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Posts in Criminology
Outlaw biker crime The relationship between Outlaw Motorcycle Gang membership and criminal behavior

By Sjoukje van Deuren

Although Dutch Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs (OMCGs) have been around since the late nineteen seventies, it was not until the turn of the century that Dutch OMCGs increasingly started to attract attention from both the authorities and the general public. In 1996, a report on Dutch organized crime provided a starting point for the government’s view that OMCGs in general and the Hells Angels in particular, are hotbeds for serious and organized crime that need to be addressed. In the report, members of the Amsterdam Hells Angels were accused of being involved in serious and organized crime, such as the trade, import, and transit of synthetic drugs (Bovenkerk & Fijnaut, 1996). In 2012, the presumption that members of at least some OMCGs were involved in organized crime, a growing fear of inter-club feuds, and the feeling that Dutch OMCGs were exhibiting themselves as untouchable and above the law, spurred the minister of Security and Justice to announce a multi-pronged, whole-of-government approach (Van Ruitenburg, 2020). This integrated approach was aimed at combating criminal OMCGs via all legal options available, including criminal, civil, and administrative means. Initially all OMCGs of the former Dutch Council of Eight – a consultative body established in 1996 by the Hells Angels and seven other motorcycle clubs to avoid turmoil and inter-club rivalry – were subjected to the integrated approach. In the context of the integrated approach, various actors, such as the police, local governments, and tax authorities closely work together to raise barriers against the OMCG subculture.1 The approach aims to hinder the criminal opportunities of OMCG members, reduce the popularity of the OMCG subculture, and target the untouchable image of OMCGs by addressing the OMCGs on the individual and on the club level. On the individual level, focal points of the approach are prioritizing the criminal prosecution of individual OMCG members, and reducing the number of OMCG members working for the private security sector or the government. Criminal prosecution is specifically targeted at OMCG board members in an effort to rid the clubs of their management. On the club level, club houses are closed down and OMCG-related events are prohibited. Clubhouses are believed to be important locations for the planning and execution of (organized) crime, while OMCGrelated events provide opportunity for the escalation of conflict. More recently, the Dutch Public Prosecution Office successfully filed petitions to the civil court to ban those Dutch OMCGs deemed to be most heavily involved in crime. Overall, the integrated approach is much more focused on the structural aspects of OMCGs as collectives, rather than on specific forms of (organized) crime committed by individual members. Importantly, when the integrated approach was implemented in 2012, there was scant knowledge on the crimes of the various Dutch OMCGs, and on whether and in which (continued)

Amsterdam: Free University of Amsterdam, 2023. 175p.

A scoping study: crime and connected and autonomous vehicles

By Ashley Brown, Shane D. Johnson & Nilufer Tuptuk

Connected and Autonomous Vehicles (CAVs) integrate advanced communication and autonomous driving technologies, enabling them to operate independently or with minimal human intervention. Despite the anticipated benefits for transportation, CAVs could be vulnerable to a wide variety of crimes unless security and crime prevention measures are proactively integrated into the technologies enabling their operation. To understand the potential crime threats, an extensive scoping review was conducted, covering incidents reported in the news and media, along with academic articles from crime and cybersecurity research. A total of 70 news articles related to crime incidents were identified, along with 12 academic articles on crimes. In addition, the findings from 35 survey papers addressing security attacks against CAVs, along with 29 additional papers covering security attacks not addressed in those surveys were synthesised. A total of 22 crime threats were identified. A 2-day workshop with experts was then held to present the findings from the review, conduct a crime scenario development exercise to identify any crime threats that were not identified in the review, and to assess the identified crimes. During the workshop, experts generated 6 new crime scenarios, bringing the total to 28 crime threats. To identify and prioritise high-risk crimes for future work, the experts were then asked to rate the threats based on their anticipated harm, achievability, frequency, and defeat-ability. The crime threats with the highest risk ratings included illegal transportation, vehicle theft, vehicle part theft, ransom for financial gain, and vandalism. The implications of our findings for research, policy and practice are discussed. Crime Science, 2025. https://crimesciencejournal.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s40163-025-00245-x

Crime Science, 14, Article number: 2 (2025), 39p.

Norms of Corruption in Politicians' Malfeasance

By Gustavo J. Bobonis and Anke Kessler

To what extent can anti-corruption measures serve to limit patronage and corrupt networks effectively and sustainably in clientelist societies with a prevailing norm of corruption? We develop a political agency model in which office holders are motivated to reduce rent seeking behavior through re-election incentives operating via elections and audits (formal institutions), but also through reputational or self-image concerns that are influenced by the prevailing norm on corruption in their peer group (informal institutions). We show that, while the formal institutions of audits and elections have the desired direct effect of reducing corruption, they also affect informal rules of conduct, which can have unintended effects. In particular, in clientelist societies with high levels of corruption, the social concerns work in opposition to formal incentives provided by anti-corruption efforts. Applying the theory to data from Puerto Rico’s anti-corruption municipal audits program, we find evidence consistent with the idea that anticorruption measures are less effective due to social spillovers.

CESifo Working Paper No. 11715, Munich: Munich Society for the Promotion of Economic Research - CESifo GmbH, 2025.

Reconsidering Crime and Technology: What Is This Thing We Call Cybercrime?

By Jonathan Lusthaus

Cybercrime is not a solely technical subject but one that involves human offenders who are susceptible to social scientific study. Yet, despite calls for cybercrime research to be mainstreamed, the topic remains a niche area within legal studies and the social sciences. Drawing on the most significant findings over recent years, this review aims to make the subject more accessible to a wide range of scholars by softening some of the perceived boundaries between conceptions of cybercrime and conventional crime. It examines these key themes in the literature: definitions and categories of cybercrime, cybercrime marketplaces, the governance of cybercrime, the importance of “place” within the world of cybercrime, cybercriminal networks, a discussion of what is new or old about cybercrime, and how we should define the concept going forward. The empirical literature on these themes suggests a simple definition is most appropriate: Cybercrime is crime that uses digital technology in a significant way.

Annual Review of Law and Social Science, Vol. 20 (2024), pp. 369–385

Beyond the Seductions of the State: Toward Freeing Criminology from Governments’ Blinders

By Jack Katz and Nahuel Roldán

Criminology is haunted by state-structured biases. We discuss five. (a) With the spatial boundaries and the binary deontology they use to count crime, governments draw researchers into ecological fog and sometimes fallacy. (b) All legal systems encourage criminologists to promote untenable implications of socially stratified criminality. (c) To degrees that vary by time and place, the scope of criminological research is compromised by methodological nationalism. (d) State agencies use chronologies that repeatedly draw researchers away from examining the nonlinear temporalities that shape variations in criminal behavior. (e) State agencies produce data that facilitate explaining the why of crime, but scientific naturalism would first work out what is to be explained. We recommend a criminology that begins by describing causal contingencies in social life independent of governments’ labeling of crime.

Annual Review of Criminology, Vol. 8:53-73 , January 2025

My Unexpected Adventure Pursuing a Career in Motion

By John Hagan

My interest in criminology grew as the Vietnam War escalated. I applied to two Canadian graduate schools and flipped a coin. The coin recommended the University of Toronto, but I chose the University of Alberta, which had a stronger criminology program. I wrote a dissertation about criminal sentencing, which led to an Assistant Professorship at the University of Toronto. Dean Robert Pritchard of Toronto’s Law School encouraged my work and later successfully nominated me for a Distinguished University Professorship. My interests continued to grow in international criminal law. A MacArthur Distinguished Professorship at Chicago’s Northwestern University and the American Bar Foundation facilitated my research at the Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. I followed this by studying the crime of genocide in Sudan and later the trial of Chicago’s Detective Jon Burge. Burge oversaw the torture of more than 100 Black men on Chicago’s South Side. US Attorney Patrick Fitzgerald prosecuted Burge when Illinois prosecutors would not. Despite many good things about Chicago, the periodic corruption of the government and police was not among them.

Annual Review of Criminology, Vol. 8:1-23 . January 2025

Prison Behavior and the Self: Exploring the Relationship Between Different Forms of Identity and Prison Misconduct

By Michael Rocque, Grant Duwe and Valerie Clark

Identity or self-concept has long been theorized to explain rule-violating behavior. Life-course criminology scholarship has incorporated identity as a core concept explaining desistance or disengagement from crime over time. Individuals who transform their identities from anti to prosocial or who are ready to move away from their past selves are more likely to desist from crime. However, the role of identity, particularly the forms of identity that have been theorized to influence desistance, has been understudied with respect to prison behavior. Understanding the ways in which identity relates to prison misconduct may help inform prison programming as well as theoretical perspectives drawing on the concept. The purpose of this study is to explore how various forms of identity are related to future prison misconduct, controlling for past misconduct and a host of other theoretical variables, in Minnesota prisons. The results indicate that two forms of identity, replacement self and cognitive transformation, are related to general misconduct but not violent misconduct in survival models. For general misconduct, both forms of identity are associated with a reduction in the risk of new convictions. Implications for theory and practice are discussed.

St. Paul: Minnesota Department of Corrections, 2023. 31p.

New Frontiers: The Use of Generative Artificial Intelligence to Facilitate Trafficking in Persons

Bennett, Phil; Cucos, Radu; Winch, Ryan

From the document: "The intersection of AI and transnational crime, particularly its application in human trafficking, represents an emerging and critically important area of study. This brief has been developed with a clear objective: to equip policymakers, law enforcement agencies, and the technology sector with the insights needed to anticipate and pre-emptively address the potential implications of AI on trafficking in persons. While we respond to the early instances of the use of AI by transnational criminal organisations, such as within Southeast Asia's cyber-scam centres, a more systemic approach is required. The potential for transnational criminal organisations to significantly expand their operations using AI technologies is considerable, and with it comes the risk of exponentially increasing harm to individuals and communities worldwide. It is imperative that we act now, before the most severe impacts of AI-enabled trafficking are realised. We have a unique time-limited opportunity--and indeed, a responsibility--to plan, train, and develop policies that can mitigate these emerging threats. This report aims to concretise this discussion by outlining specific scenarios where AI and trafficking could intersect, and to initiate a dialogue on how we can prepare and respond effectively. This document is not intended to be definitive, but rather to serve as a foundation for a broader, ongoing discussion. The ideas presented here are initial steps, and it will require innovative thinking, adequate resourcing, and sustained engagement from all sectors to build upon them effectively."

Organization For Security And Co-Operation In Europe. Office Of The Special Representative And Co-Ordinator For Combating Trafficking In Human Beings; Bali Process (Forum). Regional Support Office .NOV, 2024

Global Catastrophic Risk Assessment

RAND CORPORATION

From the document: "Global catastrophic and existential risks hold the potential to threaten human civilization. Addressing these risks is crucial for ensuring the long-term survival and flourishing of humanity. Motivated by the gravity of these risks, Congress passed the Global Catastrophic Risk Management Act in 2022, which requires the Secretary of Homeland Security and the administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency to coordinate an assessment of global catastrophic risk related to a set of threats and hazards. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Directorate and the Federal Emergency Management Agency requested the Homeland Security Operational Analysis Center's support in meeting this requirement. This report documents findings from our analysis." Authors include: Henry H. Willis, Anu Narayanan, Benjamin Boudreaux, Bianca Espinosa, Edward Geist, Daniel M. Gerstein, Dahlia Anne Goldfeld, Nidhi Kalra, Tom LaTourrette, Emily Lathrop, Alvin Moon, Jan Osburg, Benjamin Lee Preston, Kristin Van Abel, Emmi Yonekura, Robert J. Lempert, Sunny D. Bhatt, Chandra Garber, and Emily Lawson.

RAND CORPORATION. HOMELAND SECURITY OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS CENTER. 30 OCT, 2024.237p.

National Drug Control Strategy [May 2024]

UNITED STATES. OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY

From the document: "America is facing the deadliest drug threat in our history. Over the last 25 years, drug overdose deaths in the United States from synthetic opioids, including fentanyl, have risen to more than 100 times their 1999 levels. The rate of fatal overdoses from other drugs, including cocaine and methamphetamine, has also surged. The overdose crisis calls for bold action. The Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) has outlined vital steps for attacking two drivers of this crisis. [...] ONDCP's 2024 '[National Drug Control] Strategy' looks to the future this Nation needs. That future is one with greater access to prevention, treatment, harm reduction and recovery support services; with a focus on equity and equal justice; with support for incarcerated individuals, as well as post-incarceration reentry assistance; with a SUD [substance use disorder] and health care workforce that meets our Nation's needs; with a payment system that sufficiently funds care; and with a concerted transnational effort to hold drug traffickers, their enablers, and facilitators accountable. [...] The 2024 'Strategy' is aimed at addressing the overdose crisis from multiple angles. This includes preventing youth substance use, expanding access to life-saving medications like naloxone, expanding access to evidence-based treatment, building a recovery-ready Nation, and ramping up efforts to disrupt and dismantle drug trafficking."

UNITED STATES. WHITE HOUSE OFFICE; UNITED STATES. EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT; . MAY, 2024. 124p.

Foreign Lobbying in the U.S.

FREEMAN, BEN; CLEVELAND-STOUT, NICK

From the document: "This brief takes a deep dive into a newly available tranche of data tracking foreign influence in the U.S. political process. The new data was released in early 2024 following reforms to the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA), which made access to all foreign registrants' political activities and campaign contributions publicly available. The brief unearths a complex web of foreign influence in the United States -- with countries like Saudi Arabia, Ukraine, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Azerbaijan reaping the benefits of massive political influence campaigns."

QUINCY INSTITUTE FOR RESPONSIBLE STATECRAFT. Quincy Brief No. 59. 2024.

World Drug Report 2024

UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME

From the webpage description: "A global reference on drug markets, trends and policy developments, the World Drug Report offers a wealth of data and analysis and in 2024 comprises several elements tailored to different audiences. The web-based Drug market patterns and trends [hyperlink] module contains the latest analysis of global, regional and subregional estimates of and trends in drug demand and supply in a user-friendly, interactive format supported by graphs, infographics and maps. The Key findings and conclusions booklet [hyperlink] provides an overview of selected findings from the analysis presented in the Drug market patterns and trends module and the thematic Contemporary issues on drugs booklet, while the Special points of interest [hyperlink] fascicle offers a framework for the main takeaways and policy implications that can be drawn from those findings. As well as providing an in-depth analysis of key developments and emerging trends in selected drug markets, the Contemporary issues on drugs booklet [hyperlink] looks at several other developments of policy relevance. [...] The World Drug Report 2024 is aimed not only at fostering greater international cooperation to counter the impact of the world drug problem on health, governance and security, but also at assisting Member States in anticipating and addressing threats posed by drug markets and mitigating their consequences."

UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME. 2024

CCP's Role in the Fentanyl Crisis

UNITED STATES. CONGRESS. HOUSE. SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE STRATEGIC COMPETITION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY

From the document: "The fentanyl crisis is one of the most horrific disasters that America has ever faced. On average, fentanyl kills over 200 Americans daily, the equivalent of a packed Boeing 737 crashing every single day. Fentanyl is the leading cause of death for Americans aged 18-45 and a leading cause in the historic drop in American life expectancy. It has led to millions more suffering from addiction and the destruction of countless families and communities. Beyond the United States, fentanyl and other mass-produced synthetic narcotics from the People's Republic of China (PRC) are devastating nations around the world. It is truly a global crisis. The PRC, under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), is the ultimate geographic source of the fentanyl crisis. Companies in China produce nearly all of illicit fentanyl precursors, the key ingredients that drive the global illicit fentanyl trade. The House Select Committee on the Strategic Competition between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party (Select Committee) launched an investigation to better understand the role of the CCP in the fentanyl crisis. This investigation involved delving deep into public PRC websites, analyzing PRC government documents, acquiring over 37,000 unique data points of PRC companies selling narcotics online through web scraping and data analytics, undercover communications with PRC drug trafficking companies, and consultations with experts in the public and private sectors, among other steps. [...] [T]he Select Committee found thousands of PRC companies openly selling [...] illicit materials on the Chinese internet--the most heavily surveilled country-wide network in the world. The CCP runs the most advanced techno-totalitarian state in human history that 'leave[s] criminals with nowhere to hide' and has the means to stop illicit fentanyl materials manufacturers, yet it has failed to pursue flagrant violations of its own laws."

UNITED STATES. CONGRESS. HOUSE. SELECT COMMITTEE. 16 APR, 2024. 64p.

The political economy of illicit drug crops: forum introduction

By Frances Thomson, Patrick Meehan & Jonathan Goodhand (02 Apr 2024):

his article and the forum it introduces examine illicit drug crop (IDC) economies from agrarian perspectives. Examining IDCs as a group implies analysing how prohibition distinguishes them from other (licit) crops. We identify seven mechanisms through which prohibition shapes the agrarian political economy of IDCs and explore how these mechanisms and their effects generate distinctive patterns of development and political action amongst ‘illicit peasantries’. We also examine connections between illicit and licit crops, including how licit crop crises and illicit crop booms intertwine. We argue that IDC economies provide a bulwark for smallholders but are by no means peasant idylls.

The Journal of Peasant Studies. 2024. 39p.

EU Drug Markets Analysis 2024: Key insights for policy and practice

European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA)

Availability remains high across the main drugs used in Europe, evidenced by the large and in some cases increasing quantities that continue to be seized in the European Union. In addition, the market for illicit drugs is characterised by the diversification of consumer products and the widespread availability of a broader range of drugs, including new psychoactive substances, often of high potency or purity. Specialised equipment may be required to meet the detection and monitoring challenges posed by this diversification.

The recent emergence of highly potent opioids, particularly benzimidazoles (nitazenes), poses a particularly complex threat to public health due to their increased risk of life-threatening poisoning. The potential emergence of new patterns of consumption in Europe is also a key threat, due to the availability of cheap and highly potent or pure drugs. This is particularly the case for cocaine, which has seen unprecedented levels of availability

European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA), 2024. 39p.

Colombia: Drug smuggling prevention report 2024

By A&A Multiprime

As part of our commitment to contribute to loss prevention in Colombia and across the region, our team regularly engages in meetings with representatives of the Colombian Highest Maritime Authority (DIMAR) and the officers in charge of anti-narcotic policies in the ports. We gather updated informa tion about new practices and precautions to be aware of, as well as relevant recommendations and measures to adopt while visiting any of our ports. This ongoing engagement has culminated in our 2024 report, which reflects the latest insights and strategies in combating the challenges faced by the maritime industry

Recent events highlight the ongoing challenges in countering cocaine trafficking. For example, on February 8, 2024, British authorities announced a historic seizure of over 12,500 pounds of cocaine concealed in a banana shipment from the Port of Turbo, Colombia, to Southampton. This incident, marking the largest single drug seizure in UK history, emphasizes the advanced techniques used by cartels to transport substantial drug quantities into Europe and the UK, thereby confirming the global impact of Colombian narcotics. This report results from our efforts and experience over the last years, successfully assisting in several drug smuggling-related incidents and administrative investigations for breaches of shipping regulations, including the ISPS Code. We trust that this report will serve as a valuable resource for all P&I Clubs, their Members, the Masters and crews, and, in general, the entire marine industry with an interest in Colombian ports to mitigate incidents associated with drug smuggling activities

Bogota: A&A Multiprime. 2024. 18p.

Drug Trafficking on the High Seas: A Primer on the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act Brendan McDonald Trial Attorney Criminal Division Narcotic and Dangerous Drug Section

By Colleen King

In December 2023, the United States Coast Guard (USCG) offloaded approximately 18,219 pounds of cocaine from the USCG Cutter Waesche. The estimated street value of the cocaine was more than $239 million. The offload occurred as a result of six separate maritime interdictions, performed by separate cutters, taking place over a 17-day period off the coasts of Mexico and Central and South America. The interdictions were performed as part of the USCG’s counternarcotics mission. While interdictions of this size may seem out of the ordinary, the USCG routinely interdicts a variety of vessels, including Go-Fast Vessels and semi submersibles, with massive amounts of drugs (usually cocaine), moving from the Pacific and Caribbean coasts of South America northward to Mexico, the Caribbean, and eventually the United States. One can imagine that prosecuting interdictions like these may raise a variety of questions: could the United States assert jurisdiction over the suspected traffickers; would the maritime location of the interdiction matter; and would it make a difference if the ship carrying the contraband was flagged—registered—by another country? What about the transit time to a U.S. court for an initial appearance where the interdiction occurred over a thousand miles from the United States? The dizzying array of issues confronting a federal prosecutor following a high seas interdiction may not be typical of land-based legal challenges. Fortunately, a body of both federal law and international authorities is instructive on these questions. The Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA) is the United States’ principal statute addressing high seas drug trafficking and has supported thousands of prosecutions for decades. The MDLEA, as it re lates to controlled substances,5 prohibits the distribution, manufacture, or possession with intent to distribute or manufacture, controlled sub stances aboard a “covered vessel.” Its prohibitions apply “outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States,” and include both attempt and conspiracy liability. And, where an interdiction occurs outside of the United States, venue may be appropriate in your district. This article is intended to serve as an MDLEA primer. It will provide a brief his tory of the MDLEA, identify the MDLEA’s core definitional provisions, discuss its key criminal prohibition, detail its jurisdiction and venue pro vision, describe the MDLEA’s position on the use of international law as a defense, and finally, address its sentencing provisions.

March 2024 DOJ Journal of Federal Law and Practice

Organized Crime as Irregular Warfare: Strategic Lessons for Assessment and Response

David H. Ucko, Thomas A. Marks

Organized crime both preys upon and caters to human need. It is corrosive and exploitative, but also empowering, and therefore pervasive. Indeed, though often out of sight, organized crime is everywhere: wherever governments draw the line, criminal actors find profitable ways of crossing it; wherever governments fail to deliver on human need, criminal actors capitalize on unmet desire or despair. For those excluded from the political economy, from patronage systems or elite bargains, organized crime can offer opportunity, possibly also protection.

PRISM, Vol. 10, No. 3 (2023), pp. 92-117 (26 pages)

A Framework for Countering Organised Crime: Strategy, Planning, and the Lessons of Irregular Warfare

By David H. Ucko and Thomas A. Marks

Organised crime is not going well. According to the 2021 Global Organized Crime index, ‘the global illicit economy simply continue[s] along the upward trajectory it has followed over the past 20 years, posing an ever-increasing threat to security, development and justice – the pillars of democracy’ (Global Initiative, 2021, p. 8). Wherever governments seek to draw the line, criminal actors find profitable ways of crossing it; wherever governments fail to deliver on human need, criminal actors capitalise on citizens’ desire or despair. As of now, more than three-quarters of the world’s population ‘live in countries with high levels of criminality, and in countries with low resilience to organized crime’ (Global Initiative, 2021, p. 12). On aggregate, the associated activity amounts to an illicit form of governance, furnishing alternative services to a wide range of clients, be they the vulnerable and weak or a covetous elite. The breadth of organised crime, its clandestine nature, and its blending of creative and destructive effects make it difficult to counter. In past SOC ACE research, we argued that the response to organised crime often shares certain pitfalls with counterterrorism, at least since 9/11 (Ucko & Marks, 2022c). Both efforts have been stymied by 1) conceptual uncertainty of the problem at hand; 2) an urge to address the scourge head on (be it violence or crime), without acknowledging its socioeconomic-political context; and, therefore, 3) unquestioned pursuit of strategies that miss the point, whose progress is difficult to measure, and which may even be counterproductive. This convergence is based on the common features of the two phenomena, which are both concerned with i) collective actors, who ii) use violence and coercion among other methods; and who have iii) corrupting, or outright destructive effects on society. Though organised crime is not consciously political in its ideological motivation, it is – like terrorism – deeply political in its origins, activities, and effects. Given the conceptual overlap, and the common pathologies that undermine response, the lessons from countering terrorism are relevant also to the countering of organised crime. Focusing on the concept of ‘irregular warfare’, our past research identified six key lessons, touching upon 1) the socio-political embeddedness of the problem, 2) the tendency to militarise the response, 3) the mirror-imaging of state assistance programmes, 4) the invaluable role of community mobilisation, 5) the dearth of strategy, and 6) the need to engage more closely with questions of political will. As argued elsewhere, these challenges point to a need for greater strategic competence both in assessing the problem of organised crime and in designing a response (Ucko & Marks, 2022c).

To generate this strategic competence, this follow-on report sets out an analytical toolkit to assist planners and policymakers with the crafting of strategy. This ‘Framework of Analysis and Action’ builds upon lessons – negative and positive – learned via years of experience with irregular warfare, defined by the Department of Defense as ‘a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s)’ (U.S. Department of Defense, 2007, p. 1).1 It is a framework that finds its origins within the U.S. National Defense University’s College of International Security Affairs (CISA), where for two decades it has been used to teach strategic planning for complex and intensely political challenges (Ucko & Marks, 2022a). The framework consists of two parts: the Strategic Estimate of the Situation (which maps the problem, explores its drivers, frames, and methods, and critiques the current response) and the Course of Action (which uses the strategic estimate to design an appropriate strategy, guided by a theory of success). The framework is in this report adapted for organised crime, to enable the mapping of relevant actors and the crafting, thereby, of a viable response. By design, the framework responds to the six key lessons identified in our earlier work. This report goes through the framework and explains its adaptation to organised crime. Appendix A provides a summation of the toolkit, a ‘user’s guide’, that will facilitate application of the framework. Testing to date suggests great potential and we look forward to sustaining a dialogue with those engaged with countering organised crime to further evolve this toolkit. Indeed, since the beginning, this framework has been a living product, enriched by theoretical application in the classroom and practical use in the field.

SOC ACE Research Paper No. 19. Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham, 2023. 45p.

Observatory of Illicit Economies in South Eastern Europe

By Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime’s Observatory of Illicit Economies in South Eastern Europe.

In this issue, we focus on three cases where criminal groups from the region have been active in recent years: the Netherlands, Ecuador and parts of Africa.

These examples illustrate the growing involvement of Balkan criminal groups in some of the world’s hotspots for illicit activity. Research for these articles is facilitated by the Global Initiative’s network of contacts with local investigative journalists, as well as close cooperation between regional observatories of illicit economies, namely South Eastern Europe, West Africa and Latin America.

As part of the GI-TOC’s analysis of the risks of firearms trafficking from Ukraine, in this issue we show that the Western Balkans remain the main source of illegal weapons in Europe. At present, weapons are still cheap and plentiful in the region, and stockpiles have been augmented by inflows from Turkey via Bulgaria, particularly of gas and alarm guns. More on this topic can be found in a forthcoming GI-TOC report on trends in arms trafficking from the Ukraine conflict.

In this issue, we also report on a major crackdown by Serbian authorities in late 2023 on increasingly violent smugglers operating along the border between Serbia and Hungary, and examine how this has displaced migration flows towards Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Risk Bulletin No. 18. Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2024. 25p.