By Emily Corner and Helen Taylor

Acts of extreme or mass violence perpetrated by lone offenders have become increasingly common in liberal democracies over the past 20 years. Some describe these acts as politically motivated, while others attribute them to mental disorder or criminal intent. This has led to the development of distinct research and practice areas focusing on either violent extremism, mass murder, fixation, stalking, or familial and intimate partner homicide. However, there is increasing understanding that the distinction between political ideology, criminal intent and personal motivation is blurred, and that the violence carried out by these individuals is better understood using the broader concept of grievance-fuelled violence. This work is the first to empirically consolidate the existing research in these distinct areas, employing a multifaceted analytical approach to develop a holistic model of the processes of grievance development among those who commit grievance-fuelled violence.

Research Report no. 27. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 2023. 95p.

By Timothy Cubitt and Heather Wolbers

Risk assessment for violent extremism plays a critical role in understanding the threat posed by radicalised offenders and determining how these individuals are managed both in correctional settings and in the community. The Australian Institute of Criminology (AIC) was engaged by the Department of Home Affairs’ Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Branch to conduct a review of the use of risk assessments for violent extremism in Australia.

The aim of this review was to:

• identify and describe violent extremism risk assessment tools currently available to support risk assessments of convicted terrorist offenders;

• assess each tool’s suitability to assist an expert to conduct an assessment of the risk to the community from an offender, when a court is considering whether to issue a control order under Division 104 or a post-sentence order under Division 105A of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Criminal Code); and

• review current risk assessment frameworks, including the use of Structured Professional Judgement, to assess the risk of violent extremist offending and consider how violent extremism risk assessment tools might be improved.

A review of relevant peer-reviewed and grey literature was undertaken alongside semi-structured interviews with a group of experts in violent extremism risk assessment. Findings from this review are organised according to the Terms of Reference.

Special reports. no 14. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 2023. 70p.

By Oluwole Ojewale, et al.

This report details the findings of the research study that examined the plausibility between terrorism and banditry towards shedding new light on the dynamics of the country’s security challenges especially in northwest and north central Nigeria, within the focal context of Kaduna, Katsina, Niger and Zamfara States. Nigeria faces a plethora of security challenges ranging from the Boko Haram religious/violent extremism cum insurgency in the northeast to farmer-herder conflict and banditry in the northcentral and northeast, a revived secessionist movement in the southeast, police repression, piracy, and more recently attacks the nexus between banditry and terrorism; highlight the strategies and actions required by various stakeholders at various levels to counter the spread of banditry and terrorism in these focal states. Predominantly, the report utilises both qualitative and descriptive methods, generated from primary and secondary data gotten through desk review, and a consolidation of findings with feedback from consultations with stakeholders in selected focal states. The report undertook qualitative research in the focal states, documenting the experiences of some critical stakeholders through key on security installations, among others. In spite of government efforts, the security situation in Nigeria is deteriorating. The report thus explores the question of whether banditry and terrorism are the alternate side of the same coin and the security and policy implications of conflating both. The purpose of this report is to ascertain informant interviews. These interviews were cluster-based to provide a better context to the literature and systemically present the experiences of stakeholders. The report finds that while banditry gravely endangers public safety and security in the focal states, there are contextual differences in the origin, evolution, and manifestations of banditry in the focal states. Understanding these local variations is important to deploying effective and sustainable solutions to this spectre of banditry that defines governance in the states. The report also notes that there is no discernible ideological persuasion underpinning banditry beyond theft, extortion, and wanton violence. Bandits are primarily motivated by the alluring prospects of wealth in a region blighted by poverty and poor socioeconomic outcomes. However, this does not exclude the fact that fundamentalist Islamist groups operate in the same space as bandits. There is the possibility that some bandit groups might have adopted more of a religious modus operandi on their initiative or through limited contact with extremist groups. While the report notes the dearth of studies investigating in detail the theoretical and functional nature of the relationship between banditry and terrorism in these four states, the preliminary evidence points to the existence of both environmental and operational convergence between bandits and Islamist fundamentalist groups in the focal states.

Africa: Goodluck Jonathan Foundation (GJF) 2021. 43p.

By Jessica Katzenstein

Six years after the germinal United States protests against anti-Black police violence in Ferguson, MO, and months after the 2020 police killings of George Floyd and Breonna Taylor, police in mine-resistant vehicles have once again occupied both the streets and mass public attention. In 2014, images from the Ferguson protests—of snipers pointing semi automatic rifles into crowds and officers tear-gassing unarmed civilians—prompted activists and politicians to compare the St. Louis suburb to occupied Gaza, Ukraine, or Iraq.2 During the summer of 2020, as the U.S. witnessed its largest public uprisings since the 1960s, police militarization again came under scrutiny. The Department of Homeland Security flew surveillance aircraft over protests in 15 cities, as officers on the ground deployed flash-bang grenades, sound cannons, rubber bullets, and tear gas against peaceful demonstrators.3 Since protests began, at least 14 local law enforcement agencies in 10 states have received free mine-resistant vehicles built for the U.S. military.4 In response, some lawmakers have revived efforts to curtail such transfers of military equipment.5 Reform groups are advocating to demilitarize the police by limiting when and how they can use armored vehicles and camouflage uniforms.6 In this moment of potential transformation, we must analyze both the deep roots and the recent upsurge of police “militarization” in order to grasp what calls for “demilitarizing” the police could mean. This paper argues that today’s high level of police militarization is one of the cruel, complex domestic costs of recent American wars abroad. Police militarization is in a sense as old as U.S. policing itself, yet it has exploded since September 11, 2001 and its intensification must be counted among the costs of this country’s post-9/11 wars.

Providence, RI: Brown University, Watson Institute, 2020. 20p.

By U.S. Government Accountability Office; 

  On January 6, 2021, thousands of demonstrators surrounded the U.S. Capitol Building. Demonstrators attacked and injured law enforcement officers and eventually breached the building. The Capitol Police is responsible for protecting the Congress, its Members, staff, visitors, and facilities. The Capitol Police Board oversees the Capitol Police. GAO was asked to review the Capitol Police’s physical security efforts for January 6. This report addresses the Capitol Police and the Board’s: (1) physical security planning for January 6; (2) response to that day’s events, including the procedures for obtaining outside assistance; and (3) process for assessing and mitigating physical security risks. GAO reviewed Capitol Police plans, procedures, hearing statements, timelines, and other documents related to the planning and response on January 6 and how the Capitol Police assesses security risks. GAO also interviewed officials from the Capitol Police Board, the Capitol Police, the Architect of the Capitol, and other federal, state, and local agencies. What GAO Recommends GAO is making four recommendations to the Capitol Police Board and the Capitol Police, including finalizing and documenting procedures for obtaining outside assistance in an emergency, addressing security risks, and considering security recommendations. The Capitol Police Board did not take a position on GAO’s recommendations. The Capitol Police agreed with GAO’s recommendations.  

Washington DC: GAO. 2022, 68pg

By Holger Anders

  This Briefing Paper looks at sources and pathways through which al-Qaeda- and Islamic State-linked extremists in Mali obtain their arms, ammunition, and explosives. This review includes an analysis of the materiel’s origins, types, and ages. The Briefing Paper presents the author’s assessment of some 800 arms and 12,000 ammunition casings that national and international authorities recovered and granted access to following extremist attacks in Mali from 2015 to 2022. Introduction -  By 2022, Mali had faced more than a decade of armed violence perpetrated by violent extremists. Since 2015, this violence has also spread from northern to central and southern parts of Mali, resulting in thousands of victims among national and international armed forces, UN peacekeepers, and civilians. This Briefing Paper investigates the arms, ammunition, explosives, and other material used by al-Qaeda- and IslamicState linked extremists (‘extremists’) as ‘tools of violence’ used in their attacks from 2015 to 2022. It provides an update on findings previously published by the Small Arms Survey concerning the proliferation and trafficking of illicit materiel in northern Mali prior to 2015. Specifically, this Briefing Paper focuses on military materiel legally produced and transferred by state actors before being diverted to extremist use in Mali.2 In so doing, the Briefing Paper examines three topics: 1. continuity in extremist procurement of their ‘tools of violence’; 2. changes in illicitly trafficked materiel and their sources; and 3. extremist network connections identified by the monitoring of this material. A confidential database maintained by the author provides the basis for the technical information concerning extremist-used arms and other material in this Briefing Paper.3 That database contains information about some 400 extremist attacks occurring across Mali between 2015 and 2022 from sites in which national and international authorities recovered extremist-used materiel that was made available for inspection by the author. The database also contains some 200 entries of extremist propaganda claims—documented in videos and texts on social media—relating to extremist attacks in Mali from 2012 to 2022. Interviewees included in this Briefing Paper are not uniformly identified for reasons of security and confidentiality. All information presented in graphs, illustrative maps, and tables is based on the author’s work and information contained within the database. The Briefing Paper first looks at security developments in Mali since 2015.5 It then looks at extremist-held armaments in Mali prior to 2015 and at continuity and change in these armaments after that. The discussion is supplemented with insights into network connections between extremist groups in Mali.6 Key findings Extremists continue to have access to arms and other materiel—including material of recent production— through capture from armed forces and illicit trafficking from the subregion. Libya remains a prominent source for illicitly trafficking military materiel to Mali; however, other sub-regional sources exist. These sources include components for commercial explosives used in improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in Mali. Established extremist groups use materiel to support the creation of new cells, which is a key mechanism in the spread of violent extremism in Mali.

Geneva, SWIT: Small Arms Survey. 2024, 16pg

By Bàrbara Molas, Anne Craanen, Sabrina Tripodi, Kacper Rękawek, andThomas Renard

Anti-Government Extremism (AGE) presents a complex and evolving security challenge, particularly in the transatlantic space. AGE is characterised by anti-system sentiments, and adherents propagate notions of an evil elite controlling societal mechanisms, adapting global conspiracy theories to local grievances. While predominantly non-violent, it harbours the potential for violence, posing a significant policy challenge. This report contributes a comprehensive exploration of AGE by utilising original data, including interviews with security officials and an exploration of AGE spaces online, focusing on Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United States. Through thematic comparative analysis, it unveils the nature of anti-government groups and individuals, elucidating their transnational linkages both online and offline. By shedding new light on AGE’s manifestations, severity, and responses across jurisdictions, this research illuminates whether AGE constitutes a standalone security concern. Furthermore, it offers insights into practical strategies for addressing AGE, especially in the context of existing policies for preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE). The recommendations provided are tailored to the differing characteristics of AGE groups, individuals, and networks, ensuring a nuanced and effective response to this emerging threat, both online and offline.

The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT). 2024, 48pg

By Ángel Gómez , Mercedes Martínez , Francois Alexi Martel , Lucía López-Rodríguez , Alexandra Vázquez , Juana Chinchilla , Borja Paredes , Mal Hettiarachchi , Nafees Hamid , and William B Swann 

We distinguish two pathways people may follow when they join violent groups: compliance and internalization. Compliance occurs when individuals are coerced to join by powerful influence agents. Internalization occurs when individuals join due to a perceived convergence between the self and the group. We searched for evidence of each of these pathways in field investigations of former members of two renowned terrorist organizations: the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) (Study 1) and Islamist radical groups (Study 2). Results indicated that ex-fighters joined LTTE for reasons associated with both compliance and internalization but that ex-fighters joined Islamist radical groups primarily for reasons associated with internalization. When compliance occurred, it often took the form of coercion within LTTE but involved charismatic persuasion agents within Islamist groups. This evidence of systematic differences in the reasons why fighters enter violent groups suggests that strategies for preventing radicalization and fostering de-radicalization should be tailored to particular groups.

Front Psychol. 2021 Jan 7

By Elie Cavigneaux

Defeating terrorism and saving art: fighting the same battle

In a world where chaos and political instability plague many countries in the Middle East and North Africa, a lesser-known crime has emerged: the trafficking of cultural goods. This phenomenon, often overshadowed by more prominent issues, poses a significant global threat. But why is the trafficking of art and antiquities so concerning?

1. Financing Terrorism: Cultural goods trafficking is not merely a trade—it’s a critical source of funding for terrorism. Security Council resolutions, UNESCO, the European Union, and financial investigation units have all documented this link. The self-proclaimed “Islamic State” even institutionalized this trade, issuing excavation permits and organizing the sale of stolen pieces to market countries.

2. Hidden Threats: Although these looted artifacts may not flood the markets immediately, history shows that they can resurface years later. Works looted by the Nazis during World War II, for instance, have reappeared after decades of concealment.

3. Beyond Terrorism: Yet, the interest in this analysis extends beyond terrorism financing. The resale of “blood antiquities” reveals another dimension: money laundering, fraud, and tax evasion. This criminal activity affects not only the antiques market but also the broader art market.

4. Investing for Tomorrow: To combat this multifaceted threat, we must invest in detecting and preventing crimes related to cultural and art objects. Whether in times of war or peace, our ability to safeguard culture and heritage depends on proactive measures.

Working Paper. Paris: Groupe d’études géopolitiques, 2021. 13p

MAY CONTAIN MARKUP

BY SAMUEL STOUFFER, LOUIS GUTTMAN, EDWARD SUCHMAN, PAUL LAZARSFELD, SHIRLEY STAR, and JOHN CLAUSEN

"The American Soldier Vol. 4: Measurement and Prediction" delves into the intricate world of military assessment and forecasting, offering readers a comprehensive look at the tools and techniques used to evaluate soldier performance and anticipate future outcomes. This volume provides valuable insights into the evolving landscape of warfare, where data-driven decisions play a crucial role in shaping strategies and outcomes. From advanced measurement technologies to predictive analytics, this book equips readers with the knowledge needed to understand and navigate the complexities of modern military operations. A must-read for anyone interested in the intersection of technology, strategy, and warfare."

PRINCETON, NJ. PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS. 1950. 772p.

MAY CONTAIN MARKUP

BY SAMUEL A. STOUFFER ,ARTHU R A. LUMSDAINE, MARION HARPER LUMSDAINE ,ROBIN M. WILLI AMS, Jr., M. BREWSTER SMITH, IRVING L. JANIS, SHIRL EY A. STAR , AND LEONARD S. COTTRELL , Jr.

"The American Soldier Vol. 2: Combat and Its Aftermath" delves into the harrowing experiences of American soldiers on the battlefield and the lasting impact of war on their lives. Through gripping narratives and reflective insights, this volume explores the challenges faced by soldiers during combat, as well as the physical, emotional, and psychological toll that continues long after the guns fall silent. With a blend of firsthand accounts and historical context, this book offers a poignant and unvarnished look at the reality of war and its profound effects on those who serve. "The American Soldier Vol. 2" is a compelling tribute to the courage, sacrifice, and resilience of the men and women who bear the burdens of conflict in defense of their country.

PRINCETON, NJ. PRINCETON UNIVERSTY PRESS. 1949. 664p.

MAY CONTAIN MARKUP

BY CARL I. HOVLAND, ARTHUR A. LUMSDAINE, AND FRED D. SHEFFIELD

In the third installment of the thrilling 'American Soldier' series, readers are plunged into a world where cutting-edge technology intersects with the moral complexities of warfare. In this gripping narrative, the protagonist grapples with the consequences of mass communication experiments conducted in the name of military advancement.

As the boundaries between ethics and progress blur, a riveting tale unfolds, exploring the power dynamics at play in the age of information warfare. Through a masterful blend of action and introspection, 'American Soldier Vol. 3: Experiments on Mass Communication' challenges readers to confront the fine line between innovation and exploitation in the pursuit of military supremacy.

With its pulse-pounding storyline and thought-provoking themes, this latest installment captivates audiences and cements the 'American Soldier' series as a must-read for fans of military fiction and techno-thrillers alike.

PRINCETON, NJ. PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS. 1949. 360p.

MAY CONTAIN MARKUP

By BY SAMUEL A. STOUFFER, EDWARD A. SUCHMAN, LELAND C. DEVINNEY, SHIRLEY A. STAR .ROBIN M. WILLIAMS, JR.

In this gripping volume, "The American Soldier: Vol.1 - Adjustment During Army Life", readers are taken on a poignant journey through the eyes of soldiers as they navigate the challenges and triumphs of military life. Through vivid storytelling and raw authenticity, this book offers a unique glimpse into the experiences of those who serve their country. From the highs of camaraderie to the lows of homesickness, this collection of stories captures the resilience and adaptability of the American soldier. Whether you have a personal connection to the military or simply seek to understand the sacrifices made by these brave individuals, this book is sure to resonate with readers from all walks of life.

PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY. PRINCETON, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS. 1949. 614p.

MAY CONTAIN MARKUP

RAYMOND M. MOMBOISSE

In a world where tensions are high and divisions run deep, the specter of riots, revolts, and insurrections looms large. From the streets of bustling cities to the quiet corners of rural towns, unrest simmers just beneath the surface, ready to erupt at any moment. These acts of defiance and resistance are often fueled by a sense of injustice, inequality, or oppression, driving ordinary people to extraordinary measures in pursuit of change. As we navigate these turbulent times, the echoes of past uprisings serve as a stark reminder of the power of the people to challenge the status quo and demand a better future. RIOTS, REVOLTS AND INSURRECTIONS explores the complex dynamics of social unrest and the enduring quest for justice in a rapidly evolving world.

CHARLES C. THOMAS . Springfield, Illinois. 1967. 530p.

MAY CONTAIN MARKUP

Julia Boya & Angelika Patel

Hidden deep in the Bavarian mountains lies the picturesque village of Oberstdorf—a place where for hundreds of years people lived simple lives while history was made elsewhere. Yet even this remote idyll could not escape the brutal iron grip of the Nazi regime.

From the author of the international bestseller Travelers in the Third Reich comes A Village in the Third Reich, shining a light on the lives of ordinary people. Drawing on personal archives, letters, interviews and memoirs, it lays bare their brutality and love; courage and weakness; action, apathy and grief; hope, pain, joy, and despair.

Within its pages we encounter people from all walks of life – foresters, priests, farmers and nuns; innkeepers, Nazi officials, veterans and party members; village councillors, mountaineers, socialists, slave labourers, schoolchildren, tourists and aristocrats. We meet the Jews who survived – and those who didn’t; the Nazi mayor who tried to shield those persecuted by the regime; and a blind boy whose life was judged "not worth living."

This is a tale of conflicting loyalties and desires, of shattered dreams—but one in which, ultimately, human resilience triumphs. These are the stories of ordinary lives at the crossroads of history.

London. Elliott and Thompson. 2022. 420p.

By Anti-Defamation League

Every year, individuals with ties to different extreme causes and movements kill people in the United States; the ADL Center on Extremism (COE) tracks these murders. Extremists regularly commit murders in the service of their ideology, to further a group or gang they may belong to, or even while engaging in traditional, non-ideological criminal activities. In 2023, domestic extremists killed at least 17 people in the U.S., in seven separate incidents. This represents a sharp decrease from the 27 extremist-related murders ADL has documented for 2022—which itself was a decrease from the 35 identified in 2021. It continues a trend of fewer extremist-related killings after a five-year span of 47-79 extremist-related murders per year (2015- 2019). One reason for the trend is the decrease in recent years of extremist-related killings by domestic Islamist extremists and left-wing extremists. The 2023 murder totals include two extremist-related shootings sprees, both by white supremacists, which together accounted for 11 of the 17 deaths. A third shooting spree, also by an apparent white supremacist, wounded several people but luckily did not result in fatalities. All the extremist-related murders in 2023 were committed by right-wing extremists of various kinds, with 15 of the 17 killings involving perpetrators or accomplices with white supremacist connections. This is the second year in a row that right-wing extremists have been connected to all identified extremist-related killings. Two of the incidents from 2023 involved women playing some role in the killing or its aftermath. This report includes a special section that examines the role played by women in deadly extremist violence in the United States by analyzing 50 incidents from the past 20 years in which women were involved in some fashion in extremist-related killings. Murder & Extremism in the United States in 2023

New York: Anti-Defamation League, 2024. 36p.

Elizabeth Pearson, Joe Whittaker, Till Baaken, Sara Zeiger, Farangiz Atamuradova, and Maura Conway

“This report presents findings from the REASSURE (Researcher, Security, Safety, and Resilience) project’s in-depth interviews with 39 online extremism and terrorism researchers. Based at universities, research institutes, and think tanks in Europe and North America, the interviewees studied mainly, albeit not exclusively, far-right and violent jihadist online activity. The report catalogues for the first time the range of harms they have experienced, the lack of formalised systems of care or training, and their reliance therefore on informal support networks to mitigate those harms.”

Vox Pol. REASSURE. 2023. 138p

By Caroline Logan, Randy Borum, and Paul Gill

Violent extremism has galvanized public fear and attention. Driven by their concerns, the public has pushed for law enforcement and mental health systems to prevent attacks rather than just respond to them after they occur. The prevention process requires guidance for practitioners and policymakers on how best to identify people who may be at risk, to understand and assess the nature and function of the harm they may cause, and to manage them to mitigate or prevent harm. Violent Extremism provides such guidance.

Over 10 chapters, prepared by leading experts, this handbook illuminates the nature of violent extremism and the evolution of prevention-driven practice. Authors draw on the literature and their experience to explain which factors might increase (risk factors) or decrease (protective factors) risk, how those factors might operate, and how practitioners can prepare risk formulations and scenario plans that inform risk management strategies to prevent violent extremist harm.

Each chapter is crafted to support thoughtful, evidence-based practice that is transparent, accountable and ultimately defensible. Written for an international audience, the volume will be of interest to law enforcement and mental health professionals, criminal justice and security personnel, as well as criminologists, policymakers and researchers.

London, UCL Press. 2023, 319pg

By Michelle Sydes, Lorelei Hine, Angela Higginson, James McEwan, Laura Dugan, Lorraine Mazerolle

Background: Criminal justice agencies are well positioned to help prevent the radicalisation of individuals and groups, stop those radicalised from engaging in violence, and reduce the likelihood of terrorist attacks. This Evidence and Gap Map

(EGM) presents the existing evidence and gaps in the evaluation research. Objectives: To identify the existing evidence that considers the effectiveness of criminal justice interventions in preventing radicalisation, violent extremism and terrorism.

Search Methods: We conducted a comprehensive search of the academic and grey literature to locate relevant studies for the EGM. Our search locations included the Global Policing Database (GPD), eight electronic platforms encompassing over 20 academic databases, five trial registries and over 30 government and nongovernment websites. The systematic search was carried out between 8 June 2022 and 1 August 2022.

Selection Criteria: We captured criminal justice interventions published between January 2002 and December 2021 that aimed to prevent radicalisation, violent extremism, and/or terrorism. Criminal justice agencies were broadly defined to include police, courts, and corrections (both custodial and community). Eligible populations included criminal justice practitioners, places, communities or family members, victims, or individuals/groups who are radicalised or at risk of becoming radicalised. Our map includes systematic reviews, randomised controlled trials, and strong quasi‐experimental studies. We placed no limits on study outcomes, language, or geographic location.

Data Collection and Analysis: Our screening approach differed slightly for the different sources, but all documents were assessed in the systematic review software program DistillerSR on the same final eligibility criteria. Once included, we extracted information from studies using a standardised form that allowed us to collect key data for our EGM. Eligible systematic reviews were assessed for risk of bias using the AMSTAR 2 critical appraisal tool.

United States, Campbell Collaboration. 2023, 53pg

By Lorenzo Vidino, Jon Lewis, and Andrew Mines

Dollars for Daesh analyzes both the tactics ISIS supporters in the U.S. used to raise and move funds, as well as the various types of networks from which individuals drew financial support. The authors drew on thousands of pages of court documents covering criminal proceedings dating from 2013 to the end of August 2020. 

Overall, the report shows that U.S.-based ISIS supporters left a small and unsophisticated financial footprint, with a few notable exceptions. Furthermore, individuals tended to operate as lone financial actors or in small clusters, which has mitigated the effectiveness of counter-terrorism financing policies and tools that have successfully targeted the larger and more sophisticated financing mechanisms of groups like Al-Qaeda, Hezbollah, and Hamas. The low-level and largely inconspicuous nature of these actors will likely pose a unique challenge to law enforcement efforts going forward. This report is part of a new Program on Extremism stream of research into terrorism financing, which aims to assess and explore these trends across a range of various extremist groups and ideologies.

Washington, DC: George Washington University, Program on Extremism, 2020. 48p.