By The United Nations General Assembly. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights

The present report outlines human rights challenges in addressing and countering key aspects of the world drug problem. It also offers an overview of recent positive developments to shift towards more human rights-centred drug policies, and provides recommendations on the way forward in view of the upcoming midterm review of the 2019 Ministerial Declaration and to contribute to the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

United Nations, 2023. 19p.

By The International Drug Policy Consortium (IDPC)

In September 2023, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights released a landmark report on human rights in drug policy. Prepared at the request of the Human Rights Council as a contribution to the mid-term review of the 2019 Ministerial Declaration on drugs, this report constitutes the most ambitious and comprehensive UN document to date on the alignment of drug policies with human rights. The report consolidates existing human rights standards, develops new recommendations, and proposes a blueprint for transformative change, from a global punitive paradigm to drug policies based on health and human rights.

This IDPC advocacy note focuses on three key issues. First, the new standards and recommendations developed in the OHCHR report, which update our understanding of the human rights dimension of drug policies. Secondly, the consolidation of prior human rights standards developed by other UN bodies. Lastly, we lay down our recommendations for an effective implementation of the vision proposed by the report.

London: IDPC, 2023. 7p.

By UK Parliament, House of Commons, Home Affairs Committee

Drugs can have a significant and negative impact on people who use drugs, their loved ones and society. Trends in drugs may vary over time but this consequence is constant. Concerningly, drug misuse deaths across the UK continue to increase with opiates playing a significant role in this, and ‘street’ benzodiazepines and polydrug use also playing an increasing role. There were 250 drug misuse deaths per million population in Scotland in 2022—significantly higher than in England, Wales and Northern Ireland. In her Independent Review of Drugs, Professor Dame Carol Black estimated the total cost of drugs to society to be more than £19 billion per year—more than twice the value of the illicit drugs market (an estimated £9.4 billion).

In recent years, the response by the international community and devolved nations to drugs has increasingly focused on responding to drugs through a public health lens. UK policy should ensure that an approach originally and primarily based on criminal justice principles continues to adapt to achieve a proper balance of public health interventions that may reduce illicit drug use in the longer term rather than aiming simply to disrupt demand. We believe that this approach would be best supported by making drug policy the joint responsibility of the Home Office and the Department of Health and Social Care, with a minister sitting across both departments.

The main piece of legislation controlling drugs in the UK—the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971—is more than 50 years old. It is in need of review. Further, a full review by the Advisory Council is required on whether the most commonly controlled drugs in the UK are correctly classified and scheduled (under the Misuse of Drugs Regulations 2001), based on the evidence of their harms.

The Government’s latest drugs strategy, ‘From Harm to Hope: A 10-Year drugs plan to cut crime and save lives’ (the 10-Year Drugs Strategy) signals a shift towards recognising the need for a holistic response to drugs that not only aims to tackle the illicit drug market but also supports people who use drugs, their loved ones and society. However, the Government’s response could go further by adopting a broader range of public health-based harm reduction methods in tandem with its support of law enforcement efforts to tackle the illicit drugs market.

We support the use of diamorphine assisted treatment supported by psychosocial support as a second-line treatment for people with a chronic heroin dependency. We visited a centre in Middlesbrough and saw the dramatic and positive effect this treatment had on the lives of a small group of people who had used drugs and, albeit on a small scale, to local crime reduction. Disappointingly, such treatment programmes are few and controversial, and the Middlesbrough programme lost its funding. The Government should provide centralised funding for such programmes.

Safe consumption facilities, where people who use drugs may do so in safe, secure surroundings, may also reduce harm and deaths, but the status of such facilities is uncertain because of the restrictive regime in place under the 1971 Act. We recommend that the Government support a pilot facility in Glasgow and create a legislative pathway to enable more.

A national drug checking service in England could enable people to anonymously test samples of drugs, again preventing harm and potentially death. We recommend the Government establish a drug checking service, taking into account the experience of Wales. We also recommend the expansion of on-site drug checking services at temporary events such as music festivals and in the night-time economy through the creation of a dedicated licensing scheme. The power to issue such licences could include the devolution of power to grant licences to local authorities.

These public health and harm reduction interventions must be balanced with the role of police in applying the law. The police can also have a role in aiding prevention of drug use and treatment of harms. Scotland’s pioneering programme of having all police officers carry naloxone (a nasal spray or injection that can be administered immediately to reverse the effects of an opioid overdose) should be rolled out elsewhere in the UK as a straightforward means of saving lives. The police can also play an important role in diverting young people who have committed low-level drug-related offences away from the criminal justice system. We support greater standardisation of police-led diversion across England and Wales, to avoid a ‘postcode lottery’ in the treatment of such offenders.

London: House of Commons, 2023. 98p.

By Kathii Lynn Austin and Brian Freskos

The U.S. and Mexico are grappling with daunting security crises stemming from the trafficking of hundreds of thousands of guns over the U.S. southern border every year. These weapons are empowering Mexican transnational criminal organizations and inflicting substantial suffering in both countries. This report underscores how reducing cross-border gun trafficking is crucial for achieving the goals of the U.S.-Mexico Bicentennial Framework for Security, Public Health, and Safe Communities — a bilateral security agreement announced nearly two years ago. By implementing our recommendations, the U.S. and Mexico can more effectively combat illicit gun flows, saving lives, and improving prosperity.

California: Pacific Council on International Policy, 2023. 85p.

By Flore Berger

Cattle rustling in Mali surged in 2021 and continues at unprecedented levels, with the dominant perpetrators being violent extremist groups operating in the country. The scale of cattle rustling in Mali is the climax of a decade of growth of the practice, and cattle rustling is now a central and under-reported element of the country’s security crisis variously as a driver of conflict, as a governance and intimidation mechanism, and as a key source of revenue for non-state armed groups. This has dramatic humanitarian, social and economic effects on communities. Cattle rustling has since the very start of the crisis been at the heart of Mali’s war economy, with Tuareg rebel groups (since the 1990s) and violent extremist groups (since 2012) financing themselves by looting livestock and relying on a broader network to sell it, using its proceeds to finance their operations (e.g. buying fuel, vehicles and weapons). Cattle rustling, understood in this report to mean the whole range of livestock appropriation,1 has rarely been considered as a criminal economy, yet its impacts on communities and conflict dynamics across West Africa are arguably unrivalled by other more traditional organized markets, such as high-value narcotics. It is sustained by a complex network and supply chain, and perpetrated through ever-increasing violence. Furthermore, while a range of illicit economies have been used by violent extremist groups for resourcing – including trafficking of cigarettes, fuel and drugs; artisanal gold mining; and kidnapping for ransom – cattle rustling has proven to be a particularly resilient and broadly stable source of income. Cattle rustling also stands out regarding the degree to which it intersects with a long-standing history of frustration and resentment by pastoralist communities, and is therefore integral to understanding regional conflict. Cattle rustling, and reprisals for theft, spark cycles of violence as herders protect themselves by joining armed groups and arming themselves. Other communities then respond by creating more armed groups for self-protection, many of which become predatory. Cattle rustling also operates as a mechanism wielded by armed groups to terrorize the population and deprive them of a central element of livelihoods. Hundreds of villages have been pillaged and burnt down, and cattle looted.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2023. 54p.

By Matt Herbert and Lucia Bird Ruiz-Benitez de Lugo i

Since the turn of the millennium, organized crime has surged from a small number of locally or regionally active organizations into a plethora of syndicates operating throughout the globe. Their operations are now often transnational, either active in multiple countries or involved with illicit commodity chains that extend across borders and interlink different regions.

Organized crime players are increasingly active in criminal markets, from human trafficking to cybercrime to illicit fuel sales. Although the value of global organized crime activity is unknown – and likely unknowable with any real precision because of its nature – it is huge. Individual markets such as drug trafficking or timber extraction are estimated to generate hundreds of billions of dollars annually.

The rising prevalence and profitability of organized crime have had a substantial impact in many of the states in which networks operate. In part, this is through the corruption and/or coercion of state officials to allow criminal activity or purchasing impunity.

Such official complicity is now the most important factor enabling the spread and operations of organized crime and also a key impediment to efforts to design solutions and build resilience to it.

Criminal groups have been important sponsors of armed groups seeking to control, in full or in part, the territory of states across the world. Increasingly, organized crime actors have developed autonomous military capacity, becoming key threats to peace and security in their own right. Impacts of organized crime on governance also manifest from the bottom up, with local communities highly vulnerable to criminal actors’ attempts to violently seize de facto control, limit access to public services or establish alternative governance structures.

Because of this profusion of impacts, the international community is devoting increasing resources to counter the phenomena of rising organized crime. At a national level, this has seen greater funding of security force and criminal justice actors, an expansion that is mirrored in international aid, with heightened donor focus on security sector reform and governance, judicial sector training and programmes to build binational and multinational coordination on security challenges, including organized crime.

The international community has also sought to build arrangements for multilateral reciprocal cooperation, such as the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC), also known as the Palermo Convention. However, these have struggled to achieve the necessary effects and are often outpaced by criminal evolution, leading many states to prefer unilateral or ad hoc initiatives to address transnational organized crime. Further, many governments are shifting their approach to organized crime, assessing it as a national security threat rather than purely as a criminal justice challenge. The result has been that, while criminal justice tools such as multilateral arrangements con-tinue to be relied upon, other approaches – involving military, financial and diplomatic tools – are becoming increasingly common. The use of targeted sanctions has emerged as part of this expanding international toolkit to address organized crime.

Such sanctions can be defined as legal authorities that prohibit certain forms of otherwise licit activity, including financial access or travel, for a specific entity in order to hamper their pursuit of a specific goal. Historically, they have mostly been used against countries whose activities were interpreted as threats to peace and security or individuals who had breached international law or norms. Despite the growing use, there has been limited tracing of why and how different international actors have converged in their use of targeted sanctions, how they have developed processes to issue and implement sanctions regimes and their impact and effectiveness. This report series focuses on the use of targeted sanctions against criminal actors. The series encompasses both global reports and country-specific and thematic studies.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2023. 75p.

By Shehryar Fazli

The Taliban’s 3 April 2022 edict prohibiting poppy cultivation and the use and trade of all types of narcotics across Afghanistan could have grave implications for a collapsing economy. Poppy is the country’s most valuable cash crop, and its labour-intensive cultivation employs several hundred thousand people, pushing up wages and living standards of those directly and indirectly involved. Requiring little water, the poppy’s resilience in adverse agricultural conditions makes it an attractive long-term investment, especially during one of the worst droughts in decades. The new ban would affect farmers in the rural southwest region, where many Taliban leaders are from, as well as influential players across the opium and heroin supply chain. In the absence of significant financial incentives to these constituencies, the risks of a major backlash probably outweigh any benefits of enforcing a poppy ban. Providing such financial incentives would be dependent on significant foreign assistance. Some prominent experts and commentators infer that international legitimacy and funding was the Taliban’s primary motivation in announcing the edict. If so, there are no signs yet that the move will generate the desired response. Afghanistan has been politically and economically isolated since the Taliban’s August 2021 forceful seizure of power. The freezing of around $9 billion in central bank foreign reserves, held mostly in the US, triggered a collapse of the local currency and major liquidity crisis, while aid cut-offs and sanctions triggered hyper-inflation and impeded trade and other business. There are indications that the international community, led by the US, is softening its position to prevent an economic collapse affecting millions of Afghans who face starvation. Without tangible Taliban commitments to basic rights and equality, however, especially of girls and women, deeper international engagement, including on counter-narcotics, is unlikely. How willing and able the Taliban will be to enforce its edict may remain unclear for several months. The ban came amid the poppy harvest in the southwestern provinces of Helmand and Kandahar, bastions of both poppy cultivation and Taliban support. Significant quantities, therefore, may have already been harvested. Transporting them up the supply chain, and to western destinations, will depend on resourceful transnational crime groups. The most important of these are arguably in Pakistan, which shares Afghanistan’s longest border and most of the routes for westward movement of illicit goods, people, and cash from Afghanistan. Criminal networks here traverse the Indian and Iranian borders, and also move their product by sea off the southern Makran coast and Karachi port, to European, African, Asian and Australian markets. These networks, and the geography in which they operate, also require close examination. By better understanding the context and trends, policy-makers will be better able to assess policy options and their implications, especially in Europe, the destination of significant volumes of heroin from Afghanistan

SOC ACE Research Paper No. 9.

Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham. 2022. 35p.

By Ruggero Scaturro

Recent studies conducted by the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC) and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) show that the war in Ukraine may displace existing drug trafficking routes from and through Ukraine and exacerbate the instability that enables drug trafficking and manufacturing, including in areas not directly connected or exposed to hostilities.

Trauma derived from the conflict might also have an impact on current and future drug use patterns in communities affected by the war, which could create new opportunities for both local and foreign drug traffickers to meet this growing demand. This becomes particularly relevant when analyzing flows of traditional opioids as well as new psychoactive substances (NPS), and stimulants used by both civilians and soldiers at the front line. Neighbouring Ukraine, the South Eastern Europe region represents a relatively small market for drug consumption and accounts for only a small amount of drug production and supply (primarily cannabis) to EU markets. However, its strategic location between East and West – and its proximity to the Ukraine conflict – might mean that it is particularly exposed to the effects of the war on traffickers’ modus operandi and trafficking routes through the region.

Since February 2022, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has caused the progressive displacement and movement of traditional drug production and trafficking hubs in southern and eastern Ukraine towards the west, around the borders with Poland, Slovakia and Romania. Similarly, in the context of criminal mobility, overwhelmed border security management between Ukraine and its neighbouring countries to the west leads to opportunities for both Ukrainian and Russian criminals to operate and manage their businesses from South Eastern Europe, thanks to the possibility to forge documents and receive ‘golden’ passports due to their investments in countries in the region.

This report assesses whether the war in Ukraine and its resulting disruption are having a significant impact on drug flows through South Eastern Europe. The research is based on the assumption that, because of an intensified military presence in Eastern Europe, traditional flows of drugs have been, at least temporarily, disrupted. This includes the northern route of opioids from Afghanistan, which supplies large markets across Central Asia, Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. Furthermore, other drug routes, such as for cocaine from Latin America to the port of Odesa, have atrophied. Conversely, flows along alternative routes, such as the Balkan route, appear to have intensified.

In view of these shifts, this report offers an assessment of emerging trends in drugs flows and provides an overview of data on seizures in South Eastern Europe. It also assesses the impact that the Ukraine war is having on wholesale and retail drug prices and, where assessment is possible, on levels of purity and the perceived quality of substances.

Center for the Study of Democracy; Global Initiative Against Organized Crime, 2023. 28p.

By Julia Yansura and Lakshmi Kumar

In this report, Global Financial Integrity (GFI) presents an analysis of narcotics-related illicit financial flows between the United States and the major narcotics production and transit countries of Mexico and Colombia. The report was commissioned by the Western Hemisphere Drug Policy Commission as part of its mandate to evaluate US drug policies and programs in Latin America and the Caribbean, assess current efforts to reduce the illicit drug supply and address the harms associated with trafficking and drug abuse. A variety of strategies can and have been used to address drug trafficking in the Western Hemisphere, from manual and aerial crop eradication, to interdiction, illicit crop substitution and other alternate development approaches. While existing strategies have resulted in temporary disruptions to narcotics cultivation and trafficking, they have not been successful in addressing these issues in a comprehensive, lasting manner. At the same time, history has shown that many of these policies have had unintended consequences and caused harm to people, their communities and the environment in very profound ways. Financial strategies from the anti-money laundering and counter financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) toolkit offer a different lens to view and address the problem of drug trafficking. In this report, GFI argues that AML/CFT is underutilized in current US and regional counter-narcotics efforts and needs to be reprioritized. Effectively responding to the challenges of drug trafficking and transnational organized crime will require a multi-pronged, multi-stakeholder and multi-disciplinary effort that includes AML/CFT, as well as a more comprehensive approach to drug policies that encompasses human rights, public health and development.

Washington, DC: Global Financial Integrity , 2020. 67p.

By G. Herbert

This review provides a summary of the evidence on Illicit Financial Flows (IFFs) between China and developing countries in Africa and Asia. Specifically, it looks at the evidence on how IFFs to and from China impact on developing countries, as well as on the drivers of IFFs and of how flows are facilitated. The review draws upon a combination of academic and grey literature sources, though it is not exhaustive and only draws upon English language sources. IFFs involving China have attracted particular attention, due to estimates suggesting it is responsible for the largest IFFs by value globally. However, little has been published to date specifically on IFFs between China and developing countries. This paper attempts to help address this gap. Section 2 provides some background information on the debates and uncertainties around IFFs, including conceptual issues, difficulties in measuring these flows, and their potential impacts, as well as attempts to quantify China’s overall IFFs. Section 3 focuses on trade-related IFFs between China and developing countries in Asia and Africa. Discrepancies indicative of potential IFFs are identified using trade data from 2018 and an attempt is made to determine the scale of the revenue consequences of trade is-invoicing for China’s developing country partners. Section 4 considers IFFs-related to corrupt business practices, focusing largely on Chinese investment in Africa. Section 5 moves on to consider IFFs that relate to the trade in illegal products, including illegal narcotics, human trafficking, the illegal arms trade, the illegal wildlife trade, the illegal organ trade, and the trade-in counterfeit products. Finally, Section 6 discusses enabling environment factors relevant to IFFs between China and developing countries.

K4D Helpdesk Report.

Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies. 2020. 37p.

By INTERPOL

The development of mobile money services in Africa offer criminals a substantial opportunity to utilize these services to target victims in a variety of crimes as well as to further enable other forms of criminality. This rapid service development combined with criminal opportunities represents a security issue of interest to all member countries in Africa and poses a significant challenge to law enforcement agencies in member countries. As a result, INTERPOL, under the European Union funded ENACT Project, has assessed this issue in order to help drive a more strategic law enforcement response. Criminals and criminal organizations will most probably continue to utilize mobile money services following the recent increase in their popularity and the prominent role such services now play in society across Africa. This prominent role in society has enabled criminals to exploit weaknesses in regulations and identification systems, further enabled by a lack of experience and resources in law enforcement. Crime types have been identified that exploit mobile money services across Africa. These primarily include various types of fraud that target the distinct stages of deployment for mobile money services. Whilst acquisitive crimes significantly impact the lives of victims, criminals have also identified further opportunities to exploit mobile money services to assist other criminal activities. These ‘mobile money enabled crimes’ include illicit commodities purchases, terrorism financing and firearm enabled crime. Such significant crimes pose a threat to stability and security across Africa if not addressed by member countries. The threat from criminality facilitated by mobile money services in Africa is substantial, yet there is sometimes limited capacity amongst law enforcement to manage this complex issue, especially concerning the technical expertise required to utilise relevant evidence in the criminal justice system. As mobile money services develop interoperability across Africa, stronger partnerships amongst all law enforcement agencies, greater awareness of the overall issue at a regional level and identification of best practice responses from such agencies will be required. INTERPOL is in a position to support member countries through coordinated, intelligence led support to law enforcement using a range of police databases and operational support techniques.

Lyon, France: INTERPOL, 2020. 63p.

By EUROPOL

Cybercrime, in its various forms, represents an increasing threat to the EU. Cyber-attacks, online child sexual exploitation, and online frauds are highly complex crimes and manifest in diverse typologies. Meanwhile the perpetrators behind these crimes are becoming increasingly agile, exploiting new situations created by geopolitical and technological changes. The Internet Organised Crime Assessment (IOCTA) is Europol’s assessment of the cybercrime landscape and how it has changed over the last 24 months. Accompanying this report will be a series of spotlight reports released later this year, each of which examines a specific crime area relating to cybercrime.

Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2023 14p.

By Juraj Sikra

I have explored how to improve cybercrime reporting in Scotland by conducting a systematic literature review. Due to the lack of data on Scotland, I have frequently extrapolated from both the UK and the West. The research questions were: 1. What is known about cybercrime in the UK to date? 2. What is known about cybercrime victims in the UK to date? 3. What is known about cybercrime reporting to date? The answers were retrieved by combining Boolean variables with keywords into Scopus, Web of Science and ProQuest. This resulted in the analysis of 100 peer-reviewed articles. This analysis revealed a common trend, a novel taxonomy, and an original conclusion. The common trend is that of responsibilisation, which is the shifting of responsibility for policing cybercrime from the government onto the citizens and private sector, which will inevitably responsibilise consumers. The novel taxonomy is for classifying cybercrime reporting systems according to three pillars, which I referred to as Human-ToHuman (H2H), Human-To-Machine (H2M) and Machine-To-Machine (M2M). The original conclusion is that to improve cybercrime reporting in Scotland, the process needs to be treated also as a social one rather than a purely mathematical one.

Glasgow: University of Strathclyde, 2022. 60p.

By Paul Michael Gilmour

Purpose – Money laundering poses significant challenges for policymakers and law-enforcement authorities. The money-laundering phenomenon is often acknowledged as a type of “serious and organised crime” yet has traditionally been described as a complicated three-stage process, involving the “placement, layering and integration” of criminal proceeds. This article aims to reexamine the money-laundering concept within the realm of organised crime and critique its legal underpinnings. Design/methodology/approach – This paper explores how criminal actors collude in organised money laundering schemes to circumvent laws and frustrate the efforts of officials, while advancing the regulatory-spatial paradigms of which organised money launderers operate. In doing so, it reframes the debate towards the “who” and “where” of money laundering. Findings – This paper argues that authorities’ efforts to combat money laundering relies on rigid legal definitions and flawed ideals that fail to address the money-laundering problem. Originality/value – There has been little scholarly debate that questions the fundamental approach to conceptualising money laundering. This paper proposes a new approach to combating money laundering that better incorporates the actors involved in money laundering and the spaces in which it occurs.

Journal of Financial Crime , 2022

By Michael Levi

Money laundering has ascended the enforcement and criminological agenda in the course of this century, and has been accompanied by an increased focus on legal professionals as ‘enablers’ of crime. This article explores the dynamics of this enforcement, media and political agenda, and how the legal profession has responded in the UK and elsewhere, within the context of ignoring the difficulties of judging the effectiveness of anti money laundering. It concludes that legal responses are a function of their lobbying power, the determination of governments to clamp down on the toxic impacts of legal structures, and different legal cultures. However, it remains unclear what the effects on the levels and organization of serious crimes for gain are of controls on the professions.

Trends in Organized Crime volume 24, pages96–110 (2021)

By the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

In 2021, America experienced an unprecedented increase in cyber attacks and malicious cyber activity. These cyber attacks compromised businesses in an extensive array of business sectors as well as the American public. As the cyber threat evolves and becomes increasingly intertwined with traditional foreign intelligence threats and emerging technologies, the FBI continues to leverage our unique authorities and partnerships to impose risks and consequences on our nation’s cyber adversaries. The FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) provides the American public with a direct outlet to report cyber crimes to the FBI. We analyze and investigate the reporting to track the trends and threats from cyber criminals and then share this data with our intelligence and law enforcement partners. The FBI, alongside our partners, recognizes how crucial information sharing of cyber activities is to prepare our partners to combat the cyber threat, through a whole-of-government approach. Critical to that approach is public reporting to IC3 - enabling us to fill in the missing pieces with this valuable information during the investigatory process. Not only does this reporting help to prevent additional crimes, it allows us to develop key insights on the ever-evolving trends and threats we face from malign cyber actors. In 2021, IC3 continued to receive a record number of complaints from the American public: 847,376 reported complaints, which was a 7% increase from 2020, with potential losses exceeding $6.9 billion. Among the 2021 complaints received, ransomware, business e-mail compromise (BEC) schemes, and the criminal use of cryptocurrency are among the top incidents reported. In 2021, BEC schemes resulted in 19,954 complaints with an adjusted loss of nearly $2.4 billion.

Washington, DC: FBI, 2022. 33p.

Austin F. Cullen, Commissioner, et al.

This Commission was established in the wake of significant public concern about money laundering in British Columbia. The public was rightfully disturbed by the prospect of criminals laundering their cash and parking their illicit proceeds in this province. I was given a broad mandate to inquire into and report on money laundering in British Columbia, including: • the extent, growth, evolution, and methods of money laundering in various sectors of the economy; • the acts or omissions of responsible regulatory agencies and individuals that contributed to money laundering in the province; • the effectiveness of the anti–money laundering efforts by these agencies and individuals; and • barriers to effective law enforcement.

Vancouver: Province of British Columbia 2022. 1831p.

By Julia Yansura

Proceeds from extortion in Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador amount to more than US$1.1 billion annually according to a new study by Global Financial Integrity (GFI). The report, which examined data for individuals and businesses, also reveals that an estimated 330,000 people in the Northern Triangle region of Central America fall victim to extortion each year. Extortion against individuals is estimated at US$40 million – $57 million a year in Guatemala, US$190 million – $245 million a year in El Salvador, and $30 million – $50 million a year in Honduras. Data on extortion paid by businesses is not comparable across countries due to significant gaps in data availability. The report, titled Extortion in the Northern Triangle of Central America: Following the Money, assesses the value of this activity and seeks to better understand how the proceeds of extortion are used and laundered. It also considers whether anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing (AML/CFT) strategies are being effectively utilized to combat extortion.

Washington, DC: Global Financial Integrity, 2022. 39p.

by Richard Chelin

Synthetic drugs have created a public-health crisis and changed drug market dynamics in the country. Synthetic drugs, more specifically, new psychoactive substances (NPSs), were first detected in Mauritius in 2013 and since then have had a significant negative impact, overtaking heroin as the most popular drug among young people. The government has developed various policies to address the issue, the most recent being the National Drug Control Masterplan, which promotes collaboration among law enforcement agencies. However, the success of the strategy will depend on its effective implementation.

ENACT-Africa, 2020. 20p.

By Peter Tinti

Despite 8 years of violent insurgency in northern Mali, the region continues to be a transit zone for regional and global drug-trafficking networks. The networks have endured by ingratiating themselves with a rotating cast of actors whose tactics are based on pragmatic local conditions rather than ideology. For example, an implicit nonaggression pact among key elements of the CMA, Plateforme, and jihadist groups enables traffickers to continue unmolested. International partners should help regional governments better understand and dismantle these networks.

ENACT-- Africa, 2020. 24p.