By Human Rights Watch

In December 2024, Saudi Arabia will be awarded the 2034 Men’s World Cup hosting rights, which FIFA has engineered without competition. The tournament is just one of many massive, planned projects requiring immense construction under Vision 2030, such as the $500 billion futuristic NEOM city. “Die First, and I’ll Pay You Later” shows how migrant workers continue to face widespread abuses across employment sectors and geographic regions including exorbitant recruitment fees, wage theft, job immobility, inadequate heat protections and uninvestigated deaths. Saudi authorities promised labor reforms, but the report based on interviews with more than 150 migrant workers and their families shows how Saudi authorities are systematically failing to protect migrant workers and remedy abuses. Migrant workers are the human engine of Saudi Arabia’s massive construction boom. There are 13.4 million migrant workers in the country and planned projects will result in millions more. The report shows how businesses and giga-projects funded by or linked to the Public Investment Fund (PIF), the country’s sovereign wealth fund, are among those exploiting and abusing migrant workers. This blatant failure to protect workers creates a near certainty that the 2034 World Cup will come at a large human cost. The report includes recommendations to the governments of Saudi Arabia and migrant origin countries, as well as to relevant international entities including FIFA, sponsors and businesses looking to profit from Saudi Arabia’s mega- and giga-projects.  

New York: Human Rights Watch, 2024. 130p.

By Human Rights Watch

The Rwandan government has long presided over the torture and ill-treatment of detainees, whether held in official or unofficial detention facilities across the country. In “They Threw Me in the Water”: The Need for Accountability for Torture in Rwanda, Human Rights Watch documents an array of serious human rights abuses, including torture, in detention facilities in Kigali and the west of the country. The case of Innocent Kayumba, the former director of Rubavu and Nyarugenge prisons, convicted on April 5, 2024, for the assault and murder of a detainee at Rubavu prison in 2019 underscores serious failings in the Rwandan judiciary’s response to evidence of torture. The judiciary, as well as the national human rights institution, have largely failed to investigate or address repeated and credible allegations of torture made by detainees and former detainees since at least 2017. While Kayumba’s trial is a significant first step towards breaking the near total impunity around abuse in detention, much more is needed for Rwanda to end the practice and hold accountable those responsible for torture and other ill-treatments in prisons and unofficial detention facilities. Rwanda should comply with the provisions of its own constitution and fulfill its obligations under international human rights law by urgently conducting a comprehensive investigation into torture in prisons, that is capable of leading to both accountability and redress for victims.

New York: Human Rights Watch, 2024. 39p.

By Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International

Amnesty International Kenya and Human Rights Watch document the abuses committed by police and other state agents during the 2023 nationwide protests. The opposition, Azimio La Umoja One Kenya Coalition, organized the protests over alleged fraud and malpractices during the 2022 elections, and against the high cost of living and tax hikes proposed by the new administration of President William Ruto. “Unchecked Injustice” is based on 224 interviews with survivors and witnesses to abuses in Nairobi, Kisumu, Machakos, Migori, Nakuru, Kisii, Nyamira, Homa Bay, Siaya, and Makueni counties. The report documents how police used arbitrary and excessive force against protesters between March-July 2023. They shot directly into crowds with lethal weapons and lesslethal “rubber bullets,” fired tear gas into residential areas and schools, and carried out violent and abusive house-to-house operations, beating and shooting residents, killing at least 31 people. The Independent Policing Oversight Authority, which provides civilian oversight of the work of the police in Kenya, recorded that at least 67 were killed during this period. The report also documents arbitrary arrests, detention, torture and other ill-treatment of people including children under 18, and the long-term health and socio-economic impact of abuses. Amnesty International Kenya and Human Rights Watch call on the Kenyan government to acknowledge, condemn and investigate the killings and use of excessive force by police, and hold to account those credibly implicated in abuses. The government should also introduce credible police reforms.

New York: Human Rights Watch, 2024. 96p.

By Human Rights Watch

The 175-page report, “‘I Learned How to Say No’: Labor Abuses & Sexual Exploitation in Colombian Webcam Studios,” exposes working conditions in webcam studios in Bogotá, Cali, Medellín, and Palmira, where models record content that is broadcasted by adult platforms and streamed around the world. Webcamming is a global industry in which studies estimate that platforms keep between 50 and 65 percent of what viewers pay. People interviewed said that studios retain as much as 70 percent of what is paid out by the platform, reducing the pay of workers. Adult webcam platforms based in the United States and Europe should immediately address labor abuses and sexual exploitation in Colombian webcam studios.

New York: Human Rights Watch, 2024. 285p.

By Michael Garcia Bochenek

In the last few months of 2017, public defenders working in United States communities along the US-Mexico border began noticing a pattern. Over several months, they had seen an increasing number of people facing criminal charges for irregularly crossing the border arriving in court with a new concern: When these people had a chance to speak in court, their primary worry was not that they were facing prosecution; instead, they were asking the judges where their children were. These public defenders were seeing the early days of the forcible family separation policy put in place by the administration of US President Donald J. Trump and developed in a larger context of overheated, dehumanizing, and at times racist official rhetoric toward migrants. The policy began in March 2017 as a pilot program in and around El Paso, Texas, and was then rolled out along the entire US-Mexico border in early 2018. The policy deployed a minor federal criminal charge—“improper entry”—to force children and parents apart. Its official name, “Zero Tolerance,” referred to Attorney General Jeff Sessions’ directive that every adult who entered the United States irregularly would face prosecution. Criminal charges for improper entry have long been misused as a means of immigration enforcement, raising serious human rights concerns. More than five years before Sessions’ “zero tolerance” directive, improper entry and improper reentry were the most prosecuted federal crimes in the United States. As misguided and abusive as this earlier use of such charges was, it had not deliberately targeted children and their parents. In fact, before mid-2017, the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) generally did not request prosecution of parents arriving with their children and federal prosecutors had usually declined to pursue improper entry charges against parents traveling with their children precisely to avoid separating arriving families. The policy developed at Sessions’ directive did not appear primarily aimed at securing convictions. Although a criminal conviction would mean more serious consequences on a subsequent irregular entry, the offense is, as a federal magistrate judge observed, “quite literally one of the least serious federal offenses.”1 The real payoff, as far as the architects of the policy were concerned, was that a criminal charge could be used as a reason to transfer the immediate responsibility for protective care of the child. Parents who faced charges were in the custody of the US Marshals Service. Their children remained in US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) detention. The parents were rapidly convicted—some spent less than a minute in front of the judge once their case was called, and most received sentences of time already served in government custody, so they were back in CBP holding cells in short order. In the meantime, however, DHS, the federal government department that includes CBP, had deemed their children to be unaccompanied. DHS agents not only knew exactly where the parents were but also knew that the parents would quickly return to CBP detention. Even so, the department treated the brief change in custody as meaning that parents were not “available” to provide care. Unaccompanied migrant children are entitled to specific protections. In response to a court case settled in 1997, Flores v. Reno, care of unaccompanied children is the responsibility of the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR), an agency of the US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). A 2008 anti-trafficking law requires DHS to transfer unaccompanied children to ORR expeditiously, usually within 72 hours. The forcible family separation policy weaponized these requirements. Keeping families together is, in the vast majority of these types of cases, in children's best interests. But instead of making every effort to keep families together, DHS transferred the children it had separated to ORR, without planning for or putting measures in place that would enable authorities to reunite them with their parents. Discussions about separating children from their parents at the border began less than a month after President Trump took office. One federal prosecutor commented in early 2017, “History would not judge that kindly.” 2 In March 2017, after Reuters broke the story that family separation was under consideration, a DHS staffer emailed Allen Blume, the department’s budget director, to say, “I would be truly grateful if you could tell me this isn’t being seriously considered.” 3 This report is based on a review of public and internal government documents, legal proceedings, and the findings of DHS, DOJ, and HHS internal investigations, drawing on Human Rights Watch’s extensive interviews with forcibly separated children and parents in 2018 and 2019. It finds that the forcible separation of children from their parents was a deliberate, targeted policy choice taken even though the architects of the policy knew or should have known that it would inflict anguish and suffering on families. Forcible separation of children from their families inflicted harms that were severe and foreseeable. Once parents realized they would not be immediately reunited with their children, they were distraught. Some children sobbed uncontrollably. Many felt abandoned. Nearly all were bewildered, not least because immigration officials would not tell them where their parents were or gave responses that proved to be lies. Children forcibly separated from their parents experienced anxiety, had nightmares, regressed to earlier developmental stages, or found it difficult to trust others and form attachments. Some lashed out. Others stopped speaking.

New York: Human Rights Watch, 2024, 145p.

By The European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE)

Women and girls are more likely to be the targets of cyber violence on digital platforms and, as a result, they experience significant physical, sexual and psychological distress and/or financial difficulties. ▪ There is limited provision in digital platforms’ standards and trust and safety policies for keeping users safe from gender-related cyber violence online, despite the high incidence of this phenomenon. ▪ The standards and trust and safety policies of the platforms make little reference to relevant human rights acts or important legislative advances in the fight against gender-based violence and cyber violence. ▪ Digital platforms dealing with the significant challenges of cyber violence acts and behaviours would benefit from greater collaboration across platforms. This would enable cross-platform reporting and the harmonisation of the wide variety of definitions of cyber violence. ▪ Digital platforms do not have cyber violence data that is disaggregated by sex available for incident reporting, response and followup practices. This renders the assessment of the true extent of cyber violence acts and behaviours against women and girls challenging. More transparency is needed in relation to moderation and follow-up practices. ▪ This lack of a gender-sensitive approach at the level of reporting, recording and responding to different forms of violence online renders the scale of the phenomenon of cyber violence against women and girls largely invisible and contributes to obscuring its dynamics.

Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2024 22p.

By Jonathan Haggerty and Arthur Rizer

After the Trump administration implemented its “zero tolerance” immigration policy in early 2018, stories of children being ripped from their mother’s arms and extended family separations emerged. Initially, administration officials denied the existence of any policy aimed at separating families at the border. Others later claimed the separations were unintentional. However, a recent review of a leaked report from the Office of the Inspector General reveals both claims were false. This report revealed staff members from the White House and the Departments of Justice and Homeland Security met on multiple occasions to craft a plan, which they knew would separate migrant children from their parents, with the explicit goal of deterring illegal border crossings. The resulting outrage eventually prompted President Trump to partially rescind the “zero tolerance” policy and fueled the political left’s opposition to the Trump administration’s handling of immigration laws. As a new administration takes office, immigration advocates have produced an exhaustive list of border policies for the Biden White House to repeal, but this administration will have to prioritize which of the Trump-era immigration regulations to address first. And, while the political left undoubtedly presents a strong case against the “zero tolerance” prosecutions undertaken by its predecessor, a robust set of conservative arguments against this policy offers the Biden administration ample, cross-ideological support for a new approach.

R STREET POLICY STUDY NO. 212 November 2020, 7p.

By Michael T. Light, Jason P. Robey, Jungmyung Kim

Although minor forms of criminal justice contact are increasingly used to identify immigration violators, little research has been conducted at the intersection of immigration and misdemeanor justice. As a result, citizenship remains undertheorized in punishment research and fundamental questions remain unanswered. In this article, we introduce the “crimmigrant” punishment framework to conceptualize the unique case processing consequences for non–U.S. citizens and undocumented immigrants. We then draw on rich case data from all misdemeanor arrests in Texas and California between 2006 and 2018 to establish four notable findings. (1) Misdemeanors are common and consequential. We observe more than 1.4 million misdemeanor arrests involving non–U.S. citizens, the overwhelming majority of which resulted in criminal charges and formal punishments. (2) The offenses that funnel noncitizens into the misdemeanor system are similar to those of U.S. citizens; however, we do observe an appreciable number of arrests linked to noncitizens’ legal status (e.g., giving false information). (3) Once in the misdemeanor system, noncitizens, and especially undocumented immigrants, are significantly more likely to be convicted and incarcerated compared with similarly situated U.S. citizens. (4) These disparities are more severe in Texas than in California.

Criminology, Volume 62, Issue 4, 2024, pages 655-703

By Felipe Gonçalves, Elisa Jácome and Emily Weisburst

How does immigration enforcement affect public safety? Heightened enforcement could reduce crime by deterring and incapacitating immigrant offenders or, alternatively, increase crime by discouraging victims from reporting offenses. The researchers study the U.S. Secure Communities program, which expanded interior enforcement against unauthorized immigrants. Using national survey data, they find that the program reduced the likelihood that Hispanic victims reported crimes to police and increased the victimization of Hispanics. Total reported crimes are unchanged, masking these opposing effects. The researchers provide evidence that reduced Hispanic reporting is the key driver of increased victimization. Their findings underscore the importance of trust in institutions as a central determinant of public safety.

Evanston, IL: Northwestern University, 2024. 95p.

Edited by Michał Balcerzak and Julia Kapelańska-Pręgowska

This is an open access title available under the terms of a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 License. It is free to read, download and share on Elgaronline.com. The open access publication has been financially supported by Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń as part of the research project: “Freedom or Security? Legal and Ethical Dilemmas of New Digital Technologies - the Perspective of International Human Rights Law and Security Policies” (IDUB grant, “Inter disciplinas excellentia”) This book explores how international organizations have addressed the actual and potential human rights issues caused by AI technologies. Combining in-depth theoretical and doctrinal analysis with a pragmatic approach, it addresses vital questions on where accountability and responsibility for AI-related violations of human rights should lie

Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, UK · Northampton, MA, USA, 2024, 347p.

By Mary Holper

Alleged mandatory immigration detainees are unable to access federal court review of whether they are illegally detained without a bond hearing. The conviction that causes a detainee to be deportable also causes mandatory detention, so that the substantive findings in the deportation litigation path and detention litigation path overlap, even though their consequences differ. In this situation, habeas courts invoke 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9)— the “zipper clause”—a 1996 statute barring habeas petitions. With § 1252(b)(9), Congress intended to “zip” all claims “arising from any action taken or proceeding brought to remove” a noncitizen into a single circuit court petition for review of a final removal order. But the detention and deportation litigation paths are two sides of an unmatched zipper. One path leads to deportation while the other leads to detention without a bond hearing pending the decision on deportation.

This article exposes a problem that, while under-litigated in immigration detention law, is robbing alleged mandatory detainees of their right to access habeas corpus in order to challenge their illegal detention. As a solution, this article proposes the “Great Writ,” habeas corpus, as a remedy. Because the alleged mandatory detainees do not seek a review of their removal orders, and seek only release from custody, they invoke the “core” of habeas corpus. Although a federal appellate court will ultimately review the substantive legal question that causes both their deportation and detention, that review comes too little, and too late. Thus, it provides no adequate substitute for habeas corpus because there is no meaningful opportunity to demonstrate, to a politically independent adjudicator, that the noncitizen is illegally detained. For these detainees, § 1252(b)(9) has proven to be an ill-fitted zipper that allows illegal executive detention to continue for months and years. If the core of the Suspension Clause is to mean anything, it must guard these detainees’ liberty interests.

Boston College Law School, Boston College Law School Legal Studies Research Paper No. 634, 2024. 53p.

By Pisarevskaya, Asya and Scholten, Peter

This open access book develops a typology of cities by exploring how current levels of migration-related diversity and segregation relate to three groups of factors: international mobilities, inequalities and political-institutional aspects of local governance. Based on both quantitative and qualitative data from 16 cities in four European countries (France, Germany, The Netherlands, and Italy), the book compares the cities and uses a method of fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis. It demonstrates the shared contingencies of factors among the cities within each type and the crucial differences between the types of localities, and offers a more differentiated, holistic understanding of migration-related diversity configurations through the five conceptualised types: (1) Superdiverse cities, (2) Postindustrial diverse cities. (3) Middle class diverse cities, (4) Divided cities, and (5) Marginal migration cities. As such, the book is a valuable read to all those who would like to learn more about urban migration-related diversity and how it is formed and governed.

Cham: Springer Nature, 2025, 225p.

Edited by Jakub Bijak

This is an open access title available under the terms of a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 License. It is free to read, download and share on Elgaronline.com. This unique book provides a practical and interdisciplinary blueprint for determining quantitative scenarios of future international migration. Focusing on complexity and uncertainty as the defining challenges of migration, it explores how scenario building can be used to inform and underpin effective migration policy and practice.

Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, UK • Northampton, MA, USA, 2024, 185p.

By Christopher L. Foote

The US unemployment rate has drifted higher since early 2023, even though growth in payroll employment has been strong over this period. Some commentators have noted that the puzzle of rising unemployment amid rapid hiring can be explained by a large increase in immigration, which would raise population growth and allow firms to hire large numbers of new (immigrant) workers without dipping into the unemployment pool. This paper uses a source of administrative data that is directly related to the labor market—immigrant applications for work permits—to estimate the immigrant labor inflow in 2023 and 2024. The surge in new work permit applications in these two years supports the large immigration estimates based on other administrative data from the Department of Homeland Security, including the significant immigration increase recently estimated by the Congressional Budget Office.

Boston: Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, 2024. 27p.

Edited by Fia Cottrell-Sundevall · Ragnheiður Kristjánsdóttir

This open access book examines disenfranchisement and voting barriers in ten self-governing and aspiring liberal democracies worldwide, before and after the introduction of so-called universal suffrage. Focusing on economic voting restrictions implemented through constitutional provisions and laws, it explores the various disqualifications that prevent people from voting. The notions of economic independence underpinning these restrictions have built and reinforced societal structures and power relations, particularly concerning class, gender, race, civil status, age, and education. Historically, voting rights have been celebrated as a symbol of inclusivity and equal citizenship. Yet, as contributors in this collection highlight, recent centennial celebrations of universal suffrage often depict it as a distinct milestone, overshadowing the voting restrictions that persisted post women’s suffrage. As democracy now faces new, concerted challenges, there is a compelling reason to revisit and question the narrative of the progression of democratic ideals.

Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2024. 286p.

By Melanie Gower

There is a long history of cooperation between the UK and France over immigration controls at their shared borders. This has been formalised through a series of bilateral agreements, including the Sangatte Protocol (1991) and the Treaty of Le Touquet (2003). The latter allowed for France and the UK to carry out immigration controls in each other’s territories at seaports. The Sandhurst Treaty (2018) provided a legal framework for broader cooperation on border and migration issues. Early agreements addressed security around the Channel Tunnel and ferry terminals and preventing people crossing the border by hiding in vehicles. Since 2019 cooperation has focused on small boat crossings. Small boats have been the predominant recorded method of irregular arrival in the UK since 2020. The Home Office says 82 organised criminal gangs responsible for people smuggling by small boats have been “dismantled” since a Joint Intelligence Cell with France was established in July 2020. UK funding commitments Many border control agreements since 2014 have had associated funding commitments. The UK will provide €541 million (around £476 million at the time of the agreement) between 2023/24 and 2025/26, under a three-year deal made in March 2023. France is due to make an unspecified “substantial and continuing” contribution. How is the effectiveness of UK spending assessed? There is limited official information published about how the funding attached to successive agreements is spent and monitored. The government says France and the UK jointly assess the impact of cooperation and funding through regular strategic reviews. The government doesn’t publish details of review outcomes. It says doing so could undermine border security controls and the UK-France relationship.

Recent statistics The UK–France Joint Leaders’ Declaration issued in March 2023 included an agreement to increase the interception rate of boats crossing the English Channel and to “drastically reduce the number of crossings year on year”. Fewer people and boats were detected arriving in the UK in 2023 compared with 2022. The number of people intercepted and returned to France was also lower. • 36% fewer people were detected arriving by small boats in 2023 than in 2022. The Home Office says this is largely explained by a 93% reduction in Albanian nationals arriving by small boats 2023, which it attributes to recent partnership work between the UK and Albania. Arrivals of other nationalities reduced by 14% overall. • 46% fewer boats were detected arriving in the UK without permission in 2023 than in 2022, although the average number of people in each boat increased from 41 to 49. • France prevented fewer crossing attempts in 2023 than in 2022. The Home Office says this reflects the decline in the overall number of crossing attempts in 2023. Data for the first nine months of 2024 shows the number of people arriving in small boats (25,244) was slightly more than for the same period in 2023 (24,830). This is despite fewer boats (479) arriving in the first nine months of 2024 than over the same period in 2023 (506). More recent provisional data shows significantly more people and boats arrived in October and November 2024 compared to in 2023. The Home Office has cited weather conditions as a relevant factor. Topical issues Some stakeholders, including Border Force unions, some MPs, and migrants’ rights advocates, have criticised agreements between the UK and France for falling short of what they think is needed to address unauthorised border crossings. Their alternative suggestions have included powers for French law enforcement to arrest and detain intercepted migrants; powers for UK counterparts in France; and enhanced safe and legal routes for asylum seekers wishing to come to the UK. There have been reports of French police intervening more to prevent small boat departures since the 2023 UK-France funding agreement. Some commentators have linked the increased funding with an increase in migrant fatalities in 2024. Recent UK governments have wanted formal agreements with European states to return unauthorised migrants who travel to the UK. So far, the Labour government has prioritised practical cooperation with neighbouring countries over pursuing a formal returns agreement with the EU.

London: UK House of Commons Library, 2024. 31p.

By CJ McKinney, Melanie Gower

The UK has agreements with some countries for the return of people lacking legal residence. These agreements take various forms and are not usually published.

The attached briefing lists known agreements and links to the text where available. The government has confirmed the existence of some form of agreement with 24 countries since 2021, some recent and some struck up to 20 years ago:

In 2021, the government confirmed that it has formal returns agreements with Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, China, Djibouti, Democratic Republic of Congo, Guinea, Iraq, Kuwait, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Korea, South Sudan, Switzerland and Vietnam. That accounts for 16 countries, excluding the deal with Afghanistan because it has been inoperable in practice since regime change later in 2021.

Since 2021, the government has signed formal returns agreements with Albania, Georgia, Serbia, Moldova and Pakistan. These five replaced European Union agreements with those countries in which the UK took part while an EU member.

In 2021, the UK and India agreed a migration and mobility partnership that included provisions on returns.

In 2024, the UK and Bangladesh announced an informal returns agreement described as standard operating procedures.

In 2020, the UK and Ireland set up an informal returns agreement covering asylum seekers (rather than British or Irish citizens), described as non-legally binding operational arrangements.

There may well be other informal or even formal agreements, the existence of which has not been disclosed. The arrangement with Ireland was not announced at the time and only came to public attention in 2024.

Agreements made in the form of a treaty are published and laid before Parliament, but the government is not required to publish a memorandum of understanding or operational protocol. It has refused, for example, to disclose the contents of the 2022 Pakistan agreement.

London: UK House of Commons Library, 2024. 10p.

By Jasmijn Slootjes and Ravenna Sohst

Across Europe, concerns about irregular migration have dominated media headlines and shaped recent elections. Discussions of and policymaking related to irregular migration are often a numbers game, fueled by the latest estimates of changing migration trends and migrant populations. Data on irregular migration also influence decision-making, advocacy, and strategic and operational planning of a wide range of governmental and nongovernmental actors.

But despite playing such important roles, data on irregular migration are often inadequate—either lacking altogether, uneven, or difficult to access. This has consequences for policymakers, service providers, and other stakeholders that would benefit from better access to reliable data.

This MPI Europe policy brief explores obstacles that hinder the effective collection and use of irregular migration data, how this affects policymakers and other actors, and potential avenues for strengthening the evidence base. This study, which is part of the Measuring Irregular Migration and Related Policies (MIrreM) project, draws on insights shared in workshops and interviews by policymakers, subject matter experts, NGO representatives, and other stakeholders.

Brussels: Migration Policy Institute - Europe, 2024. 18p.

By International Organization for Migration (IOM)

This publication entitled "Detention and Migration in West and Central Africa: A Comparative Study" provides a comprehensive analysis of the detention situation in the context of migration across the West and Central African region. Through the Network of Legal Experts on Migration for West and Central Africa (Nolem), an in-depth research is conducted analyzing how 13 countries in the region regulate and enforce detention of migrants in both law and practice. The study delves into whether current laws and practices of migrant detention are consistent with international and regional human rights law and discusses the gaps or violations and identifies good practices. The study also examines the alternatives to detention that are proposed by states. Finally, recommendations are made to states, regional bodies and other stakeholders. The study gives specific attention to providing a gender responsive and child sensitive approach. The study contains country-specific papers drafted by the legal experts shaping the Nolem Network, as well as articles providing and international and regional overview and a comparative analysis. The Nolem Network aims to reshape the migration policy and law landscape in West and Central Africa by strengthening and promoting evidence-based, rights-based and gender-responsive national and regional migration laws and policies throughout the region for lasting positive change.

Geneva, SWIT: International Organization for Migration, 2024. 124p.

By Margaret Monyani

North Africa is a focal point for global migration flows, making effective and humane management approaches vital.

North Africa’s role in global migration needs effective, humane management. This report examines Libya, Tunisia and Egypt’s migration policies, highlighting their impact on stability and migrant safety. It emphasises the need for stable governance, socio-economic development and international cooperation. The report offers recommendations for balanced approaches that address security as well as humanitarian needs.

Key findings Socio-economic instability is still a key driver of migration in North Africa. High unemployment pushes people to look for opportunities abroad, exacerbating migration flows. Regional migration dynamics are complicated by external influences. Policies in Libya, Tunisia and Egypt focus on restricting migration to Europe rather than supporting the African Union’s (AU) Free Movement Protocol, which limits opportunities for regional integration and economic development. Recommendations Libya should: Advocate for a shift in international initiatives from a focus on migration control to one that emphasises human rights, dignity and the protection of migrants, particularly within EU-funded programmes Adopt non-detention approaches for migrants, such as community-based care, regularisation pathways and access to legal support, to prioritise their rights and well-being Tunisia should: Develop a comprehensive national asylum policy that aligns with international standards to better protect asylum seekers and refugees Revisit bilateral agreements with European nations to align them with regional African migration aims, supporting the AU’s Free Movement Protocol Bolster legal and operational capacities to disrupt smuggling networks through investment in resources and law enforcement training Ongoing conflict in Libya has created a vacuum where militias and smuggling networks control migration routes, leading to severe human rights abuses in unofficial detention centres. Human rights violations against migrants are widespread in Libya, while Tunisia and Egypt face challenges in providing legal protection and basic services to migrants. Egypt should: Implement policy reforms that focus on enhancing economic opportunities to address the root causes of migration, particularly through job creation and economic stability Revise visa restrictions to reduce irregular migration and encourage safer migration pathways Strengthen legal frameworks to combat human trafficking and foster deeper regional cooperation The AU should: Accelerate the ratification of the Free Movement Protocol by addressing specific political and logistical barriers in North Africa, promoting intraregional mobility Develop a platform for real-time information exchange on migration trends, human trafficking and smuggling networks, enhancing evidencebased decision making and rapid responses Strengthen cooperation with the EU to ensure migration policies prioritise both security concerns and migrants’ rights

Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, 2024. 24p.