By Dr Ben Collier, Dr Morgan Currie, & Dr Benedetta Catanzariti

We are a team of researchers at the University of Edinburgh’s department of Science, Technology, and Innovation Studies, with a broad range of expertise and experience relating to digital technologies. The Scottish Parliament has commissioned us to conduct this research study evaluating the potential threats, risks, and mitigations to parliamentary business associated with novel generative AI technologies. We have been asked to consider particularly the threat of deepfaked video to the integrity of the Parliament video livestream and archived recordings of parliamentary business - a phenomenon which one of our participants dubbed ‘chamberfakes’. Scottish Parliament makes its live streamed and archived video of chamber and committee business widely accessible to major broadcasters and to the public directly through its website and on major social media platforms. Parliamentary video is produced as a neutral record of parliamentary business, and its accessibility serves a core democratic function of making the Scottish Parliament visible to the public. At the same time, this broad accessibility could lead to security vulnerabilities, including deepfake attacks. The report identifies three main deepfake-related risks: 1. Hacking the video livestream, either through a cybersecurity breach or by compromising a live participant dialing in through Zoom 2. Disseminating deepfakes on social media platforms 3. Creating deepfakes using parliamentary video material as a training resource for online harassment and abuse of MSPs While deepfake technologies are part of concerning broader trends in the proliferation of misinformation, abuse, and organised political interference, they do not generally represent a step change in capabilities for most hostile actors in the context of Parliamentary video. Instead, they generally offer small-to-medium scale reductions in barriers to entry for some existing forms of harm. Scottish Parliament has no formal processes in place to respond to these deepfake threats. However, Parliament’s strong institutional resilience - particularly the deep knowledge and experience of its staff - can play a current role in preventing or mitigating threats. The broadcasting team has multiple people who monitor both the live transmitted video and online video stream, ensuring the video transmission chain proceeds correctly. Parliament’s strategic risk register is already set up to respond to cybersecurity and personal online security threats to MSPs. The Official Report of Parliament, the transcript of all the Parliament's public proceedings, offers a record to check video suspected of tampering. Beyond current practices of risk management there are several technical, educational and legal solutions that could be adopted as future mitigations to deepfake risks. Considering deepfakes in relation to a broader constellation of risks and finding an optimistic picture of the resilience of Parliament to these threats, this report focuses its recommendations on several key institutional solutions that Scottish Parliament could adopt. Recommendations: 1. Develop formal intervention plan and reporting procedures for a deepfake or misinformation attack, involving the assignment of responsibility for this process to a specific individual via the risk register and establishing reporting procedures to UK Parliament and ministers and to MSPs 2. Institute further material and human-in-the-loop checks, including having cameras dump a live feed to file locally straight from the recording apparatus itself, authentication checks for participants dialling in to give evidence, and retaining an in-house staff to monitor the feed in comparison with live proceedings 3. Establish a communications team (or hire a small number of dedicated communications staff) within the broadcasting unit to support to MSPs who encounter or are victims of misinformation, track how parliamentary content is being circulated and used, and promote the use of parliamentary video through communications campaigns and direct engagement with broadcasters and platforms

Edinburgh: The Scottish Centre for Crime and Justice Research (SCCJR), 2024. 29p.

By Primitivo III Cabanes Ragandang

This report examines online youth‐led initiatives involved in challenging violent extremism (CVE).

It focuses on the 2013–2023 online presence of 13 youth organisations, namely: KRIS (Philippines), Youth for Peace Movement Davao de Oro (Philippines), United Voice for Peace Network Inc. (Philippines), Global Peace Youth (Philippines), Students Against Violence Everywhere, Paiman Alumni Trust, Sri Lanka Unites, Youth for Peace (Cambodia), Sambisig, Team Pakigsandurot, MasterPeace, Youth for Peace Philippines Cordillera Youth Brigade and College of Youth Activism and Development.

Based on data scraped from more than 130 social media posts, the report highlights the dynamics of youth‐led CVE efforts online, and discusses strategic planning, content creation and organisational challenges.

The study identifies the dual approach of young people in CVE work across both online and offline spaces. The predominant use of digital platforms to document offline activities suggests that for many, the online platform is secondary, pointing to the challenges of internet access in certain regions of Asia.

Limited internet access in marginalised communities emerges as a significant barrier, underlining the need for more inclusive online participation. Organisational hurdles include communication issues, resource constraints, team dynamics and visibility challenges, particularly where messaging is too localised.

This report recommends that CVE youth organisations be given more training in online content creation and social media literacy. It suggests prioritising and supporting offline activities to improve sustainability, and proposes collaborative online spaces to boost engagement. The report also recommends that tech companies broaden their existing community systems to amplify and lend credibility to CVE‐related content on social media platforms.

The report shows that online youth‐led CVE initiatives in Asia are not explicitly labelled as CVE. They have a variety of names but allare geared towards challenging ideas and acts that are violent and extreme in nature.

In some initiatives, young people directly condemn violent forms and acts of extremism. Other initiatives advocate social change in a preventive sense, with young people addressing factors that contribute to violence and extremist ideas.

Another type of initiative involves Asian youths promoting positive values and behaviours as a means of CVE, advocating positive messaging, active participation and good citizenship. This approach encourages positive behaviour as a counter to extremist ideologies.

The report concludes with a recommendation that tech companies should support existing youth CVE initiatives, rather than creating new ones. This support might include establishing a support network for these initiatives and organising conferences to gather and connect young CVE advocates across the region. Strengthening communication channels with youth groups and fostering collaborative online spaces would improve coordination and content dissemination.

Modifying search engine functions would make it easier to identify relevant groups. Using community systems to endorse CVE‐related content would boost credibility, while supporting regulatory duties with AI (artificial intelligence) capabilities would make content moderation easier. Strengthening proactive measures to safeguard online spaces and reduce harmful influences requires addressing emerging threats such as domestic terrorism and extremist ideologies.

London: The Global Network on Extremism and Technology (GNET) , 2024. 44p.

By Helen Young and Geoff M. Boucher

Digital publishing, sale and distribution of books have contributed significantly to the dissemination and mainstreaming of far‐right extremist (FRE) material in the 21st century. Historical and contemporary books that espouse politically and ideologically motivated violence circulate widely and easily online, in both FRE and mainstream spaces. Such books include, but are not limited to: the speeches of Adolf Hitler, William L. Pierce’s The Turner Diaries, Theodore Kaczynski’s Industrial Society and its Future (The Unabomber Manifesto), James Mason’s Siege, and anthologies produced by the Iron March forum and Terrorgram Collective.

Commercial book publication, sales, distribution and sharing platforms play a significant role in enabling the circulation of FRE material, as this report details through analysis of Amazon, Google Play, Rakuten Kobo, Goodreads, and Scribd and its e‐book‐platform, Everand. An autoethnographic ‘snowball’ methodology was used, exploiting the features of commercial book platforms, such as search functions and algorithmically driven recommendations. FRE books were quickly and easily located on all platforms analysed.

There are two principal ways that major e‐book sites enable the circulation of FRE material:

Distribution: of self‐publications by FRE authors (through Amazon Kindle, for example), access for ideologically motivated small presses to large marketplaces, and users’ sharing of FRE material including manifestos (on Scribd, for example)

Recommendation algorithms on all platforms directing users from one FRE title to another, or from Far‐Right material that does not meet the threshold of extremism to that which does.

Recommendation algorithms are particularly problematic because they have the capacity to direct users who have not yet encountered extremist material towards FRE books and to actively reinforce extremist perspectives.

Technology companies have already taken steps to remove some of the most notorious FRE books from sale, distribution and discussion. In the case of extremist novels, such as The Turner Diaries, searches typically meet a dead end and return purchasing recommendations of books on anti‐racism and de‐radicalisation rather than hate fiction.

This report recommends that the companies surveyed extend this practice to other FRE materials documented below, using available techniques to understand and interrupt the formation of a network of recommendations which leads individuals towards publications advocating political violence. The report also recommends the use of available techniques (such as machine learning) to scrutinise the nature of self‐published materials, with the aim of preventing reproductions of materials that are refused classification from being published spuriously under misleading titles or pseudonyms.

The report is agnostic on whether such companies should stock the speeches of Adolf Hitler, for instance, focusing instead on potential problems in the way the affordances of search technologies provide ready‐made FRE libraries.

London: Global Network on Extremism and Technology, 2023. 36p.

By Patrick Meehan and Jonathan Goodhand

This research paper advances a conceptual framework for analysing the nexus between paramilitaries, illicit economies and organised crime in borderland and frontier regions. We challenge two dominant policy narratives around paramilitaries: first, the idea that these organisations are symptomatic of state breakdown and flourish in marginal spaces suffering from ‘governance deficits’. Second, the idea that paramilitaries can primarily be understood as apolitical, predatory and self-enriching actors, driven by economic motives, and operating outside formal political systems. In critiquing these narratives, we develop an alternative approach that studies how paramilitaries become embedded in enduring systems of rule in borderlands shaped by protracted conflict and illicit economies. At the centre of our approach is the concept of ‘coercive brokerage’ which provides a lens for exploring how paramilitaries play a crucial role in shaping power relations by mediating between different scales, jurisdictions and policy domains. Brokerage can be defined as the capacity to mediate the transmission of power across divides – or synapses – between different networks or power structures, and facilitates connections outside formal institutions. In conflict-affected frontier spaces, the use of violence – actual or threatened – enables brokers to fulfil their connective function and creates a privileged space for distinct forms of ‘coercive brokerage’. Coercive brokers have an ambiguous relationship with the state; they derive power from mediating the state’s influence, rather than acting as state proxies. By fulfilling these roles as intermediaries, coercive brokers become embedded in political and market systems in frontier regions and beyond. As we argue below, over time, coercive brokers become important political actors who deal with collective action problems by cementing alliances and political coalitions that connect political centres with frontier regions, and who pursue political interests and agendas. Not all paramilitaries become coercive brokers who end up assuming significant political roles. We aim to explore why some paramilitary figures and groups become powerful coercive brokers and others do not. We also examine why coercive brokerage seems to be a particular feature of frontier and borderland contexts. And finally, we aim to better understand variation in the dynamics of coercive brokerage – at the national and subnational levels. This paper is the first of a three-part series exploring the nexus between paramilitaries, illicit economies and organised crime. This first paper conceptualises coercive brokerage and outlines how this concept advances the growing body of recent literature on militias and paramilitaries. The second paper then works with the concept of coercive brokerage to present comparative analysis of the paramilitary-organised crime nexus in three contexts: Afghanistan, Colombia and Myanmar. These case studies draw upon data and analysis generated by a four-year Global Challenges Research Fund (GCRF) project, Drugs & (Dis)order (https://drugs-and-disorder.org/). The third paper outlines a set of policy implications based on the key findings from across the case studies.

SOC ACE Research Paper No 26. University of Birmingham. 2023. 35p.

By Marcela Neves Bezerra and Mitja Kovac

Modern Brazil is plagued by social and economic inequalities, endemic violence, crime, and weak rule of law. Once these narratives become dependent on each other, all aspects must be worked on to change the scenario experienced in the country, of insecurity, fear and lack of opportunities. This paper argues that unprecedented increase in social injustice in Brazil is not the result of short-term measures, but the materialization of a history marked by economic and social inequalities that extend from the colonial period to the present moment and faulty criminal policies that intensified in the mid-1990's. Moreover, current massive incarceration, overcrowding of prisons combined with the lack of human living conditions is turning Brazil into a gigantic, perpetual school of crime. Investment in education that has a direct effect on the decrease of crime rate, must be aligned with the structuring of a new, less repressive and more inclusive punitive policy, to induce criminals not to recur to crime. Paper suggests that essential development in Brazil is possible only if the efficient legal institutions, rule of law, and criminal sanctioning based on principles of social justice are available to all citizens.

School of Economics and Business University of Ljubljana, 2020,

By Anina Schwarzenbach and Michael Jensen

Prior research suggests that members of terrorist groups prioritize forming network ties based on trust to improve their organizational and operational security. The homophily principle, which postulates that individuals tend to form relationships based on shared characteristics, can be a key mechanism through which people identify trustworthy associates. Next to homophily, the mechanism of establishing interconnected relationships through transitivity is also well-known to serve this purpose and shape community structures in social networks. We analyze the community structures of the Islamist co-offending network in the United States, which is highly violent, to assess whether homophily and transitivity determine which extremists form co-offending ties. We rely on a new database on the individual attributes and the co-offending relationships of 494 Islamist offenders radicalized in the United States between 1993 and 2020. Using community detection algorithms, we show that the US Islamist co-offending network is highly clustered, modular, and includes many small but only a few large communities. Furthermore, results from exponential random graph modeling show that transitive relationships as well as spatial proximity, ideological affiliation, and shared socio-cultural characteristics drive co-offending among US Islamist extremists. Overall, these findings demonstrate that the processes of homophily and transitivity shape violent social networks.

PLoS ONE 19(6): 2024, 31p.

By The International Centre for the Study of Radicalization (ISCR), King’s College London, United Kingdom

This report is the sixth in a series of short reports that look at the user journeys of individuals in extremist communities. This report focuses on the extremist chan culture, which refers to a collection of online platforms. The existence of chans is in stark opposition to mainstream social media, where users are usually encouraged to share their personal content and use their real identities. Strong group identity within chans is mostly established by the use of in‑jokes and subcultural slang, despite the anonymous online setting. The decision to focus on extremist chan culture in this report is informed by the continued threat posed to broader society by chan sites, which foster a climate in which extremism is the norm and in which violence is often openly encouraged. These chan sites continue to represent a particular kind of extreme online hate which requires moderation in order to curtail the rise and spread of extreme far‑right communities. On the report’s methodology, the study used focus groups, involving individuals who have accessed, observed and occasionally participated in the private communication channels of these extremist communities. The names of all communities mentioned during the focus groups, including those that participants accessed, have been removed. Key findings on extremist chan culture are: • While there are non‑English language chan sites which attract large audiences in many countries, the most popular is 4chan, with more than 22,000,000 users. Since its inception, 4chan has been a haven for violence. • Newcomers are generally only able to find new chan sites through word of mouth, with more informed users periodically posting lists of links to more obscure chans on popular forums like 4chan. • The existence of smaller chan sites further implies their links to other such sites based on shared ideology and in some instances a sense of camaraderie. • Misogyny and queerphobia remain rife on extremist chan sites, with different chan sites varying slightly in their attitudes towards women.

London: Global Network on Extremism and Technology (GNET), 2024. 20p.

By Joshua J. Reynolds, Victoria Estrada-Reynolds , Scott Freng, Sean M. McCrea,

Police officers must rely on the available information when investigating crimes. One cue police sometimes rely on is suspect movement (e.g., furtive movements and headlong flight). The courts have explicitly allowed officers to use this information to support warrantless searches. Yet, there is scant empirical evidence examining whether suspect movement is associated with guilt. Using 141 participants in an experimental design, we examined whether individuals who were made guilty (experimentally) would be more likely to avoid a police representation in a social distance paradigm. We also examined a second legal perspective, that racial minorities or individuals who have low police legitimacy would be more likely to avoid the police. Using Bayesian statistics and information criteria we found that neither guilt nor race was associated with avoidance, but feeling guilty was positively associated with avoidance

Applied Psychology in Criminal Justice, 2021, 16p.

By Seema Choksy Pessar, Rosanna Smart, Tim Naimi, Marlene Lira, Jason Blanchette, Anne Boustead, and Rosalie Liccardo Pacula

Aims: To measure the association between state cannabis policies and use among adults and youth in the United States from 2002 to 2019, given rapid policy liberalization and complex state cannabis policy environments.

Design: Repeated cross-sectional time series analysis. Three sets of models assessed the linear association between the Cannabis Policy Scale (CPS), an aggregate measure of 17 state cannabis policy areas that weights each policy by its efficacy and implementation rating, and prevalence of cannabis use. The first included year and state fixed effects; the second added state-level controls; the third replaced state fixed effects with state random effects. Standard errors were clustered at the state level in all models.

Setting and participants - United States.

Measurements: Past-month prevalence of cannabis use is from the National Survey on Drug Use and Health Small Area Estimates, a nationally and state-representative cross-sectional survey of household population ages 12 and older for years 2002–2003 to 2018–2019. Exposure data include the CPS.

Findings: A 10 percentage-point increase in the CPS (i.e. greater cannabis policy restrictiveness) was associated with lower past-month use prevalence by 0.81 (95% confidence interval [CI] = -1.05 to −0.56) to 0.97 (95% CI = -1.19 to −0.75) percentage-points for the population ages 12 years and older. When models were stratified by age, a 10 percentage-point increase in the CPS was associated with a 0.87 (95% CI = -1.13 to −0.61) to 1.04 percentage-point (95% CI = -1.03 to −0.84) reduction in past-month use prevalence for adults ages 18 years and older, and a 0.17 (95% CI = -0.24 to −0.09) to 0.21 percentage-point (95% CI = -0.35 to −0.07) reduction for youth ages 12–17 years.

Conclusions: More restrictive US cannabis policies appear to be associated with reduced cannabis use for both adults and youth.

Addiction; Early View, 2024, 7p.

By JEN HOLLIS AND STUART MATHEWS

To most Australians, fire danger forecasting is embedded within our cultural identity and history. It’s as Australian as kangaroos, the Holden Ute and the Sydney Opera House.

For the last six decades Australians have relied heavily on the pioneering work of Alan McArthur who developed the Forest Fire Danger Index and Grassland Fire Danger Index. The system has served Australians well and with only minor adaptations to meet local needs, it remains largely unchanged. The most significant adjustment came after the 2009 Black Saturday fires in the state of Victoria which, in one afternoon, burned through more than 450,000 hectares and resulted in the devastating loss of 173 lives.

Following a Royal Commission investigation into the fires, it was recognised that McArthur’s system was being applied well beyond the original design. As a result, categories were added, including one at the top end of the fire danger scale reflecting conditions beyond the existing maximum of 100. Importantly, it was also recognised that there was a need to incorporate new science and technological developments (for example, remote sensing, landscape mapping, higher computational capability) into calculating and interpreting fire danger.

International Association of Wildfire. 2022.

By N. Bénichou, M. Adelzadeh, J. Singh, I. Gomaa, N. Elsagan, M. Kinateder, C. Ma, A. Gaur, A. Bwalya, and M. Sultan

Fires in the wildland-urban interface (WUI) have become a global issue, with disasters taking place all over the world recently. The drivers of increasing WUI fire risk—increasing population and expansion of urban areas into wildlands, and climate change—are global-scale phenomena. In the coming decades, WUI fire risk is expected to increase both in regions with a long history of fires and in regions that have had been less affected over past decades. WUI fires can cause the ignition of many structures through the spread of flames and radiant heat and the deposition of burning embers over a short period of time. This can overwhelm protection capabilities, lead to large evacuations, and cause disasters with the potential for the total loss of hundreds of structures in a few hours.

As discussed in Chapter 1 of this Guide, over the last decade, an average of 5 533 wildfires have occurred each year in Canada, involving 2.9 million hectares of wildland area. The number of evacuations caused by wildfires increased by about 1.5 evacuations per year between 1980 and 2014, with more than 20 evacuations per year after 2010. The substantial negative impacts of WUI fires were illustrated by the Okanagan Mountain Park Fire, which affected Kelowna in 2003; the Flat Top Complex Wildfire, which destroyed significant parts of Slave Lake in 2011; and the Horse River Fire, which immensely affected Fort McMurray in 2016 and was the most costly insured loss event in Canadian history. These disasters resulted in a loss of over 2 400 structures and roughly 3 400 dwelling units. Total insured losses from these wildland fire disasters and the 2017 wildland fire catastrophic events in British Columbia are currently estimated to be $4.8 billion. Despite all efforts, wildfires pose a significant challenge to the residential population, to mitigation efforts, and to existing infrastructure when located in a WUI setting. Wildfires are likely to become more severe and frequent as a result of climate change.

National Research Council Canada: Ottawa, ON. 2021. 192 pp.

Heather Kreidler, Rapporteur; Board on Environmental Change and Society; Board on Agriculture and Natural Resources; Division of Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education; Division on Earth and Life Studies; National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine

Over the past two decades, wildfires in western North America have significantly increased in frequency, magnitude, and severity. Scientists have documented three leading causes: a century of suppression and inadequate forest management that has led to overly dense, fuel-rich forests; climate change, which has turned woodlands and grasslands into hot, dry tinderboxes; and the spread of urbanization, which has increased the probability of man-made ignitions. Less well known are the environmental and social implications associated with the acceleration of these trends.

To explore these concerns and to identify possible policy responses, the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine's Board on Environmental Change and Society, in partnership with the Royal Society of Canada, convened a workshop in June 2024, "The Social and Ecological Consequences of Future Wildfire in the West". Over two days, two dozen wildfire experts and a hybrid audience of over 200 participants explored the history, current state, and anticipated future of wildfire science and policy across the western United States and Canada. This publication summarizes the presentations and discussions of the workshop.

National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2024. Social-Ecological Consequences of Future Wildfires and Smoke in the West: Proceedings of a Workshop. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. https://doi.org/10.17226/27972.

Contributor(s): National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine; Division on Earth and Life Studies; Board on Chemical Sciences and Technology; Committee on the Chemistry of Urban Wildfires

Wildfires in America are becoming larger, more frequent, and more destructive, driven by climate change and existing land management practices. Many of these fires occur at the wildland-urban interface (WUI), areas where development and wildland areas overlap and which are increasingly at risk of devastating fires as communities continue to expand into previously undeveloped areas. Unlike conventional wildfires, WUI fires are driven in part by the burning of homes, cars, and other human-made structures and in part by burning vegetation. The interaction of these two types of fires can lead to public health effects that are unique to WUI fires.

This report evaluates existing and needed chemistry information that decision-makers can use to mitigate WUI fires and their potential health impacts. It describes key fuels of concern in WUI fires, especially household components like siding, insulation, and plastic. It examines key pathways for exposure, including inhalation and ingestion, and identifies communities vulnerable to exposure. The report recommends a research agenda to inform response to and prevention of WUI fires, outlining needs in characterizing fuels and predicting emissions and toxicants.

National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2022. The Chemistry of Fires at the Wildland-Urban Interface. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. https://doi.org/10.17226/26460. .2022. 215p.

U.S. Forest Service

Under this strategy, the Forest Service will work with partners to engineer a paradigm shift by focusing fuels and forest health treatments more strategically and at the scale of the problem, using the best available science as the guide. At the Forest Service, we now have the science and tools we need to size and place treatments in a way that will truly make a difference. We will focus on key “firesheds”—large forested landscapes and rangelands with a high likelihood that an ignition could expose homes, communities, and infrastructure to wildfire. Firesheds, typically about 250,000 acres in size, are mapped to match the scale of community exposure to wildfire.

Our new management paradigm builds on the National Cohesive Wildland Fire Management Strategy, Our new management paradigm builds on the National Cohesive Wildland Fire Management Strategy, including efforts to create fire-adapted communities and other collaborative strategies for cross-boundary treatments, including Cohesive Strategy projects and Shared Stewardship agreements. We will build on our long-standing work and relationships with U.S. Department of the Interior agencies. We will work collaboratively with States, Tribes, local communities, private landowners, and other stakeholders to adapt lessons learned into a coordinated and effective program of work.

U.S. Forest Service. 2022. 35p.

By Alexander Maranghides, Eric D. Link, Christopher U. Brown, William Mell, Steven Hawks, Mike Wilson, Will Brewer, Robert Vihnanek, William D. Walton

The Camp Fire ignited on November 8, 2018 in the foothills of the Sierra Nevada in Butte County, California. The first 24 hours were characterized by a fast-moving fire with initial spread driven by high winds up to 22 m/s (50 mi/h) and long-range spotting up to 6.3 km (3.9 mi) into the community. The fire quickly impacted the communities of Concow, Paradise, and Magalia. The Camp Fire became the most destructive and deadly fire in California history, with over 18,000 destroyed structures, 700 damaged structures, and 85 fatalities. After a preliminary reconnaissance, it was determined that abundant data was available to support an in-depth case study of this devastating wildland-urban interface (WUI) fire to increase our understanding of WUI fire spread, fire behavior, evacuation, and structure response. The methodology guiding the case study and a detailed timeline reconstruction of the fire progression and fire behavior are presented. Over 2200 observations about fire spread and behavior were collected during the case study. Subsequent reports will detail additional aspects of the incident including emergency response and evacuation, and defensive actions and structure response. This study has identified that Butte County and the Town of Paradise were well prepared to respond to a WUI fire, that the Camp Fire grew and spread rapidly and that multiple factors contributed to the rapid growth and spread of the Camp Fire. Additionally, this study identified the importance of the wildland fire ignition location relative to the community, that multiple parcel-level fire spread pathways caused structure ignitions, and that WUI fire spread impacted the affected communities in multiple ways beyond the destruction of residential and commercial properties.

Technical Note (NIST TN) - 2135. 2021. 425p.

By The Los Angeles County

The Los Angeles County After Action Review of the Woolsey Fire evaluates the incident’s response, identifies areas for improvement, and offers recommendations for future preparedness, focusing on agency coordination, communication, evacuation, and recovery efforts.

• The Woolsey Fire After Action Review (AAR) provides a comprehensive analysis of the event, highlighting both successes and areas for improvement.
• The AAR process involved data collection, interviews, and cross-checking to ensure a detailed account of the incident.
• Key sections of the report include an executive summary, timeline of events, findings, and recommendations.
• Recommendations are divided into near-term and longer-term policy actions, focusing on response, communication, evacuation, and recovery.
• Appendices provide historical context and background information on involved agencies and regional fire history.
• The report emphasizes planning for future disasters in areas prone to wildfires and earthquakes.
• Training and coordination among agencies, such as the County Sheriff’s Department and Public Works, are highlighted as crucial for effective disaster response.
• Historical fire data shows a repetitive fire cycle in the region, underlining the importance of preparedness and mitigation efforts.

LLos Angeles County. 2019. 203p.

CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION, US. Department of Justice

• Tulsa Race Massacre: Violent attack on Black community of Greenwood, Oklahoma, May 31-June 1, 1921.
• Massive Destruction: 10,000 white Tulsans destroyed homes, businesses; hundreds of Black residents killed.
• Law Enforcement’s Role: Deputized white residents participated in violence, looting, and arson.
• Failure of Justice: Authorities failed to help survivors; legal attempts for reparations were unsuccessful.
• Historical Reckoning: DOJ review acknowledges massacre’s impact, despite expired statutes of limitations.
• Legal Analysis: Modern laws could have prosecuted hate crimes, but were unavailable in 1921.
• Insurance Denials: Black residents denied compensation due to “riot clause” in policies.
• Federal Investigation: DOJ’s Cold Case Unit reviewed the events under the Emmett Till Act.
• Government’s Role: White officials obstructed rebuilding efforts, imposed restrictive fire codes.
• Survivors’ Plight: Left without resources, faced systemic racism and state-sanctioned brutality.
• Historical Documentation: Review includes survivor accounts, primary materials, and past investigations.
• Confrontation Trigger: Arrest of Dick Rowland and sensationalized newspaper article incited violence.
• Continued Efforts: Work to ensure future generations understand the massacre’s magnitude continues.

CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION, US. Department of Justice. 2025. 126p

By Parliament of Australia. Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs References Committee

This examination of right-wing extremists in Australia looks at the movements, motivations and international links of local groups, particularly in online spaces. The report makes recommendations focusing on social media platform regulation, law enforcement access to encrypted communications and the creation of a national hate crimes database.

The inquiry, prompted by growing concern regarding right-wing extremism globally and its impact on Australian society, sought digito define, understand and limit the harm of right-wing extremist movements. Along with the historical and ideological background, it considers modern pathways to radicalisation with a focus on the significant role of online platforms. The report considers existing measures in place to counter violent extremism and makes six recommendations to curtail the spread and limit the harm of extremist groups.

Recommendations

The Australian Government should regularly assess the effectiveness of deradicalisation and countering violent extremism programs, incorporating insights from experts, practitioners, and research organisations, both domestically and internationally.

Develop a national framework to guide engagement with young people, aiming to help them identify and reject harmful ideologies while fostering positive social connections.

Research how extremist actors, particularly those targeting young people, use online platforms, including social media and gaming platforms, to spread propaganda and recruit members.

The Office of the eSafety Commissioner should collaborate with stakeholders to develop guidelines for transparent and independent measures to ensure social media platforms are effectively removing harmful extremist content.

Consider legislation allowing law enforcement and intelligence agencies, with a warrant obtained through proper judicial process, to access encrypted communications when there is a credible national security threat.

Establish a national hate crimes database to aid in the development of effective prevention and support programs.

Canberra: Parliament of Australia. The Senate, Legal and Constitutional Affairs References Committee 2024. 223p.

By Namkee G. Choi, C. Nathan Marti, Bryan Y. Choi

Background: Cannabidiol (CBD) use has been increasing for its putative therapeutic potential for various health conditions. Research using a nationally representative sample is needed to examine characteristics of CBD users. Methods: Data came from the adult sample (N=47,100) of the 2022 U.S. National Survey on Drug Use and Health. We fitted generalized linear models to examine the sociodemographic, health, other substance use, and cannabis risk perception as correlates of CBD-only use and CBD-cannabis co-use, compared to cannabis-only use. Results: In 2022, 20.6 % and 23.0 % of U.S. adults reported using CBD and cannabis, respectively, in the preceding 12 months, and 63 % of CBD users also used cannabis. CBD use was significantly higher among women (CBD-only vs. cannabis-only use: IRR=1.43, 95 % CI=1.31–1.57), but significantly lower among Black and Hispanic individuals compared to non-Hispanic White individuals (CBD-only vs. cannabis-only use: IRR=0.71, 95 % CI=0.60–0.85 for Black individuals; IRR=0.79, 95 % CI=0.65–0.96 for Hispanic individuals). Older ages, higher SES, chronic medical conditions, mental illness, and high cannabis risk perception were also associated with higher likelihood of CBD-only use versus cannabis-only use. CBD-cannabis co-users were at most risk in terms of chronic illness, mental illness, cannabis use disorder, and other substance use problems. Conclusions: The high prevalence of self-reported CBD use among those with physical and mental health problems warrants public health warnings about potential side effects and drug interactions. The high CBD-cannabis co-use rate also calls for more research on potential benefits and negative effects of the co-use.

Drug and Alcohol Dependence Reports Volume 13, December 2024, 100289

By Melissa Mendez

This paper, based on a qualitative study with incarcerated male young offenders in Trinidad and Tobago, explores participants’ conceptualizations of the impact of family background on adolescent offending. The paper challenges the civilized vs deviant dichotomy often proffered when discussing the presence (and absence) of fathers and offers a nuanced account of what makes a ‘good family’ and a ‘good father’ according to young offenders. Findings demonstrate participants’ preference for the nuclear family, irrespective of whether they were raised within supportive familial networks. These findings raise questions about the continued strength of historically resilient matrifocal support systems in the Caribbean.

The British Journal of Criminology, 2024, 18 p.