Edited by Ivan Sammut, Jelena Agranovska

This book is the result of an academic project, funded by the Hercules Programme of the European Commission to study legislation dealing with crimes against the Financial Interest of the EU awarded to the Department of  European and Comparative Law within the Faculty of Laws of the University of Malta. The study deals with the notion of criminal law at the European Union level as well as the relationship between the EU legal order and the national legal order. The focus of the study is on the development of EU criminal legislation aimed at protecting the financial interests of the EU, with a focus on cybercrime, fraud and public spending. It starts with the current legal basis in the TFEU, followed by the development of EU legislation in the area as well as the legislation of relevant bodies, such as EPO, OLAF and EUROPOL. The study tackles how this legislation is being received by the national legal orders, whereby eleven EU Member States are selected based on size, geography and legal systems. These Member States are France, Ireland, Croatia, Estonia, Germany, Italy, Malta, Spain, Latvia, Greece and Poland. A comparative study is made between those sections of EU criminal law dealing with the financial interests of the EU in these Member States to analyse the current legislation and propose future developments. The study, which is led by the editors based at the University of Malta, examines the subject from a European perspective. Besides the European perspective, the  study focuses on national case-studies, followed by a comparative analysis.

The Hague: Eleven International Publishing, 2020. 340p.

Edited by Marcelo F. Aebi, Stefano Caneppele, Lorena Molnar 

Cybercrime has become part of everyday life. We live in hybrid societies, fluctuating between the material and the virtual world, and we are hence confronted with online, offline and hybrid offences. However, the few victimisation surveys conducted in Europe reveal that victims of online crimes seldom report them to the police. Consequently, cybercrimes – which according to the best estimates represent between one third and more than half of all attempted and completed crimes in Europe – seldom appear in national criminal statistics. The State seems powerless to prevent them and private security companies flourish. 

During two days, experts from all over the continent gathered together in the framework of a virtual conference organized by the Council of Europe and the European Union to discuss what we know, what we do not know, and what we could do to improve our knowledge of crime in our contemporary hybrid societies, develop evidence-based criminal policies, provide assistance to crime victims, and implement realistic programs in the field of crime prevention and offender treatment. This book presents their experiences, reflexions, and proposals.

The Hague: Eleven International Publishing, 2022. 154p.

By Indhu Rammohan, Tommi Gaines, Ayden Scheim, Ahmed Bayoumi, Dan Werb

Supervised consumption services (SCS) prevent overdose deaths onsite; however, less is known about their effect on population-level overdose mortality. We aimed to characterise overdose mortality in Toronto, ON, Canada, and to establish the spatial association between SCS locations and overdose mortality events.

Canada, Lancet Public Health. 2024, 9pg

By Bryce Pardo, Jirka Taylor, Jonathan P. Caulkins, Beau Kilmer, Peter Reuter, Bradley D. Stein 

  The U.S. opioid crisis worsened dramatically with the arrival of synthetic opioids, such as fentanyl, which are now responsible for tens of thousands of deaths annually. This crisis is far-reaching and even with prompt, targeted responses, many of the problems will persist for decades to come. RAND Corporation researchers have completed numerous opioid-related projects and have more underway for such clients and grantors as the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, the Assistant Secretary of Health and Human Services for Planning and Evaluation, the National Institute on Drug Abuse, the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy, and Pew Charitable Trusts. Researchers have advanced an understanding of the dimensions of the problem, some of the causes and consequences, and the effectiveness of different responses. However, no one has yet addressed the full scope of the problems associated with opioid use disorder and overdose deaths. Beginning in late 2018, the RAND Corporation initiated a comprehensive effort to understand the problem and responses to help reverse the tide of the opioid crisis. The project involves dozens of RAND experts in a variety of areas, including drug policy, substance use treatment, health care, public health, criminal justice, child welfare and other social services, education, and employment. In this work, we intend to describe the entire opioid ecosystem, identifying the components of the system and how they interact; establish concepts of success and metrics to gauge progress; and construct a simulation model of large parts of the ecosystem to permit an evaluation of the full effects  of policy responses. We dedicated project resources and communications expertise to ensure that our products and dissemination activities are optimized for reaching our primary intended audiences: policymakers and other critical decision-makers and influencers, including those in the public, private, and nonprofit sectors. The project is ambitious in scope and will not be the last word on the subject, but by tackling the crisis in a comprehensive fashion, it promises to offer a unique and broad perspective in terms of the way the nation understands and responds to this urgent national problem. Ten years ago, few would have predicted that illicitly manufactured synthetic opioids from overseas would sweep through parts of Appalachia, New England, and the Midwest. As drug markets are flooded by fentanyl and other synthetic opioids, policymakers, researchers, and the public are trying to understand what to make of it and how to respond. The synthesis of heroin in the late 19th century displaced morphine and forever changed the opiate landscape, and we might again be standing at the precipice of a new era. Cheap, accessible, and mass-produced synthetic opioids could very well displace heroin, generating important and hard-to-predict consequences. As part of RAND’s project to stem the tide of the opioid crisis, this mixed-methods report offers a systematic assessment of the past, present, and possible futures of fentanyl and other synthetic opioids found in illicit drug markets in the United States. This research is rooted in secondary data analysis, literature and document reviews, international case studies, and key informant interviews. Our goal is to provide local, state, and national decision-makers who are concerned about rising overdose trends with insights that might improve their understanding of and responses to this problem. We also hope to provide new information to other researchers, media sources, and the public, who are contributing to these critical policy discussions  

Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2019. 265p.

By Neil Donnelly and Sara Rahman

AIM To understand whether the introduction of penalty notices in New South Wales (NSW) for first time low, special and novice range drink-driving and drug-driving offences reduced the number of court appearances and increased the certainty of licence sanctions for these offences. METHOD Data was obtained from the NSW Police Force’s Computerised Operational Policing System (COPS) for all first time low, special and novice range exceed the prescribed concentration of alcohol (PCA) incidents and first time drug-driving incidents occurring between 5 December 2016 to 1 March 2020. We used a combination of interrupted time series analysis, and descriptive analysis respectively to determine the changes in CANs and dismissals post-reform. We used logistic regression to identify significant correlates of receiving a penalty notice among the first time PCA and drug-driving offenders in our sample. RESULTS The introduction of penalty notices significantly reduced the number of CANs issued for first time low, special and novice range PCA offences by 81.0%, or 4,779 fewer CANs than predicted. For first time drug-driving there was a significant, though smaller (29.8%) reduction in CANs (or 1,118 fewer CANs issued). These changes also translated into decreases in court dismissals and conditional discharges. Among first time low, special and novice range PCA offenders, the percentage receiving a court dismissal or conditional discharge decreased from 51.5% to 8.0% while among first time drug-driving offenders it decreased from 28.0% to 15.2%. Among both first time low, special and novice range PCA offenders and drug-driving offenders, having no concurrent offences and no prior proceedings to court in the previous 5 years predicted receipt of a penalty notice. The smaller reduction in court appearances for drug-driving was primarily due to those charged with this offence having more concurrent and prior offences. CONCLUSION The introduction of penalty notices significantly reduced the number of court appearances for first time low, special and novice range PCA offences and to a lesser extent, first time drug-driving offences, and decreased the percentage of offenders who received a court dismissal or conditional discharge for these offences.  
Crime and Justice Bulletin No. CJB262
Sydney: NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research, 2023. 22p.

By Kostas Papaioannou, Tien-Li Kuo, Sashka Dimova, Andi Fugard, Sarah Sharrock, Ellie Roberts, Felicity Kersting, Tina Haux, Terry Ng-Knight
Family Drug and Alcohol Courts (FDACs) offer an alternative to standard care proceedings involving parental drug or alcohol misuse, using a “problem-solving” approach to justice to support parents to reduce their misuse issues. The primary aim is to improve outcomes for children and families, ensuring that children can either live safely with parents at the end of care proceedings or, where reunification (defined as the legal order given for the child to return to live with the primary carer) is not possible, have the best chance for permanency and stability outside the family home. FDACs also aim to reduce the risk of families re-entering care proceedings at a later date. Previous research on the FDAC approach to care proceedings showed some promising results. Harwin et al.’s (2011) independent evaluation found that FDAC care proceedings are more likely than standard care proceedings to help parents stop misusing alcohol and substances and be reunified with their children. The follow-up evidence indicated that the achieved positive outcomes were sustained over time (Harwin et al., 2014; Harwin et al., 2016). There are, however, a number of limitations in the existing evidence on FDAC’s effectiveness. Most of the evidence comes from the Harwin et al.’s (2011, 2014, 2016) evaluation that ran from 2008 and 2012, prior to the introduction of the Children and Families Act 2014,1 which significantly altered how standard care proceedings operate (CJI, 2021). Their evaluation focused only on the London FDAC, the first to be set up. As FDAC has since been rolled out more widely to include 15 specialist FDAC teams, working in 22 courts and serving families in 36 local authorities, it is important to understand and assess whether the promising findings from London are observed in other areas of England. This evaluation was commissioned to assess and understand the impact of FDAC using a counterfactual group, and to assess how FDAC has been implemented to date in England. The evaluation was commissioned by WWCSC and was part of the Department for Education’s Supporting Families: Investing in Practice programme.

London: Foundations, 2023. 137p.

By Mark Goodchild , Jeremias Paul, Roberto Iglesias, Annerie Bouw, Anne-Marie Perucic

Background The Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products (the Protocol) entered into force in September 2018, and commits Parties to implement a package of measures to combat this global problem. The aim of this study is to assess the potential impact of eliminating illicit cigarettes on consumption, use and tax revenues. Methods We identified 36 countries where an independent (non-industry sponsored) study of the illicit cigarette market was available. We developed a conceptual framework for describing how the elimination of illicit cigarettes might impact on demand (consumption and use) and applied this framework to our sample of countries to assess the impact of eliminating illicit cigarettes across different settings. Findings Illicit cigarettes account on average for 11.2% of the market in these 36 countries. The elimination of illicit cigarettes would reduce total cigarette consumption by 1.9% across these countries. The decrease in ’group A’ countries—where illicit cigarettes are >15% of the market—would average 4.1%. The smoking rate would decrease by 1.0% in relative terms including by 2.2% in group A countries. Tax revenues from the legal sale of cigarettes would increase by 11.2% including by 25.1% in group A countries. Conclusions The illicit cigarette market reflects a complex interplay between supply and demand, with an array of different country conditions. Regardless of the situation, our study highlights the contribution that the elimination of illicit trade can make to tobacco control through demand reduction while at the same time generating significant tax revenues. 

Switzerland: World Health Organization, 2020, 8p.

By Max Gallien

Africa has become a growth market for the tobacco industry, as people in the global North have started to smoke much less. The prevalence of smoking in Europe since the 1990s has dropped by one-third, and even further in the Americas (44%). Over the same period, smoking levels in Africa have increased by over 50% (Reitsma et al. 2017).1 Africa’s youth, in particular, is overrepresented among new smokers (N. Ramanandraibe and A.E. Ouma 2011; Blecher and Ross 2013). This is part of a wider shift in tobacco consumption from richer to poorer countries – it has been projected that 6.8 million of a global total of 8.3 million tobacco-related deaths will occur in low- and middle-income countries by 2030 (Mathers and Loncar 2006). Africa is not only facing rising health care costs connected to tobacco consumption, but also the loss of lives, particularly men, as a consequence of smoking-related diseases.

Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies, Summary Brief Number 22, 2020. 8p.

By Max Gallien , Giovanni Occhiali

Objective: To evaluate the common industry claim that higher tobacco taxation leads to higher levels of smuggling, particularly in a limited state capacity setting. Design:This paper evaluates the effects of a tobacco tax increase in Sierra Leone on smuggling by using gap analyses. Its models are based on multiple rounds of the Demographic and Health Survey and customs data as well as newly collected data on cigarette prices. Results: The paper shows that despite a substantial increase in cigarette taxation, and despite the absence of other formal tobacco control policies, smuggling has not increased in Sierra Leone. Its primary model shows a decrease in cigarette smuggling by 16.74% following the tax increase, alongside a decrease in cigarette consumption more widely and an increase in tax revenue. Conclusions: By presenting a low income and lower enforcement capacity case study, this paper provides novel and critical evidence to the debate on the tax smuggling link. Furthermore, it points to new questions on how states in these contexts can limit cigarette smuggling.

Published Online First: Tobacco Control, 02 June 2022, DOI:10.1136/tobaccocontrol-2021-057163

By Max Gallien and Florian Weigand

Although  smuggling is  commonly  assumed to happen  in remote and difficult-to-access borderlands, in reality, smuggling is most prevalent in areas that states tightly control, including formal border crossings. To understand this puzzle, this article explores the relationship between states and smugglers at international borders. Based on extensive empirical research in various borderlands in North Africa and Southeast Asia, it argues that different kinds of smugglers prefer different types of relationships with the state. The article outlines six ideal types of such relationships. It contends that these types of relationships are the dominant factor in how different smuggling networks choose routes along a border. The findings have implications for our understanding of smuggling and policies that aim at addressing smuggling, especially regarding the effects of border fortifications and corruption prevention. bordFor over 400 kilometers, the border between Tunisia and Libya stretches across deserts, lakes, and mountains. The border provides a source of income for one of the largest smuggling economies in North Africa, with trading in everything from gasoline, fabrics, and electronics to cigarettes and narcotics. Its length and terrain make the border difficult to control for both Tunisian and Libyan security forces, and offer plenty of opportunities for the thousands of smugglers who cross the border everyday to stay undetected or leverage their superior knowledge of the terrain in high-speed car chases with soldiers and customs officers. And yet, most of these smugglers have chosen two particular points in the border to conduct their business: the formal border crossings as Ras Jedir and Dhiba. In fact, differ-ent smuggling networks prefer different routes: while those trading in mobile phones, bananas, or alcohol have typically preferred to play cat and Mouse.

SECURITY STUDIES, 2021, VOL. 30, NO. 1, 79–106

By Rasmus Munksgaard and James Martin 

  A growing share of drug distribution takes place through cryptomarkets—illicit online drug markets which supply the lower levels of the drug trade. Though the economy at large is well understood and the motivations and demographics of buyers as well, the population of drug sellers has received less scrutiny. In this study we address this research gap through the largest qualitative study of cryptomarket vendors to date. We find that sellers begin their careers in varying ways, some moving their business online, others moving into cryptomarket distribution from buying, reselling or supplying friends or from other cybercrimes. We further observe that economic and non-economic motivations frequently overlap, and that strategies for managing risk vary extensively. We conclude with a discussion of our findings from a policy perspective, focusing on the implications for policing drug markets and health policies.  

Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology 2020. 44p.

By Richard L. Harries, Caitlyn Norman, Robert Reid, Niamh Nic Daeid, Lorna A. Nisbet

The administration of new psychoactive substances (NPS), in particular synthetic cannabinoid receptor agonists (SCRAs), via e-cigarettes, within prison settings has been well publicized. This study provides an overview of five e-cigarette case samples seized from Scottish prisons between May 2022 and July 2023 where the anabolic-androgenic steroids (AASs) mestanolone and oxandrolone were identified following gas chromatography-mass spectrometry (GC-MS) analyses. These e-cigarette samples represented 2.9% of all samples containing e-cigarette cartridges (n = 170) and 9.4% of all samples found to contain AASs (n = 53) seized during the same time period. The AASs were detected in combination with other drugs, including cocaine, Δ9-tetrahydrocannabinol (Δ9-THC), SCRAs and nicotine. This represents a new and novel route of administration for AASs.

Forensic Science International, (2024)

By Pascal Tanguay

Elections in 2023 have brought a new government to power, headed by Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin, who declared in late September that his government intends to achieve in the next six months a partial reversal of the reforms, recriminalizing recreational use and leaving the medical market as the sole legal arena.

Through a methodical data collection process involving key informant interviews and literature reviews, this report sheds light on the substantial impacts of such policy changes, especially on the illicit markets and organized crime networks. Informed by these insights, the GI-TOC has formulated preliminary policy recommendations to secure a resilient Thai cannabis market that is as balanced as it is sustainable.

Geneva, SWIT: The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC),  2024. 34p.

By Michael McLaggan

Prominent throughout the world, illicit financial flows (IFFs) not only undermine the ability of states to collect revenue, but they also pose challenges to governance and the rule of law and provide avenues for the funding of further illicit activity. Although a global occurrence, IFFs may manifest differently at the regional level, making a uniform approach difficult. This calls for a model that is more inclusive of different types of flows than traditional understandings of IFFs, which tend to focus on financial flows within the formal system. In regions such as East and southern Africa, where informality is much higher than in the developed nations of the ‘global north’, the greater focus on formal systems does not find the same degree of applicability. This is not to downplay the necessity of observing and countering formal financial flows of an illicit nature but rather to emphasise the need to pay greater attention to informal and trade flows, which are prolific in less developed regions. This paper draws on extensive research by the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC) – in particular, the Observatory of Illicit Economies in East and Southern Africa – in addition to research by other international organisations, to analyse whether the ‘IFFs pyramid’ proposed by the GI-TOC (Reitano, 2022) is applicable to and useful for researchers seeking to understanding illicit financial flows in various settings around the world but especially in regions where greater levels of informality exists, such as East and southern Africa. The paper finds that the pervasive informality of markets in the East and southern African region, and their abuse by criminal actors, means that greater attention to IFFs is necessary in this sphere. Common also is the use of illicitly acquired, or otherwise illicitly traded commodities, in barter (that is, goods for goods) markets. Identified as particularly relevant is the pernicious influence of state-embedded actors, who often play substantial roles in the facilitation of IFFs and act as obstacles to policies to address them. Furthermore, vested interests of criminal actors in keeping certain industries and markets informal serve as barriers to formalisation and highlight the greater need to pay attention to informal financial flows especially. The due consideration to trade and informal flows is what makes the IFFs pyramid a useful model for understanding these flows in both global and regional settings. At the very least, the pyramid model highlights the need for holistic approaches and policy reform when considering IFFs in less developed regions.  

Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham. 2024, 33pg

By Prem Mahadevan, Maria Khoruk, Alla Mohammad Mohmandzai and Ruggero Scaturro

How will the new Taliban regime change Afghanistan’s illicit drug landscape in the coming years? Are the Taliban genuinely committed to combating the flow of narcotics within and outside Afghanistan, as signalled by the ban on opium cultivation issued by the Taliban leadership in April 2022?

Based on field research coordinated by the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC) in the Afghan provinces of Helmand and Nangarhar, this paper analyses the changes to the Afghan drug economy since the Taliban’s return to power on 15 August 2021, documenting the adaptation of local actors engaged in the opium economy to the events that had a profound impact on their lives. Historical analysis supplements the field research findings and aids our understanding of the shifting conditions of the illicit drug economy in Afghanistan. Given the institutional weakness of Afghan statehood after nearly five decades of civil war, the GI-TOC’s approach represents a collation of provincial and district-level assessments rather than a comprehensive country-wide assessment.

This research paper outlines the complexities of local conditions and reveals a regime fragmented among varied interests and power structures, seeking to reconcile the profitability of the drugs trade with the strive for legitimacy.

University of Birmingham, Research Paper No. 27. 2023, 31pg

By World Economic Forum

The Global Risks Report explores some of the most severe risks we may face over the next decade, against a backdrop of rapid technological change, economic uncertainty, a warming planet and conflict. As cooperation comes under pressure, weakened economies and societies may only require the smallest shock to edge past the tipping point of resilience.

Geneva, SWIT: World Economic Forum, 2024. 124p

By International Crisis Group

What’s new? Mexico’s criminal groups use social media to garner popular support, denigrate rivals, glorify narco-culture and coordinate violence. Social media is also crucial for providing timely information about flare-ups of violence, particularly since journalists face major threats to their safety, which heavily circumscribes their ability to report from many crime-affected municipalities.

Why does it matter? These criminal groups are recruiting and spreading disinformation online, making them stronger and creating a glut of unverified information that puts civilians at greater risk. Platforms have struggled to respond appropriately.

What should be done? Platforms should boost resources for online monitoring, especially when violence is spiking. Given social media’s importance in disseminating information, platforms should modify their algorithms to demote posts supporting criminal groups and work with civil society to identify trusted accounts, including anonymous ones. Mexico’s government should also invest in protecting journalists.

Brussels: Crisis Group, 2024

By Abigail Weitzman, Mónica Caudillo, and Eldad J. Levy

In this review, we argue that to understand patterns and causes of violence in contemporary Latin America, we must explicitly consider when violence takes on interpersonal qualities. We begin by reviewing prominent definitions and measurements of interpersonal violence. We then detail the proliferation of interlocking sources of regional insecurity, including gender-based violence, gangs, narcotrafficking, vigilantism, and political corruption. Throughout this description, we highlight when and how each source of insecurity can become interpersonal. Next, we outline mutually reinforcing macro and micro conditions underlying interpersonal violence in its many hybrid forms. To conclude, we call for more multifaceted conceptualizations of interpersonal violence that embrace the complexities of Latin American security situations and discuss the opportunities and challenges that lie ahead in this area.

Annual Review of Criminology, Volume 7, Page 163 - 186

By Christopher Dowling, Dominic Boland, Anthony Morgan, Julianne Webster, Yi-Ning Chiu and Roger Lowe 

This study explores changes to the internal culture of a sample of Australian outlaw motorcycle gangs (OMCGs). We analysed data from 39 in-depth interviews with former OMCG members in Queensland to discern changes in recruitment practices, hierarchies and governance processes, as well as values, norms and relationships experienced and observed while members of an OMCG. Structurally, clubs changed little, although participants described how members were increasingly using the structures and systems of clubs for their own benefit. Changes were noted in recruitment practices, which were seen as increasingly geared towards enlisting violent, criminally-inclined men. There was also a perceived erosion of loyalty and camaraderie within OMCGs, with a shift towards younger, newer members who were seen as self-interested and financially motivated. These changes were contributing factors in decisions of many former members to disengage from OMCGs. 

Australia, Australia Institute of Criminology. Trends & issues in crime and criminal justice no. 615. February 2021. 16pg

By Adam Baird , Matthew Louis Bishop , Dylan Kerrigan

The Southern Caribbean became a key hemispheric drug transhipment point in the late 1990s, to which the alarmingly high level of homicidal violence in Trinidad is often attributed. Existing research, concentrated in criminology and mainstream international relations, as well as the anti-drug policy establishment, tends to accept this correlation, framing the challenge as a typical post-Westphalian security threat. However, conventional accounts struggle to explain why murders have continued to rise even as the relative salience of narcotrafficking has actually declined. By consciously disentangling the main variables, we advance a more nuanced empirical account of how ‘the local’ is both inserted into and mediates the impact of ‘the global’. Relatively little violence can be ascribed to the drug trade directly: cocaine frequently transits through Trinidad peacefully, whereas firearms stubbornly remain within a distinctive geostrategic context we term a ‘weapons sink’. The ensuing murders are driven by the ways in which these ‘residues’ of the trade reconstitute the domestic gangscape. As guns filter inexorably into the community, they reshape the norms and practices underpinning acceptable and anticipated gang behaviour, generating specifically ‘residual’ forms of violence that are not new in genesis, but rather draw on long historical antecedents to exacerbate the homicide panorama. Our analysis emphasises the importance of taking firearms more seriously in understanding the diversity of historically constituted violences in places that appear to resemble—but differ to—the predominant Latin American cases from which the conventional wisdom about supposed ‘drug violence’ is generally distilled.

Political Geography. Volume 106, October 2023, 102966