Edited by Julia M. Eckert

This book addresses two developments in the conceptualisation of citizenship that arise from the »war on terror«, namely the re-culturalisation of membership in a polity and the re-moralisation of access to rights. Taking an anthropological perspective, it traces the ways in which the trans-nationalisation of the »war on terror« has affected notions of »the dangerous other« in different political and social contexts, asking what changes in the ideas of the state and of the nation have been promoted by the emerging culture of security, and how these changes affect practices of citizenship and societal group relations.

\Bielefeld, Transcript Verlag, 2008. 197p.

By Bailey K. Roberts, Colleen P. Nofi, Emma Cornell, Sandeep Kapoor, MD, MS-HPPL,b,c,d,e Laura Harrison, MPH,c,d Chethan Sathya

BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES: In 2020, firearm injuries became the leading cause of death among US abstract children and adolescents. This study aimed to evaluate new 2021 data on US pediatric firearm deaths and disparities to understand trends compared with previous years. METHODS: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Wide-ranging Online Data for Epidemiologic Research was queried for firearm mortalities in children/adolescents from 2018 to 2021. Absolute mortality, death rates, and characteristics were reported. Death rates were defined per 100 000 persons in that population per year. Death rates across states were illustrated via geographic heat maps, and correlations with state poverty levels were calculated. RESULTS: In 2021, firearms continued to be the leading cause of death among US children. From 2018 to 2021, there was a 41.6% increase in the firearm death rate. In 2021, among children who died by firearms, 84.8% were male, 49.9% were Black, 82.6% were aged 15 to 19 years, and 64.3% died by homicide. Black children accounted for 67.3% of firearm homicides, with a death rate increase of 1.8 from 2020 to 2021. White children accounted for 78.4% of firearm suicides. From 2020 to 2021, the suicide rate increased among Black and white children, yet decreased among American Indian or Alaskan Native children. Geographically, there were worsening clusters of firearm death rates in Southern states and increasing rates in Midwestern states from 2018 to 2021. Across the United States, higher poverty levels correlated with higher firearm death rates (R 5 0.76, P < .001).

Pediatrics, August 21, 2023.

By Sarah Watson

Mass sho are otingsone example of a focusing event that has particular significance for firearms legislation. Mass shootings shock, disturb and provoke enormous and controversial debate, often causing significant public and media resonance, becoming the subject of intense discussion politically. At times providing an impetus for legislative amendments, often in distinct ways that routine gun violence does not. If certain events highlight the need for reform, policy change becomes more likely. Cases with the lowest number of victims are likely to generate the least amount of attention and are most likely to be missed in data collection, rendering them the least noteworthy, least important in terms of lethality and social and political consequence. Various problems come to the attention of people in and around government, necessitating an understanding of why such problems occupy officials’ attention and appear to be more ‘deserved>

Criminology & Criminal JusticeOnlineFirst, July 19, 2022

By Michael D. Makowsky and Patrick L. Warren

We assess firearms as a means of Black self-defense in the Jim Crow South. We infer firearm access by race and place by measuring the fraction of suicides committed with a firearm. Corroborating anecdotal accounts and historical claims, state bans on pistols and increases in White law enforcement personnel served as mechanisms to disarm the Black community, while having no comparable effect on White firearms. The interaction of these mechanisms with changing national market prices for firearms provides us with a credible identification strategy for Black firearm access. Rates of Black lynching decreased with greater Black firearm access.

Prepublication paper, 2022. 35p

Edited by Gian Ege, Christian Schwarzenegger and Monika Stempkowski

Trafficking in arms and weapons material is, perhaps, one of the most notorious forms of organised crime. Fuelled by both the movie industry as well as real world examples, criminal organisations are widely believed to engage in the trafficking of firearms and weapons material, including nuclear material. This illicit trade is further facilitated by corruption and other forms of collusion with government entities as well as by links between the criminal elements and the arms industry. As part of a joint teaching programme on transnational organised crime, students from the Universities of Queensland, Vienna and Zurich researched the topic of arms trafficking in a year-long course. Some of their academic papers are compiled in this volume, addressing topics ranging from international and national legal frameworks to levels and characteristics of this phenomenon in selected places, and enforcement and industry measures adopted to prevent and suppress this illicit trade.

Berllin: Carl Grossman Verlag, 2022. 300p.

By Elise White, Basaime Spate, Javonte Alexander, and Rachel Swaner

In 2020, while the world was wrestling with how to keep safe from a new contagious respiratory virus, many young, urban Americans were navigating how best to protect themselves from another public health crisis: a steep increase in gun violence. Long before these dual pandemics came to dominate media coverage, researchers at the Center for Justice Innovation [the Center] had been grappling with understanding gun violence in cities around the country: Why are young people carrying and using guns? What factors—social and structural—are creating and impacting gun culture? What cultural strategies do youth develop in response to gun culture, and how can those strategies be leveraged to stem the violence? To answer these questions and build on the Center’s previous study of New York City youth gun carrying (Swaner et al. 2020), the Center received funding from the National Collaborative on Gun Violence Research to conduct an exploratory, participatory action research study of the socio-cultural roots of gun violence in four cities (Brooklyn, NY; Wilmington, DE; Philadelphia, PA; Detroit, MI) that will each produce site-specific findings. This report focuses on the findings from the Brooklyn, NY site, where we conducted interviews with 103 youth ages 15-24 who had carried a gun in the previous year. Data were collected between February 27, 2020, and March 30, 2021.

New York: Center for Justice Innovation , 2023. 72p.

By Ariel Bogle

As mainstream social media companies have increased their scrutiny and moderation of right-wing extremist (RWE) content and groups,1 there’s been a move to alternative online content platforms.2 There’s also growing concern about right-wing extremism in Australia,3 and about how this shift has diversified the mechanisms used to fundraise by RWE entities.4 This phenomenon isn’t well understood in Australia, despite the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) advising in March 2021 that ‘ideological extremism’5 now makes up around 40% of its priority counterterrorism caseload.6 Research by ASPI’s International Cyber Policy Centre (ICPC) has found that nine Australian Telegram channels7 that share RWE content used at least 22 different funding platforms, including online monetisation tools and cryptocurrencies, to solicit, process and earn funds between 1 January 2021 and 15 July 2021. Due to the opaque nature of many online financial platforms, it’s difficult to obtain a complete picture of online fundraising, so this sample is necessarily limited. However, in this report we aim to provide a preliminary map of the online financial platforms and services that may both support and incentivise an RWE content ecosystem in Australia. Most funding platforms found in our sample have policies that explicitly prohibit the use of their services for hate speech, but we found that those policies were often unclear and not uniformly enforced. Of course, there’s debate about how to balance civil liberties with the risks posed by online communities that promote RWE ideology (and much of that activity isn’t illegal), but a better understanding of online funding mechanisms is necessary, given the growing concern about the role online propaganda may play in inspiring acts of violence8 as well as the risk that, like other social divisions, such channels and movements could be exploited by adversaries.9 The fundraising facilitated by these platforms not only has the potential to grow the resources of groups and individuals linked to right-wing extremism, but it’s also likely to be a means of building the RWE community both within Australia and with overseas groups and a vector for spreading RWE propaganda through the engagement inherent in fundraising efforts. The funding platforms mirror those used by RWE figures overseas, and funding requests were boosted by foreign actors, continuing Australian RWEs’ history of ‘meaningful international exchange’ with overseas counterparts.

Barton, ACT: The Australian Strategic Policy Institute Limited, International Cyber Policy Centre 2021.36p.

By Kathryn M. Roberts

Countering the radical Islamist narrative remains a high-profile priority of the United States in its ongoing efforts to counter domestic violent extremism. Since mid-2014, government officials have condemned the United States as unable to muster a satisfactory counter-narrative, and emphasize the potentially devastating consequences of failure. Experts inside and outside the government describe the Islamic State as masters of the internet capable of reaching into the United States and turning its people into hate-filled, violently inspired terrorists at will. The idea that the United States must aggressively work to counter these messages domestically remains a given but should it The focus of this thesis is to examine current U.S. efforts in counter-messaging to determine why the United States believes it is failing, and what, if any, evidence supports the idea that a counter-narrative or counter-messaging should be part of domestic countering violent extremism CVE programs. Review of official documents found little basis to assess U.S. programs, as no meaningful published strategy, objectives, or performance data exist for current efforts. Moreover, the foundational assumptions underlying current programs suggest malalignment between what U.S. officials desire a counter-messaging effort to accomplish and what is realistically achievable. Based on these findings, it is recommended that domestic CVE programs eliminate counter-messaging from their portfolio.

Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2020. 119p,

By Riza Kumar

Protracted insurgencies and the growing threat by local affiliates of the global terrorism networks of al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (ISIS) throughout Nigeria, Somalia, and Burkina Faso have transformed on-the-ground responses to violent extremism throughout Sub-Saharan Africa. Somalia continues to grapple with the unrelenting force of the al-Qaeda affiliated al-Shabaab; Burkina Faso contends with al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM), ISIS in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), and Ansarul Islam; and Nigeria remains encumbered by Boko Haram’s 14-year insurgency and the increasingly violent Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP). As serious and sustained militant and terrorist movements continue to kill thousands and displace millions, the three respective governments have altered their responses to violent extremists and terrorism, integrating civilian-led, community-based security strategies into their national counterterrorism programs. National armies and their international partners have offered some reprieve from enduring violent conflicts, but in many cases have failed to offer comprehensive protections to all civilians. Civilian counterterrorism militias emerged to provide security to vulnerable communities and were quickly recognized as an alternative to state-sponsored counterinsurgency campaigns. However, once these counterterrorism militias were enlisted and absorbed into the national security apparatus, new—albeit long-established—challenges quickly emerged. Localized counterterrorism campaigns have at times devolved into vengeful operations against ethnic rivals as well as opportunities to carry out illicit activities such as extortion, drug trafficking, and looting. The benefits and drawbacks of civilian counterterrorism militias remain consistent across different regions. The strategy is cost-effective and practical as civilian defense forces are often cheaper than formal security units, such as the national army and the police. There is a ready pool of potential local recruits to safeguard vulnerable communities, and they are knowledgeable about the communities they protect. Most importantly, civilian troops establish a level of community loyalty that can be difficult to achieve with national armies. Significant drawbacks of civilian forces are that troops can become unreliable and difficult to control if not properly managed. Furthermore, without strong and effective oversight mechanisms, civilian troops are capable of undermining government authority, rule of law, and governance. Unfortunately, if not carefully executed, civilian forces could deteriorate into armed criminal networks,1 transforming from vanguards of safety into long-term sources of instability and insecurity.

Berlin: Counter Extremism Project, 2023. 24p.

By Anna Kruglova

This policy brief analyses the phenomenon of conspiracy theories, and how they fit in the realm of research on violent extremism. Using the case study of QAnon, this Policy Brief looks at how the movement mobilises people to violence on social media and attempts to determine how different this process is from any other process of radicalisation to violence. By combining discourse analysis of the movement’s Gab posts, interviewing former supporters, and analysing three illustrative case studies, this Policy Brief identifies five discourses - such as revenge, “the Other”, chosenness/ specialness, apocalypse, and urgency for action and altruism - that are used to bring people into the violent mindset. It emphasises the similarity of these discourses to the ones used by other extremist organisations and argues against exceptionalising the threat of QAnon and other conspiracy theories. It concludes by making recommendations about how to tackle QAnon propaganda.

The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT) , 2023. 22p.

By Theo Clement | Hans-Jakob Schindler

The nexus between terrorist and transnational organized crime (TOC) networks in West Africa presents one of the most significant security challenges. Both networks undermine governance and the rule of law and cooperate on a multitude of levels in a complex web of mutual beneficial arrangements. Therefore, this nexus presents a mutually enforcing mechanism that supports and accelerates regional destabilization. This paper argues that the risks emanating from this cooperation are not limited to terrorism financing alone as terrorist groups also use their cooperation with TOC networks to gain access to resources needed for their activities, such as arms and ammunition. Finally, such cooperation also allows terrorist groups to carve out spaces that allow them to control the local population while at the same time provide security for local licit and illicit economic activities. Therefore, this cooperation is in some cases also a tool through which terrorist groups can gain support and acceptance among the local population. Therefore, tackling this nexus must involve both the regaining of territorial control from terrorist groups by the respective governments as well as the strengthening of governance structures. Both aims should also be attempted concurrently. This paper presents a range of recommendations for German and European decision-makers that primarily aim to disrupt the entry as well as exit points of the flows of illicit goods of the region. Given the current challenges European and German projects face when cooperating with some of the governments in the region, an emphasis on increasing regional cooperation in West Africa seems advisable. In particular, the paper suggests strengthening national and regional law enforcement and border control capabilities, especially within the coastal states of the Gulf of Guinea. Increased cooperation with the Intergovernmental Action Group Against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA), increased support to strengthen the management and control mechanisms for national parks, and intensified exchange mechanisms, such as the West Africa Police Chief Committee (WAPCC) of Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), could be contemplated. In addition, German and European decision-makers could encourage and support governments in the region in their efforts to intensify the use of existing regional mechanisms such as the ECOWAS sanctions mechanism, as well as increase the participation of regional states in the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)-World Customs Organization (WCO) Container Control Program and INTERPOL’s West African Police Information System (WAPIS) as possible priorities.

Berlin: Counter Extremism Project Germany GmbH ,2023. 16p

By Dele-Adedeji | Sofia Koller

This policy paper summarizes the current state of affairs regarding the linkages of terrorist groups in West Africa with terrorist networks in other African regions. It also provides recommendations for policymakers and security agencies. The paper looks at linkages of JNIM, IS West Africa Province (ISWAP), and IS in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) with terrorist groups in North, West-Central, Eastern, and Southern Africa. In West Africa, ISWAP’s activities have been regionally confined to Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon. There is no indication that ISWAP intends to expand its territorial base beyond these countries or that it has any transregional linkage with terrorist groups in other parts of Africa. JNIM and ISGS have demonstrated that they possess the intention and capability of regional expansion across West Africa. Increasing attacks further southwards in West Africa and their presence in the neighboring regions of Ivory Coast, Ghana, Togo, and Benin suggests that both groups intend to expand their geographical zone of influence to the Gulf of Guinea. There is, however, no indication of either JNIM or ISGS forming a transregional linkage with terrorist groups in other African sub-regions. ● In North, West-Central, East, and Southern Africa, there are also currently no indications that terrorist groups have developed linkages with other terrorist networks beyond their own region. ● Terrorist groups in West Africa are pragmatic in their approach to collaborations. Their choice of network linkages is guided by local dynamics and their own particular agenda rather than ideology. Hence, existing linkages are driven by the involvement in transnational organized crime (TNCO), potential financial gains as well as the potential of financing terrorism via local and international sources, training of fighters, foreign terrorist fighters from other African countries, and weapons smuggling and use of small arms and light weapons (SALWs).

Berlin: Counter Extremism Project Germany GmbH ,2023. 16p.

By Anders Strindberg

This report provides an overview of Social Identity Theory (SIT) and its utility as an integrative framework for the qualitative study of terrorism and violent extremism. SIT is a sociological theory for understanding the effects of social identification on group membership, group behaviour, and intergroup relations. It was designed specifically for the study of intergroup conflict, but scholars have developed a comprehensive analytical apparatus for improving our understanding of multiple aspects both of inter- and intragroup relations and conflict. SIT can serve as scaffolding for organizing our knowledge about terrorism and violent extremism, but also as a foundation for new analytical tools and structures. Following a preface, chapter one demonstrates the need for an integrative analytical framework in the qualitative study of terrorism and violent extremism. Chapter two discusses why SIT is suitable as such a framework, and also the main criticisms against it. Chapters four through seven examine the basic hypotheses and implications of SIT and each chapter identifies some to the key implications for the study of terrorism and violent extremism. Chapter eight outlines a particularly influential SIT-derived structure for organizing analysis of terrorism – Fathali Moghaddam’s “staircase to terrorism” – and chapter nine provides a brief summary and conclusion.

Sweden: Swedish Defence Research Agency, 2020. 80p.

By James D. Wright, Peter H. Rossi, Kathleen Daly with the assistance of Eleanor Weber-Burdin

FRON THE JACKET: “The United States is one of the most heavily armed private populations in world history; one-half the households in the country possess at least one firearm, and the total number of firearms in private hands is well over 100 million. The rates of criminal violence in the United States are among the highest in the world. What, if anything, is the relationship between these facts? UNDER THE GUN provides -for the first time a comprehensive review and analysis of both the published and the unpublished literature on weapons, crime, and violence in the U.S.

Each chapter explores the issues and trends which have been widely debated over the years. Some of the topics covered include: the number of guns in private hands, recent upward trends in firearms sales, demographic characteristics of gun owners, uses of guns in self-defense, patterns of violent crimes committed in the U.S., characteristics of weapons used in crimes, public opinion on gun control issues, and the effectiveness of gun control laws.”

"Wright/Rossi/Daly bring balanced judgment, the best data available, and careful analysis to each issue. They outline an agenda for research which is sensi ble and critical to the matters at hand. The book is more than 'state of the art.' It separates data from inference, logic from value-based argument, and identifies the sorts of issues which cannot be settled by empirical inquiry..” — James Short.

NY. Aldine Publishing Company. 1983. 350p.

By Konaev, Margarita; Fedasiuk, Ryan; Corrigan, Jack; Lu, Ellen; Stephenson, Alex; Toner, Helen; Gelles, Rebecca.

From the webpage: "This data brief uses procurement records published by the U.S. Department of Defense and China's People's Liberation Army between April and November of 2020 to assess, and, where appropriate, compare what each military is buying when it comes to artificial intelligence. We find that the two militaries are prioritizing similar application areas, especially intelligent and autonomous vehicles and AI applications for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance."

Georgetown University. Walsh School Of Foreign Service. Center For Security And Emerging Technology. 2023.

By Jonathan Jay • Luke W. Miratrix • Charles C. Branas • Marc A. Zimmerman • David Hemenway

Although multiple interventions to remediate physical blight have been found to reduce urban firearm violence, there is limited evidence for demolishing vacant buildings as a violence reduction strategy. Starting in 2014, Detroit, MI launched a large-scale program that demolished over 10,000 buildings in its first 3 years. We analyzed the pre-post effects of this program on fatal and nonfatal firearm assaults and illegal drug violations at the U.S. Census block group level, using propensity score matching and negative binomial regression. Receiving over 5 demolitions was associated with a 11% reduction in firearm assaults, relative to comparable control locations, 95% CI [7%, 15%], p = 0.01. The program was associated with larger reductions in firearm assaults for the locations receiving moderate numbers of demolitions (between 6 and 12) than for locations receiving high numbers of demolitions (13 and over). No effects were observed for illegal drug violations and no evidence of spatial crime displacement was detected. These findings suggest that vacant building demolitions may affect gun violence.

J Behav Med (2019) 42:626–634

By Rose Kagawa , Benjamin Calnin , Colette Smirniotis , Magdalena Cerdá , Garen Wintemute , Kara E Rudolph

Former industrial cities facing economic challenges and depopulation often experience high levels of firearm and other forms of violence. Within these cities, violent crime often clusters in neighborhoods affected by high levels of vacant and abandoned housing. This study estimates the effects of building demolition in Detroit, Michigan on the subsequent risk of violent crime using property-level data and longitudinal targeted maximum likelihood estimation. The primary outcome is violent Crime Index crimes (homicide, rape, robbery and aggravated assault). We estimate effects for this category of crimes as a whole and for the subset involving firearms. Drug and other lower-level crimes are included as secondary outcomes. We compare the risk of experiencing each crime type following building demolition in Census blocks and block groups to an estimate of the risk had there been no demolition in the 1-3 quarters prior in 2017. There were >2600 total demolitions in about 1700 blocks in 2017 in Detroit. Nearly all demolished buildings were sourced from tax foreclosures. Estimates suggest the risk for all crime types tested would have been statistically indistinguishable from the observed crime risk had demolitions in the prior 1-3 quarters of 2017 not occurred. Our results run counter to most previous research on this topic, which tends to show a protective effect of demolition on violent crime. Understanding why our results differ may provide important insights into the types of demolition programs with the greatest potential to reduce violent crime.

Prev Med. 2022 Dec;165(Pt A):107257.

By John MacDonald , George Mohler , P Jeffrey Brantingham

Gun violence rates increased in U.S. cities in 2020 and into 2021. Gun violence rates in U.S. cities is typically concentrated in racially segregated neighborhoods with higher poverty levels. However, poverty levels and demographics alone do not explain the high concentration of violence or its relative change over time. In this paper, we examine the extent to which the increase in shooting victimization in Philadelphia, New York, and Los Angeles during the 2020-2021 pandemic was concentrated in gun violence hot spots, and how the increase impacted race and ethnic disparities in shooting victimization rates. We find that 36% (Philadelphia), 47% (New York), and 55% (Los Angeles) of the increase in shootings observed during the period 2020-2021 occurred in the top decile of census block groups, by aggregate number of shootings, and that the race/ethnicity of victims in these gun violence hot spots were disproportionately Black and Hispanic. We discuss the implications of these findings as they relate to racial disparities in victimization and place-based efforts to reduce gun violence.

Prev Med 2022 Dec;165(Pt A):107241.

By Julia P. Schleimer, Christopher D. McCort, Aaron B. Shev, Veronica A. Pear, Elizabeth Tomsich, Alaina De Biasi, Shani Buggs, Hannah S. Laqueur & Garen J. Wintemute

Background: Firearm violence is a significant public health problem in the United States. A surge in firearm purchasing following the onset of the coronavirus pandemic may have contributed to an increase in firearm violence. We sought to estimate the state-level association between firearm purchasing and interpersonal firearm violence during the pandemic. Methods: Cross-sectional study of the 48 contiguous states and the District of Columbia from January 2018 through July 2020. Data were obtained from the National Instant Criminal Background Check System (a proxy for firearm purchasing) and the Gun Violence Archive. Using negative binomial regression models, we estimated the association between cumulative excess firearm purchases in March through July 2020 (measured as the difference between observed rates and those expected from autoregressive integrated moving average models) and injuries (including nonfatal and fatal) from intentional, interpersonal firearm violence (non-domestic and domestic violence). Results: We estimated that there were 4.3 million excess firearm purchases nationally from March through July 2020 and a total of 4075 more firearm injuries than expected from April through July. We found no relationship between state-level excess purchasing and non-domestic firearm violence, e.g., each excess purchase per 100 population was associated with a rate ratio (RR) of firearm injury from non-domestic violence of 0.76 (95% CI: 0.50– 1.02) in April; 0.99 (95% CI: 0.72–1.25) in May; 1.10 (95% CI: 0.93–1.32) in June; and 0.98 (95% CI: 0.85–1.12) in July. Excess firearm purchasing within states was associated with an increase in firearm injuries from domestic violence in April (RR: 2.60; 95% CI: 1.32–5.93) and May (RR: 1.79; 95% CI: 1.19–2.91), though estimates were sensitive to model specification. Conclusions: Nationwide, firearm purchasing and firearm violence increased substantially during the first months of the coronavirus pandemic. At the state level, the magnitude of the increase in purchasing was not associated with the magnitude of the increase in firearm violence. Increases in purchasing may have contributed to additional firearm injuries from domestic violence in April and May. Results suggest much of the rise in firearm violence during our study period was attributable to other factors, indicating a need for additional research.

Injury Epidemiology (2021) 8:43

By Emily A. Wang, C Riley, G Wood, A Greene, N Horton, M Williams, P Violano, RM Brase, et al.

Introduction The USA has the highest rate of community gun violence of any developed democracy. There is an urgent need to develop feasible, scalable and community-led interventions that mitigate incident gun violence and its associated health impacts. Our community-academic research team received National Institutes of Health funding to design a community-led intervention that mitigates the health impacts of living in communities with high rates of gun violence. Methods and analysis We adapted ‘Building Resilience to Disasters’, a conceptual framework for natural disaster preparedness, to guide actions of multiple sectors and the broader community to respond to the man-made disaster of gun violence. Using this framework, we will identify existing community assets to be building blocks of future community-led interventions. To identify existing community assets, we will conduct social network and spatial analyses of the gun violence episodes in our community and use these analyses to identify people and neighbourhood blocks that have been successful in avoiding gun violence. We will conduct qualitative interviews among a sample of individuals in the network that have avoided violence (n=45) and those living or working on blocks that have not been a location of victimisation (n=45) to identify existing assets. Lastly, we will use community-based system dynamics modelling processes to create a computer simulation of the community-level contributors and mitigators of the effects of gun violence that incorporates local population-based based data for calibration. We will engage a multistakeholder group and use themes from the qualitative interviews and the computer si

BMJ Open 2020;10:e040277