By: Dustin A. Richardson, Jeremy D. Barnum, Meagan E. Cahill, Dulani Woods, Kevin D. Lucey, Michael J. D. Vermeer, Brian A. Jackson

Individuals with intellectual and developmental disabilities (IDDs) are at a higher risk of being victimized, arrested, and charged with a crime (The Arc, undated-a). They are also more likely to serve longer prison sentences than individuals without IDDs (The Arc, undated-a). Despite their overrepresentation, individuals with IDDs who are involved in the criminal justice system are often overlooked or neglected, and the body of research on this topic is lacking (The Arc, undated-a; Wilkerson, Lopez-Wright, and Davis, 2022). As gatekeepers of the criminal justice system, police officers are often the first point of contact for individuals with IDDs, yet rarely are they trained on how to respond to this population effectively (Melendrez et al., undated; Watson, Phan, and Compton, 2022; Watson, Compton, and Pope, 2019). Consequently, justice system professionals may have limited experience with or insufficient knowledge about IDDs, which can lead to the “misidentification of disability, a heightened risk of false confessions, inaccurate assumptions about competency and credibility, inappropriate placement in institutions, and the unknowing waivers of rights” (The Arc, undated-a). In the absence of proper training, officers are forced to rely on traditional approaches that do not account for the unique needs of those with IDDs. Therefore, it is critical to identify ways in which the law enforcement response to persons with IDDs can be improved.

This report documents an effort to do just that as part of the Priority Criminal Justice Needs Initiative, a multiyear collaboration to develop expert-identified research and policy needs on issues affecting the criminal justice system. On behalf of the National Institute of Justice (NIJ), RAND and the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) convened a workshop to address the law enforcement response to persons with IDDs. The purpose of this workshop was to inform a research agenda for NIJ and other stakeholders to discover and implement novel law enforcement responses to individuals with IDDs. The meeting occurred on July 12 and 13, 2023, in Washington, D.C., at the NIJ offices within the Office of Justice Programs. PERF staff consulted the research literature and identified practitioners, academics, and individuals associated with advocacy organizations to serve as participants. PERF also received input from federal partners and law enforcement agencies (LEAs) attempting to improve their response to the IDD community, taking care to include perspectives from various geographic regions.

RAND - Sep 23, 2024

By Amy J. Halsted, Max L. Bromley and John K. Cochran

Numerous prior studies have explored the level of job satisfaction of police officers. Some research has also focused on officer perceptions of community policing as practiced in municipal police agencies. There has been little empirical research on either topic conducted in sheriffs' offices throughout the US. The present study examines the relative effects of work orientation on levels of job satisfaction among deputy sheriffs in an urban sheriff's office which practices community policing on an agency-wide basis. Our findings suggest service-oriented deputies are somewhat more satisfied with their jobs than their crime control-oriented counterparts.

PIJPSM 23,1 82

By: Joshua C. Hinkle, David Weisburd, Christine Famega, and Justin Ready

Background: Hot spots policing is one of the most influential police innovations, with a strong body of experimental research showing it to be effective in reducing crime and disorder. However, most studies have been conducted in major cities, and we thus know little about whether it is effective in smaller cities that account for a majority of police agencies. The lack of experimental studies in smaller cities is likely partly due to challenges of designing statistically powerful tests in such contexts.

Objectives: The current paper explores the challenges of statistical power and “noise” resulting from low base rates of crime in smaller cities and provides suggestions for future evaluations to overcome these limitations.

Research Design: Crime data from a randomized, experimental evaluation of broken windows policing in hot spots are used to illustrate the challenges that low base rates present for evaluating hot spots police innovations in smaller cities.

Results: Analyses show that low base rates make it difficult to detect treatment effects. Very large effect sizes would be required to reach sufficient power, and random fluctuations around low base rates make detecting treatment effects difficult irrespective of power by masking differences between treatment and control groups.

Conclusions: Low base rates present strong challenges to researchers attempting to evaluate hot spots policing in smaller cities. As such, base rates must be taken directly into account when designing experimental evaluations. The paper offers suggestions to researchers who attempt to expand the examination of hot spots policing and other microplace-based interventions to smaller jurisdictions.

By Dr Colin Rogers

The Problem-Oriented Policing (or Partnership) approach is one that is used to underpin the current neighbourhood policing team approach in England and Wales. It relies upon a scientific approach which identifies problems and provides ethical and appropriate responses using the concepts of the Problem Analysis Triangle (PAT) and the SARA model. However, this approach has been in vogue since the mid and late 1990s and this article compares data from a current police service with that published in 1998. Comparison is made between this information to provide an indication of just how far the police have progressed in their use, application, and understanding of the Problem-Oriented Partnership approach.

Police Journal, PJ 83 4 (295), 1 December 2010

By James Yates

  Background In 2013, after a lengthy trial, United States District Court Judge Shira Scheindlin found that the New York City Police Department (“NYPD”), violated City residents’ Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights and that the City did so with deliberate indifference to NYPD officers’ “practice of making unconstitutional stops and conducting unconstitutional frisks.” In addition, the Court found that the City had a “policy of indirect racial profiling by targeting racially defined groups for stops based on local crime suspect data . . . [that] resulted in the disproportionate and discriminatory stopping of Blacks and Hispanics in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.” In a “Remedies Opinion,” a Monitor was appointed by the Court with authority to implement reforms related to training, documentation, supervision and discipline. Subsequently, the Court (Hon. Analisa Torres, D.J.) requested the preparation of an indepth, critical examination of the efficacy, fairness, and integrity of the City’s policies, practices and procedures with respect to police misconduct during stops. This Report is intended to meet the Court’s directive for a study of the NYPD disciplinary process as it relates to Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment compliance in investigative encounters. Summary Description of NYPD Discipline Any recount of NYPD’s disciplinary process will aim at a moving target. Modifications in the disciplinary process utilized by or imposed upon NYPD are in constant flux. In the last five years alone, there has been a blizzard of reforms, outlined in the Report, to New York City and State laws governing discipline, not to mention a variety of changes in rules and regulations within the Department and related agencies, many of which have been, and continue to be, the subject of active litigation and modification. While it is useful, in the Report, to cite data describing or summarizing disciplinary results at various moments in time and to highlight individual disciplinary cases of note, the main thrust of the Report is not transitory data or individual case studies, but rather, as directed by the Court, a look at policies, practices and procedures. At the outset, the Report reviews processes within the police department itself. While the Civilian Complaint Review Board (“CCRB”) may be the most recognized venue for reviewing claims of police misconduct, the Board handles a small minority of examinations of police conduct. CCRB investigates fewer than 5,000 complaints each year. As many as 50,000 misconduct reviews are performed by other divisions or personnel within the Department. They include the Internal Affairs Bureau (“IAB”), a Force Investigation Division (“FID”), the Office of the Chief of Department (“OCD”), Borough Adjutants, Borough Investigating Units (“BIU”) and local Command Officers (“CO”). [Please note: a dictionary of acronyms used throughout the Report is attached as Appendix 2.] Police activity is also scrutinized by a variety of audits conducted by or overseen by the Quality Assurance Division (“QAD”), a unit within the Department, including audits of radio dispatch communications, arrests, and police self-inspection examinations. Separate from the Department’s disciplinary process, an Early Intervention Committee (“EIC”) reviews officer history when certain signals of potential misconduct are  triggered. Other outside agencies regularly monitor potential misconduct, including the Commission to Combat Police Corruption (“CCPC”), the Office of the Inspector General for the NYPD (“OIG-NYPD”), the NYC Commission on Human Rights (“CCHR”) and a state agency, the Attorney General’s Law Enforcement Misconduct Investigative Office (“LEMIO”). Finally, thousands of complaints undergo scrutiny by way of claims lodged with the New York City Comptroller’s office and lawsuits filed in state and federal court. There is no cognizable attempt to coordinate the various reviews of police misconduct. Without full coordination, cooperation and sharing of information, the mere fact of split or concurrent investigations of any given encounter can lead to confusion or delay. Civilian Complaint Review Board The CCRB is comprised of fifteen members. Five members are appointed by the City Council; five members are appointed by the Mayor; one member is appointed by the Public Advocate; a Chair is appointed jointly by the Mayor and the City Council Speaker; and three members, with law enforcement experience, are designated by the Police Commissioner. Within CCRB, panels of three of the fifteen members are assembled to review closing reports and recommendations prepared by the investigative staff. Members are assigned to panels on a rotational basis. The Board has adopted a rule, not required by law, that each decisional panel shall have one of the police designees as a member. This leads to police designees hearing a greater volume of cases than other appointees. As an adjustment, more recently, CCRB sends some cases to panels without a police designee, but, if the panel substantiates misconduct, the matter is then sent for a second review attended by a police designee. In essence, misconduct may not be substantiated unless approved by a panel with a police designee. The Report discusses the impact of that decision. Disciplinary Recommendations to the Police Commissioner Findings of officer misconduct arrive at the Police Commissioner’s desk by dint of two highways: a substantiated finding referred from a CCRB panel to the Police Commissioner or one sent after an internal police department investigation. For minor or technical infractions within the Department, local commands/precinct commanders are authorized to impose discipline directly. All other recommendations for discipline are referred to, and left to, the discretion of the Police Commissioner, who may accept or reject a finding and who will then decide whether to impose a penalty, guidance, or neither. Disciplinary proceedings are either formal or informal. Formal discipline is administered through a trial process where Charges and Specifications are served detailing the allegations of misconduct. A deputy within the Department, sitting as a trial commissioner, receives evidence and makes a recommendation of guilty or not guilty along with a recommendation for a penalty or guidance or neither. The hearing is open to the public and the officer is entitled to representation. There may be several hundred such hearings in a given year. New York State Law requires that the trial commissioner be a deputy of the Police Commissioner if the subject officer faces possible termination. An Appellate Division ruling, barring hearings before an independent administrative hearing officer, has extended that provision of law to require that all trials come before a departmental deputy as the hearing officer, even in the more usual case where termination is not sought by the prosecuting authority. Informal discipline, which is much more common, occurs at the precinct or in the Department outside the trial process, when an officer “accepts” a “command discipline” along with the recommended or negotiated outcome. Absent extraordinary circumstances, stop and frisk misconduct is addressed by informal discipline. At the conclusion of an investigation or trial, CCRB or a trial commissioner (a departmental deputy), as the case may be, will determine if an allegation is substantiated by a preponderance of the evidence. Investigations and trials are not bound by strict rules of evidence. Hearsay is admissible and may form the basis for a finding. In formal proceedings at Departmental trials a verdict of Guilty or Not Guilty is rendered by the Trial Commissioner along with a recommendation for discipline or guidance if Guilty. Whether an allegation of misconduct is substantiated by CCRB or found by a Trial Commissioner, the Police Commissioner is not constrained to follow the recommendations and may vary the finding, alter a penalty, or decide upon no disciplinary action (NDA). The variance may be based upon the Commissioner’s: (i) disagreement with the factual findings; (ii) a different understanding of the applicable law or rules; (iii) a desire to exercise lenity—imposing a lesser penalty or no penalty; or (iv) any combination thereof. While various provisions of law require an explanation by the Police Commissioner in certain cases of disagreement with the findings of CCRB or a trial commissioner, the explanatory letters are often unclear as to whether the modification is based upon disagreements with factual findings, legal conclusions, or a simple desire to modify a penalty. The unfettered reach of the Commissioner’s authority is a point of frequent public debate.   

September 19, 2024. 503p.

By Brittany C. Cunningham, Bryce E. Peterson, Daniel S. Lawrence, Michael D. White, James R. Coldren, Jr., Jennifer Lafferty, Keri Richardson

Over the past decade, thousands of law enforcement agencies in the United States have adopted body‑worn cameras (BWCs) (Hyland, 2018). The rapid diffusion of these devices has been driven by several factors, most notably numerous controversial uses of force by police against community members of color and evidence suggesting that BWCs can produce a range of positive outcomes like reductions in complaints and uses of force (Braga et al., 2018; Peterson & Lawrence, 2021; Sutherland et al., 2017), added evidentiary value in investigations and downstream court proceedings (Huff et al., 2023; Todak et al., 2023), and enhanced perceptions of procedural justice and police legitimacy (Demir et al., 2020; McCluskey et al., 2019). The demand for police BWCs has continued unabated into the 2020s (National Conference of State Legislatures, 2022; White & Malm, 2020), and interest has now expanded to corrections. By 2023, at least ten state prison systems have begun the process of deploying BWCs, with many local jails following suit (Bogel-Burroughs, 2022; Brodie et al., 2020; Welsh-Huggins, 2021; Winton, 2021). Despite this expansion, there is limited research on the impact of these devices in prisons or jails. There are also fundamental differences between correctional and law enforcement settings that researchers must consider. For example, correctional officers interact with incarcerated residents on a more consistent and long-term basis than police interact with civilians. Prisons and jails also include a high concentration of vulnerable populations, including people under serious psychological distress and experiencing mental and behavioral health challenges (Maruschak et al., 2021). Another potential concern is that BWCs are redundant in prisons and jails because these environments are already saturated with stationary surveillance cameras (Allard et al., 2006). Although the stationary camera networks in many correctional facilitates are outdated and suffer from blind spots (Lawrence et al., 2022), it is not yet clear whether BWCs offer any added benefits beyond what is captured through these extant systems. For example, can BWCs provide additional evidentiary value in the investigation of misconduct incidents or staff uses of force? The current brief seeks to address this knowledge gap by examining the footage of response-to-resistance (RTR) events produced by BWCs compared to stationary closed-circuit television (CCTV) cameras in a correctional setting. The following sections describe the background of the current study, our approach to reviewing BWC and  stationary CCTV camera footage, and our key findings.

Arlington, VA: CNA, 2023. 16p.

By Brittany Cunningham, Jessica Dockstader, Zoe Thorkildsen

Officer safety is of critical importance in an era of increased risk for law enforcement officers. Law enforcement officers (hereafter, “officers”) respond to some of the most unpredictable, traumatic, and violent encounters of any profession.1 Although much of an officer’s workday entails repetitive interactions, some calls for service or self-initiated interactions by police officers may escalate into dangerous encounters. According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI’s) Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted (LEOKA) Program, between 2010 and 2018, an average of 51 officers died in a felonious killing per year. LEOKA defines a felonious killing as an “incident type in which the willful and intentional actions of an offender result in the fatal injury of an officer who is performing his or her official duties.” Regardless of how officer line-of-duty deaths, assaults, or injuries occur, the consequences are tragic and complex, affecting officers’
work and home life.2 Just as de-escalation, defusing, and crisis intervention tactics are paramount today, so is officer safety. This brief provides an accessible resource for law enforcement agencies, line officers, and their stakeholders (e.g., policy-makers, training instructors) to inform the development of targeted training, policies, and practices to promote officer safety while in the line of duty. Specifically, this brief offers the following:

•  a summary of officer safety risks related to calls for services, traffic-related encounters, ambushes, and blue-on-blue encounters;

• recommendations for promoting officer safety related to tactical preparedness; and

• real-world policing initiatives that serve as examples of practices in the field to improve officer safety.

Arlington, VA: CNA, 2021. 24p.

By Christopher M. Sun, James R. “Chip” Coldren, Jr., Keri Richardson, and Emma Wohl

Law enforcement agencies continue to develop new and innovative strategies to better support and police the communities they serve, from integrating gunshot detection technologies into dispatch systems to improve response times during shootings, to collaborating with local health and social service organizations to address issues such as homelessness or substance abuse in comprehensively ways. Over the past 10 years, the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA), in partnership with the CNA Institute for Public Research (IPR), has supported law enforcement agencies across the country in implementing innovative policing approaches through the Strategies for Policing Innovation Initiative (SPI, formerly the Smart Policing Initiative). SPI supports not only the development and implementation of innovative policing strategies, but also the research partnerships that result in in-depth analyses and rigorous evaluations of these strategies to advance what is known about effective and efficient policing practices. This report examines SPI’s accomplishments since its inception in 2009 and explores some of the major themes across SPI initiatives in both policing and policing research, including the following:

• Reductions in violent crime

• Improved crime analysis capabilities in police agencies

• Evolution of research partnerships with SPI sites

• Collaborative partnerships with agencies, organizations, and community stakeholders

• Integration of technology into policing

Arlington VA: CNA, 2019. 20p

By Benjamin Carleton, Tammy Felix, Monique Jenkins, Stephen Rickman, Chief Robert C. White (retired), Tom Woodmansee, and Michael Speer,   A. Nicole Phillips, Brian G. Remondino, and Kimberly L. Sachs

On May 25, 2020, George Floyd, a 46-year-old African American man died after being handcuffed and pinned to the ground by a Minneapolis police officer. Community bystanders captured the event on video, which was shared widely on social media and resulted in community outrage, an FBI investigation, a civil rights investigation, and the firing and arrests of all four involved officers. The compelling video—8 minutes and 46 seconds of Officer Derek Chauvin kneeling on the neck of George Floyd—quickly spread amongst social media, cable news stations, and major news outlets, sparking strong reactions both within the Minneapolis community and across the nation. This incident contributed to a growing public perception of biased and sometimes brutal treatment of African Americans by police officers. This incident occurred within the context of other recent shootings and deaths of African Americans at the hands of police officers. George Floyd’s cries of “I can’t breathe” harken back to 2014 and the in-custody death of Eric Garner by use of a chokehold. More recently, with the shooting deaths of Walter Scott, Alton Sterling, Breonna Taylor, and Philando Castile, many Americans reached a tipping point in their patience with systemic racism and the pace of police reforms, leading to nationwide protests. The day after the killing of Floyd, protests in the city of Minneapolis ended with a march to Minneapolis Third Precinct Headquarters. Tensions rose as protestors threw water bottles, and police responded with rubber bullets and tear gas. Protests resumed the following day. Once again, in the evening hours, protest led to confrontations with police, who responded with tear gas, rubber bullets, and flash bangs. Later that evening in nearby neighborhoods, windows of businesses were broken, some stores were looted, and two buildings were set ablaze. For the remainder of the week, Minneapolis experienced ongoing protests and damage to public buildings, looting, fires, and civil disturbances across the City. Protests and civil disturbances surfaced in other cities, beginning in earnest in Philadelphia on May 30. For the next several weeks, Philadelphia experienced peaceful protests coupled with civil unrest resulting in looting, vandalism, and burning of buildings. Police deployed tear gas, rubber bullets, and other crowd control munitions and tools, sometimes directly affecting Philadelphia residential neighborhoods. In the aftermath, Mayor James Kenney and Police Commissioner Danielle Outlaw announced plans “to engage an independent consultant to conduct a comprehensive examination of the City’s response to recent protests and other activities, which will include investigations of the Philadelphia Police Department’s use of force.” Police Commissioner Outlaw stated that “the Department’s commitment to reform must include an assessment of how police responded to the very protests that called for change.” She also pledged to make public a final comprehensive report. The City of Philadelphia contracted CNA (a nationally recognized, well-established, non-profit research organization with extensive experience in police assessments) along with Montgomery McCracken Walker & Rhoads, LLP (a Philadelphia-based law firm with extensive experience in conducting government and corporate internal investigations) to conduct the after-action analysis of the City’s response to the Floyd protests. The City committed to an independently conducted analysis and openly provided the consulting team access to relevant data and personnel needed to perform the analysis. The purpose of this after-action analysis is to provide the PPD and other City officials with an enhanced understanding of what happened during the Floyd protests, and to provide guidance on improving future PPD and City responses. This report is a “forward-thinking document” that emphasizes developing recommendations and remedial actions that will strengthen PPD and the City’s future responses to demonstrations, protests, and civil unrest. Importantly, this analysis is not an investigation of wrongdoing (which will be addressed by other agencies), but rather an effort to provide a roadmap to PPD and support agencies to apply best practices and lessons learned for more effective responses in the future. The timeline for this analysis extends from the national events leading up to the Philadelphia protests beginning the afternoon of May 30, 2020, through June 15, after which there was a falloff in the number, size, and tenor of the protests. This analysis focuses on the actions taken by PPD, coupled with the nature and extent of support of other agencies in response to these protests and civil disturbances. This report does not broadly examine PPD policy, training and practices, but rather focuses on those relevant to this response.

Arlington, VA: CNA, 2020. 110p.

By The New South Wales Police Force

The NSW Police Force (NSWPF) responds to more than 60,000 mental health incidents in the community every year and this figure has increased by around 10 per cent annually since 2018. In most cases a criminal offence has not been committed, there is no threat of violence and a weapon is not involved. This report looks at the NSWPF response to mental health incidents in the community.

Purpose

• Examine the demand on the NSWPF in responding to mental health incidents in the community.

• Review the training officers receive.

• Defining the role of police in responding to mental health incidents in the community.

• Reviewing the current operational model.

• Develop potential options for alternate response models.

Findings

The report noted that while police are best equipped to respond to incidents involving criminality and public order, other health professionals are able to provide more appropriate care for people experiencing mental health crises.

It also acknowledged that police, as the primary responder, can potentially escalate a situation and that the high volume of police deployment to mental health related matters can also have flow on impacts to other community safety issues, limiting resources of police to respond to other matters.

Actions

• The NSWPF and NSW Ministry of Health have set up a working group of senior officials to consider the findings of the report and to develop options for an alternative response.

• Additionally, the NSWPF has newly established the Mental Health Command to strengthen engagement and enhance police interventions when responding to mental health incidents.

• The Command will provide oversight, strategic guidance and advice as well as engage with external stakeholders.

Publisher Government of New South Wales

By University of Pennsylvania Crime and Justice Policy Lab and California Partnership for Safe Communities

Violence reduction in the U.S. is benefitting from excellent research (and ongoing research agendas) into specific interventions that can be evaluated and replicated. However, more is needed. The fact that so many cities continue to struggle with serious violence despite record investments in new programs indicates that the field needs a broader approach. WHAT’S MISSING? There is a crucial gap holding back the field of violence reduction: an understanding of not just what programs or strategies to adopt, but how to manage and govern on the city level to reduce serious violence. This was the primary conclusion of a 2022 expert convening. Running a rigorous violence intervention program in a particular community is very challenging. Assembling, implementing, and sustaining an effective city-level strategy is an even more complex and difficult task. The challenge of developing successful citywide strategies is enormously important, often ignored, and a large part of why cities are failing to sustainably reduce violence. The convened group comprised several important perspectives: people who have led city violence reduction offices (Jeremy Biddle, Sasha Cotton, Reygan Cunningham), people who help cities and city partners develop their violence prevention capacity (Vaughn Crandall, Fatimah Loren Drier, David Muhammed) and academic experts (Anthony Braga, Shani Buggs, Rodrigo Canales, Daniel Webster). The group was led by the University of Pennsylvania Crime and Justice Policy Lab (CJP) and the California Partnership for Safe Communities (CPSC), working with key leads from the White House Community Violence Intervention Collaborative and the Ballmer Community Violence Reduction Initiative (CAPS). (See Appendix A for more on the convening. This document describes the group’s conclusions and exploration of the current gap in research, implementation, governance, and ongoing management that challenges the violence reduction field, including suggestions of three areas where investment and effort could make a near-term impact: RESEARCH: Ongoing study of how cities structure, manage, and govern violence reduction efforts to establish baselines against which to assess near-term efforts and make long-term progress. Key action research questions, which could be applied to particular cities or systematically across cohorts, include: How are cities currently structuring their violence intervention efforts? Where does management and government authority for producing reductions in community violence reside? To what extent are citywide violence intervention efforts informed by basic analyses of community violence? What are the shortfalls for the ways in which cities use current analyses of their problems? How can cities build internal capacity for problem analysis and governance structures to ensure these analyses are used? What role does city government-based infrastructure play in administering and managing violence intervention strategies? What role does community-based infrastructure play in administering and managing violence intervention strategies? How are these government and community efforts resourced—monetarily, administratively, in terms of personnel, and over time? What key management capacities can be identified that correlate with success, or lack thereof, in producing and sustaining city level reductions in community violence? TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE: Using action research and existing evidence to help cities develop effective strategies and strengthen political governance, management, and key capacities. At present, technical assistance providers are filling capacity gaps at the local level—while technical assistance will likely always be needed to help cities get started or course-correct as they go, the field needs useful frameworks for improving city-level systems aimed at reducing community violence. POLICY: Engaging the field on how to sustain and enhance violence reduction efforts through policy development, governance, and management. Mayoral offices or statewide offices of violence prevention, strong community-based intermediaries, and other governing entities may be better able to provide structural support to violence reduction strategies when those offices and entities are supported by strong standards of practice  

Oakland, CA: California Partnership for Safe Communities, 2023. 13p.   

By Anthony A.Braga, John M.MacDonald,  Stephen Douglas,  Brian Wade,  Benjamin Struh

The evaluation literature suggests that focused deterrence strategies are effective in reducing gun violence. However, focused deterrence is notoriously difficult to implement and sustain. The history of focused deterrence implementation failure raises questions about its viability as a gun violence prevention strategy. Stockton, California, implemented focused deterrence three times during the past 25 years. In its most recent version, Stockton officials explicitly designed the strategy to be a permanent feature of the city’s violence prevention portfolio. Although program caseloads diminished over the course of the COVID-19 pandemicandthestrategyfacedleadershipandresource challenges, Stockton’s efforts prevented the program from being discontinued and, for those gang members who did receive treatment, delivered a robust gun violence prevention strategy. A quasi-experimental evaluation showsthattreated gang members wireless likely to be shot and reduced their violent offending relative to similar untreated gang members. The focused deterrence impacts also appear to spill over to gang members who were socially connected to treated gang members. 

Criminology & Public Policy, 2024. 

By  Elizabeth Carlson and Charles Wheeler

During his first administration, former President Trump adopted aggressive anti-immigrant policies, which included family separation, a ban on individuals from Muslim-majority countries, stringent border policies like the Remain in Mexico and Title 42, and attempted terminations of programs such as Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) and Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for several national groups. Attorneys and representatives for immigrants had some success in pushing back against the administration’s most extreme measures through litigation and advocacy. Should they return to the White House, Trump and his supporters have promised to enact an even more draconian anti-immigrant agenda, including a commitment to conducting the largest mass deportation in U.S. history, ending birthright citizenship (which is guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment), and revoking humanitarian protections for those already in the United States. Many of these efforts, of course, will be challenged in court. This article summarizes 10 likely immigration initiatives under a second Trump administration. It seeks to educate members of the public who value the crucial role and myriad contributions of immigrants and refugees — past and present — in the United States. It will also outline how advocates can fight to protect their clients from these measures.

Journal on Migration and Human Security 1–15 © 2024.

By H. Douglas Ott and Alysson Gatens

The nature of police work may at times involve stressful situations such as the threat of, and actual, physical harm and witnessing the human toll of violence. The stress of the job combined with organizational stressors may severely impact police officers and their work. Stress can lead to substance misuse and disorders, trauma, and suicide. Police departments can address officer stress through interventions, such as counseling, peer support groups, and stress management training. This article summarizes literature on the effects of police officer stress and trauma. Police officers that embrace active coping styles may be better able to handle stress  

Chicago: Illinois Criminal Justice Information. Authority 2022. 14p.

By: Auzeen Shariati and Rob T. Guerette

Traditional criminology has focused on the criminal nature of offenders as a means for reducing crime. In contrast, situational crime prevention (SCP) is a process of multiple stages, and seeks to understand where, when, and how crime incidents occur. Similar to epidemiology, SCP has sought to alter environments which host crime behavior in order to make them less suitable for offending. Based on an analysis of the incidence and distribution of a given crime problem, the SCP approach then identifies risk factors, formulates and implements appropriate solutions, and evaluates the results. In this way, the individual “propensity” of offenders, like individual diagnoses, becomes less important, at least as a means of prevention. This chapter discusses in more detail the situational crime prevention approach. Following a brief description of its historical development, the theoretical foundations are presented. An overview of the process and types of prevention techniques are then outlined followed by a discussion on the existing evidence of effectiveness.

December 2017 DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-44124-5_22

By: John E. Eck and Tamara D. Madensen

Problem-oriented Policing is a theory of policing, but does not contain a theory of problems. Situational crime prevention is a theory of problems, but does not contain a theory of an implementing institution. The paper shows why without Situational Crime Prevention, problem-oriented policing would have difficulty working. An analogy is drawn to lichens and it is asserted that any useful theory of policing must be like a lichen.

January 2012, DOI: 10.4324/9780203154403

By: Tahir Maqsood, Sajjad A. Madani, Bahadar Nawab, Shakir Ullah, Ingrid Nyborg

Community-oriented policing (COP) as a model has found widespread acceptance throughout the world both in developed and developing countries. Similarly, Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) have been embraced by many developed countries to augment COP initiatives. However, very little is known about the application of ICTs in COP in developing countries, particularly South Asia. In this article, we review the current ICT-based COP initiatives by focusing on some of the selected projects from developed countries and South Asia. The paper has used COP in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province of Pakistan as a case. While meaningful insights can be derived through learning from the experiences of developed countries, we highlight some major issues and challenges that are likely to be faced while implementing ICT based COP in South Asia. Moreover, we provide an overview of some exciting opportunities that arise as a result of embracing ICTs to enhance COP efforts for building trusting community-police relations and hence improving human security in the region.

Journal of Human Security | 2019 | Volume 15 | Issue 2 | Pages 21–40

By: Federico del Castillo

In the broad context of Uruguay’s police reform, the Ministry of Interior is implementing a pilot Problem-Oriented Policing (POP) program in Montevideo since late 2012. This research examined the obstacles confronted by the program throughout its implementation. Using a grounded theory approach, qualitative data was collected through 20 semi-structured interviews with members of the Uruguay National Police (UNP) of different ranks. Findings were analyzed based on the following categories: a) contextual factors; b) theoretical and practical inaccuracies; c) characteristics, skills and actions of project managers; d) resistance and motivational issues; e) resources; f) external support and cooperation. Consistent with research conducted on POP in other settings, findings suggest the program confronted a diverse set of obstacles over its implementation corresponding to all but one of the proposed categories. The study concludes with a series of recommendations to inform future POP endeavors by the UNP.

November 2017

By: Gary Cordner and Elizabeth Biebel

Problem-oriented policing was first introduced in an article by Herman Goldstein in 1979. It was formally field-tested in the 1980s in Baltimore County (Cordner, 1986) and Newport News (Eck and Spelman, 1987), given a wider audience through an Atlantic Monthly magazine article in 1989 (Wilson and Kelling), and systematically described and explained in Goldstein's 1990 book. Today, it is widely regarded as the most analytical and intellectually challenging strategy in the police arsenal.

Questions linger, however, about the implementation and practicality of problem-oriented policing (POP). The SARA process (scanning, analysis, response, assessment) for carrying out POP is analytically and creatively demanding, as well as time-consuming. Some observers question whether police have the knowledge and skill to implement the SARA process properly. Police officers often question whether they have the time to do so.

The research reported here carefully examined problem-oriented policing in practice by ordinary police officers in one agency - the San Diego, California Police Department. The objective was to discover and describe the reality of everyday, street-level POP as practiced by generalist patrol officers. San Diego was chosen because of its reputation as a national leader in problem-oriented policing.

200518, 06/19/2003, 98-IJ-CX-0080

By: Mark Ungar and Enrique Desmond Arias

In every part of Latin America, unprecedented levels of violence have even led to questions about the underlying quality of democratic rule. In response to this crisis, governments have enacted an array of policies, ranging from repressive mano dura crackdowns and adoption of new technology to the reform of criminal justice systems. But one of the most popular approaches to reform efforts has been community-oriented policing (COP), a strategy popularised in the USA in the 1990s, which is based on close collaboration between the police and the neighbourhood residents. COP focuses on the causes of crime
rather than simply responsding to it by empowering citizens, building police
community partnerships, improving social services and using better crime statistics. Street patrols, policy councils and youth services are some of the many COP programmes being adopted in Latin America and other regions. As other authors emphasise, this reform also entails restructuring of police forces to make them more flexible and responsive. Skogan and Hartnett (1997), for example, stress decentralisation of authority and foot patrols to facilitate citizen-police communications and public participation in setting police priorities and developing tactics.

The results of these efforts, however, have been very uneven. Some programmes have shown considerable success while others have faced many difficulties and either been defunded or left to expire of their own accord. Why do some projects succeed where others fail? More importantly, what can Latin American policy-makers learn from past experiences in the region in order to develop more effective and successful policies for the future?

This edition of Policing and Society takes a step towards answering these questions by bringing together security officials, practitioners and scholars to offer detailed analyses of community reform efforts at the local, regional and national levels throughout Latin America. The articles cover programmes in Colombia, Chile, Venezuela, Honduras, the Dominican Republic, Argentina, Mexico and Brazil. By detailing the challenges facing reform and how to overcome them, these cases provide an important compendium about community policing in Latin America that will help practitioners and policy-makers build effective durable programmes. This introduction highlights critical issues that the individual articles develop further. Those challenges, as contributors discuss, fall along two main dimensions: support for community policing by key actors, from Presidents to neighbourhood residents, and a continuity of that support through the entire process of community policing creation, from initial proposals to programme evaluation.

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