By Zhuoer Lin, Yi Wang, Thomas M. Gill, Xi Chen:

Disparities in cognition persist between non-Hispanic Black (hereafter, Black) and non-Hispanic White (hereafter, White) older adults, and are possibly influenced by early educational differences stemming from structural racism. However, the relationship between school racial segregation and later-life cognition remains underexplored. We examined a nationally sample of older Americans from the Health and Retirement Study. Utilizing childhood residence data and cognitive assessment data (1995-2018) for Black and White participants aged 65 and older, Black-White dissimilarity index for public elementary schools measuring school segregation, multilevel analyses revealed a significant negative association between school segregation and later-life cognitive outcomes among Black participants, but not among White participants. Potential mediators across the life course, including educational attainment, explained 58-73% of the association, yet the associations remained large and significant among Black participants for all outcomes. Given the rising trend of school segregation in the US, educational policies aimed at reducing segregation are crucial to address health inequities. Clinicians can leverage patients' early-life educational circumstances to promote screening, prevention, and management of cognitive disorders.

IZA DP No. 17466

Bonn: IZA – Institute of Labor Economics. 2024. 64p.

By Zhuoer Lin, Yi Wang, Thomas M. Gill, Xi Chen:

Disparities in cognition persist between non-Hispanic Black (hereafter, Black) and non-Hispanic White (hereafter, White) older adults, and are possibly influenced by early educational differences stemming from structural racism. However, the relationship between school racial segregation and later-life cognition remains underexplored. We examined a nationally sample of older Americans from the Health and Retirement Study. Utilizing childhood residence data and cognitive assessment data (1995-2018) for Black and White participants aged 65 and older, Black-White dissimilarity index for public elementary schools measuring school segregation, multilevel analyses revealed a significant negative association between school segregation and later-life cognitive outcomes among Black participants, but not among White participants. Potential mediators across the life course, including educational attainment, explained 58-73% of the association, yet the associations remained large and significant among Black participants for all outcomes. Given the rising trend of school segregation in the US, educational policies aimed at reducing segregation are crucial to address health inequities. Clinicians can leverage patients' early-life educational circumstances to promote screening, prevention, and management of cognitive disorders.

IZA DP No. 17466

Bonn: IZA – Institute of Labor Economics. 2024. 64p.

By Susan Olzak

This study examines the effect of violent and nonviolent tactics in gaining support for social movements using information on protests by the Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement. The theoretical dispute over whether violence benefits or harms a movement remains unsettled, and the empirical evidence is inconclusive. Violence increases media attention and generates recognition of a movement and its goals, but violence also raises fears of instability and risks disapproval. This article aims to bring coherence to this debate by arguing that while violence can benefit a movement by emphasizing the contrast between peaceful and violent protesters, the costs associated with the use of violence ought to diminish support for a movement. The analysis that uses a hybrid model to analyze panel data from two national surveys finds evidence that both peaceful and violent BLM protests are associated with higher support for BLM, but they do not change individuals’ support over time.

Mobilization: An International Quarterly (2024) 29 (3): 287–307.

By Maureen A. Eger https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9023-7316 and Susan Olzak 

While radical right parties championing anti-immigrant platforms have made electoral gains throughout Europe, anti-immigrant sentiment—a key indicator of radical right support—has not dramatically increased during this same period. In this article, we seek to help make sense of this paradox by incorporating a contextual factor missing from previous studies: levels of anti-immigrant violence. Our key argument is that higher levels of collective violence targeting immigrants raise the salience of the immigrant/native boundary, which activates both positive and negative views of immigrants and makes these attitudes more cognitively accessible and politically relevant. This argument implies that exposure to violence against immigrants should strengthen existing prejudice (or empathy) toward immigrants and engender feelings of affinity (or antipathy) for radical right parties. Analyses of the German portion of the European Social Survey (ESS 2014 − 2019) and the Anti-Refugee Violence in Germany (ARVIG 2014 − 2017) datasets reveal a powerful interaction effect: exposure to higher levels of collective violence increased the probability of feeling closest to radical right parties among those who held neutral, negative, and extremely negative views of immigrants. However, these events were not associated with radical right sympathies among those holding pro-immigrant attitudes. We conclude that when violence against immigrants resonates with public opinion on immigrants, it opens new political opportunities for radical right parties. These findings should inform future research on the politicization of international migration, especially studies investigating how anti-immigrant attitudes translate into political outcomes.

International Migration ReviewVolume 57, Issue 2, June 2023, Pages 746-777

By Susan Olzak

Influential studies of right-wing extremist violence offer evidence that such violence is motivated by grievances intensified by a perceived loss in status or by economic dislocations. This article moves away from an emphasis on grievances by turning to theories of ethno-nationalism and group conflict. Ethno-nationalism is in part driven by attitudes of dominant groups favoring ethnic exclusion, whereas group threat theories explain that ethnic diversity increases the salience of ethnic boundaries and fuels a collective response to group threat. Such threats encourage violence to contain this threat and restore dominance. Exclusionary attitudes and support for expanded gun rights in America further legitimize a culture of ethno-nationalism that encourages violent acts. I test these arguments with data from the Pew Research Center, the Southern Poverty Law Center, and the Extremist Crime Database on right-wing violence. The state-level and county-level results support the claim that rising ethnic diversity raises the rate and volume of right-wing violence significantly. State-level results also find that rising memberships in the National Rifle Association increase the rate of right-wing violence significantly.

Sociological Science 10(2):197-226, March 20, 2023

By Lisel Petis

This paper responds to municipalities' concerns about the increase in visible homelessness and its perceived impact on community safety. The overlap between the criminal justice system and homelessness is well-documented, but debates on how to best address these issues remain divisive. Many stakeholders entrenched in their viewpoints, often overlooking the complexity of homelessness and the need for a multifaceted approach. However, the reality is that singular solutions have proven insufficient. We must combine strategies and offer multiple options to address the diverse needs of different individuals. Arrest and jail should always be a last resort for addressing homelessness, as criminalizing survival behaviors only perpetuates the cycle of homelessness and incarceration. This approach is costly, can be harmful, and fails to address the underlying causes of homelessness. To break this cycle, it is crucial to find better solutions, some of which we explore in this piece. Key conclusions: • Immediate Actions: Providing jobs—such as trash cleanup in an encampment— to homeless individuals, managing public spaces, and offering safe parking lots for those living in vehicles can prove impactful. Additionally, involuntary hospitalization and scattered sites programs can offer immediate support to those needing urgent assistance. Homeless outreach teams can also play a crucial role by building trust, offering immediate assistance, and connecting individuals to essential services, ultimately reducing reliance on emergency services and jails. • Long-Term Strategies: Expanding transportation and housing options is critical for reducing homelessness, as doing so provides greater access to jobs and shelter. Innovative solutions like using vacant hotels for immediate housing, employing community courts for rehabilitative justice, creating “one-stop shops” for essential services, and using shelter-finder apps can help stabilize individuals and connect them to necessary resources. • Early Intervention: Providing financial training and support equips individuals with the skills to manage money effectively and plan for major life events, which can help prevent one setback from snowballing into homelessness. Predictive analytics can identify at-risk individuals before eviction, enabling targeted early intervention to stabilize their housing situation. Expanding supportive housing and improving access to mental health and substance use treatment are crucial for those transitioning from incarceration or facing behavioral health challenges. Efforts like the Clean Slate Initiative and the creation of “third places” help reintegrate individuals into society and build community-support networks.

R Street Policy Study No. 311 Washington, DC: R Street, 2024 23p.

By C. Jarrett Dieterle

Introduction In January 2020, the world of alcohol rules seemed to be mired in a kind of stasis. It had been 85 years since Prohibi琀椀on, but the broad legal structure governing alcohol remained remarkably unchanged. Just three months later, in March 2020, everything changed. The COVID-19 global pandemic that gripped America and the broader world led to unprecedented realignments in our way of life. Governments began issuing mask mandates, social distancing orders, and even rules around how—and if—businesses could con琀椀nue opera琀椀ng. In response, innova琀椀ons like to-go and delivery alcohol took hold across the country, leading to a substan琀椀al shi昀琀 in how alcohol was regulated. Now, three years later, opposi琀椀on to these changes has started to become more prevalent. Most of the pushback has been focused on concerns that less stringent alcohol regula琀椀on could create nega琀椀ve externali琀椀es. One of the prime areas of concern has been underage drinking and whether enhanced alcohol delivery will lead to a spike in youth drinking across the country. This study breaks down the latest underage drinking data to help provide a more informed debate around America’s pandemic-era alcohol reforms.

R Street Shorts No. 128, Washington, DC: R Street, 2023. 7p.

By Chelsea Boyd

The United States is in the midst of an overdose crisis. One promising harm reduction intervention that could prevent overdoses and curb the crisis is overdose prevention centers (OPCs). OPCs are facilities where people who use drugs (PWUD) can consume pre-obtained substances under medical supervision. In addition to supervised consumption services, OPCs o昀琀en provide other harm reduction and basic services, such as syringe exchange, treatment referrals, wound care, public assistance referrals and more. The first OPC opened in Switzerland in the 1980s, and OPCs now exist in at least 11 countries Evidence supporting OPCs largely comes from the facilities operating in Canada and Australia. Evaluations of these centers have shown that they are remarkably effective at decreasing health harms associated with drug use, and there has never been a reported overdose death at an OPC. Additionally, OPCs have been shown to reduce syringe and consumption equipment sharing, decrease overdose deaths in the area around the center, prevent new HIV and hepatitis C infections, increase treatment uptake and decrease public injecting and syringe litter. Studies also have found that OPCs do not increase crime or drug use. Nevertheless, in both Canada and Australia, advocates who wanted to open the facilities faced uphill battles that left the OPCs in legal limbo for many years before ultimately receiving permanent legal authorization. The United States currently has two locally sanctioned OPCs in operation in New York City, and several states and cities are working toward opening OPCs despite their federally illegal status under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA). Although no jurisdiction other than New York City has opened an OPC in the United States, these centers have been authorized by policymakers at the state, county and local levels. In addition to New York City, Philadelphia, Seattle, Rhode Island and California have made progress toward authorizing OPCs. Policymakers at every level of government can take action to facilitate the opening of OPCs. Local policymakers and groups, such as mayors or city councils, can authorize OPCs, although this path provides the least protection from state or federal interference. States can pass legislation that authorizes OPCs through pilot programs, which allows them to be rigorously evaluated and ensures that an OPC’s existence does not conflict with state law. Nevertheless, federal action legitimizing OPCs is also necessary. Congress could consider amending the CSA to clarify that OPCs do not violate the act or stipulate that federal funds cannot be used to enforce the CSA in regard to OPCs. Alternatively, the administration could release a memorandum stating that the federal government will not interfere with OPCs operating under state or local authorization, or the Department of Justice could release a similar statement. The challenge with either of those actions is that future administrations could decide not to honor these statements. Regardless of how OPCs are authorized, policymakers can apply pragmatic approaches to authorize them in their jurisdictions. These include getting community buy-in, working with law enforcement, formalizing requirements for operation and evaluation and ensuring that the facilities and policies are designed to meet the needs of the populations they serve.

R Street Policy Study No. 265, Washington, DC: R Street, 2022. 19p.

By Stacey McKenna

To combat rising rates of drug overdoses, the United States government has begun to embrace a public health response that has been saving lives for decades: harm reduction. This pragmatic public health approach aims to mitigate the health risks associated with a range of behaviors rather than insisting people quit them altogether. Despite the benefits of harm reduction programs, stigma, paraphernalia laws and weak or inconsistent protections from such laws can undermine the uptake of their services. In addition, a small but growing body of evidence indicates that, despite the legalization and expansion of these programs, successful implementation may also be limited by outdated local, state and federal policy. To better understand how outdated policy might create barriers to providing optimal harm reduction services, we interviewed 10 harm reduction providers serving diverse populations across the United States. These interviews revealed two primary areas of concern that harm reduction providers perceived as hindering the services they offered, both of which relate to government overreach: the overregulation of operations and the excessive restrictions on how funding can be used. To remove these barriers and enable harm reduction organizations to save more lives, we suggest that—instead of supporting legislation that regulates the details of harm reduction practice—lawmakers support bills that emphasize organizational autonomy for these groups. Doing so would allow harm reduction providers to tailor programs as needed, remain flexible in the face of changing science and provide more effective services to their communities.

R Street Policy Study No. 262 July 2022, 9p.

By C. Jarrett Dieterle

Before the COVID-19 pandemic, the concept of to-go alcohol was largely unheard of in America. Certain locales, such as New Orleans, offered so-called “go-cups” for alcoholic beverages, and a handful of municipalities across the country had open-container zones that allowed consumers to walk from restaurant to restaurant with a drink in hand. But by and large, alcohol purchased at a bar or restaurant had to be consumed inside the restaurant. When COVID-19 hit and dining inside turned into a public health liability, most restaurants and bars pivoted to a takeout and delivery model of service to keep their doors open. While food was readily convertible to this format, alcohol was not. In most states, antiquated laws governing the sale of alcoholic beverages prevented alcohol from being sold either as a curbside to-go opt-on or via delivery. In response, governors and alcohol regulatory agencies around the country issued emergency orders that granted both on-premise and off-premise establishments the ability to sell alcohol in a to-go or delivery capacity. This rapid reaction resulted in some of the fastest alcohol regulation changes in the last hundred years. To-go and delivery privileges provided a badly needed lifeline to restaurants, bars and liquor stores during an unprecedented time of government-imposed lockdowns and social distancing orders. As one example of the impact of these reforms, states that permitted to-go and delivery drinks saw higher rates of furloughed employees being hired back by restaurants during the pandemic. Given this measurable success, many states have since made the decision to legisla琀椀vely extend, or make permanent, to-go and delivery alcohol. As of last fall, 29 states had extended or made permanent to-go drinks, and 32 states had passed to-go or delivery reforms of some kind (either from on- or off-premise retailers). Despite this reform wave, opposition has begun to develop against to-go and delivery alcohol reform—specifically around concerns that it could raise the prevalence of drunk driving. This paper examines that opposition and presents research to determine if to-go alcohol has had any impact on alcohol-impaired driving fatalities over the past two years.

R Street Shorts No. 114, June 2022, 6p.

By Marina Zaloznaya, Jennifer L. Glanville, Jennifer Haylett

Although men are overrepresented among the perpetrators of high-profile, white-collar crime, examinations of public-sector corruption typically reveal little-to-no gender differences in participation. Drawing from Steffensmeier's theory of gender inequality in the criminal underworld and Tomaskovic-Devey and Avent-Holt's relational theory of inequality, we argue that this apparent equality conceals systematically different patterns of engagement. We hypothesize that bureaucrats and other facilitators are more willing to collaborate with men than with women. Because public-sector corruption markets are not male dominated, we argue that “gatekeepers” of both genders systematically exclude women from lucrative illegal collaborations. We further hypothesize that patterns of gender inequality are more pronounced in riskier and more profitable public-sector corruption. We test these hypotheses with data from an original nationally representative survey conducted in Russia in 2018 using models that incorporate controls for explanations that locate gender differences in crime engagement in offender attributes. Our results demonstrate that gender differences in public-sector corruption are a function of coordination among multiple actors. These relational dynamics advantage Russian men over women in that they are more likely to use less costly types of remuneration and to engage in high-stakes exchanges with bigger material yields.

Criminology, Volume 62, Issue 4, 2024, pages 739-768

By Holly Nguyen, Lee Ann Slocum

Despite extensive theorizing on the employment–crime link, little discussion has taken place on the mechanisms through which job gains and losses affect behavior. We draw on prospect theory and the loss aversion principle, which suggests people are more sensitive to losses than gains, to assess how individuals contend with transitions in employment and income. Using fixed-effects and asymmetrical fixed-effects models, we analyze 36 months of retrospective information for a sample of incarcerated males collected as part of the Second Nebraska Inmate Study. First, we assess whether job losses are more likely than job gains to generate financial stress and find support for the loss aversion principle. Second, we explore how people might compensate for changes in job and income status by engaging in risk-taking behaviors (illegal earnings, gun carrying, and offending versatility). We find the positive relationship between job and income loss on the probability of reporting illegal earnings and crime versatility is stronger than the negative relationship between job and income gain and these behaviors. Financial stress, however, does not attenuate the relationship between losses and risk-taking behaviors. We discuss the implications for theory and policy.

Criminology, Volume 62, Issue 4, 2024, pages 799-829

By Seema Choksy Pessar, Rosanna Smart, Tim Naimi, Marlene Lira, Jason Blanchette, Anne Boustead, and Rosalie Liccardo Pacula

Aims: To measure the association between state cannabis policies and use among adults and youth in the United States from 2002 to 2019, given rapid policy liberalization and complex state cannabis policy environments.

Design: Repeated cross-sectional time series analysis. Three sets of models assessed the linear association between the Cannabis Policy Scale (CPS), an aggregate measure of 17 state cannabis policy areas that weights each policy by its efficacy and implementation rating, and prevalence of cannabis use. The first included year and state fixed effects; the second added state-level controls; the third replaced state fixed effects with state random effects. Standard errors were clustered at the state level in all models.

Setting and participants - United States.

Measurements: Past-month prevalence of cannabis use is from the National Survey on Drug Use and Health Small Area Estimates, a nationally and state-representative cross-sectional survey of household population ages 12 and older for years 2002–2003 to 2018–2019. Exposure data include the CPS.

Findings: A 10 percentage-point increase in the CPS (i.e. greater cannabis policy restrictiveness) was associated with lower past-month use prevalence by 0.81 (95% confidence interval [CI] = -1.05 to −0.56) to 0.97 (95% CI = -1.19 to −0.75) percentage-points for the population ages 12 years and older. When models were stratified by age, a 10 percentage-point increase in the CPS was associated with a 0.87 (95% CI = -1.13 to −0.61) to 1.04 percentage-point (95% CI = -1.03 to −0.84) reduction in past-month use prevalence for adults ages 18 years and older, and a 0.17 (95% CI = -0.24 to −0.09) to 0.21 percentage-point (95% CI = -0.35 to −0.07) reduction for youth ages 12–17 years.

Conclusions: More restrictive US cannabis policies appear to be associated with reduced cannabis use for both adults and youth.

Addiction; Early View, 2024, 7p.

By N. Bénichou, M. Adelzadeh, J. Singh, I. Gomaa, N. Elsagan, M. Kinateder, C. Ma, A. Gaur, A. Bwalya, and M. Sultan

Fires in the wildland-urban interface (WUI) have become a global issue, with disasters taking place all over the world recently. The drivers of increasing WUI fire risk—increasing population and expansion of urban areas into wildlands, and climate change—are global-scale phenomena. In the coming decades, WUI fire risk is expected to increase both in regions with a long history of fires and in regions that have had been less affected over past decades. WUI fires can cause the ignition of many structures through the spread of flames and radiant heat and the deposition of burning embers over a short period of time. This can overwhelm protection capabilities, lead to large evacuations, and cause disasters with the potential for the total loss of hundreds of structures in a few hours.

As discussed in Chapter 1 of this Guide, over the last decade, an average of 5 533 wildfires have occurred each year in Canada, involving 2.9 million hectares of wildland area. The number of evacuations caused by wildfires increased by about 1.5 evacuations per year between 1980 and 2014, with more than 20 evacuations per year after 2010. The substantial negative impacts of WUI fires were illustrated by the Okanagan Mountain Park Fire, which affected Kelowna in 2003; the Flat Top Complex Wildfire, which destroyed significant parts of Slave Lake in 2011; and the Horse River Fire, which immensely affected Fort McMurray in 2016 and was the most costly insured loss event in Canadian history. These disasters resulted in a loss of over 2 400 structures and roughly 3 400 dwelling units. Total insured losses from these wildland fire disasters and the 2017 wildland fire catastrophic events in British Columbia are currently estimated to be $4.8 billion. Despite all efforts, wildfires pose a significant challenge to the residential population, to mitigation efforts, and to existing infrastructure when located in a WUI setting. Wildfires are likely to become more severe and frequent as a result of climate change.

National Research Council Canada: Ottawa, ON. 2021. 192 pp.

U.S. Forest Service

Under this strategy, the Forest Service will work with partners to engineer a paradigm shift by focusing fuels and forest health treatments more strategically and at the scale of the problem, using the best available science as the guide. At the Forest Service, we now have the science and tools we need to size and place treatments in a way that will truly make a difference. We will focus on key “firesheds”—large forested landscapes and rangelands with a high likelihood that an ignition could expose homes, communities, and infrastructure to wildfire. Firesheds, typically about 250,000 acres in size, are mapped to match the scale of community exposure to wildfire.

Our new management paradigm builds on the National Cohesive Wildland Fire Management Strategy, Our new management paradigm builds on the National Cohesive Wildland Fire Management Strategy, including efforts to create fire-adapted communities and other collaborative strategies for cross-boundary treatments, including Cohesive Strategy projects and Shared Stewardship agreements. We will build on our long-standing work and relationships with U.S. Department of the Interior agencies. We will work collaboratively with States, Tribes, local communities, private landowners, and other stakeholders to adapt lessons learned into a coordinated and effective program of work.

U.S. Forest Service. 2022. 35p.

By The Los Angeles County

The Los Angeles County After Action Review of the Woolsey Fire evaluates the incident’s response, identifies areas for improvement, and offers recommendations for future preparedness, focusing on agency coordination, communication, evacuation, and recovery efforts.

• The Woolsey Fire After Action Review (AAR) provides a comprehensive analysis of the event, highlighting both successes and areas for improvement.
• The AAR process involved data collection, interviews, and cross-checking to ensure a detailed account of the incident.
• Key sections of the report include an executive summary, timeline of events, findings, and recommendations.
• Recommendations are divided into near-term and longer-term policy actions, focusing on response, communication, evacuation, and recovery.
• Appendices provide historical context and background information on involved agencies and regional fire history.
• The report emphasizes planning for future disasters in areas prone to wildfires and earthquakes.
• Training and coordination among agencies, such as the County Sheriff’s Department and Public Works, are highlighted as crucial for effective disaster response.
• Historical fire data shows a repetitive fire cycle in the region, underlining the importance of preparedness and mitigation efforts.

LLos Angeles County. 2019. 203p.

By Parliament of Australia. Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs References Committee

This examination of right-wing extremists in Australia looks at the movements, motivations and international links of local groups, particularly in online spaces. The report makes recommendations focusing on social media platform regulation, law enforcement access to encrypted communications and the creation of a national hate crimes database.

The inquiry, prompted by growing concern regarding right-wing extremism globally and its impact on Australian society, sought digito define, understand and limit the harm of right-wing extremist movements. Along with the historical and ideological background, it considers modern pathways to radicalisation with a focus on the significant role of online platforms. The report considers existing measures in place to counter violent extremism and makes six recommendations to curtail the spread and limit the harm of extremist groups.

Recommendations

The Australian Government should regularly assess the effectiveness of deradicalisation and countering violent extremism programs, incorporating insights from experts, practitioners, and research organisations, both domestically and internationally.

Develop a national framework to guide engagement with young people, aiming to help them identify and reject harmful ideologies while fostering positive social connections.

Research how extremist actors, particularly those targeting young people, use online platforms, including social media and gaming platforms, to spread propaganda and recruit members.

The Office of the eSafety Commissioner should collaborate with stakeholders to develop guidelines for transparent and independent measures to ensure social media platforms are effectively removing harmful extremist content.

Consider legislation allowing law enforcement and intelligence agencies, with a warrant obtained through proper judicial process, to access encrypted communications when there is a credible national security threat.

Establish a national hate crimes database to aid in the development of effective prevention and support programs.

Canberra: Parliament of Australia. The Senate, Legal and Constitutional Affairs References Committee 2024. 223p.

By Christoph Feldhaus, Lukas Reinhardt, Matthias Sutter:

In a democracy, it is essential that citizens accept rules and laws, regardless of which party is in power. We study why citizens in polarized societies resist rules implemented by political opponents. This may be due to the rules' specific content, but also because of a general preference against being restricted by political opponents. We develop a method to measure the latter channel. In our experiment with almost 1,300 supporters and opponents of Donald Trump, we show that polarization undermines rule-following behavior significantly, independent of the rules' content. Subjects perceive the intentions behind (identical) rules as much more malevolent if they were imposed by a political opponent rather than a political ally.

Bonn:  IZA – Institute of Labor Economics, 2024. 36p.

By Sigurd S. Arntzen, Jon H. Fiva, Rune J. Sørensen

This paper assesses the effectiveness of democratic systems in preventing individuals with criminal backgrounds from holding political office. Unlike many countries, Norway has no legal restrictions against felons running for office. We analyze local election candidates from 2003 to 2019, paired with administrative records of criminal offenses. We demonstrate that individuals with criminal records are systematically penalized at every stage of their political careers. Candidates are less likely to have criminal records than the general population, with elected officials less likely to have criminal backgrounds than their unelected peers, and mayors being the most lawful. Through a series of counterfactual exercises, we demonstrate that the most significant reduction in criminal involvement occurs at the nomination stage, especially within established local party organizations.

CESifo, Munich, 2024, 49 p.

By National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine; Division of Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education; Board on Science Education; Susan Debad, Rapporteur

The complex challenges facing society today call for new ways of doing research that bring researchers, policy makers, community leaders and members, industry stakeholders, and others together to identify evidence needs, contribute different kinds of knowledge and expertise, and use evidence to accomplish shared goals. Although momentum is building toward a research enterprise that more routinely enables and rewards this type of collaboration, the development of institutional capacities to support diverse forms of engaged research have not kept pace with the need for them.

The National Academias Press, 2001, 148 pages