By John H. Boman IV & Owen Gallupe 

In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, state-level governments across the United States issued mandatory stay-at-home orders around the end of March 2020. Though intended to stop the spread of the COVID-19 virus, the lockdowns have had sweeping impacts on life in ways which were not originally planned. This study’s purpose is to investigate the extent to which governmental responses to COVID-19 have impacted crime rates in the U.S. Compared to the pre-pandemic year of 2019, crime – as measured by calls for service to law enforcement – has decreased markedly. However, there are multiple indications that the crime drop is being driven by decreases in minor offenses which are typically committed in peer groups. At the same time, serious crimes which are generally not committed with co-offenders (namely homicide and intimate partner violence) have either remained constant or increased. As such, the crime drop appears to be hiding a very disturbing trend where homicides remain unchanged and intimate partner batteries are increasing. Since many offenders would presumably be committing less serious crimes in a non-pandemic world, we raise attention to the possibility that mandatory lockdown orders may have taken minor offenders and placed them into situations where there is rampant opportunity for intimate partner violence, serious batteries, and homicides. While crime in the U.S. appears to be down overall, this good news should not blind us to a troubling co-occurring reality – a reality that paints a dim picture of unintended consequences to public health and criminal justice finances as a result of COVID-19 lockdowns.

American Journal of Criminal Justice, 2020. 9p.

By Michael T. Light, Jingying Hea, and Jason P. Robey

We make use of uniquely comprehensive arrest data from the Texas Department of Public Safety to compare the criminality of undocumented immigrants to legal immigrants and native-born US citizens between 2012 and 2018. We find that undocumented immigrants have substantially lower crime rates than native-born citizens and legal immigrants across a range of felony offenses. Relative to undocumented immigrants, US-born citizens are over 2 times more likely to be arrested for violent crimes, 2.5 times more likely to be arrested for drug crimes, and over 4 times more likely to be arrested for property crimes. In addition, the proportion of arrests involving undocumented immigrants in Texas was relatively stable or decreasing over this period. The differences between US-born citizens and undocumented immigrants are robust to using alternative estimates of the broader undocumented population, alternate classifications of those counted as “undocumented” at arrest and substituting misdemeanors or convictions as measures of crime.

 Madison, Wisconsin: 2020. 8p.

MAY CONTAIN MARKUP

FRANK PARTNOY

In "Infectious Greed: How Deceit and Risk Corrupted the Financial Markets, delves into the intricate web of deceit and risk that has plagued the financial markets. This gripping exposé uncovers the various factors that led to the corruption and downfall of the financial sector, offering a stark look at the dark underbelly of greed and deception. Through meticulous research and compelling narratives, [author name] sheds light on the devastating consequences of unchecked avarice and manipulation within the realm of high finance. A must-read for anyone seeking to understand the forces at play behind some of the most notorious financial scandals in history.

Henry Holt and Company. New York. 2003. 470p.

MAY CONTAIN MARKUP

ROBERT W. TAYLOR, TORY J.CAETI, D. KALL LOPER, ERIC J. FRITSCH, and JOHN LIEDERBACH

FROM THE PREFACE: “The first section of the book covers the etiology of the digital crime and digital terrorism problem. The focus in this section is on the types of crimes and acts of terrorism that are committed using computers, networks, and the Internet. Additionally, the reasons why offenders commit these types of crimes are examined in relation to current criminological theories and explanations. As the reader will find, applying criminological theory to digital crime and terrorism is a relatively recent conception. Finally, the section concludes with a chapter on digital criminals and hackers. Chapter I provides an introduction and overview of computer crime. In particular, a categorization of types of computer crimes is presented including I) the computer as the target, 2) the computer as an instrument of a crime, 3) the computer as incidental to crime, and 4) crimes associated with the prevalence of computers. Chapter 2 provides a definition and overview of two key areas of concern in regards to computer crimes, specifically "information warfare" and "cyber-terrorism." Chapter 3 reviews criminological theories that can explain digital crime. Since few theories have been applied directly to digital crime, this chapter focuses on the classic criminological theories that can be applied to digital crime. In other words, the theories discussed in this chapter were developed to explain crime in general, not digital crime specifically. In particular, this chapter focuses on choice, deterrence, psychological. social structure, and social process theories. Finally, Chapter 4 presents an overview of the hacker subculture and presents a typology of hacker types based on relative levels of skill, resources, and enculturation in the values of the hacker subculture. The chapter closes with a discussion of contemporary hacker roles and terminology.”

Prentice Hall. Upper Saddle River, New Jersey. 2006. 413p.

MAY CONTAIN MARKUP

By Kevin Cardwell, Timothy Clinton, Tyler Cohen, Edward Collins, James "Jim" Cornell, Michael Cross, Larry Depew, Art Ehuan, Michael Gregg, Captain Benjamin R. Jean, Kevin O'Shea, Kevin Reis ,Anthony Reyes, Sondra Schneider ,Amber Schroader, Karen Schuler, Jesse Varsalone ,Jack Wiles and Craig Wright

INTRODUCTION: “As is often the case with security compromises, it's not a matter of if your company will be compromised, but when. If I had known the employee I hired was going to resign, break into my office, and damage my computers in the span of three days, hindsight being 20/20,I would have sent notification to the security guards at the front door placing them on high alert and made sure he was not granted access to the building after he resigned. Of course, I in hindsight, I should have done a better job of hiring critical personnel .He was hired as a computer security analyst and security hacker instructor; and was (or should have been) the best example of ethical conduct.

Clearly, we see only what we want to see when hiring staff and you won't know whether an employee is ethical until a compromise occurs. Even if my blinders had been off, I would have never seen this compromise coming. It boggles the mind to think that anyone would ruin or jeopardize his career in computer security for so little. But he did break into the building and he did damage our computers, and therefore he will be held accountable for his actions, as detailed in the following forensic information. Pay attention when the legal issues are reviewed.You will learn bits and pieces regarding how to make your life easier by knowing what you really need to know "when" your computer security compromise occurs.

Computer forensics is the preservation, identification, extraction, interpretation, and documentation of computer evidence. In Chapter 9 of Cyber Crime Investigations, digital forensics is referred to as "the scientific acquisition, analysis, and preservation of data contained in electronic media whose information can be used as evidence in a court of law"

Syngress Publishing. Inc. Elsevier, Inc.. Burlington, MA. 2007. 727p.

By DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE NEW ZEALAND

“…The study includes statistical information to the extent that it is available. The law and administrative procedures are described and where appropriate psychological and sociological factors are discussed. This factual background is essential for informed consideration of the criminal scene. Inevitably interpretations are made and a variety of opinion is offered. It was not the purpose of the Department to produce a colourless official document devoid of all contentious matter. Although there has been a measure of co-ordination, diversity of opinion and spontaneity remain. It would therefore be difficult to agree with everything that is said or suggested.”

Ministry of Justice. New Zealand. 1968. 410p.

By Rumbi Matamba and Chwayita Thobela

Over the past decade, the GI-TOC has documented a staggering 108% increase in targeted killings in South Africa. While South Africa has long grappled with high levels of violence, as evidenced by a per capita murder rate of 45 per 100,000 in 2022/23, or approximately 70 murders a day, targeted killings have notably escalated, particularly political killings at local municipal level. Hitmen have become more daring, incidents more public and victims more high-profile. Coupled with the deficiencies in South Africa’s overburdened criminal justice system, where only about 15% of all murders are solved, the picture that emerges is one of a situation that is barely contained.

GI-TOC recorded 131 targeted killings in South Africa in 2023, just ten fewer than in 2022. The 131 cases were grouped into four categories: organized-crime related (46 cases or 35% of incidents), minibus taxi-industry related (45 incidents, or 34%), political assassinations (31 incidents, or nearly 24%) and personal assassinations (9 incidents, or nearly 7%). While every effort is made to ensure that the data is robust and accurate, this is almost certainly an undercount as the database draws on publicly available information such as press reports, media statements from affected families, court records, and media statements by the criminal justice sector.

This report is framed in the context of South Africa’s 2024 general elections. Previous analysis has shown that there are always spikes in political assassinations during election years, particularly in long-contested provinces such as KwaZulu-Natal. The 2024 elections, the sixth national election in the country’s 30 years of democracy, have been earmarked as a potential watershed moment.

Political violence and assassinations pose a very real threat to the country’s democracy. They are not an isolated phenomenon and they intersect with organized crime and criminal networks. The intertwining of criminal networks and political assassinations in South Africa underscores the urgent need for comprehensive strategies to tackle organized crime and stop targeted killings.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2024. 32p.

By David Pyrooz

Between 1990 and 2021, for adult offenders, Colorado punished felony murder with a mandatory minimum sentence of life without parole. Felony murder was classified as a class 1 felony, along with other theories of first-degree murder, such as after-deliberation and extreme indifference murder, as well as first-degree kidnapping, until Governor Jared Polis signed Senate Bill 124, effective September 15, 2021, reclassifying the offense to a class 2 felony. As a result, felony murder is now punishable by a sentence of 16-48 years.

The purpose of this study is to provide a statistical portrait of people who have been convicted of felony murder between 1990 and 2021. Data were acquired through open records requests from the Colorado Department of Corrections (“CDOC”) and the State Court Administrator’s Office (“SCAO”), along with public data from the Colorado State Demography Office. This study’s primary unit of analysis is a criminal case, meaning a criminal case identifiable by a single case number in which a person was found guilty. With respect to felony murder, a felony murder case means one with one or more felony murder convictions where no other theory of first-degree murder was proven with respect to that or those homicide(s).

Unpublished paper, 2023.

By Hannah Miles and Samantha Bricknell

The National Homicide Monitoring Program is Australia’s only national data collection on homicide incidents, victims and offenders. This report describes 232 homicide incidents recorded by Australian state and territory police between 1 July 2022 and 30 June 2023. During this 12-month period there were 247 victims of homicide and 260 identified offenders

Statistical Report no. 46. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2024. 49p.

By Lucy Bryant

Figures from the UK Office for National Statistics (2021a) suggest that alcohol-related violence in England and Wales has been declining – both as a total figure (1,001,000 in 2009/10 to 525,000 in 2019/20) and as a proportion of all violent incidents (54% in 2009/10 to 42% in 2019/20). ■ This decline remains unexplained and generally unexamined – however, there are existing bodies of research that might offer insight into this trend. ■ This report examines possible explanations for the decline seen in alcohol-related violence – drawing on existing literature exploring: changing patterns in violence (e.g., Farrell et al. 2014), alcohol’s relationship with violence (e.g., Graham & Livingston 2011), and the measurement of violence (e.g., Reiner 2016). ■ Changing patterns in youth drinking might contribute to this violence decline. It is younger, rather than older age groups, who predominantly engage in violence in night-time economy settings (Finney 2004). Youth drinking in England has seen a recent downturn (e.g., Oldham et al. 2018), corresponding to some degree with declines in alcohol-related violence.

■ A steeper decline in alcohol-related violence relative to violence overall appears to be accounted for by shi s in alcohol-related stranger and acquaintance violence. Crime Survey for England and Wales (CSEW) data show that the proportion of stranger and acquaintance violence incidents that were alcohol related fell between 2009/10 and 2019/20, whilst the proportion of domestic violence incidents which were alcohol-related generally remained stable. ■ It is possible data artefacts such as counting errors contained in national statistics form some part of the trend investigated here. While the CSEW is a widely respected data source (Tilley & Tseloni 2016), limitations in its capturing of violent incidents have been previously identified (e.g., Walby et al. 2016). It is important to consider the impact any such data artefact might have on alcohol related violence trends – investigation of the production of these National Statistics should be undertaken to assess this.   

London: Institute of Alcohol Studies, 2023. 21p.

By Terra Wiens

In 2001, the United States experienced a historic demographic change. For the first time, Hispanics became the largest minority group in the nation, exceeding the number of Black residents.2 With a population in 2020 of 62.1 million, Hispanics represent 18.7 percent of the total population of the United States.3 This study is intended to report on Hispanic homicide victimization and suicide in the United States, the role of firearms in homicide and suicide, and overall gun death figures. Recognizing this demographic landscape, the importance of documenting such victimization is clear. Indeed, studies have found that Hispanic individuals are more likely to die by firearm homicide compared to white, non-Hispanic individuals.  

Washington, DC: Violence Policy Center, 2023. 23p.

By Marty Langley and VPC Executive Director Josh Sugarmann.  

To educate the public and policymakers about the reality of black homicide victimization, each year the VPC releases Black Homicide Victimization in the United States (follow this link to download the study as a pdf). This annual study examines black homicide victimization at the state level utilizing unpublished Supplementary Homicide Report data from the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The study ranks the states by their rates of black homicide victimization and offers additional information for the 10 states with the highest black homicide victimization rates.

Washington, DC: Violence Policy Center, 2023. 18p.

By Stephanie Holmes Didwania

Fraud is one of the most prosecuted crimes in the United States, yet scholarly and journalistic discourse about fraud and other financial crimes tends to focus on the absence of so-called “white-collar” prosecutions against wealthy executives. This Article complicates that familiar narrative. It contains the first nationwide account of how the United States actually prosecutes financial crime. It shows—contrary to dominant academic and public discourse—that the government prosecutes an enormous number of people for financial crimes and that these prosecutions disproportionately involve the least advantaged U.S. residents accused of low-level offenses. This empirical account directly contradicts the aspiration advanced by the FBI and Department of Justice that federal prosecution ought to be reserved for only the most egregious and sophisticated financial crimes. This article argues, in other words, that the term “white-collar crime” is a misnomer.

To build this empirical foundation, the Article uses comprehensive data of the roughly two million federal criminal cases prosecuted over the last three decades matched to county-level population data from the U.S. Census. It demonstrates the history, geography, and inequality that characterize federal financial crime cases, which include myriad crimes such as identity theft, mail and wire fraud, public benefits fraud, and tax fraud, to name just a few. It shows that financial crime defendants are disproportionately low-income and Black, and that this overrepresentation is not only a nationwide pattern, but also a pattern in nearly every federal district in the United States. What’s more, the financial crimes prosecuted against these overrepresented defendants are on average the least serious. This Article ends by exploring how formal law and policy, structural incentives, and individual biases could easily create a prosecutorial regime for financial crime that reinforces inequality based on race, gender, and wealth.

Northwestern Law & Econ Research Paper Forthcoming, outhern California Law Review, Vol. 97, 2024, 54 pages