By Simon A. Cole Maurice Possley Ken Otterbourg Jessica Weinstock Paredes , Barbara O’Brien, Meghan Cousino, & Samuel R. Gross,

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A. THE CASES

• This report analyzes 151 cases in which defendants were exonerated between 1989 and 2023 in the United States and medicolegal death investigation (“death investigation” for short) contributed to the false conviction.

• The 151 exonerees lost a total of 1,837 years in prison, an average of 12.2 years per exoneree. That is less than the average of 14.6 years for exonerees convicted of comparable crimes but for whom death investigation did not contribute to the false conviction.

B. CASE CHARACTERISTICS

• Not surprisingly, 140 (93%) of the 151 cases in which death investigation contributed to the false conviction were homicides. However, death investigators did contribute to eleven non-homicide cases, all involving abuse of vulnerable people: children or dependent adults. Eight of these eleven were cases involving the Shaken Baby Syndrome (SBS) diagnosis, in which the top charge was child abuse.

• In more than one-third of the cases, the death investigation evidence consisted of a claim that the medical evidence was consistent with the prosecution’s theory of the crime, e.g., that the victim’s wounds were consistent with a weapon linked to the defendant.

• In another third of the cases the death investigation evidence concerned the cause of death.

• Manner of death and time of death evidence contributed to fewer cases.

C. DEMOGRAPHICS

• Women were overrepresented among the defendants for whom the death investigation contributed to their false conviction. Thirty-nine (26%) of the defendants in the 151 cases were female, more than three times the 8% of all exonerees who were female. Only around 5% of exonerees convicted of comparable crimes were female.-

• Relatedly, cases involving child victims were particularly vulnerable to contributions by death investigation. Nearly half (47%) of the 151 cases involved child victims. That compares to only 19% of all non-death-investigation exonerations and 34% of non-death-investigation exonerations for comparable crimes.

• Although concerns have been raised about racial bias in death investigation, the exonerees in death investigation exoneration cases were whiter than exonerees in general. One third of death investigation exonerees were Black compared to 53% of all exonerees. Similarly, 8% of death investigation exonerees were Hispanic, compared to 12% of all exonerees. The higher representation of whites diminishes somewhat if women are removed from the analysis.

D. DEATH INVESTIGATION SYSTEMS

• The United States has a patchwork death investigation system with variations among and within states. The two primary types are medical examiner and coroner systems. Most, but not all, experts perceive medical examiner systems to be superior and call for them to replace coroner systems. We did not find that more false convictions occurred under coroner systems. Instead, false convictions generally occurred in proportion to where more people live: their occurrence correlated with those counties’ and states’ proportions of the US population.

• Nor did we find that more false convictions occurred in systems with elected (rather than appointed) coroners and death investigators.

• In 22% of cases, the death investigation office that contributed to the false conviction was accredited by the National Association of Medical Examiners (NAME). Only 17% of US death investigation facilities are accredited.

E. QUALIFICATIONS OF DEATH INVESTIGATORS

• The highest qualification for death investigators in the US is generally considered to be board certification in the subspecialty of forensic pathology by the American Board of Pathology. However, for decades there have not been enough board-certified pathologists in the US to meet the need for death investigation services and autopsies. Therefore, many death investigations and autopsies are performed by less qualified personnel, such as pathologists without board certification, physicians with specialties other than pathology, and even, in some cases, non-physicians such as funeral directors. We did not find that most false convictions occurred in cases with underqualified death investigators. In fact, board-certified forensic pathologists contributed to 61% (92) of the 151 cases in this study.

National Registry of Exonerations (2024), 90p

By Simon D. Venema, Marieke Haan, Eric Blaauw, René Veenstra

Little is known about the conditions under which paternal incarceration is harmful to children and the mechanisms that explain this. This study addressed the family relationship context in the associations between paternal incarceration and adolescents' internalizing and externalizing problem behaviors. Using data from the Future of Families and Child Wellbeing Study, a moderated mediation model was specified where paternal incarceration predicted adolescents’ internalizing and externalizing problem behaviors through family relationship quality, and where the mediating role of family relationship quality was moderated by pre-incarceration family relationship characteristics. Using latent profile analyses, three pre-incarceration family clusters were identified (“Cohesive”; “Fragmented”; “Disharmonious”). Analyses indicated that the association between paternal incarceration and family relationship quality differed across pre-incarceration family clusters and that decreased father mother relationship quality mediated the negative association between paternal incarceration and adolescents’ internalizing and externalizing problem behaviors among “Cohesive” and “Fragmented”, but not among “Disharmonious” family clusters. The findings suggest that adolescents with more harmonious pre-incarceration family relationships are most vulnerable to the negative consequences of paternal incarceration. The study demonstrates the need to consider the family relationship context to understand the intergenerational consequences of incarceration.

Journal of Developmental and Life-Course Criminology (2024) 10:213–241

By Christie Franks and Russell G Smith

Identity crime and misuse cost the Australian economy an estimated $3.1b in 2018–19 (Smith & Franks 2020). Protecting individuals’ personal identification information and finding secure ways to verify identities has become an increased priority as the impact of identity crime continues to grow in Australia and worldwide. Biometric technologies for identity verification provide an enhanced security solution, although implementation of biometric systems within Australian society has met with varying degrees of acceptance. Since 2013, the Australian Institute of Criminology (AIC) has conducted online surveys to gain a greater understanding of identity crime and misuse in Australia. These surveys have asked about respondents’ experience of identity crime and also their previous use of, and future willingness to use, biometric technologies to safeguard their personal information. This report presents both qualitative and quantitative research findings obtained from a sample of respondents in the most recent surveys concerning their experiences of biometrics and perceptions as to its role in identity security.

Research Report no. 20. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 2021. 76p.

By Gisli Vogler

How should those profiting from injustice and violence respond to their complicity? And how can they remain responsive when faced with the many ways in which they are entangled in an unjust world? We are at a deciding moment in affluent (Western) societies when it comes to addressing these kinds of questions. On the one hand, there is cause for optimism: the last decade has seen a significant shift towards open discussion of patriarchal society, institutional racism, capitalist exploitation, and the destruction of the environment, amongst many other contemporary political problems. Social movements such as #MeToo, Black Lives Matter, Fridays for Future, and Occupy Wall Street have helped turn assuming responsibility for violence and injustice into a dominant political issue. As a consequence, unjust practices, as diverse as Amazon’s working conditions and the Oxfam sexual exploitation scandal, are met with global condemnation. Debates about how those benefiting from exploitation and expropriation can act more responsibly now pervade many aspects of everyday life, from what to eat and wear, to who has what kind of opportunities. On the other hand, societies continue to be characterized by a failure to act upon the omnipresent demands for facing up to one’s involvement in injustice. Racism, sexism and ableism, and the exploitation of minorities, poorer countries and people, and nature all remain integral parts of human existence. The re-emergence of reactionary populist forces and parties in the US and large parts of Europe, together with the consolidation of power by authoritarian leaders across the world, has exacerbated the problem. The enduring failures by complicit actors to address injustice are cause for much despair and frustration. However, they have also served as catalysts for a sustained scholarly reflection on the complexities of complicity and how to address them (Beausoleil, 2019;  Hayward, 2017; Mihai, 2022; Schaap, 2020). It is my intention in this book to contribute to this interrogation and to think further how people can appropriately respond to their complicity in injustice and violence. To this end, I begin with a constructive evaluation of recent scholarship on complicity.  

Edinburgh:  Edinburgh University Press, 2024. 194p.

By Gian Maria Campedelli, Gianmarco Daniele, Marco Le Moglie

Detection is one of the main challenges in the fight against organized crime. We show that machine learning can be used to predict mafias infiltration in Italian local governments, as measured by the dismissal of city councils infiltrated by organized crime. The model successfully predicts up to 96% of out-of-sample municipalities previously identified as infiltrated by mafias, up to two years earlier, making this index a valuable tool for identifying municipalities at risk of infiltration well in advance. Furthermore, we can identify “high-risk” local governments that may be infiltrated by organized crime but have not been detected by the state, thereby improving the efficacy of detection. We then apply this new time-varying measure of organized crime to investigate the underlying causes of this type of rent-seeking. As criminals infiltrate politics to capture public resources, we study how a positive shock in public spending (European Union transfers), affects this phenomenon. Employing a geographic Difference-in-Discontinuities design, we find a substantial and lasting increase in the predicted risk of mafia infiltration (up to 14 p.p.), emphasizing the unintended effects of delivering aid where criminal organizations can appropriate public funds.

Unpublished paper, 2024. 103p.

By: Cassandra Cross

This article investigates the contributing factors (or triggers) to the realization of romance fraud victimization, based on 1015 reports lodged with Scamwatch (Australian online reporting portal for fraud) between July 2018 and July 2019 (inclusive). The article examines the free text narrative of each report to propose five discernible trigger categories: further requests for money; characteristics of communications; verification checks; an offender's action(s); and being told by a third party. Based on a comprehensive understanding of these five categories, the article advocates for broader messaging approaches to encompass financial literacy and well-being, cyberliteracy and critical thinking skills, cybersecurity practices, and respectful and healthy relationships. Leveraging the use of these wider education and awareness campaigns could improve recognition of romance fraud. Importantly, it is suggested that banks and other financial institutions are in a strong position to focus their efforts on some of these broader messages to effect positive change.

Criminology & Public PolicyVolume 22, Issue 4: Cybercrime and Cybersecurity Nov 2023 Pages 585-894

By Jakob Manthey, Jürgen Rehm,and Uwe Vertheina

With the enforcement of the Cannabis Act on 1 April 2024, Germany has adopted one of the most liberal legal approaches to cannabis on the continent. The German model prioritises a non-profit approach and precludes legal market mechanisms. We believe these are the main drivers for increasing cannabis use and related health problems, based on observations following cannabis legalisation in Canada and many states in the U.S. Although legalising cannabis possession and cultivation may not immediately eliminate the illegal market, it is expected to serve public health goals. Despite the overall positive evaluation of the Cannabis Act in Germany, there are three potential areas of concern: the potential for misuse of the medical system, the normalization of cannabis use, and the influence of the cannabis industry. The German model may herald the beginning of a new generation of European cannabis policies, but concerted efforts will be required to ensure that these policy reforms serve rather than undermine public health goals.

The LANCET Regional Health - Europe, Vol 42 July, 2024

 By Virginia Comolli   

Building and expanding on the analysis in the Global Organized Crime Index, the GI-TOC has undertaken to map trends in organized criminality in the Pacific (Oceania). The resulting papers contribute to filling some of the gaps in a region where crime-related data can be scarce. In turn, these analyses allow us to identify vulnerabilities as well as opportunities for intervention and mitigation. The Pacific islands now occupy a more prominent place on the international strategic chessboard as a result of the proliferation of trade, diplomatic and security engagements in the region in the 21st century.  This is due to greater foreign presence and influence in Micronesia, Melanesia and Polynesia, and intensifying geopolitical competition among external partners. This reality, alongside greater connectivity and market trends, is also drastically  transforming the criminal landscape. Pacific islands have traditionally been considered as mostly immune from high levels of criminality due to their geographic remoteness.  However, highly pernicious illicit markets are taking hold, and the islands are becoming increasingly vulnerable to new threats in the form of cyber-enabled and cyber-dependent crimes and the introduction of new narcotics, to mention just two examples. Who is behind these activities? There are multiple criminal actors present and active in the Pacific islands, but the most pervasive are foreign actors.  And within the foreign actor sub-set, there are a diverse array of nationalities and sectors. The one thing they have in common is their pivotal role vis a vis evolving crime dynamics. Across the series of papers, we map their different typologies. The emerging pictures suggest that, possibly contrary to expectations, business operators are often responsible for the bulk of organized criminality. This is particularly evident in the extractive industries, but also in sectors such as real estate and financial services. Yet, more ‘obvious’ criminal actors such as cartels and triads have also made their way to the islands and intensified their operations.

Geneva, SWIT:  Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. 2024. 29p.

By Insight Crime

  At least 117,492 people were murdered in Latin America and the Caribbean during 2023, putting the median homicide rate around 20 per 100,000 people. But homicide data in many countries is missing or unreliable, so the actual number is likely higher. Here, InSight Crime dives into our yearly round-up, analyzing the organized crime dynamics behind the violence in each country of the region.

Washington, DC: Insight Crime, 2024. 52p.  

By Jeanne Batalova, Andriy Shymonyak, and Michelle Mittelstadt

  Although international migrants account for just 3.5 percent of the world’s population, their number—almost 272 million people as of 2019—is far from insubstantial. Current and historical research shows that immigration brings significant and long-lasting benefits to countries of destination and origin and to migrants and their families alike. But it also shows that immigration often comes with tremendous challenges for individuals, communities, and institutions. In the United States, a country with a long and complex immigration history, public and political debates that started well back into the 18th century about the size and type of immigration, as well as its socioeconomic impacts, show no sign of abating. And as other countries around the world become migrant-sending, receiving, or transit places (or frequently a combination), migration—whether voluntary or forced—has arguably earned a prime and enduring spot on national and international policy agendas. It also continues to capture significant public and media attention. What is often missing from these conversations is accurate, complete data about who these immigrants are, why they come and leave, and what places they occupy in the socioeconomic hierarchies of their sending and destination countries. In this edition, Immigration Data Matters, which updates an earlier Population Reference Bureau - Migration Policy Institute guide, we have significantly expanded a list of online resources that provide authoritative migration-related data and statistics to help inform understanding of this phenomenon in the United States and globally. As before, our main guiding principle is to offer data from population censuses and surveys, administrative datasets, and new analyses that can help our audience understand the size of immigrant populations and inflows and outflows, enforcement actions, public opinion, historical trends, citizenship acquisition, and many other aspects. Here we list and describe more than 250 data resources, half U.S., half international. These resources are collected or compiled by a wide range of sources, including government statistical agencies, international organizations such as the World Bank and United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and reputable research organizations. We use these resources in our own research, and while the list is by no means exhaustive, our goal is to share the most accurate, relevant, publicly available migration-related data, in one user-friendly and accessible guide. We hope this guide helps bring more knowledge to an issue area where the facts are often missing  

Migration Policy Institute and The   Population Reference Bureau , 2020. 49p.

By María Calderón

 When it comes to an understanding of political violence in Mexico, there is a risk of solely equating it with criminal groups' activities or exclusively attributing it to such groups. However, the political violence phenomenon in Mexico is complex and diverse, with a particular nexus to locally based illicit economies, for which an all-containing approach is insufficient. About half of the political violence that occurred in Mexico during the 2018 elections was directly attributed to organized crime. During such time, political figures were killed at a rate of one per week. These numbers support the growing concern about criminal groups' involvement in Mexican politics. Criminal groups have used political violence in several ways: directly manipulating and influencing elections, protecting incumbent candidates with whom they have struck an agreement, killing candidates who are perceived as a threat to their interests, intimidating poll workers, and attacking and stealing voting booths, among others. The decrease in the profitability of trafficking heroin and cannabis, the legalization of marijuana in many US states, and increased fentanyl usage have forced cartels to recalibrate strategies and markets. Nowadays, criminal groups have partially shifted towards locally based illicit economies, such as oil theft, extortion, kidnapping, and other illegal activities that require control of local territories. All these variables come into play when understanding that criminalized electoral politics is a predominantly local phenomenon in Mexico. Political violence by criminal groups in Mexico is motivated by multiple factors, including economic interests, political objectives, and vendettas. Criminal organizations often avoid open confrontation when attacking politicians or political candidates, opting for other less visible techniques to minimize the impacts on police and law enforcement agencies, such as corruption. Installing or co-opting candidates at the municipal level has afforded criminal groups direct influence over the actions of local and state police. Access to intelligence on pending arrests or other operations has also proven beneficial for criminal organizations. Political influence has allowed criminal groups to employ local security forces as appendages of their organizations to detain or kill targets and to protect the transportation of illicit goods. Moreover, criminal organizations have tapped into state finances by co-opting government employees. 

Washington, DC: Wilson Center, 2024. 6p.

By David Bruce

The South African per-capita murder rate has steadily escalated since 2011/12, when it was at its lowest since 1994. The 2022/23 rate of 45 per 100 000 is the highest in 20 years. But focusing on national murder trends is misleading as trends vary greatly across the nine provinces. The current high per-capita murder rate is driven by high rates in the Eastern Cape, KwaZulu-Natal, the Western Cape and Gauteng. Key findings: South African murder trends vary considerably across provinces. The Eastern Cape, KwaZulu-Natal, the Western Cape and Gauteng have the highest per-capita murder rates. In 2022/23, the Eastern Cape had the highest murder rate (71 per 100 000), followed by KwaZulu-Natal and the Western Cape, both with annual murder rates of 56. The four provinces with the most murders have also recorded the highest per-capita murder rate increases in the last 10 years. Since 2011/12, rates have increased most dramatically in KwaZulu-Natal and the Eastern Cape. The increase has been greatest from 2017/18 to 2022/23. The per-capita murder rate in the Western Cape decreased over the last five years. Recommendations The government and society must prioritise reducing murder rates, which are high and increasing. The collection of data about murder, and the analysis thereof, must be improved. ‘One-size-fits-all’ approaches to addressing murder are unlikely to be effective. Responses should be adapted to respond to the drivers of murder focusing on high-murder localities. Priority should be given to understanding and addressing murder in the four provinces with the highest per-capita murder rates. KwaZulu-Natal and, to a lesser degree, Gauteng experienced major surges in murder in 2021/22, with increases continuing in 2022/23. These have taken them well above their rates in the year before the COVID-19 pandemic and national lockdown. Deaths during the July 2021 unrest were not a major contributor to the increases in murder in KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng in 2021/22. Many experts believe that the entrenchment and growth of organised crime has played a major role in the increasing number of murders. More in-depth provincially focused research and analysis is required to better understand the factors and circumstances driving murder trends. 

Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, 2023. 12p.

By Göran Adamson

In 2005, the Swedish Crime Prevention Agency published a report about the link between immigration and crime. Since then, no comprehensive study has been conducted even though Sweden has experienced a large influx of migrants in combination with a rising crime rate. This study conducted by Göran Adamson and Tino Sanandaji is the first purely descriptive scientific investigation on the matter in fifteen years. The investigation (from 2002 to 2017) covers seven distinct categories of crime, and distinguishes between seven regions of origin. Based on 33 percent of the population (2017), 58 percent of those suspect for total crime on reasonable grounds are migrants. Regarding murder, manslaughter and attempted murder, the figures are 73 per cent, while the proportion of robbery is 70 percent. Non-registered migrants are linked to about 13 percent of total crime. Given the fact that this group is small, crime propensity among non-registered migrants is significant.

Sweden; Society, 2020. 13p.

UNITED STATES. CONGRESS. HOUSE. SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE STRATEGIC COMPETITION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY

From the document: "The fentanyl crisis is one of the most horrific disasters that America has ever faced. On average, fentanyl kills over 200 Americans daily, the equivalent of a packed Boeing 737 crashing every single day. Fentanyl is the leading cause of death for Americans aged 18-45 and a leading cause in the historic drop in American life expectancy. It has led to millions more suffering from addiction and the destruction of countless families and communities. Beyond the United States, fentanyl and other mass-produced synthetic narcotics from the People's Republic of China (PRC) are devastating nations around the world. It is truly a global crisis. The PRC, under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), is the ultimate geographic source of the fentanyl crisis. Companies in China produce nearly all of illicit fentanyl precursors, the key ingredients that drive the global illicit fentanyl trade. The House Select Committee on the Strategic Competition between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party (Select Committee) launched an investigation to better understand the role of the CCP in the fentanyl crisis. This investigation involved delving deep into public PRC websites, analyzing PRC government documents, acquiring over 37,000 unique data points of PRC companies selling narcotics online through web scraping and data analytics, undercover communications with PRC drug trafficking companies, and consultations with experts in the public and private sectors, among other steps. [...] [T]he Select Committee found thousands of PRC companies openly selling [...] illicit materials on the Chinese internet--the most heavily surveilled country-wide network in the world. The CCP runs the most advanced techno-totalitarian state in human history that 'leave[s] criminals with nowhere to hide' and has the means to stop illicit fentanyl materials manufacturers, yet it has failed to pursue flagrant violations of its own laws."

UNITED STATES. CONGRESS. HOUSE. SELECT COMMITTEE. 16 APR, 2024. 64p.

By David C. Brotherton, and Follow Rafael Gude

Since 2007, the Ecuadorian approach to crime control has emphasized efforts to reach higher levels of social control based on policies of social inclusion and innovations in criminal justice and police reform. One innovative aspect of this approach was the decision to legalize a number of street gangs in 2007. The government claims the success of these policies can be seen in homicide rates that have fallen from 15.35 per 100,000 in 2011 to 5 per 100,000 in 2017. However, little is understood about the factors and their combination that have produced this outcome. To explore this phenomenon, we developed a research project focusing on the impact of street gangs involved in processes of social inclusion on violence reduction. From April to October 2017, we collected multiple data sets including 60 face-to-face interviews with members from four different street subcultures in several field sites, field observations and archival materials to answer two primary questions: How has the relationship between street groups and state agencies changed in the past 10 years? How has this changed relationship contributed to a hitherto unexamined role in the homicide reduction phenomenon of Ecuador? We found that legalization helped reduce violence and criminality drastically while providing a space, both culturally and legally, to transform the social capital of the gang into effective vehicles of behavioral change. In policy terms, we argue that the social inclusion approach to street gangs should be continued and highlighted as a model of best practices of the state.

Washington, DC: IDB, 2018.

 By David C. Brotherton · Rafael Gude

 In 2008, the Ecuadorian Government launched a policy to increase public safety as part of its “Citizens’ Revolution” (La Revolución Ciudadana). An innovative aspect of this policy was the legalization of the country’s largest street gangs. During the years 2016–2017, we conducted ethnographic research with these groups focusing on the impact of legalization as a form of social inclusion. We were guided by two research questions: (1) What changed between these groups and society? and (2) What changed within these groups? We completed field observations and sixty qualitative interviews with group members, as well as multiple formal and informal interviews with government advisors, police leaders and state actors related to the initiative. Our data show that the commitment to social citizenship had a major impact on gang-related violence and was a factor in reducing the nation’s homicide rate. The study provides an example of social control where the state is committed to policies of social inclusion while rejecting the dominant model of gang repression and social exclusion practiced throughout the Americas.  

Critical Criminology, 2020.

Edited by Simon Holdaway and Paul Rock

First published in 1998. Thinking about criminology draws together the expertise of respected criminologists from the principle contemporary schools of thought. The book aims to provide a clear analysis of the relationship between sociological theory and contemporary empirical criminological research, discussing the ways in which theoretical perspectives have contributed to the understanding of relevant criminal justice institutions, law and policy

London: Routledge, 1998. 220p.

Edited by Marisa J. Fuentes and Deborah Gray White  

The 250th anniversary of the founding of Rutgers University is a perfect moment for the Rutgers community to reconcile its past, and acknowledge its role in the enslavement and debasement of African Americans and the disfranchisement and elimination of Native American people and culture. Scarlet and Black documents the history of Rutgers's connection to slavery, which was neither casual nor accidental-nor unusual. Like most early American colleges, Rutgers depended on slaves to build its campuses and serve its students and faculty; it depended on the sale of black people to fund its very existence. Men like John Henry Livingston, (Rutgers president from 1810-1824), the Reverend Philip Milledoler, (president of Rutgers from 1824-1840), Henry Rutgers, (trustee after whom the college is named), and Theodore Frelinghuysen, (Rutgers's seventh president), were among the most ardent anti-abolitionists in the mid-Atlantic. Scarlet and black are the colors Rutgers University uses to represent itself to the nation and world. They are the colors the athletes compete in, the graduates and administrators wear on celebratory occasions, and the colors that distinguish Rutgers from every other university in the United States. This book, however, uses these colors to signify something else: the blood that was spilled on the banks of the Raritan River by those dispossessed of their land and the bodies that labored unpaid and in bondage so that Rutgers could be built and sustained. The contributors to this volume offer this history as a usable one-not to tear down or weaken this very renowned, robust, and growing institution-but to strengthen it and help direct its course for the future. The work of the Committee on Enslaved and Disenfranchised Population in Rutgers History.

New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2017. 222p.

 By Vivian Miller

Peter Christian "Paddy" Barrie was a seasoned fraudster who transferred his horse doping and horse substitution skills from British to North American racetracks in the 1920s. His thoroughbred ringers were entered in elite races to guarantee winnings for syndicates and betting rings in the prohibition-era United States. This case study of a professional travelling criminal and the challenges he posed for the Pinkerton National Detective Agency in the early 1930s war on crime highlights both the importance of illegal betting to urban mobsters and the need for broader and more nuanced critiques of Depression-era organised crime activities and alliances.

Cambridge, UK: Journal of American Studies, 2021. 22p.

By Vivien Miller 

This essay uses the 1950 “case of the clinking brassieres” to explore female theft in Miami at mid-century and the ways in which gender, race, class, respectability, and youth offered protections and shaped treatment within Florida’s criminal justice system. It focuses on the illegal activities of three female telephone employees, their criminal prosecution, and post-conviction relief. These seemingly respectable coin thieves challenged a familiar image of theft as a lower-class crime associated with poverty and economic need, while their blonde hair and white skin (and an idealization of the meanings of white beauty standards), complicated public attitudes in a period when “true” or serious criminals were racketeers and organised crime operatives.

European Social Science History Conference, 2013. 39p.