By Mohammed Chiran

This policy brief delves into France’s strategy for managing Islamist terrorists and radicalized prisoners (2015-2023). The first part spans the evolution of challenges within the French prison system, covering the return of foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) and responses to terrorist attacks carried out between 2015 and 2018. The second part details key approaches for managing radicalised inmates, encompassing assessment, prison regimes, rehabilitation, monitoring, and post-release reintegration. The last section explains why it was necessary to identify the Salafi-jihadism threat to tailor prison approaches specifically to this ideology. The recommendations underscore the importance of effective communication regarding the necessity to tailor prison regimes to levels of violent radicalisation while upholding human rights. Finally, the policy brief advocates adapting counter-terrorism strategies to address Salafi-Jihadi ideology. The analysis presented in this paper draws upon the professional experience of its author, who in prisons has dedicated six years to working in P/CVE within the French prison system, as well as insights gathered from open-source materials.

   ICCT Policy Brief  

The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2024. 24p.

MAY CONTAIN MARKUP

C. Christine Fair and Peter Chalk

"Fortifying Pakistan: The Role of U.S. Internal Security Assistance" delves into the complex relationship between the United States and Pakistan, focusing on the dynamics of internal security assistance. The book provides a comprehensive analysis of how U.S. involvement has influenced Pakistan's security landscape, shedding light on the challenges and opportunities inherent in this strategic partnership. Through meticulous research and insightful perspectives, the author offers a valuable resource for policymakers, scholars, and anyone seeking a nuanced understanding of this critical geopolitical alliance.

UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE PRESS. Washington, DC. 2006. 182p.

By Emily Corner and Helen Taylor

Acts of extreme or mass violence perpetrated by lone offenders have become increasingly common in liberal democracies over the past 20 years. Some describe these acts as politically motivated, while others attribute them to mental disorder or criminal intent. This has led to the development of distinct research and practice areas focusing on either violent extremism, mass murder, fixation, stalking, or familial and intimate partner homicide. However, there is increasing understanding that the distinction between political ideology, criminal intent and personal motivation is blurred, and that the violence carried out by these individuals is better understood using the broader concept of grievance-fuelled violence. This work is the first to empirically consolidate the existing research in these distinct areas, employing a multifaceted analytical approach to develop a holistic model of the processes of grievance development among those who commit grievance-fuelled violence.

Research Report no. 27. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 2023. 95p.

By Timothy Cubitt and Heather Wolbers

Risk assessment for violent extremism plays a critical role in understanding the threat posed by radicalised offenders and determining how these individuals are managed both in correctional settings and in the community. The Australian Institute of Criminology (AIC) was engaged by the Department of Home Affairs’ Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Branch to conduct a review of the use of risk assessments for violent extremism in Australia.

The aim of this review was to:

• identify and describe violent extremism risk assessment tools currently available to support risk assessments of convicted terrorist offenders;

• assess each tool’s suitability to assist an expert to conduct an assessment of the risk to the community from an offender, when a court is considering whether to issue a control order under Division 104 or a post-sentence order under Division 105A of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Criminal Code); and

• review current risk assessment frameworks, including the use of Structured Professional Judgement, to assess the risk of violent extremist offending and consider how violent extremism risk assessment tools might be improved.

A review of relevant peer-reviewed and grey literature was undertaken alongside semi-structured interviews with a group of experts in violent extremism risk assessment. Findings from this review are organised according to the Terms of Reference.

Special reports. no 14. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 2023. 70p.

By Oluwole Ojewale, et al.

This report details the findings of the research study that examined the plausibility between terrorism and banditry towards shedding new light on the dynamics of the country’s security challenges especially in northwest and north central Nigeria, within the focal context of Kaduna, Katsina, Niger and Zamfara States. Nigeria faces a plethora of security challenges ranging from the Boko Haram religious/violent extremism cum insurgency in the northeast to farmer-herder conflict and banditry in the northcentral and northeast, a revived secessionist movement in the southeast, police repression, piracy, and more recently attacks the nexus between banditry and terrorism; highlight the strategies and actions required by various stakeholders at various levels to counter the spread of banditry and terrorism in these focal states. Predominantly, the report utilises both qualitative and descriptive methods, generated from primary and secondary data gotten through desk review, and a consolidation of findings with feedback from consultations with stakeholders in selected focal states. The report undertook qualitative research in the focal states, documenting the experiences of some critical stakeholders through key on security installations, among others. In spite of government efforts, the security situation in Nigeria is deteriorating. The report thus explores the question of whether banditry and terrorism are the alternate side of the same coin and the security and policy implications of conflating both. The purpose of this report is to ascertain informant interviews. These interviews were cluster-based to provide a better context to the literature and systemically present the experiences of stakeholders. The report finds that while banditry gravely endangers public safety and security in the focal states, there are contextual differences in the origin, evolution, and manifestations of banditry in the focal states. Understanding these local variations is important to deploying effective and sustainable solutions to this spectre of banditry that defines governance in the states. The report also notes that there is no discernible ideological persuasion underpinning banditry beyond theft, extortion, and wanton violence. Bandits are primarily motivated by the alluring prospects of wealth in a region blighted by poverty and poor socioeconomic outcomes. However, this does not exclude the fact that fundamentalist Islamist groups operate in the same space as bandits. There is the possibility that some bandit groups might have adopted more of a religious modus operandi on their initiative or through limited contact with extremist groups. While the report notes the dearth of studies investigating in detail the theoretical and functional nature of the relationship between banditry and terrorism in these four states, the preliminary evidence points to the existence of both environmental and operational convergence between bandits and Islamist fundamentalist groups in the focal states.

Africa: Goodluck Jonathan Foundation (GJF) 2021. 43p.

By Jessica Katzenstein

Six years after the germinal United States protests against anti-Black police violence in Ferguson, MO, and months after the 2020 police killings of George Floyd and Breonna Taylor, police in mine-resistant vehicles have once again occupied both the streets and mass public attention. In 2014, images from the Ferguson protests—of snipers pointing semi automatic rifles into crowds and officers tear-gassing unarmed civilians—prompted activists and politicians to compare the St. Louis suburb to occupied Gaza, Ukraine, or Iraq.2 During the summer of 2020, as the U.S. witnessed its largest public uprisings since the 1960s, police militarization again came under scrutiny. The Department of Homeland Security flew surveillance aircraft over protests in 15 cities, as officers on the ground deployed flash-bang grenades, sound cannons, rubber bullets, and tear gas against peaceful demonstrators.3 Since protests began, at least 14 local law enforcement agencies in 10 states have received free mine-resistant vehicles built for the U.S. military.4 In response, some lawmakers have revived efforts to curtail such transfers of military equipment.5 Reform groups are advocating to demilitarize the police by limiting when and how they can use armored vehicles and camouflage uniforms.6 In this moment of potential transformation, we must analyze both the deep roots and the recent upsurge of police “militarization” in order to grasp what calls for “demilitarizing” the police could mean. This paper argues that today’s high level of police militarization is one of the cruel, complex domestic costs of recent American wars abroad. Police militarization is in a sense as old as U.S. policing itself, yet it has exploded since September 11, 2001 and its intensification must be counted among the costs of this country’s post-9/11 wars.

Providence, RI: Brown University, Watson Institute, 2020. 20p.

By Michael A. Jensen and Elena Akers

Recent mass casualty attacks in the United States have renewed a long-standing debate over the need for novel legislation to effectively prosecute domestic terrorism. Those who advocate for a new terrorism law argue that deficiencies in the US legal code present challenges to prosecuting domestic extremists, leading to unwarranted sentencing disparities in international and domestic terrorism cases. Critics of the proposal for a domestic terrorism law counter that the US legal code is sufficiently flexible for the courts to punish domestic extremists to the same extent as their international counterparts. Neither side, however, has produced an empirical assessment to support their claims. In this article, we address this research gap by analysing data on 344 US federal terrorism cases that were initiated between 2014 and 2019. We find that significant disparities are endemic to US federal terrorism prosecutions for three types of sentencing outcomes: length of incarceration; time spent on supervision upon release from prison; and the use of restrictive monitoring conditions. International terrorism defendants are more likely than domestic extremists to receive severe penalties for all three sentencing decisions even when controlling for criminal severity. Sentencing disparities in US federal terrorism cases are especially large when domestic extremists are prosecuted using common criminal charges, like weapons violations. We conclude with a discussion of what these findings mean for promoting judicial fairness in US terrorism prosecutions.

Perspectives on Terrorism Volume XVIII, Issue 1 March 2024

By U.S. Government Accountability Office; 

  On January 6, 2021, thousands of demonstrators surrounded the U.S. Capitol Building. Demonstrators attacked and injured law enforcement officers and eventually breached the building. The Capitol Police is responsible for protecting the Congress, its Members, staff, visitors, and facilities. The Capitol Police Board oversees the Capitol Police. GAO was asked to review the Capitol Police’s physical security efforts for January 6. This report addresses the Capitol Police and the Board’s: (1) physical security planning for January 6; (2) response to that day’s events, including the procedures for obtaining outside assistance; and (3) process for assessing and mitigating physical security risks. GAO reviewed Capitol Police plans, procedures, hearing statements, timelines, and other documents related to the planning and response on January 6 and how the Capitol Police assesses security risks. GAO also interviewed officials from the Capitol Police Board, the Capitol Police, the Architect of the Capitol, and other federal, state, and local agencies. What GAO Recommends GAO is making four recommendations to the Capitol Police Board and the Capitol Police, including finalizing and documenting procedures for obtaining outside assistance in an emergency, addressing security risks, and considering security recommendations. The Capitol Police Board did not take a position on GAO’s recommendations. The Capitol Police agreed with GAO’s recommendations.  

Washington DC: GAO. 2022, 68pg

By Holger Anders

  This Briefing Paper looks at sources and pathways through which al-Qaeda- and Islamic State-linked extremists in Mali obtain their arms, ammunition, and explosives. This review includes an analysis of the materiel’s origins, types, and ages. The Briefing Paper presents the author’s assessment of some 800 arms and 12,000 ammunition casings that national and international authorities recovered and granted access to following extremist attacks in Mali from 2015 to 2022. Introduction -  By 2022, Mali had faced more than a decade of armed violence perpetrated by violent extremists. Since 2015, this violence has also spread from northern to central and southern parts of Mali, resulting in thousands of victims among national and international armed forces, UN peacekeepers, and civilians. This Briefing Paper investigates the arms, ammunition, explosives, and other material used by al-Qaeda- and IslamicState linked extremists (‘extremists’) as ‘tools of violence’ used in their attacks from 2015 to 2022. It provides an update on findings previously published by the Small Arms Survey concerning the proliferation and trafficking of illicit materiel in northern Mali prior to 2015. Specifically, this Briefing Paper focuses on military materiel legally produced and transferred by state actors before being diverted to extremist use in Mali.2 In so doing, the Briefing Paper examines three topics: 1. continuity in extremist procurement of their ‘tools of violence’; 2. changes in illicitly trafficked materiel and their sources; and 3. extremist network connections identified by the monitoring of this material. A confidential database maintained by the author provides the basis for the technical information concerning extremist-used arms and other material in this Briefing Paper.3 That database contains information about some 400 extremist attacks occurring across Mali between 2015 and 2022 from sites in which national and international authorities recovered extremist-used materiel that was made available for inspection by the author. The database also contains some 200 entries of extremist propaganda claims—documented in videos and texts on social media—relating to extremist attacks in Mali from 2012 to 2022. Interviewees included in this Briefing Paper are not uniformly identified for reasons of security and confidentiality. All information presented in graphs, illustrative maps, and tables is based on the author’s work and information contained within the database. The Briefing Paper first looks at security developments in Mali since 2015.5 It then looks at extremist-held armaments in Mali prior to 2015 and at continuity and change in these armaments after that. The discussion is supplemented with insights into network connections between extremist groups in Mali.6 Key findings Extremists continue to have access to arms and other materiel—including material of recent production— through capture from armed forces and illicit trafficking from the subregion. Libya remains a prominent source for illicitly trafficking military materiel to Mali; however, other sub-regional sources exist. These sources include components for commercial explosives used in improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in Mali. Established extremist groups use materiel to support the creation of new cells, which is a key mechanism in the spread of violent extremism in Mali.

Geneva, SWIT: Small Arms Survey. 2024, 16pg

By Bàrbara Molas, Anne Craanen, Sabrina Tripodi, Kacper Rękawek, andThomas Renard

Anti-Government Extremism (AGE) presents a complex and evolving security challenge, particularly in the transatlantic space. AGE is characterised by anti-system sentiments, and adherents propagate notions of an evil elite controlling societal mechanisms, adapting global conspiracy theories to local grievances. While predominantly non-violent, it harbours the potential for violence, posing a significant policy challenge. This report contributes a comprehensive exploration of AGE by utilising original data, including interviews with security officials and an exploration of AGE spaces online, focusing on Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United States. Through thematic comparative analysis, it unveils the nature of anti-government groups and individuals, elucidating their transnational linkages both online and offline. By shedding new light on AGE’s manifestations, severity, and responses across jurisdictions, this research illuminates whether AGE constitutes a standalone security concern. Furthermore, it offers insights into practical strategies for addressing AGE, especially in the context of existing policies for preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE). The recommendations provided are tailored to the differing characteristics of AGE groups, individuals, and networks, ensuring a nuanced and effective response to this emerging threat, both online and offline.

The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT). 2024, 48pg

By Ángel Gómez , Mercedes Martínez , Francois Alexi Martel , Lucía López-Rodríguez , Alexandra Vázquez , Juana Chinchilla , Borja Paredes , Mal Hettiarachchi , Nafees Hamid , and William B Swann 

We distinguish two pathways people may follow when they join violent groups: compliance and internalization. Compliance occurs when individuals are coerced to join by powerful influence agents. Internalization occurs when individuals join due to a perceived convergence between the self and the group. We searched for evidence of each of these pathways in field investigations of former members of two renowned terrorist organizations: the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) (Study 1) and Islamist radical groups (Study 2). Results indicated that ex-fighters joined LTTE for reasons associated with both compliance and internalization but that ex-fighters joined Islamist radical groups primarily for reasons associated with internalization. When compliance occurred, it often took the form of coercion within LTTE but involved charismatic persuasion agents within Islamist groups. This evidence of systematic differences in the reasons why fighters enter violent groups suggests that strategies for preventing radicalization and fostering de-radicalization should be tailored to particular groups.

Front Psychol. 2021 Jan 7

By International Crisis Group

What’s new? Jama’tu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad (JAS) has gained ground in the intra-jihadist fighting in north-eastern Nigeria, halting the previous momentum of the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP). In the course of 2023, JAS took most of the islands in Lake Chad, which ISWAP had controlled. 

Why did it happen? Conflict between these Boko Haram splinters stems from differences in governance and treatment of civilians. JAS kills and steals from everyone; the more bureaucratic ISWAP generally spares Muslim non-combatants. Many JAS members surrendered to authorities or continued fighting instead of joining ISWAP after the death of JAS’s

leader in 2021. 

  Why does it matter? In the last two years, JAS and ISWAP may have visited more damage upon each other than the Lake Chad states have inflicted on the jihadists. Still, the splinters pose a significant threat. ISWAP is regrouping, while the revamped JAS is set to target civilians around the lake. What should be done? The Lake Chad governments will need to do more to prevail over the jihadists. They should mitigate risks to civilians by maintaining humanitarian assistance; expanding efforts to support defectors; improving airstrike precision; and reinvigorating regional security cooperation.    

Edited by Jeff Breinholt

Initially enacted in 1992, the Antiterrorism Act (ATA), 18 U.S.C. §2333, provides a legal remedy for American victims killed or injured by reason of international terrorism by creating a private cause of action, with treble damages and attorneys’ fees. Since then, some 150 lawsuits have been brought under the statute against such terrorist organizations as Hamas, Hizballah, and FARC, as well as the banks and companies alleged to have assisted them. These lawsuits have generated some 600 opinions.

Washington, DC: George Washington University Program on Extremism. 2024, 91pg

Edited By James Cuno and Thomas G. Weiss

Intentional destruction of cultural heritage has a long history. Contemporary examples include the Bamiyan Buddhas in Afghanistan, mosques in Xinjiang, China, mausoleums in Timbuktu, Mali, and Greco-Roman remains in Syria. Cultural heritage destruction invariably accompanies assaults on civilians, making heritage attacks impossible to disentangle from the mass atrocities of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing. Both seek to eliminate people and the heritage with which they identify. Cultural Heritage and Mass Atrocities assembles thirty-eight experts from the heritage, social science, humanitarian, legal, and military communities. Focusing on immovable cultural heritage vulnerable to attack, the volume’s guiding framework is the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), a United Nations resolution adopted unanimously in 2005 to permit international intervention against crimes of war or genocide. Based on the three pillars of prevent, react, and rebuild, R2P offers today’s policymakers a set of existing laws and international norms that can and—as this book argues—must be extended to the protection of cultural heritage. Essays consider the global value of cultural heritage and document recent attacks on people and sites in China, Guatemala, Iraq, Mali, Sri Lanka and Afghanistan, Syria, and Yemen. Comprehensive sections on vulnerable populations as well as the role of international law and the military offer readers critical insights and point toward research, policy, and action agendas to protect both people and cultural heritage. The table of contents along with a concise abstract of each chapter is offered online in Arabic, Chinese, French, Russian, and Spanish to facilitate robust, global dissemination of the strategies and tactics offered in this pathbreaking call to action.

Los Angeles: J. Paul Getty Trust, 2022. 649p.

By Elie Cavigneaux

Defeating terrorism and saving art: fighting the same battle

In a world where chaos and political instability plague many countries in the Middle East and North Africa, a lesser-known crime has emerged: the trafficking of cultural goods. This phenomenon, often overshadowed by more prominent issues, poses a significant global threat. But why is the trafficking of art and antiquities so concerning?

1. Financing Terrorism: Cultural goods trafficking is not merely a trade—it’s a critical source of funding for terrorism. Security Council resolutions, UNESCO, the European Union, and financial investigation units have all documented this link. The self-proclaimed “Islamic State” even institutionalized this trade, issuing excavation permits and organizing the sale of stolen pieces to market countries.

2. Hidden Threats: Although these looted artifacts may not flood the markets immediately, history shows that they can resurface years later. Works looted by the Nazis during World War II, for instance, have reappeared after decades of concealment.

3. Beyond Terrorism: Yet, the interest in this analysis extends beyond terrorism financing. The resale of “blood antiquities” reveals another dimension: money laundering, fraud, and tax evasion. This criminal activity affects not only the antiques market but also the broader art market.

4. Investing for Tomorrow: To combat this multifaceted threat, we must invest in detecting and preventing crimes related to cultural and art objects. Whether in times of war or peace, our ability to safeguard culture and heritage depends on proactive measures.

Working Paper. Paris: Groupe d’études géopolitiques, 2021. 13p

By Lauren Van Metre and Thomas Leo Scherer  

  The United States Institute of Peace seeks to advance the field of peacebuilding by evaluating the evidence base supporting its core practices, such as dialogue and conflict analysis, engagement with religious leaders, and the prevention and countering of violent extremism. These systematic reviews identify effective programming and new approaches for further exploration. This evidence review paper evaluates the evidence and practice of an evolving approach to preventing and countering violent extremism: understanding and strengthening community resilience. Preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) is unique among peacebuilding areas. The field was initially shaped and influenced by a frenzied national security response to a perceived imminent threat from a global religious radical movement that sought the destruction of the West and its secular governments. Thus, the problem of violent extremism and its countering strategy were neatly encapsulated in an ideological paradigm that facilitated crisis decision-making rather than purposeful action in support of an evidence-based policy and practice. Today, in promoting a community resilience approach to P/CVE, it is critical to steer away from earlier ideologically influenced forms of community engagement by acknowledging that ideological remnants persist and continue to do harm to frontline communities; these forms of community engagement scapegoat communities for attracting violent-extremist networks and target them as “threats” for security force responses. Instead, the P/CVE field needs to adopt a radically dif­ferent resilience approach that presumes and strengthens a community’s capacity to resist violent extremism.

Washington, DC:  The United States Institute of Peace , 2023. 72p.

By Harald De Cauwer; Dennis G. Barten; Derrick Tin; Luc J. Mortelmans; Gregory R. Ciottone; Francis Somville

  Background: Mass gatherings are vulnerable to terrorist attacks and are considered soft targets with potential to inflict high numbers of casualties. The objective of this study was to identify and characterize all documented terrorist attacks targeted at concerts and festivals reported to the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) over a 50-year period. Methods: TheGTDwas searched forall terrorist attacks against concerts and festivals that occurred world-wide from 1970 through 2019. Analyseswere performed on temporal factors, location, target type, attack and weapon type, attacker type, and number of casualties or hostages. Ambiguous incidents were excluded if there was doubt about whether they were exclusively acts of terrorism. Chi Square tests were performed to evaluate trends over time and differences in attack types. Results: In total, 146 terrorist attacks were identified. In addition to musical concerts, festivals included religious, cultural, community, and food festivals. With 53 incidents, South Asia was the most heavily hit region of the world, followed by theMiddle East & North Africa with 25 attacks. Bombings and explosions were the most common attack types. The attacks targeted attendees, pilgrims, politicians, or police/military members who secured the concerts and festivals. Conclusion: This analysis of the GTD, which identified terrorist attacks aimed at concerts and festivals over a 50-year period, demonstrates that the threat is significant, and not only in world regions where terrorism is more prevalent or local conflicts are going on. The findings of this study may help to create or enhance contingency plans.  

Prehosp Disaster Med. 2023;38(1):33–40. 

By Michael A. Jensen,  Sheehan Kane,  Elena Akers, Rese

The most significant terrorist threat to the United States originates from domestic extremist movements, which have steadily increased their violent activities in recent years. While a host of legal statutes were passed after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks to aid in the prosecution of international terrorism suspects, the rapid rise in domestic extremism has not led to a similar process of revising the U.S. legal code. Many international terrorism defendants are prosecuted under specific terrorism statutes that are far less often used in cases involving individuals suspected of committing domestic extremist crimes. The application of different laws in international and domestic terrorism cases has led to intense debate over the need for new domestic terrorism legislation. Proponents argue that legal revisions are necessary to promote judicial fairness, address sentencing disparities, and deter individuals from engaging in domestic extremism. Opponents argue that international and domestic terrorism cases can already be prosecuted to a similar extent under the current legal regime, and they suggest that new domestic terrorism laws could be used to infringe on civil rights and liberties.

This research brief contributes to this debate by providing an assessment of the current legal regime as it applies to the prosecution of terrorism in the United States. Using data from the Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the United States (PIRUS) project, this brief looks at sentencing disparities in 344 federal terrorism prosecutions that were initiated between 2014-2019. The brief includes sections on the “in/out” decision, case disposition, incarceration length, post-incarceration supervision, and special conditions of probation.

College Park, MD: START., 2023. 9p.

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BY SAMUEL STOUFFER, LOUIS GUTTMAN, EDWARD SUCHMAN, PAUL LAZARSFELD, SHIRLEY STAR, and JOHN CLAUSEN

"The American Soldier Vol. 4: Measurement and Prediction" delves into the intricate world of military assessment and forecasting, offering readers a comprehensive look at the tools and techniques used to evaluate soldier performance and anticipate future outcomes. This volume provides valuable insights into the evolving landscape of warfare, where data-driven decisions play a crucial role in shaping strategies and outcomes. From advanced measurement technologies to predictive analytics, this book equips readers with the knowledge needed to understand and navigate the complexities of modern military operations. A must-read for anyone interested in the intersection of technology, strategy, and warfare."

PRINCETON, NJ. PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS. 1950. 772p.

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BY SAMUEL A. STOUFFER ,ARTHU R A. LUMSDAINE, MARION HARPER LUMSDAINE ,ROBIN M. WILLI AMS, Jr., M. BREWSTER SMITH, IRVING L. JANIS, SHIRL EY A. STAR , AND LEONARD S. COTTRELL , Jr.

"The American Soldier Vol. 2: Combat and Its Aftermath" delves into the harrowing experiences of American soldiers on the battlefield and the lasting impact of war on their lives. Through gripping narratives and reflective insights, this volume explores the challenges faced by soldiers during combat, as well as the physical, emotional, and psychological toll that continues long after the guns fall silent. With a blend of firsthand accounts and historical context, this book offers a poignant and unvarnished look at the reality of war and its profound effects on those who serve. "The American Soldier Vol. 2" is a compelling tribute to the courage, sacrifice, and resilience of the men and women who bear the burdens of conflict in defense of their country.

PRINCETON, NJ. PRINCETON UNIVERSTY PRESS. 1949. 664p.