By John O. Koehler
This book is about the untold story of the East German secret police, known as theStasi. It discusses the history and operations of the Stasi, including their collaboration with the KGB, their espionage activities in West Germany and other countries, and their involvement in terrorism. The document also includes interviews with former Stasi officers and victims of Stasi repression.
Basic Books, 1999, 460 pages
By Kees Kuiken
“Soldiers, Cops, Bannermen: The Rise and Fall of the First Communist Chinese PoliceState1931-1969”by Kees Kuiken, discusses the history of the Chinese police state from1931 to 1969. The book explores topics such as the role of police in maintaining control, the transition from soldiers to cops, and the challenges faced by the police state. The book also examines the historical context of China’s quest for order and the evolution of the police system in the Chinese Empire.
Wolters-Noordhoff, 1993 - 143 pages
By J. Micheal Waller
Summary of main points
•The book is titled“Security for Small Businesses”by David L. Berger.•The book covers various topics related to security measures for small businesses.
•It includes chapters on perimeter control, alarms, closed circuittelevision (CCTV),and security services
.•The book also includes a bibliography with references to other publications onsecurity management.•The book provides information on crime prevention and basic precautions against crimes.
•It discusses security equipment and methods such as barrier protection, alarm systems, and locks.•The book also covers topics like check cashing, credit cards, robbery, and burglary.
•There are references to other books on hotel security management, industrialsecurity management, and employee honesty management.
•The book provides information on tools, maintenance, environment, buildingconditions, housekeeping, lighting, heating, and ventilation.
•It includes information on employee training, personal protection, machine safety, and electricity equipment.
•The book emphasizes the importance of security for small businesses and provides practical advice and recommendations.
Avalon Publishing, 1994, 390 pages
By Iain Lauchlan
This book explores the origins, structure, and activities of the Okhrana, the secret police in Tsarist Russia and discusses the comparison of security policing in Russia and the West, as well as the role of the Okhrana in suppressing revolution and counter-revolutionary activities. It also examines the connections between the Okhrana and right-wing terror groups, as well as its interactions with civil society and military intelligence.The author uses various sources, including archival documents and personal memoirs, to provide a comprehensive analysis of the Okhrana’s operations.
The book concludes with some remarks on the predictable downfall of Imperial Russia.A bibliography and index are included.
SKS-FLS, 2002, 405 pages
By Fatoumata Sira Diallo
This book is a collection of various titles and references related to the topics of diplomacy, strategy, and policing in Sub-Saharan Africa. It includes information on academic works, books, articles, and documents that cover subjects such as international relations, political science, economic science, and sociology. The document also mentions specific titles and authors, as well as organizations and websites that provide relevant information on these topics.
Editions L'Harmattan, 2019, 391 pages
By by Tal Jonathan-Zamir, David Weisburd, and Badi Hasisi.
“Policing Terrorism, Crime Control, and Police-Community Relations: Learning fromthe Israeli Experience.”is written by Tal Jonathan-Zamir, David Weisburd, and Badi Hasisi. The book discusses the Israeli experience in policing terrorism, crime control,and police-community relations. It covers various topics such as the impact of terrorismthreats on police performance, public evaluations of the police, and the role of thepolice in counterterrorism. The book is supported by grants from the U.S. Departmentof Homeland Security and the U.S. National Institute of Justice
Springer, 2014, 172 pagine
By M.L. Mathews, Philip B. Heymann, andA.S. Mathews
“Policing the Conflict in South Africa”edited by M.L. Mathews, Philip B. Heymann, and A.S. Mathews. discusses the reform of policing in South Africa, including the structure, membership, and control of the police, as well as popular perceptions of policing among blacks in South Africa. The document also mentions protests and police misconduct in South Africa.
Cambridge University Press, 2008, 226 pages
By Marco Gopfert
This book titled“Policing the Frontier: An Ethnography of Two Worlds in Niger”by Mirco Gopfert. is part of the seriesPolice/Worlds: Studies in Security, Crime, and Governance. It explores the topic of policing in rural Niger and examines thei nteraction between the police and the local communities. The book provides an ethnographic perspective on the challenges and complexities of policing in this context.
Cornell University Press, 2020, 175 pages
By Alan Williams
“The Police of Paris, 1718-1789” by Alan Williams provides a historical account of the police force in Paris during the 18th century. The book covers topics such as the power and organization of the police, their operations, and the relationship between the police and the people of Paris. The document also includes a bibliography and index for further reference.
Louisiana State University Press, 1979, 328 pages
GUNARATNA, ROHAN
From the document: "In 2024, the Israel-Hamas conflict will emerge as the preeminent threat to global security. An escalation of the conflict could spark a regional war and lead to a global recession. The West's support for Israel will fuel protests in the Muslim world, drive radicalisation and bring about terrorist attacks. Sunni and Shia groups will pose a common threat to western, Israeli and Jewish interests. Preventing the conflict from escalating and working towards a sustainable solution for the Palestinian people will require visionary leadership."
NANYANG TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY. .30 MAY, 2024.
By Caitlin McCulloch, Brian A. Jackson, Sameer M. Siddiqi, Jordan R. Reimer, Emily Allendorf
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has changed and expanded its efforts in violence prevention in the past five years. DHS asked the Homeland Security Operational Analysis Center (HSOAC) to examine the change in efforts by the Center for Prevention Programs and Partnerships (CP3) and its predecessor organizations in preventing terrorism and other violence and explore options for CP3 moving forward.
In the United States, the full potential value of countering violent extremism (CVE) has never been realized because of key disconnects between the intent of CVE programs and the realities of their implementation. Although it might not have been the intent, efforts singled out and stigmatized American Muslim communities. The disconnect between stated intention and reality stimulated potent opposition to CVE as a concept. In response, the federal government decided to make significant changes in its approaches in this policy area. In late 2021, DHS asked HSOAC to examine and characterize the changes that had been made, providing an outside viewpoint on the extent of change and how those changes had responded to the concerns about CVE efforts. This report documents the researchers' approach, findings, and recommendations.
There has been enormous growth in CP3, and it is currently working on developing and standardizing the institutions and processes that are required to support a larger organization. These efforts include extensive standardization efforts in training and evaluation of CP3's work. Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) posed some problems, including making it difficult to create a cohesive whole with new personnel, but also presented some new opportunities, such as an increased ability to reach a diversity of stakeholders digitally.
CP3 and the government more broadly have made major shifts in the rhetorical framing of their work, toward a public health–informed approach, a framing that aligns more closely with the intent of their programs. Although there is still discussion of the implications of a public health–informed approach, this shift was reflected in both interviews and official documentation.
In line with this rhetorical shift is the expansion in the diversity of stakeholders, both in engagement and in grantees, including evidence of a shift away from criminal justice and security partners, although they remain important collaborators.
External stakeholders remain skeptical, but there are some signs of increasing trust in relevant actors outside government.
Continue efforts to build and sustain consistency in messages and activities. Many external stakeholders noted the importance of rebuilding trust and that sustainable and continuous actions and relationships were essential for fostering that trust.
Continue to codify and standardize internal office procedures—with rapid growth comes a renewed need for new internal institutions to keep all personnel on the same page.
More clearly define the elements of a public health–informed approach and how they will be applied to violence prevention for CP3 programs and outreach. There are many definitions present in practitioner circles and the academic literature; choosing one and fully exploring the implications of the definition will be key for aligning stated CP3 goals with programmatic action.
Invest further in program evaluation. The research team recognizes that it is difficult to evaluate effectiveness in this area, but, without standardized evaluation, supporting the impact of CP3 programs will be difficult.
Commit to transparency and external communication. Transparency in actions taken and evidence collected, as well as communication with skeptical audiences, will be key in showing change and growth in CP3 and its activities to external actors and in further building trust with external audiences.
By John S. Hollywood, Keith Gierlack, Pauline Moore, Thomas Goode, Henry H. Willis, Devon Hill, Rahim Ali, Annie Brothers, Ryan Bauer, Jonathan Tran
Soft targets and crowded places (ST-CPs) are easily accessible to large numbers of people and have limited security or protective measures in place, making them vulnerable to attack. Examples include sports arenas, shopping centers, schools, transportation systems, and houses of worship. Although attacks on them are relatively rare, they result in significant loss of life and contribute to an atmosphere of fear throughout society. Researchers performed a landscape assessment of the threat to and major vulnerabilities of ST-CPs, existing security measures and initiatives, and ways to improve allocation of security resources. The researchers then developed a road map for future investments and made recommendations for improving ST-CP security and response to attacks. These recommendations include research, development, test, and evaluation priorities to improve prevention and protection, such as seeking methods of deterring and dissuading would-be attackers, more evaluation of the effectiveness of security measures, and developing a model concept of operations for open and nonsecure spaces. In addition, they recommended funding and policy priorities focused on public education and training, providing additional resources to cross-organizational security teams and managers, and increasing funding for access control systems.
Key Findings
The most-common motivations for attacks are personal, followed by terrorism and extremism.
Education and private buildings are the most–frequently targeted types of ST-CPs.
Attacks on ST-CPs with large, accessible crowds, such as houses of worship, shopping malls, restaurants, bars, and nightclubs, have the highest average lethality.
Layered security strategies, in which measures work together, improve the chance that an attack will be prevented, halted, or mitigated.
Tips from the public have prevented attacks. Public education on what to report and how, and support for threat assessment teams, would make tips more effective.
Access control systems, such as locks, secured windows, and secured entryways, have been effective and efficient but need to be trained on and maintained.
Bystanders and security have both stopped attacks. Groups of bystanders tackling shooters have been highly effective. Training can make responses even more effective.
Response command, control, and communications need to be improved. Alternatives to traditional, push-to-talk voice radio communications are needed.
Security measures need more effectiveness and efficiency evaluations. The security community has growing interest in artificial intelligence (AI); evaluations of security systems with AI will be needed as these systems deploy.
Recommendations
Find ways to deter and dissuade would-be attackers.
Develop indicators of and education about suspicious seeking of weapons.
Develop protocols and education for wellness checks.
Further evaluate the effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of security measures.
Develop a model concept of operations for open and nonsecure spaces, such as shopping malls and restaurants.
Continuously track and analyze mass-attack plots.
Review mass-shooting events to determine whether some ordinary criminal shootings should be treated as mass attacks on soft targets or crowded places.
Find ways to reduce the mass psychological effects of attacks, including societal fear and secondary trauma.
Focus on basics, such as provision and maintenance of access control equipment and public education campaigns on what to look for and how to report it.
Strengthen the system-based, layered security framework.
Ensure that funding and policy priorities reflect research findings.
Fund enhanced public education and training on what to report and how.
Provide additional funding to cross-organizational threat assessment teams and managers.
Fund enhanced public education and training on how to respond to an active attacker.
Provide additional funding to cross-organizational security teams and managers.
Fund and distribute updates of site security guidance documents and training.
Fund access control systems
Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2024. 24p.
By John S. Hollywood, Keith Gierlack, Pauline Moore, Thomas Goode, Henry H. Willis, Devon Hill, Rahim Ali, Annie Brothers, Ryan Bauer, Jonathan Tran
Attacks on soft targets and crowded places (ST-CPs) represent a significant challenge. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security requires research and development to assess methods for reducing the propensity and loss of life from these types of attacks. In response, researchers from the Homeland Security Operational Analysis Center conducted a comprehensive landscape assessment of the threat to ST-CPs and corresponding security measures. This assessment integrated literature reviews, attack plot analyses, grant data reviews, and security cost modeling to identify both needs for improvement and recommended research and investment priorities for addressing those needs.
The number of attack plots is broadly aligned with regional population counts. The most-common motivations for ST-CP attacks have been personal, followed by terrorist and extremist motivations. Education and private buildings (workplaces) are the most–frequently targeted types of ST-CPs. Attacks on ST-CPs that have large, accessible crowds, such as houses of worship, shopping malls, restaurants, bars, and nightclubs, had the highest average lethality.
To defend ST-CPs, a layered approach has security measures work together to improve the chance that an attack will be stopped or mitigated. Prevention measures stop attacks before they reach execution; however, the public needs to know what warning signs to look for and how to report them, and threat assessment teams need to assess tips and follow up appropriately. Access control systems, such as locks, secured windows, and secured entryways, have been effective and efficient. Bystanders and security have both stopped attacks; groups of bystanders tackling shooters have been highly effective.
Key Findings
The conditions that a would-be attacker must fulfill to successfully execute a high-fatality attack are collectively the attack chain; interrupting that chain can prevent or reduce casualties
An attacker must carry out many steps to complete a high-fatality attack. The attacker must become fully committed, plan, acquire weapons and skills, and make other preparations without being detected and reported by others. Once on scene, the attacker must get through the site's security layers and engage a crowd without being stopped quickly.
A system-based, or layered, approach helps security measures work together to improve the chances that an attack will be stopped or mitigated at any of these steps, guarding against single points of failure.
Prevention measures are perhaps the most-important factors in interrupting the attack chain because they can and have halted many plots before they reached execution. Reports of warning signs have been key. However, the public must know what to look for and how, and authorities need threat assessment teams and training to assess tips and follow up appropriately.
Access and entry-control systems, including locks, secured windows, and secured entry spaces, have been effective and efficient in protecting against attackers.
Both bystanders and on-scene security have been effective in stopping attacks. Groups of bystanders tackling shooters have been highly effective in ending attacks.
Recommendations
Seek methods for deterring and dissuading would-be attackers from becoming committed to plots.
Develop indicators and training to detect suspicious seeking of weapons and ammunition.
Develop enhancements to "see something, say something" campaigns.
Develop and evaluate campaigns to reduce hoax threats of violence.
Develop rules and processes for assessment, monitoring, and follow-up with reported threats, including processes for initial wellness checks.
Evaluate the effectiveness of site security technologies in stopping simulated attacks.
Study the social costs of security measures more.
Develop a model strategy for open and nonsecure spaces, such as parks, parking lots, shopping malls, and restaurants.
Improve command and control, leadership, and coordination during attack responses.
Study alternatives to traditional voice radio communications during attack responses.
Continuously track and analyze mass-attack plots.
Determine whether some ordinary criminal shootings should be treated as mass attacks on ST-CPs.
Seek ways to reduce the mass psychological impacts of attacks.
Support detailed tracking of grant spending related to ST-CP security.
Fund enhanced public education and training on what to report and how and on how to respond to an active attacker.
Provide funding to cross-organizational threat assessment teams, security teams, and managers, and provide training on how to report on and how to respond during an incident.
Fund access control systems.
Fund medical supplies and training to match updated medical standards.
Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2024. 168p.
By Sonjai Kumar
This article discusses the differences between the risk management and enterprise risk management. Though the concept of risk management is very old, almost as old as beginning of human existence but the concept of ERM is new around two decades old. The importance of enterprise risk management increased over the period of time due various crisis and emergence risk based capital in banking and insurance industry. The article discuss the various factors necessary for success of enterprise risk management.
Academia Letters, July 2021. Article 2234. 9p
NOWRASTEH, ALEX
From the document: "This policy analysis is an update and simplification of three previous Cato policy analyses on the same topic that were published in 2016, 2019, and 2023. It differs from the 2016 and 2019 editions because it does not include the total number of visas issued during the years analyzed, does not include a cost-benefit analysis of different immigration policies intended to reduce the threat of foreign-born terrorism, and it further differs from the 2019 version because it does not include native-born terrorists. The risks of foreign-born terrorists on US soil are quantified by evaluating how many people they murdered and injured in attacks, the ideologies of the attackers, the visas on which the foreign-born terrorists entered the country, their countries of origin, and the costs of their terrorist attacks."
CATO INSTITUTE. 9 APR, 2024. 28p.
UNITED STATES. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY. OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS; UNITED STATES. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION; CANADIAN CENTRE FOR CYBER SECURITY; ESTONIAN NATIONAL CYBER SECURITY CENTRE; JAPAN COMPUTER EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM COORDINATION CENTER; NATIONAL CENTER OF INCIDENT READINESS AND STRATEGY FOR CYBERSECURITY JAPAN; FINLAND. NATIONAL CYBER SECURITY CENTRE; JAPAN. NATIONAL POLICE AGENCY; UNITED KINGDOM. NATIONAL CYBER SECURITY CENTRE
From the document: "Civil society--nonprofit, advocacy, cultural, faith-based, academic, think tanks, journalist, dissident, and diaspora organizations, communities, and individuals involved in defending human rights and advancing democracy--are considered high-risk communities. Often, these organizations and their employees are targeted by state-sponsored threat actors who seek to undermine democratic values and interests. Regularly conducted as a type of transnational repression (also referred to as digital transnational repression), state-sponsored actors compromise organizational or personal devices and networks to intimidate, silence, coerce, harass, or harm civil society organizations and individuals. According to industry reporting, state-sponsored targeting of high-risk communities predominantly emanates from the governments of Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea. Actors typically perform extensive pre-operational research to learn about potential victims, gather information to support social engineering, or obtain login credentials. Actors target organization networks or personal accounts (e.g., email) and devices of individuals for surveillance and monitoring, often via spyware applications--malicious software that collects data from affected devices. This guide provides recommendations for civil society organizations and individuals to mitigate the threat of state-sponsored cyber operations based on observed malicious behavior. The guide also provides recommendations for software manufacturers to improve the security posture of their customers."
UNITED STATES. CYBERSECURITY & INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY AGENCY. 14 MAY, 2024. 19p.
By Liam Michaud a a , b , * , Gillian Kolla c , d , Katherine Rudzinski Graduate Program in Socio-Legal Studies, York University, Toronto, ON, Canada b e , Adrian Guta
The ongoing overdose and drug toxicity crisis in North America has contributed momentum to the emergence of safer supply prescribing and programs in Canada as a means of providing an alternative to the highly volatile unregulated drug supply. The implementation and scale-up of safer supply have been met with a vocal reaction on the part of news media commentators, conservative politicians, recovery industry representatives, and some prominent addiction medicine physicians. This reaction has largely converged around several narratives, based on unsubstantiated claims and anecdotal evidence, alleging that safer supply programs are generating a "new opioid epidemic", reflecting an emerging alignment among key institutional and political actors. Employing situational analysis method, and drawing on the policy studies and social science scholarship on moral panics, this essay examines news media coverage from January to July 2023, bringing this into dialogue with other existing empirical sources on safer supply (e.g. Coroner's reports, program evaluations, debates among experts in medical journals). We employ eight previously established criteria delineating moral panics to critically appraise public dialogue regarding safer supply, diverted medication, and claims of increased youth initiation to drug use and youth overdose. In detailing the emergence of a moral panic regarding safer supply, we trace historic continuities with earlier drug scares in Canadian history mobilized as tools of racialized poverty governance, as well as previous backlashes towards healthcare interventions for people who use drugs (PWUD). The essay assesses the claims of moral entrepreneurs against the current landscape of opioid use, diversion, and overdose among youth, notes the key role played by medical expertise in this and previous moral panics, and identifies what the convergence of these narratives materialize for PWUD and healthcare access, as well as the broader policy responses such narratives activate.
International Journal of Drug Policy 127 (2024) 104423
MASLEJ, NESTOR; FATTORINI, LOREDANA; PERRAULT, RAYMOND; PARLI, VANESSA; REUEL, ANKA; BRYNJOLFSSON, ERIK
From the document: "Welcome to the seventh edition of the AI Index report. The 2024 Index is our most comprehensive to date and arrives at an important moment when AI's influence on society has never been more pronounced. This year, we have broadened our scope to more extensively cover essential trends such as technical advancements in AI, public perceptions of the technology, and the geopolitical dynamics surrounding its development. Featuring more original data than ever before, this edition introduces new estimates on AI training costs, detailed analyses of the responsible AI landscape, and an entirely new chapter dedicated to AI's impact on science and medicine. The AI Index report tracks, collates, distills, and visualizes data related to artificial intelligence (AI). Our mission is to provide unbiased, rigorously vetted, broadly sourced data in order for policymakers, researchers, executives, journalists, and the general public to develop a more thorough and nuanced understanding of the complex field of AI." See pages 10 and 11 for a full list of contributors.
STANFORD UNIVERSITY. HUMAN-CENTERED ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE. 2024. 502p.
UNITED STATES. WHITE HOUSE OFFICE. BIDEN, JOSEPH R., JR.
From the webpage: "Critical infrastructure comprises the physical and virtual assets and systems so vital to the Nation that their incapacity or destruction would have a debilitating impact on national security, national economic security, or national public health or safety. It is diverse and complex, and includes distributed networks, varied organizational structures, operating models, interdependent systems, and governance constructs. The United States is in the midst of a generational investment in the Nation's infrastructure. This investment, and the emergence of new technologies, presents an opportunity to build for the future. In the 21st century, the United States will rely on new sources of energy, modes of transportation, and an increasingly interconnected and interdependent economy. This modernization effort will ensure critical infrastructure provides a strong and innovative economy, protects American families, and enhances our collective resilience to disasters before they happen -- creating a resilient Nation for generations to come. The United States also faces an era of strategic competition with nation-state actors who target American critical infrastructure and tolerate or enable malicious actions conducted by non-state actors. [...] This memorandum advances our national unity of effort to strengthen and maintain secure, functioning, and resilient critical infrastructure."
UNITED STATES. EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT; UNITED STATES. OFFICE OF THE NATIONAL CYBER DIRECTOR
From the document: "The '2024 Report on the Cybersecurity Posture of the United States' assesses the cybersecurity posture of the United States, the effectiveness of national cyber policy and strategy, and the status of the implementation of national cyber policy and strategy by Federal departments and agencies. Additionally, this report highlights cybersecurity threats and issues facing the United States, including new or emerging technologies that may affect national security, economic prosperity, and the rule of law. This is the first edition of the report and covers calendar year 2023, with additional consideration of developments in 2024 preceding the publication of this report. Over the past year, U.S. national cybersecurity posture improved, driven by steady progress towards the 2023 National Cybersecurity Strategy's (NCS) vision of a defensible, resilient, and values-aligned digital ecosystem achieved through fundamental shifts in the underlying dynamics that shape cyberspace. The Administration has successfully begun implementation of the NCS Implementation Plan, which coordinates actions by departments and agencies across the Federal Government to make the President's affirmative vision a reality. These initial implementation actions set the foundation for further investment and sustained commitment by stakeholders across the digital ecosystem."
United States. Executive Office of the President. United States. Office of the National Cyber Director. 2024. 37p.
