By Katya Migacheva and Jordan Reimer

  The following resource aims to serve as a guide for U.S. state governments as they seek to implement comprehensive targeted violence prevention (TVP) programming. It is not aimed to be prescriptive, but rather provide menus of options for what comprehensive TVP programming might look like at a state level. This resource lays out three specific categories of activities for state-level TVP implementation. The first (Preparation) and last (Monitoring) are "back-end" activities to help state governments lay the groundwork for effective programming and sustain those efforts in perpetuity. The middle category (Prevention) follows the public health model of violence prevention and incorporates four levels of prevention – Primordial, Primary, Secondary, and Tertiary – that address community and individual susceptibility to targeted violence. Guided by the broad mission statement (see below), each activity category (e.g., Preparation, Prevention, Monitoring) has been organized as a logic model, delineating individual goals to accomplish the mission, and corresponding objectives, tasks, outputs, and desired outcomes for each goal. For each output and outcome, or key performance indicators (KPIs) we propose measures of success and corresponding methods/scales to calculate those measures. We also suggest impact indicators to gauge the extent of achieving the overall mission. Finally, appendices lay out definitions of key terms, potential TVP stakeholders, references for targeted violence risk factors, scales for use in conducting measurements, and a references to materials used to develop this resource.    

Washington, DC: National Governors Association, 2022. 140p.

by Trevor Johnston, Erik E. Mueller, Irina A. Chindea, Hannah Jane Byrne, Nathan Vest, Colin P. Clarke, Anusree Garg, Howard J. Shatz

Violent nonstate actors (VNSAs) obtain money from multiple sources, both licit (e.g., donations and legitimate businesses) and illicit (e.g., extortion, smuggling, theft). They use that money to pay, equip, and sustain their fighters and to provide services to local populations, which can help build support for the groups, allowing them to extract resources, gain safe havens, and challenge state authority and territorial control. In this way, financial resources can prolong conflicts and undermine stabilization efforts after the fighting ends. Countering VNSA financing plays a critical role in degrading such organizations. Various means are available to disrupt financing. These include kinetic means, such as destroying resources or neutralizing leadership, and nonkinetic means, such as targeted financial sanctions and legal remedies. The counter–threat financing (CTF) tools that work best for transnational groups may not work as well for national ones, and some tools may prove counterproductive in certain situations. Which tools to use in a given case is not always obvious. The authors draw lessons from efforts against five VNSA groups to discover, in each case, how they financed their activities and for what purposes, as well as which methods to counter this financing worked best and which were counterproductive. The authors then consider what the U.S. Army can do to support counter–terrorism financing efforts.

Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2023. 386p.

by James V. Marrone, Todd C. Helmus, Elizabeth Bodine-Baron, Christopher Santucci

The number of programs dedicated to countering violent extremism (CVE) has grown in recent years, but a fundamental gap remains in the understanding of the effectiveness of such programs. A 2017 RAND Corporation report documented that only a handful of such programs have been subject to rigorous evaluations of effect. Such evaluations are critical because they help ensure that programming funds are dedicated to the most-effective efforts. Evaluations also play a critical role in helping individual programs improve the quality of service provision.

This report presents the results of an evaluation designed to assess the impact of a CVE-themed radio talk show, Ina Mafita, broadcast in northern Nigeria in 2018–2019. RAND researchers studied this program by recruiting more than 2,000 northern Nigerians via text message from a research panel administered by a mobile phone–based market research company. The participants were randomly assigned to listen to either the treatment program of interest, which is intended to address underlying factors promoting instability and support for Boko Haram in northern Nigeria, or to a nontreatment control program. Specifically, RAND researchers examined the effects of the program on listeners' beliefs about the importance of being a role model and the value of local committees in reintegrating at-risk youth, as well as their views of kidnap victims. The report details the research design and findings and offers recommendations for improving such evaluations in the future.

Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2022. 32p.

By the  U.S. Department of Justice Civil Rights Division 

 The United States has conducted an extensive investigation of the Orange County District Attorney’s Office (OCDA) and the Orange County Sheriff’s Department (OCSD), pursuant to our authority under the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 34 U.S.C. § 12601 (previously codified at 42 U.S.C. § 14141). We have determined that there is reasonable cause to believe that the Orange County District Attorney’s Office and the Orange County Sheriff’s Department engaged in a pattern or practice of conduct—the operation of a custodial informant program—that systematically violated criminal defendants’ right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment and right to due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment. While our review focused on custodial informant activity from 2007 through 2016, the informant controversy continues to undermine public confidence in the integrity of the Orange County criminal legal system. Neither agency has implemented sufficient remedial measures to identify criminal cases impacted by unlawful informant activities or prevent future constitutional violations. This report provides a public accounting of the scope and impact of the informant program on the Orange County criminal legal system. … We focused our investigation on: (1) whether OCDA and OCSD used custodial informants to elicit incriminating statements from individuals in the Orange County Jail, after those individuals had been charged with a crime, in violation of the Sixth Amendment; and (2) whether OCDA failed to disclose exculpatory evidence about those custodial informants to criminal defendants in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. We reviewed thousands of pages of documents, made  numerous site visits to OCDA and OCSD, and conducted dozens of interviews in the course of our investigation. In particular, we conducted 17 transcribed interviews with OCDA prosecutors about specific cases they personally handled involving custodial informants. The evidence reveals that custodial informants in the Orange County Jail system acted as agents of law enforcement to elicit incriminating statements from defendants represented by counsel, and that for years OCSD maintained and concealed systems to track, manage, and reward those custodial informants. The evidence also reveals that OCDA prosecutors failed to seek out and disclose to defense counsel exculpatory information regarding custodial informants. We therefore have reasonable cause to believe that this pattern or practice of conduct by both agencies resulted in systematic violations of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.     

Washington, DC: The Author, 2022. 63p.

By The United States Commission on Civil Rights,  Minnesota Advisory Committee 

The nature and scope of the problem. There will be no end to disparate policing, and the accompanying resentment in the community, until sufficient data can be collected to better inform both policymakers and the People who elect them. Disparate policing is abusive on many levels, affecting the individuals involved, reopening unhealed wounds left by historical injustices, and reminding entire communities that their lives don’t matter. The Committee found that the lack of political will at all levels of government to enforce the limits on police conduct is the major impediment to meaningful change that would address the Constitutional violations identified in this report.  

Minneapolis:: Minnesota Advisory Committee to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights ,2022. 62p.

Law Enforcement Conduct Commission 

Police officers are the first responders to the majority of domestic and family violence incidents that take place in New South Wales. They play a critical role in keeping victims safe, detaining, or arresting offenders and applying for protection orders. Police attend 180,000 incidents a year – or about 500 every day. This chilling number highlights how important it is for police to be well trained, well equipped and have appropriate systems in place to deal with this sadly all too common crime. The NSW Police Force estimates that 40% of police work involves responding to domestic violence. The Law Enforcement Conduct Commission used data from complaints to look at the effectiveness of NSW Police Force processes and procedures in relation to domestic and family violence incidents. We used data from complaint investigations linked to incidents involving a police officer responding to domestic and family violence incidents between 2017 and 2021. We looked at matters in which police officers were involved in domestic and family violence incidents, as well as matters in which officers were investigated for conducting inadequate investigations into reports of domestic and family violence incidents. We saw that police officers had been involved in domestic and family violence incidents, and at times were charged with domestic violence offences. We saw issues such as poor record keeping practices and police with inadequate training in how to properly investigate domestic violence incidents. The Commission has made 13 recommendations to assist the NSW Police Force to strengthen its procedures and the way it investigates complaints about domestic and family violence. Police officers play a critical role as first responders to domestic and family violence incidents. However, addressing domestic violence issues cannot be solved by the NSW Police Force alone. …As we do our work, we will look at the impact these proposed changes have on the way police respond to these incidents and any complaints made about the way they have dealt with domestic and family violence.    

Sydney: The Commission, 2023. 92p.

By  Melissa Scaia, and Rhonda Martinson,

An assessment of the Minneapolis Police Department’s response to domestic violence identified practices that put survivor safety at risk and did not hold violent offenders accountable. In 2017, a study by the Police Conduct Oversight Commission on the police response to domestic violence (DV) cases in Minneapolis documented that police officers wrote reports or made arrests in only 20% of DV calls from 2014-2016. During that time, the Minneapolis Police Department (MPD) received over 43,000 DV-related calls. Concern about the findings from the Office of Police Conduct’s review 2017 report led the Office of Police Conduct Review (OPCR) to request that Global Rights for Women (GRW), in coordination with local advocacy agencies, conduct an assessment of MPD’s response to DV cases. With a length of experience in international work on violence against women as a human rights issue, the GRW team is keenly aware that domestic violence is the most common form of gender-based violence around the world. No country or community is free from this crisis, including Minneapolis. …

Minneapolis: Global Rights for Women , Minneapolis Domestic Violence Working Group,  2023. 140p.

By Paul Pazen, Steven L. Byers, Cole Anderson, and Andy Archuleta

Public safety plays a critical role in the economic vitality of a community. Increasing population, attracting new businesses, generating a workforce, and bolstering the ability to attract tourism are all directly related to real and perceived safety challenges. If people are not safe, they cannot learn, work, or enjoy their communities. Ultimately, high crime rates result in a failure to thrive. It’s no secret that Colorado has been hit with a crime wave. Skyrocketing crime rates, fentanyl deaths, and the number one rank in the country when it comes to auto thefts, are all factors that have put Colorado’s economic future at risk and made Coloradans less safe. The question this report poses is: why has Colorado become less safe? A comparison of policing and crime rates in the two largest cities in Colorado, Denver and Colorado Springs, uncovers distinctly different trends in policing and police resources that have produced differing outcomes. For example, in Denver, the crime rate increased by 32% from 2010 to 2022 while the number of uniformed police officers decreased by 15.1%. A crime case is cleared when it has been solved and the clearance rates for violent crime in Denver have dropped 18.6% at a time when the crime rate is increasing. In Colorado Springs, the crime rate decreased by 15.9% and the number of uniformed police officers rose 5.7% from 2010 to 2022. Clearance rates for violent crime increased by 9.7% while the crime rate decreased. The criminal justice system includes police who investigate crime, district attorneys who prosecute offenders, and the Department of Corrections, which keeps offenders off of the streets and facilitates the reformation and re-entry of offenders. Each of these parts plays an important and unique role in keeping Coloradans safe and is represented by one side of the “crime triangle.” Much like a triangle, when one side collapses, the system collapses.

Greenwood Village, CO: Common Sense Institute (CSI) , 2023. 38p.

 By Peter Hillen, Elizabeth Speakman, Nadine Dougall, Inga Heyman, Jennifer Murray, Michelle Jamieson, Elizabeth Aston, Andrew McAuley  

This report describes the findings of an independent evaluation of a Police Scotland test of change (pilot) of the carriage and administration of intranasal naloxone as an emergency first aid measure to persons suspected of experiencing an opioid overdose. The pilot was conducted between March and October 2021 in three test areas in Scotland: Falkirk, Dundee City and Glasgow East, and subsequently extended to include Caithness, Falkirk and Glasgow custody and community police officers in Stirling. Research aims and objectives The evaluation focused on the implementation and processes of the pilot to allow elements of learning and best practice to be identified and to inform any potential future national implementation of naloxone carriage/administration within Police Scotland. The evaluation assessed: • Police officer attitudes towards drug use and people who use drugs; • Police officer experiences of witnessing and responding to overdose; • Police officer understanding and awareness of drug overdose incidents and naloxone as a first aid intervention; • Effectiveness of naloxone training (considering knowledge/skills of officers both before and after training); • Experience of naloxone carriage/administration by officers; • Barriers/facilitators (actual or perceived) impacting on police carriage/administration of naloxone; • Perceptions from local communities, including recovery communities, people who use drugs, their families and/or relevant support services.   

Edinburgh; Napier University ,2022. 98p.

United States Department of Justice Civil Rights Division and United States Attorney's Office District of Minnesota Civil Division

FROM THE EXECUTIVE SUMMERY: On April 21, 2021, the Department of Justice opened a pattern or practice investigation ofthe Minneapolis Police Department (MPD) and the City of Minneapolis. By then, Derek Chauvin had been convicted in state court for the tragic murder of George Floyd in 2020. Inthe years before, shootings by other MPD officers had generated public outcry , culminating in weeks of civil unrest after George Floyd was killed. Our federal investigation focused on the police department as a whole , not the acts of any one officer. To be sure, many MPD officers do their difficult work with professionalism ,courage, and respect. Nevertheless, our investigation found that the systemic problems in MPD made what happened to George Floyd possible.

United States Department of Justice Civil Rights Division. June 16, 2023

By The Joint Federal/Provincial Commission into the April 2020 Nova Scotia Mass Casualty

  In this volume, we describe the various processes involved in leading and designing the Mass Casualty Commission. The mass casualty of April 18 and 19, 2020, created profound grief, disruption, and destabilization in Nova Scotia and beyond. Early in our mandate, the Commission adopted the image and metaphor of rippled water to signify the breadth and depth of the impact of what happened over approximately 13 hours on April 18 to April 19, 2020, and in the aftermath. The ripple acknowledges that the immediate impact experienced by those most affected – the individuals, families, first responders, service providers, and local communities – was appropriately the starting point of our mandate. it also captures the dynamic impact of the mass casualty, which expanded outward and affected communities, institutions, and society in Nova Scotia, across Canada, in the United States, and further afield. The Commission saw every day how the mass casualty was a source of grief, bereavement, and trauma for many individuals, families, and communities. Some members of the Commission staff and their families live in Colchester, Cumberland, or Hants counties as well as throughout Nova Scotia. While acknowledging the unique nature and depth of loss for those whose loved ones were taken, regardless of where we live, the mass casualty to varying degrees affected everyone’s sense of safety, trust, and well-being. That impact will continue long past the conclusion of our mandate. As Commissioners, we were motivated by a desire to ensure that our collective work would provide answers and make positive contributions to community safety and well-being in the future. From our first days on the job we made a series of decisions about how best to carry out our mandate with the public interest at the forefront. in line with and throughout our mandate, we invited and endeavoured to seek and respond to input from directly affected Participants in the Commission’s process, while maintaining our independence. The mandate also directed that we not express any conclusion or recommendation regarding the civil or criminal  liability of any person or organization. This direction was not unique to our inquiry; the Supreme Court of Canada has made clear that all public inquiries are prohibited by law from making any findings or conclusions regarding civil and criminal liability….

Halifax, NS: Joint Federal/Provincial Commission into the April 2020 Nova Scotia Mass Casualty, 2023. 294p.

By The Joint Federal/Provincial Commission into the April 2020 Nova Scotia Mass Casualty, 

  As Commissioners, we grounded our work every day in the memory of those whose lives were taken. Interacting with and learning from the individuals, families, and members of the communities most affected is an additional catalyst to the completion of our tasks. We have also been spurred on by the remarkable wisdom and generosity of everyone who contributed to our work: Participants and their counsel, witnesses (both through interviews and in public proceedings), experts, stakeholders, the media, community members, the wider public, and Commission staff. To all of you, we express our gratitude. This Report marks the end of our mandated responsibilities as a public inquiry and the shift to a shared responsibility to act. We do not absolve ourselves of obligations to contribute to the implementation of the Report’s recommendations in the days, weeks, and years to come. Yet acting on our recommendations is clearly in the hands and purview of others once the Commissioners have produced the Report. The leadership for this next phase includes those who participated in the Commission’s work; those external to the Commission, such as those who have reported on it and followed it; and others who have a formal, recognized duty to contribute to public safety and community well-being. We have said many times that this is a shared responsibility and opportunity. In Volume  6, Implementation, we expand on the importance of this collective responsibility, highlighting the significance of co-operation among politicians, policy-makers, institutions, organizations, community groups, and individuals right across society.   

Halifax, NS: Joint Federal/Provincial Commission into the April 2020 Nova Scotia Mass Casualty, 2023. 83p.

 By The Joint Federal/Provincial Commission into the April 2020 Nova Scotia Mass Casualty

  in this volume, we build on the findings and conclusions reached so far by turning to the institutional context of policing. This volume addresses the policing dimensions of the following issues set out in our mandate: … (iii) interactions with police, including any specific relationship between the perpetrator and the RCMP and between the perpetrator and social services, including mental health services, prior to the event and the outcomes of those interactions, (iv) police actions, including operational tactics, response, decision-making and supervision, (v) communications with the public during and after the event, including the appropriate use of the public alerting system established under the Alert Ready program, (vi) communications between and within the RCMP, municipal police forces, the Canada Border Services Agency, the Criminal intelligence Service Nova Scotia, the Canadian Firearms Program, and the Alert Ready program, (vii) police policies, procedures and training in respect of gender-based and intimate partner violence, (viii) police policies, procedures and training in respect of active shooter incidents, … (x) policies with respect to police responses to reports of the possession of prohibited firearms, including communications between law enforcement agencies, and (xi) information and support provided to the families of victims, affected citizens, police personnel and the community  

Halifax, NS: Joint Federal/Provincial Commission into the April 2020 Nova Scotia Mass Casualty, , 2023. 722p.

By The  Joint Federal/Provincial Commission into the April 2020 Nova Scotia Mass Casualty 

Volume 2 sets out a narrative overview of what happened leading up to, during, and in the immediate aftermath of the Nova Scotia mass casualty on April 18 and 19, 2020. In addition, it contains our first set of main findings with respect to the perpetrator’s actions and the responses of individuals and the community, the RCMP, and other police and emergency response agencies. Volumes 3, 4, and 5 build on these main findings and examine them in light of the causes, circumstances, and context of these events. Our mandate directs us to include 11 specific issues as part of our examination of how and why the mass casualty occurred. We canvassed these specific issues in relation to three broad themes, and each of these themes is the subject of a volume in this Report: Violence (Volume 3), Community (Volume 4), and Policing (Volume 5). These volumes contain our additional findings and conclusions with respect to a range of topics within each theme, and they expand on them by identifying lessons to be learned and recommendations for action. The first three specific issues set out in our mandate relate to violence: (i) contributing and contextual factors, including the role of gender-based and intimate partner violence; (ii) access to firearms; (iii) interactions with police, including any specific relationship between the perpetrator and the RCMP and between the perpetrator and social services, including mental health services, prior to the event and the outcomes of those interactions.  

Halifax, NS: Joint Federal/Provincial Commission into the April 2020 Nova Scotia Mass Casualty, 2023. 517p.

By The Joint Federal/Provincial Commission into the April 2020 Nova Scotia Mass Casualty

Volume 2 sets out the Commission’s main findings in the narrative of what happened leading up to, during, and in the aftermath of the mass casualty of April 18 and 19, 2020. As distressing as it is to recall the violent attack that ended the lives of 22 people (one of whom was expecting a child) and injured others, our mandate requires us to provide a detailed account of these events. We have striven to include enough detail to give readers a clear, hour-by-hour account of the perpetrator’s actions as well as the response of community members and those who had a formal duty to respond. Formal responsibility rests with first and secondary police responders, emergency services personnel (including firefighters and paramedics), and other service providers (for example, tow truck operators and medical examiners). Whenever possible, we include first-voice perspectives from those who experienced the mass casualty as witnesses, community members, service providers, and as responders and overseers of the response. Witnesses and people around the perpetrator have only so much information, however, and analysis of evidence can only take us so far. Some of the perpetrator’s actions – in particular, the motivation for his violent rampage – are unknown at this time and likely will remain so forever. …

Halifax, NS: Joint Federal/Provincial Commission into the April 2020 Nova Scotia Mass Casualty, 2023. 379p.

By The Joint Federal/Provincial Commission into the April 2020 Nova Scotia Mass Casualty

 The mass casualty of April 18 and 19, 2020, created profound grief, disruption, and destabilization in Nova Scotia and beyond. Early in our mandate, the Commission adopted the image and metaphor of rippling water to signify the breadth and depth of the impact of what happened over approximately a 13-hour period on those two days and in their aftermath. The ripple acknowledges that the immediate impact experienced by those most affected – the individuals, families, first responders, service providers, and local communities  – was appropriately the starting point of our mandate. It also captures the dynamic impact of the mass casualty, which expanded outward and affected communities, institutions, and society in Nova Scotia, across Canada, in the United States, and further afield. We introduced the ripple image as we started our work, and we acknowledge that the rippling effects of the mass casualty will continue after our Report is read and our recommendations are implemented. No one can undo the perpetrator’s actions or the actions taken by others in response: these actions are the epicentre of concentric circles of impact caused by one man. Collectively, individuals, communities, the province of Nova Scotia, and all of Canada can learn from this incident and work together toward enhanced safety and well-being in the future. An appreciation of the depth and breadth of this rippling impact is an essential component of effective, concerted, forward-looking efforts. …

Halifax, NS: Joint Federal/Provincial Commission into the April 2020 Nova Scotia Mass Casualty,  2023. 206p.

By The Joint Federal/Provincial Commission into the April 2020 Nova Scotia Mass Casualty

  The Final Report of the Mass Casualty Commission, brings together everything we have learned about the April 2020 mass casualty in Nova Scotia as well as our recommendations to help make communities safer. The Report is divided into seven volumes. volumes that are longer are divided into parts and chapters focusing on specific topics, while others just contain chapters. Recommendations, main findings, and lessons learned are woven throughout the Report and are also listed in the Executive Summary. Please note that quoted material is cited in the volume in which it appears. Appendices and annexes are also available. All materials relating to the Final Report are available on the Commission website MassCasualtyCommission.ca and through Library and Archives Canada. Each volume of the Final Report focuses on an area of our mandate: Volume 1 Context and Purpose Volume 2 What Happened Volume 3 violence Volume 4 Community Volume 5 Policing Volume 6 Implementation – A Shared Responsibility to Act Volume 7 Process, and volume 7 Appendices  

Halifax, NS: Joint Federal/Provincial Commission into the April 2020 Nova Scotia Mass Casualty, (2023) . 317p. 

By The Chicago’s Use of Force Community Working Group 

 This Report from community representatives of Chicago’s Use of Force Community Working Group offers our feedback on the Chicago Police Department’s (CPD) training on de-escalation and the use of force. The Working Group was first convened in the summer of 2020 in response to the requirements of the federal civil rights Consent Decree designed to bring an end to the CPD’s pattern of police brutality and racial discrimination. Over the course of two years, the Working Group persuaded the CPD to make transformative changes to its policies governing police use of force. Last fall, we issued a Public Report on CPD’s new policies, including areas still in need of change. The new policies, if implemented and enforced on the ground, have the potential to dramatically reduce unnecessary CPD violence and improve public safety. The recent murder of Tyre Nichols by members of the Memphis Police Department serves as a stark reminder of all that is at stake in Chicago. CPD’s pattern of civil rights violations, which led to the Consent Decree, persist because of a culture of violence, racism, and denial similar to the police culture that enabled officers in Memphis to believe that they could beat and kill Mr. Nichols with impunity. … 

Chicago: The Working Group, 2023. 24p.

By Zach Goldberg

  After the killing of George Floyd in May 2020, a surprising number of Democrats embraced calls to “defund” the police. According to data from the 2020 Cooperative Election Survey, 35.4% of Democrats expressed support for reducing spending on law enforcement. Even as violent crime surged across the country, many Democrats remained supportive of defunding, which was supposedly necessary to achieve racial justice and equity. But support for defunding and depolicing is actually higher among white (and Asian) Democrats than among black and Hispanic Democrats. Relatively stronger support among the former, more affluent groups has led some to suggest that these attitudes are “luxury beliefs” that the privileged can afford to adopt to signal their virtue because they do not have to suffer the consequences. The luxury beliefs thesis thus suggests that socioeconomic status (SES) drives support for depolicing. But it is also possible that a genuine moral-political ideology, not affluence, plays an important role. This report is an attempt to empirically test the luxury beliefs hypothesis. It ultimately finds support for both the SES and ideology-centered accounts.

New York: Manhattan Institute, 2022. 57p.

By David S. Abrams, Hanming Fang and Priyanka Goonetilleke

Police “stop-and-frisks” of pedestrians and motorists have become an increasingly controversial tactic, given low average rates of contraband discovery, incidents of abuse, and evidence of racial disparity. Study of the tactic by economists has been much influenced by Knowles, Persico, and Todd (2001; hereafter, KPT) who first suggested the use of a “hit rate” (contraband discovery rate per frisk) test to distinguish racial prejudice from statistical discrimination in highway searches by police officers. Models used by KPT and almost all subsequent literature (e.g., Anwar and Fang 2006) on the subject imply diminishing marginal returns to frisks. That is, if frisks decrease substantially, the rate of contraband discovery should rise, ceteris paribus. This is the first paper to test this assumption empirically using arguably exogenous variations in frisk rates (cf. Feigenberg and Miller 2022). 1 We study the period around the nationwide protests that followed the killing of George Floyd on May 25, 2020, after which police frisks dropped tremendously and rapidly. Using extremely granular data from Chicago, we find that hit rates increased as police frisks plunged, in line with the predictions of KPT.

AEA Papers and Proceedings 2022, 112: 178–183 ,2022. 7p.