal, most having been trafficked from the United States (U.S.). The volume of firearms sold in the United States and trafficked across the U.S.-Mexico border, however, is notoriously difficult to record. Previous attempts have involved multiplicative approximations based upon the quantity of arms confiscated at the border.

San Diego: Trans-Border Institute, University of San Diego; Rio de Janeiro, Brazil: Igarapé Institute, 2013. 31p.

The School Shooter: A Threat Assessment Perspective.

By Mary Ellen O'Toole

This paper presents a systematic procedure for threat assessment and intervention of school shooters. The model is designed to be used by educators, mental-health professionals, and law-enforcement agencies and is intended to help refine and strengthen the efforts of the National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime. Its fundamental building blocks are its threat-assessment standards, which provide a framework for evaluating a spoken, written, and symbolic threat, along with a four-pronged assessment approach, which looks at the personality of the student, the student's family dynamics, the school dynamics, the student's role in those dynamics, and social dynamics. The model is not a profile of the school shooter or a checklist of danger signs pointing to the next adolescent who will bring lethal violence to a school. It discusses misinformation about school shootings; how to assess a threat, including motivations; types of threats; factors in threat assessment; and levels of risk. The document cautions that one or two traits or characteristics should not be considered in isolation or given more weight than the others. The text outlines the intervention process and closes with a number of recommendations. Four appendices list methodologies used in the report, suggested readings, and other information. (RJM)

Quantico, VA: Critical Incident Response Group (CIRG), National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime (NCAVC), FBI Academy , 1999. 52p.

Lethal Violence in Schools: A National Study

By Edward Gaughan, Jay D. Cerio, and Robert A. Myers

American public schools are safe places, perhaps even safer than American homes. The tragic school shootings that are the focus of this report have occurred in less than one-hundredth of one percent of schools. The probability of being shot at school is similarly low. But shootings have occurred at schools, have been largely unpredictable, and have raised the anxieties and concerns of students, families, teachers, and the public at large. Between 1974 and 2000, the National Threat Assessment Center (NTAC) of the United States Secret Service identified 37 incidents. At least 20 incidents have been reported in the national media since 1992, and eight since 1999, and these do not include several planned shootings that were prevented by authorities. Why do these shootings occur? Why do they occur where they do? What can we do to protect our children?

Alfred, NY: Alfred University, 2001. 44p.

K-12:Education: Characteristics of School Shootings

By J,M, Nowicki

GAO found that shootings at K-12 schools most commonly resulted from disputes or grievances, for example, between students or staff, or between gangs, although the specific characteristics of school shootings over the past 10 years varied widely, according to GAO’s analysis of the Naval Postgraduate School’s K-12 School Shooting Database. (See figure.) After disputes and grievances, accidental shootings were most common, followed closely by school-targeted shootings, such as those in Parkland, Florida and Santa Fe, Texas.

Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2020. 58p.

Mass Shootings in Schools and Risk Mitigation Through Target hardening

By Jay Van Kirk

Mass shootings occur on a regular basis in the United States, and depending on the definitions applied to the shootings an argument can be made that mass shootings of all types occur far more often than what is reported in the media as a “mass shooting.” Unfortunately, school shootings are also part of this analysis of mass shootings, and school shootings in the United States have occurred on a recurring basis since at least 1853. In the modern era, however, school shootings have become more frequent and more deadly as demonstrated by the May 24th, 2022, school shooting in Uvalde, Texas. This heinous crime at Robb Elementary School resulted in the deaths of nineteen children, and two teachers. Although there has been extensive research on mass shooters, mass shootings, and mass shootings in schools, there has not been enough emphasis on the application of homeland javascript:void(0);security principles of target hardening in schools as a risk mitigation factor for mass shootings. In fact, there is much that can be done to keep schools safe through basic target hardening measures, and many of these security updates can be immediately undertaken at the state and local level with relatively minor additional cost to schools and the taxpaying public. This paper references the mass shooting on February 14, 2018, at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School in Parkland, Florida, and makes policy recommendations toward basic target hardening measures which may be applied as necessary within the public school K-12 environment. The school shooting at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School was selected due to the fact that it has been recently investigated regarding the facts and circumstances of the incident, and provides ample information for analysis of effective target hardening measures.

Des Moines, IA: Des Moines Area Community College, 2022. 17p.