By Criminal Justice Inspection Northern Ireland’s (CJI’s) 

Re-building policing in the post-conflict era demanded a concerted effort to establish trust, confidence and the legitimacy of policing within all communities of Northern Ireland. Policing by consent and policing with the community were key defining principles of the Police Service of Northern Ireland which required policing to be based locally, within communities. While local policing in Northern Ireland has undergone various iterations over the last 22 years, the importance of local engagement has remained. The Community Safety Framework (the Framework) was developed to ensure partnership working on community safety issues and to provide ‘an operational roadmap’ for delivery.1 While partnership working was effective, the Framework lacked analysis of key community safety issues and contained no action plan or objectives for delivery. Knowledge of the Framework was minimal among criminal justice partners, and there was no evidence of the use of the Framework to support priority setting or to assist with delivery. It is recommended that the Department of Justice develop and publicly consult on a new community safety vision, strategy and action plan for delivery. The Community Safety Framework provided for a multi-agency governance model, however the Community Safety Board, recently renamed the Community Safety Network, did not have a governance role. A review of the Community Safety Board had identified several areas of improvement and progress was underway in the identification of shared priorities and a forward workplan. This work should continue, however the effective operation of the Community Safety Network should remain under review. The community safety arena in Northern Ireland is a crowded space. Knowledge of existing community safety structures was fragmented; greater awareness was needed to avoid duplication and to maximise the impact of the Community Safety Network. It is recommended that a mapping exercise of the existing strategic and operational community safety fora in Northern Ireland is conducted. 

Belfast: Criminal Justice Inspection Northern Ireland’s (CJI’s), 2024, 105 pg.

By Stephen Koppel & Michael Rempel

Key Findings: Pedestrian Stops: Steep Decline in Stops Until 2022: From 2013 to 2021, the total number of stops fell by 92%. Then 2022 saw a 69% increase—the largest one-year increase in the past decade. Changing Borough Composition: Stops fell sharply in all boroughs since 2013. The decline was greatest in Queens and Brooklyn and smallest in the Bronx. From 2013 to 2022, the share of stops in Queens fell from 24% to 16%, but climbed from 13% to 30% in the Bronx, despite making up 17% of the City’s 2022 population. Widening Racial Disparities: Black and Hispanic people made up 88% of people stopped in 2022. Compared to white people, police stopped Black people at a rate 7.5 times higher in 2013, a disparity that grew to 11.8 times higher in 2022; and police stopped Hispanic people at a rate 3.5 times higher than white people in 2013, growing to 5.1 times higher in 2022. Increasing Arrest (“Hit”) Rates Until 2022: In 2013, just 8% of stops led to arrest. As police made fewer stops over the following years, the proportion that resulted in arrest rose: peaking at 38% in 2021, before falling to 33% in 2022. Stops led to an arrest for 32% of Hispanic and 33% of Black people in 2022 compared to 38% of white people. Desk Appearance Tickets (DATs): Rising DAT Issuance Since 2019: The DAT issuance rate declined in the years leading up to reform (from 29% in 2013 to 20% in 2019), before rising by 23 percentage points from 2019-2021. However, DAT issuance fell from 43% in 2021 to 29% in 2022, in part reflecting May 2022 rollbacks to reforms that initially went into effect in 2020. Declining Racial Disparities: In 2013, white people were 10 percentage points more likely to receive a DAT compared to Black people and 6 percentage points more likely compared to Hispanic people. By 2022, the Black-white gap narrowed to 6 percentage points, while the Hispanic-white gap was eliminated. Arrests: Fewer Arrests: From 2013 to 2022, the annual number of misdemeanor arrests fell by two-thirds (from 296,956 to 102,537). This included a sharp 75% drop from 2013 to 2020, followed by 13% and 23% respective increases in 2021 and 2022. Similar Racial Disparities: In 2022, Black people were 6.1 times more likely than white people to be arrested for a misdemeanor, while Hispanic people were 3.9 times more likely. These disparities are comparable to a decade ago. Decline in Youth Arrests but Rising Disparities: In 2022, youth under the age of 25 accounted for 18% of misdemeanor arrests, down from 34% in 2013. Racial disparities widened, with Black and Hispanic youth 8.3 and 4.7 times (respectively) more likely to be arrested on a misdemeanor than white youth in 2022. Prosecutions: Misdemeanor prosecutions mirrored misdemeanor arrest trends, declining by two-thirds from 2013 to 2022.

New York: Data Collaboration for Justice, 2024. 58p.

By Vittorio Nastasi

On any given day, approximately 514,000 people are held in local jails across the United States. Though defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty, more than 80% of the jail population are awaiting trial and have yet to be convicted of a crime. Defendants accused of particularly serious violent crimes or who pose a credible threat to public safety may be detained in jail while awaiting trial. However, most defendants are entitled to pretrial release. Judges may impose conditions on a defendant’s release, such as electronic monitoring or supervision through a pretrial services agency. Monetary release conditions, commonly referred to as “cash bail” or “money bail,” are among the most common type of pretrial release conditions in the United States. Cash bail allows defendants to secure their release by depositing a specified amount of money with the court as collateral, providing a financial incentive for compliance during the pretrial phase. If a defendant appears as required through the disposition of their case, the bail  amount is returned to them. If a defendant fails to appear in court as required, the bail amount is forfeited, and the defendant may face additional criminal charges or penalties. Cash bail was historically intended to provide a financial incentive for defendants to show up at required court dates, but reforms adopted in the 1970s and 1980s allow judges to also consider potential risks to public safety when making bail decisions. Under the right circumstances, cash bail is an appropriate tool for ensuring that defendants cooperate throughout the pretrial period. However, many defendants are unable to afford the cost of bail and are consequently detained for no reason other than their inability to pay. Recent research suggests that bail decisions can result in defendants losing their jobs, coerce defendants into accepting plea bargains, and increase the probability that are defendants are convicted. Given the potential negative consequences of pretrial detention resulting from an inability to afford cash bail, reform advocates have suggested limiting the use of monetary release conditions. Reforms to pretrial policy require policymakers to balance several competing interests, many of which are difficult to quantify. For example, it is not possible to quantify the normative value of the presumption of innocence or American’s Constitutional right to reasonable bail. However, research evidence can shed some light on the efficacy of cash bail for ensuring compliance during the pretrial period. With some caveats, the studies included in this review collectively suggest that monetary release conditions like cash bail do not consistently improve court attendance and may not result in net crime reduction. 

Los Angeles: Reason Foundation, 2024.   40p.

By the Board of the Police Commissioner’s Subcommittee to Define Defunding Police.

Executive Summary In Chapter 1, we discuss the genesis of the Subcommittee and elaborate on some of the substantive arguments that shape debates around defunding. We discuss the policy lenses we have used to produce this report, which include a health and disability lens, an Africentric lens, and an Indigenous and Mi’kmaw-led models. Chapter 2 In Chapter 2, we provide background regarding: 1. policing in HRM; 2. approaches to public safety in the HRM; and 3. the history of the movement to “defund the police” in the HRM. We explain how the police are governed, identify that our per capita spending on the HRP exceeds many other cities’ spending, and discuss how the police spend their time based on data they provided us and from Statistics Canada. Chapter 3A In Chapter 3(a), we provide the results of our public survey and our online consultation session. 2351 responses were received to the Subcommittee’s online survey, 19 individuals provided presentations, and 8 organizations provided written submissions. 56.8% of participants in our survey (1308) indicated support for the idea of defunding the police, while 43.2% of respondents (996) did not. Support for defunding was much higher amongst women and gender diverse folks than amongst men. Chapter 3B Chapter 3(b) details the results from a submission from the National Police Federation (“NPF”), which is the union that represents the RCMP around Canada. Two report authors then had a followup meeting with representatives from the NPF. While the NPF takes a strong stance against defunding, there are nonetheless shared areas of agreement and concern about the inadequate funding of social services; the use of police to fill roles that could more appropriately filled by service providers; the need for increased diversion from criminal systems for those experiencing mental health crises; and the complex problem of the police responses to unhoused people. We discuss these commonalities as well as important differences of opinion. Chapter 4 In Chapter 4, we lay out the “framework” for this report’s definition of defunding in Halifax Regional Municipality as a foundation for the rest of the report. We conclude, based on our research and consultation, that there are four “pillars” of defunding: 1. Reforms to police practices, oversight, and accountability; 2. Reforms aimed at “detasking” police and “retasking” more appropriate community service providers; 3. Legislative, regulatory, and policy reforms intended to promote community safety; and 4. Financial reforms aimed at tying police budgets to clear performance metrics and encouraging public participation in municipal budgeting, with the ultimate intention of decreasing budgetary allocations to police and increasing allocations to community-based social services. Chapter 5 In Chapter 5, we discuss reforms to police practices, oversight and accountability. Rather than recommend that the police do more training, we stress the need to evaluate existing training to see whether it’s actually working and also examine  how decisions regarding training are made. We recommend a full-scale review of all lethal and non-lethal use of force options available to police, with the aim of reducing use of force and disarming some officers (such as community response officers). We recommend that police policies be available to the public. We argue the Board is failing to adequately govern the police and make recommendations to improve this situation. We recommend that the Board abandon plans to implement body cams and push for meaningful accountability by advocating for progressive changes to the provincial Police Act. Chapter 6 In Chapter 6, we define what detasking is, then recommend that the city consider options to either partially or fully detask: 1. responding to incidents involving unhoused persons; 2. responding to incidents involving young persons; 3. responding to incidents of gender-based and intimate-partner violence; 4. responding to overdoses; and 5. responding to noise complaints. Chapter 6A In Chapter 6(a), we discuss the Mobile Mental Health Crisis Team in HRM, which pairs police and clinical staff, then overview different approaches Canadian and American municipalities are taking to move toward civilian led mental health crisis response. We recommend that Regional Council, in cooperation with the Police Board, divert the majority of crisis calls to non-police-involved teams. Chapter 6B In Chapter 6(b), we discuss different approaches municipalities are taking to remove police from the enforcement of motor vehicle offences and otherwise promote safety on the road. We recommend that the city continue to invest in public transit and traffic calming measures, advocate for the province to reduce the speed limit in residential area from 50 to 40 kilometers per hour, develop a civilian team to enforce motor vehicle offences and traffic-related bylaws and handle road closures for street events and protests and parades, and invest in speed and red light cameras. Chapter 6C In Chapter 6(c), we overview third party reporting programs around Canada, which allow those who have been impacted by sexual violence to report the assault to a non-police community organization. We recommend that the HRM create a third party reporting program and address funding gaps in sexual assault prevention and response services in the municipality through the creation of a grant program. Chapter 7 In Chapter 7, we focus our recommendations to go beyond policing and towards broader social reforms. We focus primarily on mental health and substance use services, affordable housing, and promoting public engagement in municipal budgeting. We recommend that the HRM convene a working group to provide advice on developing a health- and social equity-based approach to drug decriminalization and also establish a grant program for registered non-profit or charitable organizations in order to promote access to mental health and substance use services. In terms of housing, we recommend that HRM uses a human-rights based-approach in developing its strategy to affordable housing and homelessness, and that the Municipality also significantly increase its investment in affordable housing in line with other jurisdictions in the region. In terms of the budget, we recommend that HRM align their per capita spending on the HRP ($393 in 2020) with other peer cities such as London, Ontario ($272 in 2020), and tie the approval of the annual budget to performance metrics. Finally, we recommend that the city establish participatory budgeting processes to let the public decide how to redistribute funds taken from the police budget    

Halifax, NS, CA: The Commission, 2024. 218p.

By Jeremy M. Wilson, Clifford A. Grammich

Police officer recruitment and selection are challenging, yet vitally important contributors to police accountability and establishing a trusted relationship with the community. To help police leaders make informed decisions, researchers at Michigan State University reviewed existing literature and compiled this guide to current resources on law enforcement staffing. The guide presents summaries of publications describing innovative strategies and rigorously tested recruitment and selection tactics in a format that is concise and accessible. All information is cross tabulated on an easy-to-read table that allows readers to easily identify resources (and the specific page numbers within the resource) that address fourteen relevant themes such as mentorship, outreach to schools, and focus on various underrepresented groups. This work supports a comprehensive commitment by the U.S. Department of Justice to provide resources for the field to help police leaders meet the challenges of recruitment and staffing, as indicated by the 2023 publication of Recruitment and Retention for the Modern Law Enforcement Agency

Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services., 2023. 32p.

By Scott Decker, Sean Verano and Jack Greene.

Despite their rich theoretical and practical importance, criminologists have paid scant attention to the patterns of crime and the responses to crime during exceptional events. Throughout the world large-scale political, social, economic, cultural, and sporting events have become commonplace. Natural disasters such as as blackouts, hurricanes, tornadoes, and tsunamis present similar opportunities. Such events often tax the capacities of jurisdictions to provide safety and security in response to the exceptional to event, asas well asas toto meet thethe "“routine”routine" public safety needs. This article examines “routine” crime as measured by calls for police "routine" as by for service, official crime reports, and police arrests in Salt Lake City before, during, and after the 2002 Olympic Games. The analyses the suggest that while a rather benign demographic among attendees and the presence of large numbers of social control agents might have been expected to decrease calls for police service for minor crime, it actually increased in Salt Lake during this period. The it in Salt this implications of these findings are considered for theories of routine activities, as well as systems capacity.

Journal of Criminal Justice. 32. (2007) 89-101.

Perrin, Benjamin

This report considers the upcoming 2010 Olympics in Vancouver in the context of Canada's human trafficking response to date, and makes recommendations to ensure that this event is not a flashpoint for human trafficking.

Calgary: Future Group, 2007. 24p.

Blowe, Kevin and du Boulay, Estelle

In the months before the start of the 2012 Olympics in Stratford in east London, there was a growing anxiety amongst Londoners about the prospect of snipers in helicopters and RAF fighters in the skies, missile launchers on tower blocks and repeated predictions that Newham would experience lockdown during peak periods. Newham Monitoring Project had also been receiving enquiries from across east London for months from local residents, particularly those working with young people, who were concerned about the massive proposed policing operation and its impact at street level. London 2012 seemed to deserve its reputation as the first 'Security Games'. The Olympics presented the largest peacetime military and security operation since 1945, with a policing and security budget of around L553m. From 2010, the number of security personnel required by Olympic organisers rose sharply to an estimated 23,700 on the busiest days, more than double the original predictions, with up to 12,000 police from forces across the country and the Ministry of Defence providing more troops deployed (in uniform) to work during the Games than were then stationed in Afghanistan. Even more CCTV was installed in a city that already had the highest level of surveillance of its citizens than anywhere in the world, whilst around $80 million was spent on the construction of an 11-mile long 5000-volt electric fence around the Olympic zone. The reason for this extraordinary level of security, the Home Office argued in its March 2011 publication 'Olympic and Paralympic Safety and Security Strategy,' was primarily the threat from terrorism: it promised 'maximum use of existing national security and intelligence structures' with the threat-level raised from 'substantial' to 'severe' (which assumes 'an attack is highly likely'). A secondary threat was public disorder, heightened by the perception of a weak police response to rioting the previous summer that followed the death of Mark Duggan in August 2011. The International Olympic Committee had made it clear after the riots that it expected the British government, the Metropolitan police and other domestic agencies to ensure that the Olympics passed off without incident. Arrangements were made to fast-track the trials of people accused of offences linked to the Olympics in the same highly controversial way that had followed the disorder of the previous year, with Alison Saunders, the chief CPS prosecutor for London, explicitly linking these measures to 'the lessons of the summer riots.' With a climate of fear slowly building through state institutions and the media, we were also aware of the significant pattern of racialised social "sanitisation" and exploitation that have been a hallmark of sport mega events globally, particularly where they have been held in poorer and developing areas. Activists and academics from countries including South Africa and India, which have both hosted major sport events in recent years, travelled to the UK to share their experiences of human rights abuses and 'sweep up operations' in their localities. These had had a massively detrimental and often devastating impact on the lives of local people, leaving them homeless, unemployed or vulnerable to excessive policing or criminalisation, with a legacy of property developers and real estate owners benefiting most. These were real life stories behind the promises of employment and regeneration that had been made in each host city. We recognised that an atmosphere of intensive security, focused on the borough where Newham Monitoring Project has worked for over thirty years, had the potential to negatively impact on local people. Most military and all private security personnel would work inside the 'ticketed areas' of the event venues, but in the streets surrounding the Olympic Park in Stratford and the ExCel Centre in Canning Town, it was the prospect of a massive policing operation that was our greatest concern. Newham is one of London's poorest and most ethnically diverse boroughs with the second highest Muslim population in the UK, one that had experienced long-term state surveillance, suspicion and incidents like the bungled anti-terrorism raids in 2006 on two families living in Forest Gate, who endured a terrifying ordeal based on faulty intelligence. The borough also has one of the youngest populations in London, with 23.6% of residents in 2011 aged between 10 and 24,6 coupled with a long history of difficult relationships between young people and the police. This is particularly the case over the use of stop and search powers.

London: Newham Monitoring Project, 2013. 29p.

UNITED STATES. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

From the document: "Protecting our nation requires timely responses to rapidly evolving dangers while protecting against longer-term homeland security threats and hazards. To meet these complex operational needs, innovation, research and development (IRD) initiatives and investments are critical to ensure the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has the tools to help secure our nation. [...] While historically DHS has supported research and development (R&D), investments in innovation are newer and growing in scope and number across all DHS Components, whether through technological improvements or process efficiencies. The combination of these innovation and R&D investments will benefit from increased awareness and coordination. The Secretary's Calendar Year (CY) 2023 priorities captured this, seeking to 'ensure R&D across the Department and with external partners are coordinated and integrated.' To accomplish this goal, this coordinated DHS IRD Strategic Plan focuses on current efforts and longer-term Departmental investments. The Plan also highlights complementary efforts underway across the HSE [homeland security enterprise], consisting of federal, state, local, tribal, territorial, nongovernmental, and private sector entities, as well as individuals, families, and communities who share a common national interest in the safety and security of the United States and its people. The Plan inventories current and future IRD efforts within DHS, organized by the DHS Missions and Objectives as articulated in the third 'Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (2023).' By capturing these initiatives in a comprehensive plan, the Department can identify cross-cutting IRD themes that provide opportunities for making impacts towards meeting multiple desired outcomes. These are articulated as Strategic Priority Research Areas (SPRAs)[.]"

UNITED STATES. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY. MAY, 2024. 44p.

By Marco Gopfert

This book titled“Policing the Frontier: An Ethnography of Two Worlds in Niger”by Mirco Gopfert. is part of the seriesPolice/Worlds: Studies in Security, Crime, and Governance. It explores the topic of policing in rural Niger and examines thei nteraction between the police and the local communities. The book provides an ethnographic perspective on the challenges and complexities of policing in this context.

Cornell University Press, 2020, 175 pages

By Caitlin McCulloch, Brian A. Jackson, Sameer M. Siddiqi, Jordan R. Reimer, Emily Allendorf

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has changed and expanded its efforts in violence prevention in the past five years. DHS asked the Homeland Security Operational Analysis Center (HSOAC) to examine the change in efforts by the Center for Prevention Programs and Partnerships (CP3) and its predecessor organizations in preventing terrorism and other violence and explore options for CP3 moving forward.

In the United States, the full potential value of countering violent extremism (CVE) has never been realized because of key disconnects between the intent of CVE programs and the realities of their implementation. Although it might not have been the intent, efforts singled out and stigmatized American Muslim communities. The disconnect between stated intention and reality stimulated potent opposition to CVE as a concept. In response, the federal government decided to make significant changes in its approaches in this policy area. In late 2021, DHS asked HSOAC to examine and characterize the changes that had been made, providing an outside viewpoint on the extent of change and how those changes had responded to the concerns about CVE efforts. This report documents the researchers' approach, findings, and recommendations.

Key Findings

• There has been enormous growth in CP3, and it is currently working on developing and standardizing the institutions and processes that are required to support a larger organization. These efforts include extensive standardization efforts in training and evaluation of CP3's work. Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) posed some problems, including making it difficult to create a cohesive whole with new personnel, but also presented some new opportunities, such as an increased ability to reach a diversity of stakeholders digitally.

• CP3 and the government more broadly have made major shifts in the rhetorical framing of their work, toward a public health–informed approach, a framing that aligns more closely with the intent of their programs. Although there is still discussion of the implications of a public health–informed approach, this shift was reflected in both interviews and official documentation.

• In line with this rhetorical shift is the expansion in the diversity of stakeholders, both in engagement and in grantees, including evidence of a shift away from criminal justice and security partners, although they remain important collaborators.

• External stakeholders remain skeptical, but there are some signs of increasing trust in relevant actors outside government.

Recommendations

• Continue efforts to build and sustain consistency in messages and activities. Many external stakeholders noted the importance of rebuilding trust and that sustainable and continuous actions and relationships were essential for fostering that trust.

• Continue to codify and standardize internal office procedures—with rapid growth comes a renewed need for new internal institutions to keep all personnel on the same page.

• More clearly define the elements of a public health–informed approach and how they will be applied to violence prevention for CP3 programs and outreach. There are many definitions present in practitioner circles and the academic literature; choosing one and fully exploring the implications of the definition will be key for aligning stated CP3 goals with programmatic action.

• Invest further in program evaluation. The research team recognizes that it is difficult to evaluate effectiveness in this area, but, without standardized evaluation, supporting the impact of CP3 programs will be difficult.

• Commit to transparency and external communication. Transparency in actions taken and evidence collected, as well as communication with skeptical audiences, will be key in showing change and growth in CP3 and its activities to external actors and in further building trust with external audiences.

By John S. Hollywood, Keith Gierlack, Pauline Moore, Thomas Goode, Henry H. Willis, Devon Hill, Rahim Ali, Annie Brothers, Ryan Bauer, Jonathan Tran

Soft targets and crowded places (ST-CPs) are easily accessible to large numbers of people and have limited security or protective measures in place, making them vulnerable to attack. Examples include sports arenas, shopping centers, schools, transportation systems, and houses of worship. Although attacks on them are relatively rare, they result in significant loss of life and contribute to an atmosphere of fear throughout society. Researchers performed a landscape assessment of the threat to and major vulnerabilities of ST-CPs, existing security measures and initiatives, and ways to improve allocation of security resources. The researchers then developed a road map for future investments and made recommendations for improving ST-CP security and response to attacks. These recommendations include research, development, test, and evaluation priorities to improve prevention and protection, such as seeking methods of deterring and dissuading would-be attackers, more evaluation of the effectiveness of security measures, and developing a model concept of operations for open and nonsecure spaces. In addition, they recommended funding and policy priorities focused on public education and training, providing additional resources to cross-organizational security teams and managers, and increasing funding for access control systems.

Key Findings

• The most-common motivations for attacks are personal, followed by terrorism and extremism.

• Education and private buildings are the most–frequently targeted types of ST-CPs.

• Attacks on ST-CPs with large, accessible crowds, such as houses of worship, shopping malls, restaurants, bars, and nightclubs, have the highest average lethality.

• Layered security strategies, in which measures work together, improve the chance that an attack will be prevented, halted, or mitigated.

• Tips from the public have prevented attacks. Public education on what to report and how, and support for threat assessment teams, would make tips more effective.

• Access control systems, such as locks, secured windows, and secured entryways, have been effective and efficient but need to be trained on and maintained.

• Bystanders and security have both stopped attacks. Groups of bystanders tackling shooters have been highly effective. Training can make responses even more effective.

• Response command, control, and communications need to be improved. Alternatives to traditional, push-to-talk voice radio communications are needed.

• Security measures need more effectiveness and efficiency evaluations. The security community has growing interest in artificial intelligence (AI); evaluations of security systems with AI will be needed as these systems deploy.

Recommendations

• Find ways to deter and dissuade would-be attackers.

• Develop indicators of and education about suspicious seeking of weapons.

• Develop protocols and education for wellness checks.

• Further evaluate the effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of security measures.

• Develop a model concept of operations for open and nonsecure spaces, such as shopping malls and restaurants.

• Continuously track and analyze mass-attack plots.

• Review mass-shooting events to determine whether some ordinary criminal shootings should be treated as mass attacks on soft targets or crowded places.

• Find ways to reduce the mass psychological effects of attacks, including societal fear and secondary trauma.

• Focus on basics, such as provision and maintenance of access control equipment and public education campaigns on what to look for and how to report it.

• Strengthen the system-based, layered security framework.

• Ensure that funding and policy priorities reflect research findings.

• Fund enhanced public education and training on what to report and how.

• Provide additional funding to cross-organizational threat assessment teams and managers.

• Fund enhanced public education and training on how to respond to an active attacker.

• Provide additional funding to cross-organizational security teams and managers.

• Fund and distribute updates of site security guidance documents and training.

• Fund access control systems

Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2024. 24p.

By John S. Hollywood, Keith Gierlack, Pauline Moore, Thomas Goode, Henry H. Willis, Devon Hill, Rahim Ali, Annie Brothers, Ryan Bauer, Jonathan Tran

Attacks on soft targets and crowded places (ST-CPs) represent a significant challenge. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security requires research and development to assess methods for reducing the propensity and loss of life from these types of attacks. In response, researchers from the Homeland Security Operational Analysis Center conducted a comprehensive landscape assessment of the threat to ST-CPs and corresponding security measures. This assessment integrated literature reviews, attack plot analyses, grant data reviews, and security cost modeling to identify both needs for improvement and recommended research and investment priorities for addressing those needs.

The number of attack plots is broadly aligned with regional population counts. The most-common motivations for ST-CP attacks have been personal, followed by terrorist and extremist motivations. Education and private buildings (workplaces) are the most–frequently targeted types of ST-CPs. Attacks on ST-CPs that have large, accessible crowds, such as houses of worship, shopping malls, restaurants, bars, and nightclubs, had the highest average lethality.

To defend ST-CPs, a layered approach has security measures work together to improve the chance that an attack will be stopped or mitigated. Prevention measures stop attacks before they reach execution; however, the public needs to know what warning signs to look for and how to report them, and threat assessment teams need to assess tips and follow up appropriately. Access control systems, such as locks, secured windows, and secured entryways, have been effective and efficient. Bystanders and security have both stopped attacks; groups of bystanders tackling shooters have been highly effective.

Key Findings

The conditions that a would-be attacker must fulfill to successfully execute a high-fatality attack are collectively the attack chain; interrupting that chain can prevent or reduce casualties

• An attacker must carry out many steps to complete a high-fatality attack. The attacker must become fully committed, plan, acquire weapons and skills, and make other preparations without being detected and reported by others. Once on scene, the attacker must get through the site's security layers and engage a crowd without being stopped quickly.

• A system-based, or layered, approach helps security measures work together to improve the chances that an attack will be stopped or mitigated at any of these steps, guarding against single points of failure.

• Prevention measures are perhaps the most-important factors in interrupting the attack chain because they can and have halted many plots before they reached execution. Reports of warning signs have been key. However, the public must know what to look for and how, and authorities need threat assessment teams and training to assess tips and follow up appropriately.

• Access and entry-control systems, including locks, secured windows, and secured entry spaces, have been effective and efficient in protecting against attackers.

• Both bystanders and on-scene security have been effective in stopping attacks. Groups of bystanders tackling shooters have been highly effective in ending attacks.

  Recommendations

• Seek methods for deterring and dissuading would-be attackers from becoming committed to plots.

• Develop indicators and training to detect suspicious seeking of weapons and ammunition.

• Develop enhancements to "see something, say something" campaigns.

• Develop and evaluate campaigns to reduce hoax threats of violence.

• Develop rules and processes for assessment, monitoring, and follow-up with reported threats, including processes for initial wellness checks.

• Evaluate the effectiveness of site security technologies in stopping simulated attacks.

• Study the social costs of security measures more.

• Develop a model strategy for open and nonsecure spaces, such as parks, parking lots, shopping malls, and restaurants.

• Improve command and control, leadership, and coordination during attack responses.

• Study alternatives to traditional voice radio communications during attack responses.

• Continuously track and analyze mass-attack plots.

• Determine whether some ordinary criminal shootings should be treated as mass attacks on ST-CPs.

• Seek ways to reduce the mass psychological impacts of attacks.

• Support detailed tracking of grant spending related to ST-CP security.

• Fund enhanced public education and training on what to report and how and on how to respond to an active attacker.

• Provide funding to cross-organizational threat assessment teams, security teams, and managers, and provide training on how to report on and how to respond during an incident.

• Fund access control systems.

• Fund medical supplies and training to match updated medical standards.

Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2024. 168p.

By Sonjai Kumar

This article discusses the differences between the risk management and enterprise risk management. Though the concept of risk management is very old, almost as old as beginning of human existence but the concept of ERM is new around two decades old. The importance of enterprise risk management increased over the period of time due various crisis and emergence risk based capital in banking and insurance industry. The article discuss the various factors necessary for success of enterprise risk management.

Academia Letters, July 2021. Article 2234. 9p

UNITED STATES. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY. OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS; UNITED STATES. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION; CANADIAN CENTRE FOR CYBER SECURITY; ESTONIAN NATIONAL CYBER SECURITY CENTRE; JAPAN COMPUTER EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM COORDINATION CENTER; NATIONAL CENTER OF INCIDENT READINESS AND STRATEGY FOR CYBERSECURITY JAPAN; FINLAND. NATIONAL CYBER SECURITY CENTRE; JAPAN. NATIONAL POLICE AGENCY; UNITED KINGDOM. NATIONAL CYBER SECURITY CENTRE

From the document: "Civil society--nonprofit, advocacy, cultural, faith-based, academic, think tanks, journalist, dissident, and diaspora organizations, communities, and individuals involved in defending human rights and advancing democracy--are considered high-risk communities. Often, these organizations and their employees are targeted by state-sponsored threat actors who seek to undermine democratic values and interests. Regularly conducted as a type of transnational repression (also referred to as digital transnational repression), state-sponsored actors compromise organizational or personal devices and networks to intimidate, silence, coerce, harass, or harm civil society organizations and individuals. According to industry reporting, state-sponsored targeting of high-risk communities predominantly emanates from the governments of Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea. Actors typically perform extensive pre-operational research to learn about potential victims, gather information to support social engineering, or obtain login credentials. Actors target organization networks or personal accounts (e.g., email) and devices of individuals for surveillance and monitoring, often via spyware applications--malicious software that collects data from affected devices. This guide provides recommendations for civil society organizations and individuals to mitigate the threat of state-sponsored cyber operations based on observed malicious behavior. The guide also provides recommendations for software manufacturers to improve the security posture of their customers."

UNITED STATES. CYBERSECURITY & INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY AGENCY. 14 MAY, 2024. 19p.

UNITED STATES. SPACE FORCE

From the document: "The threats the United States faces from its strategic competitors have grown substantially. At the same time, the environment is being shaped by a rapidly growing commercial space sector, which is cultivating an ecosystem of innovation and reducing barriers to entry to deliver new, operationally relevant capabilities. This has extraordinary implications for global security and stability. The United States Space Force (USSF) will be more resilient and capable if it combines organic capabilities with the capabilities from other providers. Therefore, the USSF will integrate a mix of organic, allied, and commercial space solutions into hybrid architectures where the nation's space capabilities truly are greater than the sum of the parts. The USSF will leverage the commercial sector's innovative capabilities, scalable production, and rapid technology refresh rates to enhance the resilience of national security space architectures, strengthen deterrence, and support Combatant Commander objectives in times of peace, competition, crisis, conflict, and post-conflict."

UNITED STATES. DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE. 8 APR, 2024. 19p.

ByAlex Stevens, Niamh Eastwood, and Kirstie Douse

In this review article, we develop the case for the decriminalisation of drug possession in the UK by describing our ‘modest proposal’ to repeal the relevant sections of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 and its advantages. We defend this proposal against possible critiques from both conservative and radical positions. On the conservative side, these criticisms include that it would increase drug use and harm and that it would be illegal under international law. From the more radical position, we anticipate the criticisms that decriminalisation of possession would leave the harm associated with illegal drug supply to continue, that it would leave in place restrictions on the rights to use drugs, that it would forego the possible tax income from a legally regulated market, and that the drug laws would continue to act as tools of social control. In response, we argue that decriminalisation offers a feasible first step towards reducing the harm of drug control which would not increase drug-related harm.

Drug Science, Policy and Law Volume 10: 1–10

MASLEJ, NESTOR; FATTORINI, LOREDANA; PERRAULT, RAYMOND; PARLI, VANESSA; REUEL, ANKA; BRYNJOLFSSON, ERIK

From the document: "Welcome to the seventh edition of the AI Index report. The 2024 Index is our most comprehensive to date and arrives at an important moment when AI's influence on society has never been more pronounced. This year, we have broadened our scope to more extensively cover essential trends such as technical advancements in AI, public perceptions of the technology, and the geopolitical dynamics surrounding its development. Featuring more original data than ever before, this edition introduces new estimates on AI training costs, detailed analyses of the responsible AI landscape, and an entirely new chapter dedicated to AI's impact on science and medicine. The AI Index report tracks, collates, distills, and visualizes data related to artificial intelligence (AI). Our mission is to provide unbiased, rigorously vetted, broadly sourced data in order for policymakers, researchers, executives, journalists, and the general public to develop a more thorough and nuanced understanding of the complex field of AI." See pages 10 and 11 for a full list of contributors.

STANFORD UNIVERSITY. HUMAN-CENTERED ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE. 2024. 502p.

UNITED STATES. EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT; UNITED STATES. OFFICE OF THE NATIONAL CYBER DIRECTOR

From the document: "The '2024 Report on the Cybersecurity Posture of the United States' assesses the cybersecurity posture of the United States, the effectiveness of national cyber policy and strategy, and the status of the implementation of national cyber policy and strategy by Federal departments and agencies. Additionally, this report highlights cybersecurity threats and issues facing the United States, including new or emerging technologies that may affect national security, economic prosperity, and the rule of law. This is the first edition of the report and covers calendar year 2023, with additional consideration of developments in 2024 preceding the publication of this report. Over the past year, U.S. national cybersecurity posture improved, driven by steady progress towards the 2023 National Cybersecurity Strategy's (NCS) vision of a defensible, resilient, and values-aligned digital ecosystem achieved through fundamental shifts in the underlying dynamics that shape cyberspace. The Administration has successfully begun implementation of the NCS Implementation Plan, which coordinates actions by departments and agencies across the Federal Government to make the President's affirmative vision a reality. These initial implementation actions set the foundation for further investment and sustained commitment by stakeholders across the digital ecosystem."

United States. Executive Office of the President. United States. Office of the National Cyber Director. 2024. 37p.

ELLISON, TOM; HUGH, BRIGITTE

From the document: "Climate change and policy responses provide new opportunities for state and non-state actors to engage in mis- and disinformation across a wide range of scales and topics. Traditionally, analysis of climate change and misinformation has focused most on the problem of climate change denialism and politicization of emissions reductions. However, misinformation, disinformation peddling, and malign influence campaigns are increasing around a broader range of climate-related issues, such as blame for climate hazards, backlash to climate-driven displacement, disputes over clean energy policies, polarization over climate protests, and competition for influence in climate-vulnerable states. Such efforts have security implications across the political, economic and societal spheres, and warrant more holistic and proactive policy attention, drawing lessons from analogous efforts around the COVID-19 pandemic and security of elections. This report provides a baseline on the intersection of climate security risks and mis- and disinformation challenges."

CENTER FOR CLIMATE AND SECURITY. COUNCIL ON STRATEGIC RISKS. 2024. 14p.