UNITED STATES. WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

From the document: "Over the last 3 years, we have more than doubled our global health partnerships--working directly with 50 countries to ensure they can more effectively prevent, detect, and control outbreaks. And we are working with partners to support an additional 50 countries to save even more lives and minimize economic losses. With strong bipartisan support from Congress, we also championed the creation of the Pandemic Fund, a new international body that has already catalyzed $2 billion in financing from 27 contributors, including countries, foundations, and philanthropies, to build stronger global health security capabilities. We are working to make life-saving medicines and vaccines more rapidly available in health emergencies, including through supporting Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance and the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations. And we are leading efforts to ensure international financial institutions, such as the World Bank Group, scale up lending for pandemic prevention, preparedness, and response because health security, economic security, climate security, and national security are all related. This new Global Health Security Strategy lays out the actions the United States will take over the next 5 years to ensure we continue this progress[.]"

United States. White House Office. APR, 2024. 64p.

UNITED STATES. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

From the document: "Protecting our nation requires timely responses to rapidly evolving dangers while protecting against longer-term homeland security threats and hazards. To meet these complex operational needs, innovation, research and development (IRD) initiatives and investments are critical to ensure the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has the tools to help secure our nation. [...] While historically DHS has supported research and development (R&D), investments in innovation are newer and growing in scope and number across all DHS Components, whether through technological improvements or process efficiencies. The combination of these innovation and R&D investments will benefit from increased awareness and coordination. The Secretary's Calendar Year (CY) 2023 priorities captured this, seeking to 'ensure R&D across the Department and with external partners are coordinated and integrated.' To accomplish this goal, this coordinated DHS IRD Strategic Plan focuses on current efforts and longer-term Departmental investments. The Plan also highlights complementary efforts underway across the HSE [homeland security enterprise], consisting of federal, state, local, tribal, territorial, nongovernmental, and private sector entities, as well as individuals, families, and communities who share a common national interest in the safety and security of the United States and its people. The Plan inventories current and future IRD efforts within DHS, organized by the DHS Missions and Objectives as articulated in the third 'Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (2023).' By capturing these initiatives in a comprehensive plan, the Department can identify cross-cutting IRD themes that provide opportunities for making impacts towards meeting multiple desired outcomes. These are articulated as Strategic Priority Research Areas (SPRAs)[.]"

UNITED STATES. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY. MAY, 2024. 44p.

By M.L. Mathews, Philip B. Heymann, andA.S. Mathews

“Policing the Conflict in South Africa”edited by M.L. Mathews, Philip B. Heymann, and A.S. Mathews. discusses the reform of policing in South Africa, including the structure, membership, and control of the police, as well as popular perceptions of policing among blacks in South Africa. The document also mentions protests and police misconduct in South Africa.

Cambridge University Press, 2008, 226 pages

GUNARATNA, ROHAN

From the document: "In 2024, the Israel-Hamas conflict will emerge as the preeminent threat to global security. An escalation of the conflict could spark a regional war and lead to a global recession. The West's support for Israel will fuel protests in the Muslim world, drive radicalisation and bring about terrorist attacks. Sunni and Shia groups will pose a common threat to western, Israeli and Jewish interests. Preventing the conflict from escalating and working towards a sustainable solution for the Palestinian people will require visionary leadership."

NANYANG TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY. .30 MAY, 2024.

By Caitlin McCulloch, Brian A. Jackson, Sameer M. Siddiqi, Jordan R. Reimer, Emily Allendorf

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has changed and expanded its efforts in violence prevention in the past five years. DHS asked the Homeland Security Operational Analysis Center (HSOAC) to examine the change in efforts by the Center for Prevention Programs and Partnerships (CP3) and its predecessor organizations in preventing terrorism and other violence and explore options for CP3 moving forward.

In the United States, the full potential value of countering violent extremism (CVE) has never been realized because of key disconnects between the intent of CVE programs and the realities of their implementation. Although it might not have been the intent, efforts singled out and stigmatized American Muslim communities. The disconnect between stated intention and reality stimulated potent opposition to CVE as a concept. In response, the federal government decided to make significant changes in its approaches in this policy area. In late 2021, DHS asked HSOAC to examine and characterize the changes that had been made, providing an outside viewpoint on the extent of change and how those changes had responded to the concerns about CVE efforts. This report documents the researchers' approach, findings, and recommendations.

Key Findings

• There has been enormous growth in CP3, and it is currently working on developing and standardizing the institutions and processes that are required to support a larger organization. These efforts include extensive standardization efforts in training and evaluation of CP3's work. Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) posed some problems, including making it difficult to create a cohesive whole with new personnel, but also presented some new opportunities, such as an increased ability to reach a diversity of stakeholders digitally.

• CP3 and the government more broadly have made major shifts in the rhetorical framing of their work, toward a public health–informed approach, a framing that aligns more closely with the intent of their programs. Although there is still discussion of the implications of a public health–informed approach, this shift was reflected in both interviews and official documentation.

• In line with this rhetorical shift is the expansion in the diversity of stakeholders, both in engagement and in grantees, including evidence of a shift away from criminal justice and security partners, although they remain important collaborators.

• External stakeholders remain skeptical, but there are some signs of increasing trust in relevant actors outside government.

Recommendations

• Continue efforts to build and sustain consistency in messages and activities. Many external stakeholders noted the importance of rebuilding trust and that sustainable and continuous actions and relationships were essential for fostering that trust.

• Continue to codify and standardize internal office procedures—with rapid growth comes a renewed need for new internal institutions to keep all personnel on the same page.

• More clearly define the elements of a public health–informed approach and how they will be applied to violence prevention for CP3 programs and outreach. There are many definitions present in practitioner circles and the academic literature; choosing one and fully exploring the implications of the definition will be key for aligning stated CP3 goals with programmatic action.

• Invest further in program evaluation. The research team recognizes that it is difficult to evaluate effectiveness in this area, but, without standardized evaluation, supporting the impact of CP3 programs will be difficult.

• Commit to transparency and external communication. Transparency in actions taken and evidence collected, as well as communication with skeptical audiences, will be key in showing change and growth in CP3 and its activities to external actors and in further building trust with external audiences.

By John S. Hollywood, Keith Gierlack, Pauline Moore, Thomas Goode, Henry H. Willis, Devon Hill, Rahim Ali, Annie Brothers, Ryan Bauer, Jonathan Tran

Soft targets and crowded places (ST-CPs) are easily accessible to large numbers of people and have limited security or protective measures in place, making them vulnerable to attack. Examples include sports arenas, shopping centers, schools, transportation systems, and houses of worship. Although attacks on them are relatively rare, they result in significant loss of life and contribute to an atmosphere of fear throughout society. Researchers performed a landscape assessment of the threat to and major vulnerabilities of ST-CPs, existing security measures and initiatives, and ways to improve allocation of security resources. The researchers then developed a road map for future investments and made recommendations for improving ST-CP security and response to attacks. These recommendations include research, development, test, and evaluation priorities to improve prevention and protection, such as seeking methods of deterring and dissuading would-be attackers, more evaluation of the effectiveness of security measures, and developing a model concept of operations for open and nonsecure spaces. In addition, they recommended funding and policy priorities focused on public education and training, providing additional resources to cross-organizational security teams and managers, and increasing funding for access control systems.

Key Findings

• The most-common motivations for attacks are personal, followed by terrorism and extremism.

• Education and private buildings are the most–frequently targeted types of ST-CPs.

• Attacks on ST-CPs with large, accessible crowds, such as houses of worship, shopping malls, restaurants, bars, and nightclubs, have the highest average lethality.

• Layered security strategies, in which measures work together, improve the chance that an attack will be prevented, halted, or mitigated.

• Tips from the public have prevented attacks. Public education on what to report and how, and support for threat assessment teams, would make tips more effective.

• Access control systems, such as locks, secured windows, and secured entryways, have been effective and efficient but need to be trained on and maintained.

• Bystanders and security have both stopped attacks. Groups of bystanders tackling shooters have been highly effective. Training can make responses even more effective.

• Response command, control, and communications need to be improved. Alternatives to traditional, push-to-talk voice radio communications are needed.

• Security measures need more effectiveness and efficiency evaluations. The security community has growing interest in artificial intelligence (AI); evaluations of security systems with AI will be needed as these systems deploy.

Recommendations

• Find ways to deter and dissuade would-be attackers.

• Develop indicators of and education about suspicious seeking of weapons.

• Develop protocols and education for wellness checks.

• Further evaluate the effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of security measures.

• Develop a model concept of operations for open and nonsecure spaces, such as shopping malls and restaurants.

• Continuously track and analyze mass-attack plots.

• Review mass-shooting events to determine whether some ordinary criminal shootings should be treated as mass attacks on soft targets or crowded places.

• Find ways to reduce the mass psychological effects of attacks, including societal fear and secondary trauma.

• Focus on basics, such as provision and maintenance of access control equipment and public education campaigns on what to look for and how to report it.

• Strengthen the system-based, layered security framework.

• Ensure that funding and policy priorities reflect research findings.

• Fund enhanced public education and training on what to report and how.

• Provide additional funding to cross-organizational threat assessment teams and managers.

• Fund enhanced public education and training on how to respond to an active attacker.

• Provide additional funding to cross-organizational security teams and managers.

• Fund and distribute updates of site security guidance documents and training.

• Fund access control systems

Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2024. 24p.

By John S. Hollywood, Keith Gierlack, Pauline Moore, Thomas Goode, Henry H. Willis, Devon Hill, Rahim Ali, Annie Brothers, Ryan Bauer, Jonathan Tran

Attacks on soft targets and crowded places (ST-CPs) represent a significant challenge. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security requires research and development to assess methods for reducing the propensity and loss of life from these types of attacks. In response, researchers from the Homeland Security Operational Analysis Center conducted a comprehensive landscape assessment of the threat to ST-CPs and corresponding security measures. This assessment integrated literature reviews, attack plot analyses, grant data reviews, and security cost modeling to identify both needs for improvement and recommended research and investment priorities for addressing those needs.

The number of attack plots is broadly aligned with regional population counts. The most-common motivations for ST-CP attacks have been personal, followed by terrorist and extremist motivations. Education and private buildings (workplaces) are the most–frequently targeted types of ST-CPs. Attacks on ST-CPs that have large, accessible crowds, such as houses of worship, shopping malls, restaurants, bars, and nightclubs, had the highest average lethality.

To defend ST-CPs, a layered approach has security measures work together to improve the chance that an attack will be stopped or mitigated. Prevention measures stop attacks before they reach execution; however, the public needs to know what warning signs to look for and how to report them, and threat assessment teams need to assess tips and follow up appropriately. Access control systems, such as locks, secured windows, and secured entryways, have been effective and efficient. Bystanders and security have both stopped attacks; groups of bystanders tackling shooters have been highly effective.

Key Findings

The conditions that a would-be attacker must fulfill to successfully execute a high-fatality attack are collectively the attack chain; interrupting that chain can prevent or reduce casualties

• An attacker must carry out many steps to complete a high-fatality attack. The attacker must become fully committed, plan, acquire weapons and skills, and make other preparations without being detected and reported by others. Once on scene, the attacker must get through the site's security layers and engage a crowd without being stopped quickly.

• A system-based, or layered, approach helps security measures work together to improve the chances that an attack will be stopped or mitigated at any of these steps, guarding against single points of failure.

• Prevention measures are perhaps the most-important factors in interrupting the attack chain because they can and have halted many plots before they reached execution. Reports of warning signs have been key. However, the public must know what to look for and how, and authorities need threat assessment teams and training to assess tips and follow up appropriately.

• Access and entry-control systems, including locks, secured windows, and secured entry spaces, have been effective and efficient in protecting against attackers.

• Both bystanders and on-scene security have been effective in stopping attacks. Groups of bystanders tackling shooters have been highly effective in ending attacks.

  Recommendations

• Seek methods for deterring and dissuading would-be attackers from becoming committed to plots.

• Develop indicators and training to detect suspicious seeking of weapons and ammunition.

• Develop enhancements to "see something, say something" campaigns.

• Develop and evaluate campaigns to reduce hoax threats of violence.

• Develop rules and processes for assessment, monitoring, and follow-up with reported threats, including processes for initial wellness checks.

• Evaluate the effectiveness of site security technologies in stopping simulated attacks.

• Study the social costs of security measures more.

• Develop a model strategy for open and nonsecure spaces, such as parks, parking lots, shopping malls, and restaurants.

• Improve command and control, leadership, and coordination during attack responses.

• Study alternatives to traditional voice radio communications during attack responses.

• Continuously track and analyze mass-attack plots.

• Determine whether some ordinary criminal shootings should be treated as mass attacks on ST-CPs.

• Seek ways to reduce the mass psychological impacts of attacks.

• Support detailed tracking of grant spending related to ST-CP security.

• Fund enhanced public education and training on what to report and how and on how to respond to an active attacker.

• Provide funding to cross-organizational threat assessment teams, security teams, and managers, and provide training on how to report on and how to respond during an incident.

• Fund access control systems.

• Fund medical supplies and training to match updated medical standards.

Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2024. 168p.

By Sonjai Kumar

This article discusses the differences between the risk management and enterprise risk management. Though the concept of risk management is very old, almost as old as beginning of human existence but the concept of ERM is new around two decades old. The importance of enterprise risk management increased over the period of time due various crisis and emergence risk based capital in banking and insurance industry. The article discuss the various factors necessary for success of enterprise risk management.

Academia Letters, July 2021. Article 2234. 9p

NOWRASTEH, ALEX

From the document: "This policy analysis is an update and simplification of three previous Cato policy analyses on the same topic that were published in 2016, 2019, and 2023. It differs from the 2016 and 2019 editions because it does not include the total number of visas issued during the years analyzed, does not include a cost-benefit analysis of different immigration policies intended to reduce the threat of foreign-born terrorism, and it further differs from the 2019 version because it does not include native-born terrorists. The risks of foreign-born terrorists on US soil are quantified by evaluating how many people they murdered and injured in attacks, the ideologies of the attackers, the visas on which the foreign-born terrorists entered the country, their countries of origin, and the costs of their terrorist attacks."

CATO INSTITUTE. 9 APR, 2024. 28p.

UNITED STATES. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY. OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS; UNITED STATES. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION; CANADIAN CENTRE FOR CYBER SECURITY; ESTONIAN NATIONAL CYBER SECURITY CENTRE; JAPAN COMPUTER EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM COORDINATION CENTER; NATIONAL CENTER OF INCIDENT READINESS AND STRATEGY FOR CYBERSECURITY JAPAN; FINLAND. NATIONAL CYBER SECURITY CENTRE; JAPAN. NATIONAL POLICE AGENCY; UNITED KINGDOM. NATIONAL CYBER SECURITY CENTRE

From the document: "Civil society--nonprofit, advocacy, cultural, faith-based, academic, think tanks, journalist, dissident, and diaspora organizations, communities, and individuals involved in defending human rights and advancing democracy--are considered high-risk communities. Often, these organizations and their employees are targeted by state-sponsored threat actors who seek to undermine democratic values and interests. Regularly conducted as a type of transnational repression (also referred to as digital transnational repression), state-sponsored actors compromise organizational or personal devices and networks to intimidate, silence, coerce, harass, or harm civil society organizations and individuals. According to industry reporting, state-sponsored targeting of high-risk communities predominantly emanates from the governments of Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea. Actors typically perform extensive pre-operational research to learn about potential victims, gather information to support social engineering, or obtain login credentials. Actors target organization networks or personal accounts (e.g., email) and devices of individuals for surveillance and monitoring, often via spyware applications--malicious software that collects data from affected devices. This guide provides recommendations for civil society organizations and individuals to mitigate the threat of state-sponsored cyber operations based on observed malicious behavior. The guide also provides recommendations for software manufacturers to improve the security posture of their customers."

UNITED STATES. CYBERSECURITY & INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY AGENCY. 14 MAY, 2024. 19p.

UNITED STATES. SPACE FORCE

From the document: "The threats the United States faces from its strategic competitors have grown substantially. At the same time, the environment is being shaped by a rapidly growing commercial space sector, which is cultivating an ecosystem of innovation and reducing barriers to entry to deliver new, operationally relevant capabilities. This has extraordinary implications for global security and stability. The United States Space Force (USSF) will be more resilient and capable if it combines organic capabilities with the capabilities from other providers. Therefore, the USSF will integrate a mix of organic, allied, and commercial space solutions into hybrid architectures where the nation's space capabilities truly are greater than the sum of the parts. The USSF will leverage the commercial sector's innovative capabilities, scalable production, and rapid technology refresh rates to enhance the resilience of national security space architectures, strengthen deterrence, and support Combatant Commander objectives in times of peace, competition, crisis, conflict, and post-conflict."

UNITED STATES. DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE. 8 APR, 2024. 19p.

DELFORGE, DAMIEN; BELOW, REGINA; WATHELET, VALENTIN; LOENHOUT, JORIS VAN; SPEYBROECK, NIKO

From the document: "In 2023, the Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT) recorded a total of 399 disasters related to natural hazards. These events resulted in 86,473 fatalities and affected 93.1 million people. The economic losses amounted to US$202.7 billion. The 2023 earthquake in Türkiye and the Syrian Arab Republic was the most catastrophic event of the year in terms of mortality and economic damage, with 56,683 reported deaths and damage worth US$42.9 billion damage. This earthquake impacted an estimated 18 million people, a total for both countries, making it the second most impactful event in terms of affected individuals. The first was the 2023 Indonesian Drought, which affected 18.8 million people from June to September 2023. In the year under review there was a high level of disaster mortality, with a total of 86,473 deaths, exceeding the 20-year average of 64,148 deaths and the median value of 19,290 deaths for the same period, mainly due to the dramatic earthquake in Türkiye and Syria in February 2023, counting for two-thirds of the EM-DAT total deaths. The number of individuals affected by disasters, 93.1 million, is below the 2003-2022 annual average of 175.5 million."

CENTRE FOR RESEARCH ON THE EPIDEMIOLOGY OF DISASTERS; CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF LOUVAIN (1970- : FRENCH-SPEAKING); UNITED STATES. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT. 3 APR, 2024.

ByAlex Stevens, Niamh Eastwood, and Kirstie Douse

In this review article, we develop the case for the decriminalisation of drug possession in the UK by describing our ‘modest proposal’ to repeal the relevant sections of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 and its advantages. We defend this proposal against possible critiques from both conservative and radical positions. On the conservative side, these criticisms include that it would increase drug use and harm and that it would be illegal under international law. From the more radical position, we anticipate the criticisms that decriminalisation of possession would leave the harm associated with illegal drug supply to continue, that it would leave in place restrictions on the rights to use drugs, that it would forego the possible tax income from a legally regulated market, and that the drug laws would continue to act as tools of social control. In response, we argue that decriminalisation offers a feasible first step towards reducing the harm of drug control which would not increase drug-related harm.

Drug Science, Policy and Law Volume 10: 1–10

By Liam Michaud a a , b , * , Gillian Kolla c , d , Katherine Rudzinski Graduate Program in Socio-Legal Studies, York University, Toronto, ON, Canada b e , Adrian Guta

The ongoing overdose and drug toxicity crisis in North America has contributed momentum to the emergence of safer supply prescribing and programs in Canada as a means of providing an alternative to the highly volatile unregulated drug supply. The implementation and scale-up of safer supply have been met with a vocal reaction on the part of news media commentators, conservative politicians, recovery industry representatives, and some prominent addiction medicine physicians. This reaction has largely converged around several narratives, based on unsubstantiated claims and anecdotal evidence, alleging that safer supply programs are generating a "new opioid epidemic", reflecting an emerging alignment among key institutional and political actors. Employing situational analysis method, and drawing on the policy studies and social science scholarship on moral panics, this essay examines news media coverage from January to July 2023, bringing this into dialogue with other existing empirical sources on safer supply (e.g. Coroner's reports, program evaluations, debates among experts in medical journals). We employ eight previously established criteria delineating moral panics to critically appraise public dialogue regarding safer supply, diverted medication, and claims of increased youth initiation to drug use and youth overdose. In detailing the emergence of a moral panic regarding safer supply, we trace historic continuities with earlier drug scares in Canadian history mobilized as tools of racialized poverty governance, as well as previous backlashes towards healthcare interventions for people who use drugs (PWUD). The essay assesses the claims of moral entrepreneurs against the current landscape of opioid use, diversion, and overdose among youth, notes the key role played by medical expertise in this and previous moral panics, and identifies what the convergence of these narratives materialize for PWUD and healthcare access, as well as the broader policy responses such narratives activate.

International Journal of Drug Policy 127 (2024) 104423

By European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) to Correlation – European Harm Reduction Network (C-EHRN)

Drug consumption rooms (DCRs) are fixed or mobile spaces in which people who use drugs are provided with sterile drug use equipment and can use illicit drugs under the supervision of trained staff. They exist in several European countries, Australia, Canada, Mexico and the USA, and are usually located in areas where there is an open drug scene and injecting in public places is common. Their primary goal is to reduce morbidity and mortality by providing a safer environment for drug use and training clients in safer forms of drug use. Other explicit objectives may be providing a conduit to other care services and reducing public nuisance. A main aim of this report is to inform discussions on DCRs by examining the available evidence, as well as reviewing the various models being adopted and their characteristics. Two operational models are typically used in Europe: (1) integrated DCRs, operating within low-threshold facilities, where the supervision of drug use is just one of several services offered; and (2) specialised DCRs, which provide a narrower range of services directly related to supervised consumption. Services typically available within DCRs include: provision of a supervised environment for drug use; clean drug use equipment, including sterile syringes; and rapid interventions if overdose occurs. In addition, DCRs may offer counselling services; primary medical care; training for clients in safer forms of drug use, overdose awareness and the use of naloxone; and referral to social, healthcare and treatment services. Access to consumption facilities may be restricted to registered service users, and often certain conditions have to be met, for example minimum age and local residency. Typically, drugs used in these facilities must be obtained prior to entry. Drug dealing and drug sharing are not allowed within the facilities (staff may be required to call in the police if necessary), and staff can advise but do not directly assist clients in administering their drugs. As frontline, low-threshold services, drug consumption rooms are often among the first places where insights can be gained into new drug use patterns, and, thus, they also can have a role to play in the early identification of new and emerging trends among high-risk populations using their services. The operation and functioning of DCRs has adapted to changes in the profiles and needs of their target groups, and to new patterns of use, as well as to new types of drugs emerging on the market. DCRs may also therefore be well placed to identify and inform strategies to mitigate harms related to developments in the illicit drug market that present new health challenges.

Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2023. 52p.

MASLEJ, NESTOR; FATTORINI, LOREDANA; PERRAULT, RAYMOND; PARLI, VANESSA; REUEL, ANKA; BRYNJOLFSSON, ERIK

From the document: "Welcome to the seventh edition of the AI Index report. The 2024 Index is our most comprehensive to date and arrives at an important moment when AI's influence on society has never been more pronounced. This year, we have broadened our scope to more extensively cover essential trends such as technical advancements in AI, public perceptions of the technology, and the geopolitical dynamics surrounding its development. Featuring more original data than ever before, this edition introduces new estimates on AI training costs, detailed analyses of the responsible AI landscape, and an entirely new chapter dedicated to AI's impact on science and medicine. The AI Index report tracks, collates, distills, and visualizes data related to artificial intelligence (AI). Our mission is to provide unbiased, rigorously vetted, broadly sourced data in order for policymakers, researchers, executives, journalists, and the general public to develop a more thorough and nuanced understanding of the complex field of AI." See pages 10 and 11 for a full list of contributors.

STANFORD UNIVERSITY. HUMAN-CENTERED ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE. 2024. 502p.

UNITED STATES. WHITE HOUSE OFFICE. BIDEN, JOSEPH R., JR.

From the webpage: "Critical infrastructure comprises the physical and virtual assets and systems so vital to the Nation that their incapacity or destruction would have a debilitating impact on national security, national economic security, or national public health or safety. It is diverse and complex, and includes distributed networks, varied organizational structures, operating models, interdependent systems, and governance constructs. The United States is in the midst of a generational investment in the Nation's infrastructure. This investment, and the emergence of new technologies, presents an opportunity to build for the future. In the 21st century, the United States will rely on new sources of energy, modes of transportation, and an increasingly interconnected and interdependent economy. This modernization effort will ensure critical infrastructure provides a strong and innovative economy, protects American families, and enhances our collective resilience to disasters before they happen -- creating a resilient Nation for generations to come. The United States also faces an era of strategic competition with nation-state actors who target American critical infrastructure and tolerate or enable malicious actions conducted by non-state actors. [...] This memorandum advances our national unity of effort to strengthen and maintain secure, functioning, and resilient critical infrastructure."

UNITED STATES. EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT; UNITED STATES. OFFICE OF THE NATIONAL CYBER DIRECTOR

From the document: "The '2024 Report on the Cybersecurity Posture of the United States' assesses the cybersecurity posture of the United States, the effectiveness of national cyber policy and strategy, and the status of the implementation of national cyber policy and strategy by Federal departments and agencies. Additionally, this report highlights cybersecurity threats and issues facing the United States, including new or emerging technologies that may affect national security, economic prosperity, and the rule of law. This is the first edition of the report and covers calendar year 2023, with additional consideration of developments in 2024 preceding the publication of this report. Over the past year, U.S. national cybersecurity posture improved, driven by steady progress towards the 2023 National Cybersecurity Strategy's (NCS) vision of a defensible, resilient, and values-aligned digital ecosystem achieved through fundamental shifts in the underlying dynamics that shape cyberspace. The Administration has successfully begun implementation of the NCS Implementation Plan, which coordinates actions by departments and agencies across the Federal Government to make the President's affirmative vision a reality. These initial implementation actions set the foundation for further investment and sustained commitment by stakeholders across the digital ecosystem."

United States. Executive Office of the President. United States. Office of the National Cyber Director. 2024. 37p.

ELLISON, TOM; HUGH, BRIGITTE

From the document: "Climate change and policy responses provide new opportunities for state and non-state actors to engage in mis- and disinformation across a wide range of scales and topics. Traditionally, analysis of climate change and misinformation has focused most on the problem of climate change denialism and politicization of emissions reductions. However, misinformation, disinformation peddling, and malign influence campaigns are increasing around a broader range of climate-related issues, such as blame for climate hazards, backlash to climate-driven displacement, disputes over clean energy policies, polarization over climate protests, and competition for influence in climate-vulnerable states. Such efforts have security implications across the political, economic and societal spheres, and warrant more holistic and proactive policy attention, drawing lessons from analogous efforts around the COVID-19 pandemic and security of elections. This report provides a baseline on the intersection of climate security risks and mis- and disinformation challenges."

CENTER FOR CLIMATE AND SECURITY. COUNCIL ON STRATEGIC RISKS. 2024. 14p.

United States. Drug Enforcement Administration

From the document: "The 2024 NDTA [National Drug Threat Assessment] highlights the dangerous shift from plant-based drugs to synthetic drugs. This shift has resulted in the most dangerous and deadly drug crisis the United States has ever faced. These synthetic drugs, such as fentanyl and methamphetamine, are responsible for nearly all of the fatal drug poisonings in our nation. The Sinaloa and Jalisco Cartels are at the heart of this crisis. These two Cartels are global criminal enterprises that have developed global supply chain networks. They rely on chemical companies and pill press companies in China to supply the precursor chemicals and pill presses needed to manufacture the drugs. They operate clandestine labs in Mexico where they manufacture these drugs, and then utilize their vast distribution networks to transport the drugs into the United States. They rely on associates in the United States to distribute the drugs at a retail level on the streets and on social media. Finally, the Cartels utilize Chinese Money Laundering Organizations to move their profits from the United States back to Mexico. Drug trafficking organizations based in Mexico and South America are increasingly utilizing China based underground banking systems as their primary money laundering mechanism. In response to these threats, the DEA [Drug Enforcement Administration] has acted urgently to target the criminal networks responsible for the influx of synthetic drugs into the United States."

United States. Drug Enforcement Administration. 2024. 57p