By Neil Donnelly and Sara Rahman

AIM To understand whether the introduction of penalty notices in New South Wales (NSW) for first time low, special and novice range drink-driving and drug-driving offences reduced the number of court appearances and increased the certainty of licence sanctions for these offences. METHOD Data was obtained from the NSW Police Force’s Computerised Operational Policing System (COPS) for all first time low, special and novice range exceed the prescribed concentration of alcohol (PCA) incidents and first time drug-driving incidents occurring between 5 December 2016 to 1 March 2020. We used a combination of interrupted time series analysis, and descriptive analysis respectively to determine the changes in CANs and dismissals post-reform. We used logistic regression to identify significant correlates of receiving a penalty notice among the first time PCA and drug-driving offenders in our sample. RESULTS The introduction of penalty notices significantly reduced the number of CANs issued for first time low, special and novice range PCA offences by 81.0%, or 4,779 fewer CANs than predicted. For first time drug-driving there was a significant, though smaller (29.8%) reduction in CANs (or 1,118 fewer CANs issued). These changes also translated into decreases in court dismissals and conditional discharges. Among first time low, special and novice range PCA offenders, the percentage receiving a court dismissal or conditional discharge decreased from 51.5% to 8.0% while among first time drug-driving offenders it decreased from 28.0% to 15.2%. Among both first time low, special and novice range PCA offenders and drug-driving offenders, having no concurrent offences and no prior proceedings to court in the previous 5 years predicted receipt of a penalty notice. The smaller reduction in court appearances for drug-driving was primarily due to those charged with this offence having more concurrent and prior offences. CONCLUSION The introduction of penalty notices significantly reduced the number of court appearances for first time low, special and novice range PCA offences and to a lesser extent, first time drug-driving offences, and decreased the percentage of offenders who received a court dismissal or conditional discharge for these offences.  
Crime and Justice Bulletin No. CJB262
Sydney: NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research, 2023. 22p.

By Kostas Papaioannou, Tien-Li Kuo, Sashka Dimova, Andi Fugard, Sarah Sharrock, Ellie Roberts, Felicity Kersting, Tina Haux, Terry Ng-Knight
Family Drug and Alcohol Courts (FDACs) offer an alternative to standard care proceedings involving parental drug or alcohol misuse, using a “problem-solving” approach to justice to support parents to reduce their misuse issues. The primary aim is to improve outcomes for children and families, ensuring that children can either live safely with parents at the end of care proceedings or, where reunification (defined as the legal order given for the child to return to live with the primary carer) is not possible, have the best chance for permanency and stability outside the family home. FDACs also aim to reduce the risk of families re-entering care proceedings at a later date. Previous research on the FDAC approach to care proceedings showed some promising results. Harwin et al.’s (2011) independent evaluation found that FDAC care proceedings are more likely than standard care proceedings to help parents stop misusing alcohol and substances and be reunified with their children. The follow-up evidence indicated that the achieved positive outcomes were sustained over time (Harwin et al., 2014; Harwin et al., 2016). There are, however, a number of limitations in the existing evidence on FDAC’s effectiveness. Most of the evidence comes from the Harwin et al.’s (2011, 2014, 2016) evaluation that ran from 2008 and 2012, prior to the introduction of the Children and Families Act 2014,1 which significantly altered how standard care proceedings operate (CJI, 2021). Their evaluation focused only on the London FDAC, the first to be set up. As FDAC has since been rolled out more widely to include 15 specialist FDAC teams, working in 22 courts and serving families in 36 local authorities, it is important to understand and assess whether the promising findings from London are observed in other areas of England. This evaluation was commissioned to assess and understand the impact of FDAC using a counterfactual group, and to assess how FDAC has been implemented to date in England. The evaluation was commissioned by WWCSC and was part of the Department for Education’s Supporting Families: Investing in Practice programme.

London: Foundations, 2023. 137p.

By Alistair Fraser, Keir Irwin-Rogers, Fern Gillon, Susan McVie, Tilman Schwarze

Violence is a critical issue around the world. In addition to the high financial costs, it takes a heavy toll on community wellbeing. Young people are most commonly affected by violence, with the World Health Organisation estimating that 43% of global homicides involve people aged 10-29 (WHO 2016). Over the last two decades, Scotland has witnessed a remarkable reduction in serious violence, including homicide, and has managed to sustain this while rates of violence in other parts of the UK have increased. This has led to an increasing consensus around Scotland’s ‘public health approach’ to violence reduction and heavy investment in specialist violence reduction units across England and Wales. Despite the perceived success of the Scottish approach, however, there has to date been a lack of evidence on the causes of violence reduction in Scotland. While it is clear that lessons can be learned, there is confusion over what public health approaches are, how they work, and the conditions under which such ideas can travel. This briefing paper aims to summarise the evidence-base on violence reduction in Scotland and highlight key lessons for other jurisdictions. It is based on a three-year research project, funded by the ESRC, involving detailed analysis of statistical data on violence, 190 interviews with senior stakeholders and community participants across the UK, reviews of Scottish Government policy, and case-studies with communities affected by violence. The briefing focuses on lessons that can be drawn from Scotland’s violence reduction journey, answering four basic questions: (1) What has changed? (2) Why did it change? (3) Where are we now and (4) Where do we go from here?

Glasgow: Scottish Centre for Crime and Justice Research, 2024. 32p.

By Amer Smailbegovic , Nedzad Korajlic, Marija Lucic-Catic, Muamer Kavazovic

ABSTRACT: The Penal-Correctional Institution of the Enclosed Type in Zenica (Kazneno-popravni zavod zatvorenog tipa Zenica), Bosnia-Herzegovina, has been in continuous operation for over 130 years and is currently the largest and most-diverse penal institution in the country. With 714 inmates serving lengthy sentences (up to 40 years) for the variety of serious offenses (including terrorism), the issue of narcotics use, traffic and trade has been encountered and countered, particularly in the last decade. The types of drugs encountered in the institution range from prescription drugs (i.e. buprenorphine, methadone), to “heavy” narcotics (i.e. heroin, morphine, speed. The type, quantity and frequency of drug use and seizure shows certain seasonal and temporal effects and is associated with the inmate-furlough periods, awarded for good behavior. Many inmates use this privilege to bring narcotics into the facility. Some of the encountered substances have been seized from the facility visitors and even from the prison staff, in the past five years, but the charges have been generally dismissed by the prosecutors for the lack of evidence. An average seizure is about ten grams per incident, and the number of seizures has been continuous, suggesting considerable financial interest and gain for the drugs to enter the institution. There are various measures proposed to counter the traffic and limit the purchases, however the inmate population is very apt in using the current legal regulations and EU-mandates to circumvent the proposed countermeasures. This study is presenting some of the findings, directions and recommendations for combating the drug-traffic within the correctional institution.

American Journal of Qualitative Research August 2020, Vol.4 No. 2, pp. 20-26

By Federico Bertola

Drug trafficking on darknet based marketplaces has become a highly concerning topic in law enforcement activities, recently. Even though Darkmarkets represent only a tiny fraction of the global drug trade, they are changing the drug markets social networks, introducing a new paradigm of the link between vendors and buyers of drugs. The aim of this study is to critically review the darkmarkets’ ecosystem and the previous literature regarding these new marketplaces, trying to investigate how the drug trade is changing with these new technologies, and the role of organised crime (OC) in these new illegal markets. And trying to understand how and whether is it involved OC on these cyber drug markets and the chain behind them. Despite opinions of part of the academy, the results show that there are no empirical evidences of direct involvement of OC as vendors in darkmarkets. However, there are evidences of an indirect role of OC in darknet drug trafficking, as supplier of illegal drugs to the online-vendors.

AM J QUALITATIVE RES, Volume 4, Issue 2 (Special Issue), pp. 27-34, 2020.

By Spencer Chainey and Robert Muggah

Despite numerous attempts to decrease homicides in the Latin American region, high homicide levels have persisted. Examining four cities in Rio de Janeiro, the research reveals the intense geographic concentration of homicides in each city, but illustrates differences in the extent of homicide concentration when using a variety of crime concentration measures. Single events involving multiple homicides and a homicide near repeat pattern are observed, with almost all these incidents taking place in areas of homicide concentration. The findings suggest that programmes targeted to areas of homicide concentration, including interventions that suppress the likelihood of future incidents, could decrease homicides.

The Police Journal, 95(2), 255-275. 2022.

By Lasha Gogidze

Under the current government, Uzbekistan is undergoing reforms to shift from a Soviet-style governance system to an open-market economy. Despite progress, the country remains an authoritarian state, marked by pervasive corruption in sectors like healthcare and education. Key institutions, influenced by the executive branch, lack due process, enabling arrests of activists and journalists on questionable charges. The civic space is restricted, with human rights defenders and journalists facing persecution for exposing government corruption. While reforms are underway, challenges persist in establishing transparency and democracy in Uzbekistan's governance model.

Bergen: U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, Chr. Michelsen Institute (U4 Helpdesk Answer, 2023. 22p.

 By Khachik Harutyunyan and Caitlin Maslen   

After a protracted conflict and a period of self-rule from 2005, South Sudan is now the world’s most recent sovereign country. The young state faces considerable governance challenges; it regularly ranks at or near the bottom of international corruption indices. Corruption is systemic across all levels of government and pervades nearly every economic sector, and perpetrators enjoy widespread impunity. As such, it takes a heavy toll on the populace by diverting the wealth from the country’s extensive oil reserves into private pockets instead of public service provision or gross fixed capital formation. This kleptocratic dynamic is embodied in scandals such as the Cash Grab and Dura Saga scandals. The international community has called on the South Sudanese government to take stronger action to tackle corruption. However, progress has been slow, and corruption remains a major challenge for South Sudan's future development  

Bergen: U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, Chr. Michelsen Institute (U4 Helpdesk Answer, 2023. 25p.

 By David Olusegun Sotola and Roberto Martinez B. Kukutschka  

Corruption in Sierra Leone remains a pervasive challenge. Since the end of the civil war in 2002, successive governments have made efforts to tackle corruption and hold perpetrators, especially those from the previous government, accountable, but challenges remain. Anti-corruption efforts have focused on amending laws, institutional frameworks and the establishment of a special anti-corruption judicial division but concerns about the backsliding of democracy in the country, weak checks on the power of the executive and the politicisation of the anti-corruption cause make it difficult to counter corruption effectively.

 Bergen: U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, Chr. Michelsen Institute (U4 Helpdesk Answer 2023. 21p.

By Lasha Gogidze

The election of Ferdinand Marcos Jr, nicknamed “Bongbong”, as the President of the Philippines in May 2022 has sustained fears of state capture by oligarchic family clans, widespread grand corruption and human rights abuses, all of which marred the rule of his father, Ferdinand Marcos Sr., the country’s former dictator who ruled from 1965 until 1986. Those fears appear to have been substantiated by continued extrajudicial killings, arrests of communist-linked leaders and activists, as well as the Marcos families’ unpaid taxes and damages to U.S. courts from human rights cases, leading to fears that this means further entrenchment of impunity.

 Bergen: U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, Chr. Michelsen Institute (U4 Helpdesk Answer, 2023. 25p.

By Caitlin Maslen  

There has been a rapid rise in the number of Mozambican universities in the past two decades, but corruption risks in these institutions and the research sector more broadly remains an under-examined area. Identified risks include political manipulation of university affairs by government, mismanagement of research grant funds and a lack of independence of the country’s quality assurance body. There are also reports of other forms of corruption such as bribery, plagiarism, academic fraud and sextortion for grades within universities. Several mitigation measures can be put into place to strengthen the integrity of the system, and these include accountability mechanisms within universities and research institutions, independence and increased capacity of the CNAQ, anti-plagiarism policies and tools, sanctions for academic dishonesty, anti-corruption clauses in research grant agreements, compliance assessments of universities and research institutions, and enhanced whistleblower protection.

 Bergen: U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, Chr. Michelsen Institute (U4 Helpdesk Answer 2023. 21p.

By Jackson Oldfield   

Corruption is widespread in Nigeria, where patronage networks and foreign actors play a significant role. Drivers of corruption include neo-patrimonialism and the “resource curse” – referring to the country’s abundance of natural resources. Bribery and other forms of corruption occur in many sectors, including public administration, the judiciary, the electricity sector, and extractive industries. Although several new anti-corruption laws have recently been introduced, weaknesses in relevant institutions have undermined their effectiveness. Despite these challenges, anti-corruption actors, such as civil society organisations, continue addressing corruption as a priority and have had notable achievements, particularly in the area of asset recovery.

 Bergen: U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, Chr. Michelsen Institute (U4 Helpdesk Answer 2023). 25p.

By Mathias Bak

Yemen's ongoing conflict has transformed into an economic battle, with various factions fighting over crucial resources, such as aid flows and control over state resources. The war economy has intensified existing corruption challenges and created avenues for illicit wealth accumulation for new power brokers and previously less powerful networks. However, this takeover of the state has not fundamentally changed the nature of the systematic corruption that has plagued Yemen long before 2014.

Bergen: U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, Chr. Michelsen Institute (U4 Helpdesk Answer 2024:1)

By Vaclav Prusa   

In 2023, President Mnangagwa secured a second term amid allegations of election irregularities and corruption in Zimbabwe. Despite anti-corruption efforts, challenges include political interference and resource constraints, hindering transparency. Though there have been efforts to address corruption in the natural resources sector, progress in prosecuting politically exposed persons and recovering stolen assets has been uneven. Likewise, hopes for reform since Mnangagwa's 2017 presidency have been tempered by enduring corruption, economic challenges, and human rights abuses. And illicit financial flows, notably linked to corruption in mining, timber, and wildlife, pose a significant international threat as they have drained billions of dollars from the country. Though civil society and independent media play crucial roles in exposing corruption, initiatives such as The Patriot Act, introduced in 2023, raises concerns about suppressing dissent and investigative journalism.

Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI) in Bergen, Norway ; Berlin: Transparency international, 2023. 26p.

By Caitlin Maslen   

Green energy (and/or renewable energy) requires large areas of land to operate, often more so than energy generated from fossil fuels. The acquisition of land comes with accompanying corruption risks which can lead to challenges such as land grabbing and illegal displacement of communities. To help mitigate corruption risks and their consequences, strong regulatory oversight and rigorous licensing requirements are needed, as well as transparency and community-based approaches to ownership of green energy projects.

Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI) in Bergen, Norway ; Berlin: Transparency international, 2023. 21p.

By Mark Goodchild , Jeremias Paul, Roberto Iglesias, Annerie Bouw, Anne-Marie Perucic

Background The Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products (the Protocol) entered into force in September 2018, and commits Parties to implement a package of measures to combat this global problem. The aim of this study is to assess the potential impact of eliminating illicit cigarettes on consumption, use and tax revenues. Methods We identified 36 countries where an independent (non-industry sponsored) study of the illicit cigarette market was available. We developed a conceptual framework for describing how the elimination of illicit cigarettes might impact on demand (consumption and use) and applied this framework to our sample of countries to assess the impact of eliminating illicit cigarettes across different settings. Findings Illicit cigarettes account on average for 11.2% of the market in these 36 countries. The elimination of illicit cigarettes would reduce total cigarette consumption by 1.9% across these countries. The decrease in ’group A’ countries—where illicit cigarettes are >15% of the market—would average 4.1%. The smoking rate would decrease by 1.0% in relative terms including by 2.2% in group A countries. Tax revenues from the legal sale of cigarettes would increase by 11.2% including by 25.1% in group A countries. Conclusions The illicit cigarette market reflects a complex interplay between supply and demand, with an array of different country conditions. Regardless of the situation, our study highlights the contribution that the elimination of illicit trade can make to tobacco control through demand reduction while at the same time generating significant tax revenues. 

Switzerland: World Health Organization, 2020, 8p.

By Rodrigo R. Soares and Danilo Souza

We document that oil-producing areas of Brazil experienced increases in crime during the period of increased economic growth driven by the 2000s oil boom. This challenges the understanding that the impact of income shocks on crime is driven primarily by the legal status of the market in question. Offshore oil production, refining, and distribution in Brazil are concentrated in large firms, without scope for income contestability. We show that various equilibrium effects of the shock – such as increased inequality, urbanization, illegal goods presence, and deterioration in public goods provision – are likely to have contributed to the increase in crime.

Bonn: IZA – Institute of Labor Economics, 2023. 47p.

Sergi, Anna

This research is linked to studies on the criminal mobility of the 'ndrangheta in Australia. Starting from extensive research in the field, and from a critique of the concept of ethnicity and its links with organised crime in Australia, this work reflects on the political interests of the Calabrian clans in Australia. Some clans can maintain ties with powers and professional elites also by exploiting "ethnic solidarity” within the migrant community

‘ndrangheta e “ricerca del potere”: riflessioni su mafia e potere politico in Australia. Rivista di studi e ricerche sulla criminalità organizzata, 6 (4). (2021) pp. 110-136

Sergi, Anna

Attention to the Calabrian mafia, the ‘ndrangheta, has been increasing across law enforcement authorities around the world. This paper aims at bringing forward a theoretical and operational conversation on how to best approach, from a policing perspective, what is a complex clan-based criminality able to operate simultaneously in different states. The paper will therefore formulate a preliminary framework for strategies focusing on the policing of mafia dynasties. It will do so by identifying how ‘ndrangheta clans can be studied as family dynasties, including in their assessment also the factors of family life (familiness) that can facilitate or obstruct the dynasty’s success. By looking at ‘ndrangheta clans as family dynasties, we can inform a framework that cuts through the most common policing aims and strategies against organised crime, as shared by states involved in current anti-mafia efforts.

‘Ndrangheta Dynasties: A Conceptual and Operational Framework for the Cross-Border Policing of the Calabrian Mafia. Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice, 15 (2). (2021) pp. 1522-1536.

Edited by Nils Duquet  

This report contains the 7 country studies  – Belgium, Estonia, the Netherlands, Poland, Serbia, Spain and Sweden –  that were undertaken as part of the second phase of project TARGET. While the reader will be able to observe interesting similarities between the situations in these countries, it is clear that gun violence in Europe is not a homogenous phenomenon.

In the first phase of Project TARGET quantitative and qualitative data on gun violence and firearm trafficking was collected in 34 European countries (27 Member States of the European Union, the United Kingdom, and six countries in the Western Balkans). In a second phase, dedicated research teams analysed the situation in seven European countries in depth. The results of the comparative analysis of all the data collected during the different phases of Project TARGET were published in the report Targeting gun violence and trafficking in Europe that was published by the Flemish Peace Institute in December 2021.

This project was coordinated by the Flemish Peace Institute and cofunded by the European Union. The research partners in this project were Leiden University, Arquebus Solutions, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the University of Warmia and Mazury in Olsztyn, and the Victimology Society of Serbia. The project was supported by Europol, the Dutch National Police, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (UNDP’s SEESAC) and the European Centre for Drugs and Drugs Addiction (EMCDDA).

Firearm trafficking and gun violence go hand in hand in Europe. An important reason for this is that criminals generally do not have access to legally-held firearms and thus need to resort to illicit gun markets – either locally or internationally - to acquire firearms. Yet, while all European countries are confronted with a certain degree of firearm trafficking, the levels of gun violence and the availability of firearms on criminal markets differ substantially across Europe. In recent years firearm trafficking has fuelled criminal gun violence and even terrorism in several European countries, but other countries seem to be much less affected. This book contains chapters on gun violence and firearm trafficking in seven different European countries: Belgium, Estonia, the Netherlands, Poland, Serbia, Spain and Sweden. While the reader will be able to observe interesting similarities between the situations in these countries, it is clear that gun violence in Europe is not a homogenous phenomenon. The country-specific analyses in this book were undertaken as part of Project TARGET, a large-scale research project on the linkages between gun violence and firearm trafficking in Europe. This project was coordinated by the Flemish Peace Institute, an independent research institute affiliated to the Flemish Parliament (Belgium), and cofunded by the European Union’s Internal Security Fund. The research partners in this project were Leiden University, Arquebus Solutions, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the University of Warmia and Mazury in Olsztyn, and the Victimology Society of Serbia. The project was supported by Europol, the Dutch National Police, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (UNDP’s SEESAC) and the European Centre for Drugs and Drugs Addiction (EMCDDA). In the first phase of Project TARGET quantitative and qualitative data on gun violence and firearm trafficking was collected in 34 European countries (27 Member States of the European Union, the United Kingdom, and six countries in the Western Balkans). In a second phase, dedicated research teams analysed the situation in seven European countries in depth. This is done in an attempt to describe the dynamics of gun violence, firearm trafficking and the possible linkages between both phenomena. In a third phase various interviews were undertaken to complement the collected data. The results of the comparative analysis of all the data collected during the different phases of Project TARGET were published in the report “Targeting gun violence and trafficking in Europe” that was published by the Flemish Peace Institute in December 2021. This book  contains the country studies that were undertaken as part of the second phase of the project. The first chapter of this book focuses on Belgium, a European country that is traditionally known for its history and passion for firearms. Although no reliable estimates of the illegal firearms possession rate in Belgium exist, law enforcement agencies in the country believe the availability of firearms on the criminal market has increased in recent years. Belgium has a reputation as a hotspot for illicit firearm trafficking in Europe, with criminal demand driven by drugs traffickers and armed robbers. Yet, different types of criminals tend to possess and use different types of firearms in Belgium. While armed robbers tend to use handguns, including blank firing weapons and modified firearms to threaten their victims, drugs criminals more often use their firearms in shootings. Military-grade firearms - very often smuggled conflict legacy weapons from the Western Balkans but also reactivated firearms - are more often used in the drugs context than in other criminal contexts. These types of weapons have also ended up in the hands of terrorists after being trafficked via Belgium. While clear linkages can be observed between firearm trafficking and criminal and terrorist violence, the impact of firearm trafficking on domestic violence is quite limited since this type of violence is generally carried out with firearms that are available to the perpetrator at that time, including legally-held firearms and ‘non-regularized’ firearms that are not trafficked. In Estonia, the focus of the second chapter of this book, firearm trafficking and gun violence are rather rare phenomena, and a clear-cut connection between them has not been observed in recent years. While both phenomena were significant security problems in Estonia in the decade after the country regained its independence from the Soviet regime, this is no longer the case. Firearm trafficking is quite limited and often involves the reactivation of firearms. Organised crime groups are not frequently involved in firearm trafficking; it is mainly carried out by opportunistic individuals on an ad hoc basis. Criminal gun violence is rather exceptional since the use of firearms by criminals is marginal. Incidents of gun violence largely occur in the family context and involve the consumption of alcohol. The perpetrators in such incidents are generally not criminals and lack access to trafficked firearms. Unsurprisingly, almost 40% of the firearms homicides are committed with a legally-held firearms. The other firearm homicides were committed with an illegally-held firearm, but these firearms are generally not trafficked weapons. Instead, often non-regularised firearms, which have been held illegally since the Second World War or since the proliferation of firearms after the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s are being used. The third chapter of this book analyses gun violence and firearm trafficking in The Netherlands. Like in Belgium, a strong nexus between firearm trafficking and drugrelated criminal violence can be observed in The Netherlands. The very lucrative character of cocaine-trafficking, but also the presence of synthetic drug production and trafficking in the country, has increased criminal demand for firearms and boosted firearm trafficking, including in military-grade firearms. This has fuelled violent competition between organised crime groups, resulted in an arms race between criminals and boosted shootings in the criminal milieu. This criminal gun violence has also spilled over to other parts of society with recent high-profile shootings of a lawyer and a crime journalist. Over the years, The Netherlands has become an important destination and transit country for the various types of firearm trafficking in Europe, including the smuggling of conflict legacy weapons from the Western Balkans and reactivated firearms from Slovakia. The fourth chapter of this book focuses on Poland, which has one of the lowest firearms homicide rates in Europe. The low level of gun violence in the country is strongly connected to the low levels of firearm trafficking and the low criminal demand for firearms in the country. Yet, like in Estonia, this was not always the case: after the collapse of the Soviet Union, firearm trafficking increased substantially with emerging criminal groups fighting each other for control over lucrative criminal markets. Since the mid-1990s the number of firearms seizures increased and reached its peak around 2000, with a significant portion of the firearms being smuggled into the country from Czechia and Slovakia. Although firearms seizures have gradually decreased afterwards, these two countries can still be considered key source countries. Poland has also become more of a transit country than a destination country with regard to firearm trafficking. In recent years the number of firearm seizures at the border has increased strongly. Especially firearm trafficking at the border with Ukraine has become a key concern for Polish law enforcement agencies, who warn about the future risk for increased trafficking in conflict-legacy weapons from Ukraine. In the fifth chapter gun violence and firearm trafficking in Serbia are analysed. Serbia is characterised by a high rate of both legal as well as illegal firearms possession, resulting from a cultural and historical tradition of firearms possession and production, and from its recent history of armed conflict and political instability. Firearms possession is dominated by young and middle-aged men and largely motivated by tradition, hunting and self-defence. Although the scope of illicit firearm possession is difficult to estimate, this possession is widely believed to be significant. The armed conflicts in the region have fuelled gun violence within Serbia and in other European countries. During these armed conflicts large amounts of firearms have ended up in the hands of civilians, where many of them have stayed for numerous years. An unknown share of these conflict legacy weapons have in recent decades, however, also been smuggled to other parts of Europe, where they are being used in the criminal milieu. Illegally-held conflict legacy firearms are not only trafficked out of the country, but also used by criminals – especially armed robbers – within the country. Gun violence in Serbia is mainly a ‘male phenomenon’ with male perpetrators and victims, with the exception of gun violence in a family context in which most victims are women. Gun violence in this context also tends to be far more lethal than in the criminal context and, like in other countries, frequently involve legally-held firearms. The sixth chapter of this book focuses on Spain, where the scope of both lethal and non-lethal gun violence has strongly decreased over the years. Yet, in the southern part of Spain gun violence, strongly connected to drug trafficking, is a significant security issue. Criminal gun violence in Spain mainly consists of (often lethal) incidents related to score-settling between crime groups involved in drug trafficking and the (generally non-lethal) use of firearms in armed robberies. In the criminal milieu especially handguns are used. The criminal acquisition of these firearms is clearly linked to international firearm trafficking, and especially the trafficking in reactivated and converted firearms. While high-level criminal groups, especially those in the south of the country, tend to have access to wide range of firearms, including automatic rifles, lower-end criminals tend to rely on lesser quality firearms. Domestic gun violence on the other hand, is not clearly linked to firearm trafficking. In such incidents of gun violence especially long guns are used, which are believed to be mainly legally held. In the final chapter the situation in Sweden is analysed. Gun violence in Sweden has increased dramatically in the last decade and this evolution is strongly connected to firearm trafficking. Increased firearm trafficking into the country has led to a greater supply of firearms in general but also automatic firearms in particular. For a long time, most of the firearms trafficked into Sweden came from the Western Balkans. Yet, since the mid-2010s the supply of firearms diversified with, next to the steady supply of firearms from the Balkans, also the increased supply of reactivated firearms and (converted) blank firing weapons. This diversification has opened up new pathways for criminals to access firearms, which in turn lowered the threshold for gun violence especially by younger criminals. As a result, the profile of gun violence in the country in recent decades has shifted away from incidents in the family context, which tend to take place in private settings and often involve legally-held firearms, towards more incidents in the criminal context, which generally take place in public settings and involve illegally-held firearms. Resorting to gun violence has become an established norm in the criminal milieu in Sweden and has, in turn, boosted firearm trafficking since criminal groups are now often involved in a miniature arms race. Consequently, Sweden has become one of the most important hotspots for gun violence in Europe. In a global perspective, levels of gun violence and firearm trafficking in Europe can be considered relatively low. Yet, both phenomena continue to have serious security implications in Europe. Policy initiatives to prevent gun violence and combat firearm trafficking are hindered by the lack of a clear intelligence picture. With this book we aim to contribute to a better understanding of the dynamics of both gun violence and firearms trafficking across Europe, and to a better understanding of the dynamics between these two phenomena. Even in a region with relatively low levels of gun violence and firearm trafficking, the lack of a sound understanding of these phenomena can have far-reaching consequences for peace and security in our societies

Brussels: Flemish Peace Institute, 2022. 444p