UNITED STATES. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY. OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS; UNITED STATES. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION; CANADIAN CENTRE FOR CYBER SECURITY; ESTONIAN NATIONAL CYBER SECURITY CENTRE; JAPAN COMPUTER EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM COORDINATION CENTER; NATIONAL CENTER OF INCIDENT READINESS AND STRATEGY FOR CYBERSECURITY JAPAN; FINLAND. NATIONAL CYBER SECURITY CENTRE; JAPAN. NATIONAL POLICE AGENCY; UNITED KINGDOM. NATIONAL CYBER SECURITY CENTRE

From the document: "Civil society--nonprofit, advocacy, cultural, faith-based, academic, think tanks, journalist, dissident, and diaspora organizations, communities, and individuals involved in defending human rights and advancing democracy--are considered high-risk communities. Often, these organizations and their employees are targeted by state-sponsored threat actors who seek to undermine democratic values and interests. Regularly conducted as a type of transnational repression (also referred to as digital transnational repression), state-sponsored actors compromise organizational or personal devices and networks to intimidate, silence, coerce, harass, or harm civil society organizations and individuals. According to industry reporting, state-sponsored targeting of high-risk communities predominantly emanates from the governments of Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea. Actors typically perform extensive pre-operational research to learn about potential victims, gather information to support social engineering, or obtain login credentials. Actors target organization networks or personal accounts (e.g., email) and devices of individuals for surveillance and monitoring, often via spyware applications--malicious software that collects data from affected devices. This guide provides recommendations for civil society organizations and individuals to mitigate the threat of state-sponsored cyber operations based on observed malicious behavior. The guide also provides recommendations for software manufacturers to improve the security posture of their customers."

UNITED STATES. CYBERSECURITY & INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY AGENCY. 14 MAY, 2024. 19p.

ByAlex Stevens, Niamh Eastwood, and Kirstie Douse

In this review article, we develop the case for the decriminalisation of drug possession in the UK by describing our ‘modest proposal’ to repeal the relevant sections of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 and its advantages. We defend this proposal against possible critiques from both conservative and radical positions. On the conservative side, these criticisms include that it would increase drug use and harm and that it would be illegal under international law. From the more radical position, we anticipate the criticisms that decriminalisation of possession would leave the harm associated with illegal drug supply to continue, that it would leave in place restrictions on the rights to use drugs, that it would forego the possible tax income from a legally regulated market, and that the drug laws would continue to act as tools of social control. In response, we argue that decriminalisation offers a feasible first step towards reducing the harm of drug control which would not increase drug-related harm.

Drug Science, Policy and Law Volume 10: 1–10

By Liam Michaud a a , b , * , Gillian Kolla c , d , Katherine Rudzinski Graduate Program in Socio-Legal Studies, York University, Toronto, ON, Canada b e , Adrian Guta

The ongoing overdose and drug toxicity crisis in North America has contributed momentum to the emergence of safer supply prescribing and programs in Canada as a means of providing an alternative to the highly volatile unregulated drug supply. The implementation and scale-up of safer supply have been met with a vocal reaction on the part of news media commentators, conservative politicians, recovery industry representatives, and some prominent addiction medicine physicians. This reaction has largely converged around several narratives, based on unsubstantiated claims and anecdotal evidence, alleging that safer supply programs are generating a "new opioid epidemic", reflecting an emerging alignment among key institutional and political actors. Employing situational analysis method, and drawing on the policy studies and social science scholarship on moral panics, this essay examines news media coverage from January to July 2023, bringing this into dialogue with other existing empirical sources on safer supply (e.g. Coroner's reports, program evaluations, debates among experts in medical journals). We employ eight previously established criteria delineating moral panics to critically appraise public dialogue regarding safer supply, diverted medication, and claims of increased youth initiation to drug use and youth overdose. In detailing the emergence of a moral panic regarding safer supply, we trace historic continuities with earlier drug scares in Canadian history mobilized as tools of racialized poverty governance, as well as previous backlashes towards healthcare interventions for people who use drugs (PWUD). The essay assesses the claims of moral entrepreneurs against the current landscape of opioid use, diversion, and overdose among youth, notes the key role played by medical expertise in this and previous moral panics, and identifies what the convergence of these narratives materialize for PWUD and healthcare access, as well as the broader policy responses such narratives activate.

International Journal of Drug Policy 127 (2024) 104423

By European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) to Correlation – European Harm Reduction Network (C-EHRN)

Drug consumption rooms (DCRs) are fixed or mobile spaces in which people who use drugs are provided with sterile drug use equipment and can use illicit drugs under the supervision of trained staff. They exist in several European countries, Australia, Canada, Mexico and the USA, and are usually located in areas where there is an open drug scene and injecting in public places is common. Their primary goal is to reduce morbidity and mortality by providing a safer environment for drug use and training clients in safer forms of drug use. Other explicit objectives may be providing a conduit to other care services and reducing public nuisance. A main aim of this report is to inform discussions on DCRs by examining the available evidence, as well as reviewing the various models being adopted and their characteristics. Two operational models are typically used in Europe: (1) integrated DCRs, operating within low-threshold facilities, where the supervision of drug use is just one of several services offered; and (2) specialised DCRs, which provide a narrower range of services directly related to supervised consumption. Services typically available within DCRs include: provision of a supervised environment for drug use; clean drug use equipment, including sterile syringes; and rapid interventions if overdose occurs. In addition, DCRs may offer counselling services; primary medical care; training for clients in safer forms of drug use, overdose awareness and the use of naloxone; and referral to social, healthcare and treatment services. Access to consumption facilities may be restricted to registered service users, and often certain conditions have to be met, for example minimum age and local residency. Typically, drugs used in these facilities must be obtained prior to entry. Drug dealing and drug sharing are not allowed within the facilities (staff may be required to call in the police if necessary), and staff can advise but do not directly assist clients in administering their drugs. As frontline, low-threshold services, drug consumption rooms are often among the first places where insights can be gained into new drug use patterns, and, thus, they also can have a role to play in the early identification of new and emerging trends among high-risk populations using their services. The operation and functioning of DCRs has adapted to changes in the profiles and needs of their target groups, and to new patterns of use, as well as to new types of drugs emerging on the market. DCRs may also therefore be well placed to identify and inform strategies to mitigate harms related to developments in the illicit drug market that present new health challenges.

Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2023. 52p.

MASLEJ, NESTOR; FATTORINI, LOREDANA; PERRAULT, RAYMOND; PARLI, VANESSA; REUEL, ANKA; BRYNJOLFSSON, ERIK

From the document: "Welcome to the seventh edition of the AI Index report. The 2024 Index is our most comprehensive to date and arrives at an important moment when AI's influence on society has never been more pronounced. This year, we have broadened our scope to more extensively cover essential trends such as technical advancements in AI, public perceptions of the technology, and the geopolitical dynamics surrounding its development. Featuring more original data than ever before, this edition introduces new estimates on AI training costs, detailed analyses of the responsible AI landscape, and an entirely new chapter dedicated to AI's impact on science and medicine. The AI Index report tracks, collates, distills, and visualizes data related to artificial intelligence (AI). Our mission is to provide unbiased, rigorously vetted, broadly sourced data in order for policymakers, researchers, executives, journalists, and the general public to develop a more thorough and nuanced understanding of the complex field of AI." See pages 10 and 11 for a full list of contributors.

STANFORD UNIVERSITY. HUMAN-CENTERED ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE. 2024. 502p.

UNITED STATES. WHITE HOUSE OFFICE. BIDEN, JOSEPH R., JR.

From the webpage: "Critical infrastructure comprises the physical and virtual assets and systems so vital to the Nation that their incapacity or destruction would have a debilitating impact on national security, national economic security, or national public health or safety. It is diverse and complex, and includes distributed networks, varied organizational structures, operating models, interdependent systems, and governance constructs. The United States is in the midst of a generational investment in the Nation's infrastructure. This investment, and the emergence of new technologies, presents an opportunity to build for the future. In the 21st century, the United States will rely on new sources of energy, modes of transportation, and an increasingly interconnected and interdependent economy. This modernization effort will ensure critical infrastructure provides a strong and innovative economy, protects American families, and enhances our collective resilience to disasters before they happen -- creating a resilient Nation for generations to come. The United States also faces an era of strategic competition with nation-state actors who target American critical infrastructure and tolerate or enable malicious actions conducted by non-state actors. [...] This memorandum advances our national unity of effort to strengthen and maintain secure, functioning, and resilient critical infrastructure."

UNITED STATES. EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT; UNITED STATES. OFFICE OF THE NATIONAL CYBER DIRECTOR

From the document: "The '2024 Report on the Cybersecurity Posture of the United States' assesses the cybersecurity posture of the United States, the effectiveness of national cyber policy and strategy, and the status of the implementation of national cyber policy and strategy by Federal departments and agencies. Additionally, this report highlights cybersecurity threats and issues facing the United States, including new or emerging technologies that may affect national security, economic prosperity, and the rule of law. This is the first edition of the report and covers calendar year 2023, with additional consideration of developments in 2024 preceding the publication of this report. Over the past year, U.S. national cybersecurity posture improved, driven by steady progress towards the 2023 National Cybersecurity Strategy's (NCS) vision of a defensible, resilient, and values-aligned digital ecosystem achieved through fundamental shifts in the underlying dynamics that shape cyberspace. The Administration has successfully begun implementation of the NCS Implementation Plan, which coordinates actions by departments and agencies across the Federal Government to make the President's affirmative vision a reality. These initial implementation actions set the foundation for further investment and sustained commitment by stakeholders across the digital ecosystem."

United States. Executive Office of the President. United States. Office of the National Cyber Director. 2024. 37p.

ELLISON, TOM; HUGH, BRIGITTE

From the document: "Climate change and policy responses provide new opportunities for state and non-state actors to engage in mis- and disinformation across a wide range of scales and topics. Traditionally, analysis of climate change and misinformation has focused most on the problem of climate change denialism and politicization of emissions reductions. However, misinformation, disinformation peddling, and malign influence campaigns are increasing around a broader range of climate-related issues, such as blame for climate hazards, backlash to climate-driven displacement, disputes over clean energy policies, polarization over climate protests, and competition for influence in climate-vulnerable states. Such efforts have security implications across the political, economic and societal spheres, and warrant more holistic and proactive policy attention, drawing lessons from analogous efforts around the COVID-19 pandemic and security of elections. This report provides a baseline on the intersection of climate security risks and mis- and disinformation challenges."

CENTER FOR CLIMATE AND SECURITY. COUNCIL ON STRATEGIC RISKS. 2024. 14p.

By Alexandra Gannoni , Alexandra Voce, Sarah Napier, Hayley Boxall and Dana Thomsen

This study reviews initiatives that aim to prevent child sexual abuse material (CSAM) offending, including evidence of effectiveness. Information was sourced via a literature search and input from an international expert advisory group. The study identified 74 initiatives in 16 countries, and 34 eligible studies measuring implementation and effectiveness.

The CSAM offending prevention initiatives identified in the study include helplines, therapeutic treatment and psychoeducation, online self-management courses, education and awareness campaigns, and other forms of support. Importantly, findings indicate that media and social media campaigns have successfully reached large numbers of offenders, both detected and undetected. While outcomes of programs are mixed, findings indicate that prevention initiatives can encourage help-seeking, reduce risk factors for offending, enhance protective factors, and reduce contact sexual offending against children. Findings also suggest that initiatives aimed at contact child sexual abuse offenders are not necessarily effective in reducing CSAM offending. Evaluations of initiatives aimed specifically at CSAM offending show promise but are limited methodologically. Further and more robust evaluations are required to determine their effect on CSAM use.

Research Report no. 28. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology.2023. 125p.

By Roderic Broadhurst, Matthew Ball, Chuxuan Jiang, Joy Wang and Harshit Trivedi

Opioids, including the highly potent synthetic opioids fentanyl and carfentanil, are commonly sold on illicit cryptomarkets or Tor darknet markets. Data collected throughout 2019 from 12 large darknet markets that sold opioids enabled observation of the impact of law enforcement seizures and voluntary or scam market closures on the availability of fentanyl and other opioids.

Trends in opioid and fentanyl availability before and after law enforcement interventions indicate whether market operators and sellers are deterred and whether market closures lead to displacement, dispersal or substitution. Evidence of all of these outcomes was present in both descriptive and trend analyses, although most effects were short lived. Market closures, especially law enforcement seizures, reduced the availability of opioids, in particular fentanyl, as well as increasing prices and displacing vendors to other markets. Market closures also led vendors to substitute fentanyl for other opioids or other illicit drugs.

Research Report no. 18. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2021. 73p.

By Geoffrey Carney-Knisely , Marquianna Griffin , Alaxandria Crawford , Kamesha Spates and Parvati Singh

The suicide rate for Black youth has increased by 60% between 2007 and 2020. Direct or vicarious racial trauma experienced through exposure to police brutality may underlie these concerning trends.MethodsWe obtained nationally aggregated monthly counts of suicides for non-Hispanic Black and White youth (age ≤ 24 years) and adults (age > 24 years) from the National Mortality Vital Statistics restricted-use data files provided by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, from 2013 to 2019. Monthly counts of Black youth suicides constituted our main outcome. We defined our exposure as the monthly counts of police killings of unarmed Black persons over 84 months (2013 to 2019), retrieved from the Mapping Police Violence database. We used ARIMA (AutoRegressive Integrated Moving Average) time-series analyses to examine whether Black youth suicides increased within 0 to 3 months following police killings of unarmed Black persons, controlling for autocorrelation and corresponding series of white youth suicides.ResultsSuicides among Black youth increase by ~1 count within three months following an increase in police killings of unarmed Black persons (coefficient=0.95,p<0.05), which approximates to about 267 suicides among Black youth over our study period. The observed increase in suicides concentrates among Black male youth.

Annals of Epidemiology. Volume 94, June 2024, Pages 91-99. June 2024.

By Ben Grunwald, John Rappaport and Michael Berg

Private security officers outnumber police by a wide margin, and the gap may be growing. As cities have claimed to defund the police, many have quietly expanded their use of private security, reallocating spending from the public to the private sector. It is difficult to know what to make of these trends, largely because we know so little about what private security looks like on the ground. On one prevalent view of the facts, a shift from public to private security would mean little more than a change of uniform, as the two labor markets are deeply intertwined. Indeed, academics, the media, popular culture, and the police themselves all tell us that private security is some amalgam of a police retirement community and a dumping ground for disgraced former cops. But if, instead, private officers differ systematically from the public police—and crossover between the sectors is limited—then substitution from policing to private security could drastically change who is providing security services.

We bring novel data to bear on these questions, presenting the largest empirical study of private security to date. We introduce an administrative dataset covering nearly 300,000 licensed private security officers in the State of Florida. By linking this dataset to similarly comprehensive information about public law enforcement, we have, for the first time, a nearly complete picture of the entire security labor market in one state. We report two principal findings. First, the public and private security markets are predominantly characterized by occupational segregation, not integration. The individuals who compose the private security sector differ markedly from the public police; they are, for example, significantly less likely to be white men. We also find that few private officers, roughly 2%, have previously worked in public policing, and even fewer will go on to policing in the future. Second, while former police make up a small share of all private security, roughly a quarter of cops who do cross over have been fired from a policing job. In fact, fired police officers are nearly as likely to land in private security as to find another policing job, and a full quarter end up in one or the other. We explore the implications of these findings, including intersections with police abolition and the future of policing, at the paper’s close.

Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, Forthcoming . U of Chicago, Public Law Working Paper No. 850. University of Chicago Coase-Sandor Institute for Law & Economics Research Paper No. 1004. Duke Law School Public Law & Legal Theory Series No. 2024-24

MAY CONTAIN MARKUP

By Brian E. McKnight

FROM THE PREFACE: “In moving down through this nested hierarchy of organizational types, we reach one of the key steps at a level where the social units are distinct as unique cultural and political entities. What was peculiarly Byzantine, or peculiarly Chinese, about the perception of law-enforcement problems and responses and about the ways in which lawbreakers were treated? These attributes, which distinguish one such political entity from another, are simply parts of our definition of what it is to be Chinese or Byzantine or Roman. Such defining attributes evolve over time. The Chinese language has changed from the time of the Shang dynasty to today. However, the changes in these fundamental attributes are evolutionary, not revolutionary. Despite the ways in which it has changed, the Chinese language has remained the Chinese language..”

Cambridge University Press. 1992. 572p.

Edited by Yvonne Daly

Police Custody in Ireland brings together experts from policing studies, law, criminology, and psychology, to critically examine contemporary police custody in Ireland, what we know about it, how it operates, how it is experienced, and how it might be improved. This first-of-its-kind collection focuses exclusively on detention in Garda Síochána stations, critically examining it from human rights and best practice perspectives. It examines the physical environment of custody, police interview techniques, existing protections, rights, and entitlements, and experiences of specific communities in custody, such as children, ethnic minorities, non-English speakers, the Mincéir/Traveller community, and those with intellectual disabilities or Autism Spectrum Disorder. Police Custody in Ireland gives a snapshot of garda custody as it is now and makes important recommendations for necessary future improvements. An accessible and compelling read, this book will be of interest to those engaged in policing and criminology, as well as related areas of interest such as human rights, youth justice and disability studies.

Abingdon, Oxon ; New York : Routledge, 2024. 363p.

By Christopher M. Sun, James R. “Chip” Coldren, Jr.Keri RichardsonEmma Wohl

Law enforcement agencies continue to develop new and innovative strategies to better support and police the communities they serve, from integrating gunshot detection technologies into dispatch systems to improve response times during shootings, to collaborating with local health and social service organizations to address issues such as homelessness or substance abuse in comprehensively ways. Over the past 10 years, the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA), in partnership with the CNA Institute for Public Research (IPR), has supported law enforcement agencies across the country in implementing innovative policing approaches through the Strategies for Policing Innovation Initiative (SPI, formerly the Smart Policing Initiative). SPI supports not only the development and implementation of innovative policing strategies, but also the research partnerships that result in in-depth analyses and rigorous evaluations of these strategies to advance what is known about effective and efficient policing practices. This report examines SPI’s accomplishments since its inception in 2009 and explores some of the major themes across SPI initiatives in both policing and policing research, including the following:

• Reductions in violent crime

• Improved crime analysis capabilities in police agencies

• Evolution of research partnerships with SPI sites

• Collaborative partnerships with agencies, organizations, and community stakeholders

• Integration of technology into policing

Arlington, VA: CNA, 2019. 20p.

By Anthony A. Braga, Cory Schnell, Brandon C. Welsh

Research Summary

Broken windows theory suggests that police can prevent serious crime by addressing social and physical disorder in neighborhoods. In many U.S. cities, recent increases in disorder, fear, and crime have initiated calls for an intensification of disorder policing efforts. Disorder policing programs can be controversial, with evaluations yielding conflicting results. Further, a growing number of descriptive analyses of aggressive order maintenance programs raise concerns over varied negative consequences, such as increased racial disparities in arrests of citizens. Systematic review and meta-analytic techniques were used to conduct an updated analysis of the effects of disorder policing on crime. Fifty-six eligible studies including 59 independent tests of disorder policing interventions were identified, representing almost twice the number included in the previous review. As part of the meta-analysis, new effect size metrics were used. The updated meta-analysis suggests that policing disorder strategies are associated with overall statistically significant crime reduction effects that spill over into surrounding areas. The strongest program effect sizes were generated by community and problem-solving interventions designed to change social and physical disorder conditions at crime hot spots. Conversely, aggressive order maintenance strategies did not generate significant crime reductions.

Policy Implications

The types of strategies used by police departments to address disorder seem to matter in controlling crime, and this holds important implications for police–community relations, justice, and crime prevention. Further research is needed to understand the key programmatic elements that maximize the capacity of these strategies to prevent crime.

Criminology & Public Policy. Early View, May 2024.

By Anthony Morgan,  Timothy Cubitt,  Isabella Voce

• Using data from a large national survey of online Australians, we examined the presence of risk and protective factors for cognitive and behavioural radicalisation among individuals who participated in an anti-authority protest since early 2020.

• Anti-authority protesters exhibited more risk factors and fewer protective factors for cognitive and behavioural radicalisation than other respondents, including people who had protested in support of other issues or movements. They were also more likely to justify violence in support of their cause and willing to support or participate in violent or unlawful behaviour on behalf of their group.

• These findings show that people who participated in anti-authority protests were more vulnerable to radicalisation compared with other protestors and non-protestors. The results have implications for responding to protest movements that promote anti-government sentiment, that spread disinformation and that are exploited by malicious actors.

• AIC Research Report 31

Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2024. 62p.

By Vicki Sentas, Louise Boon-Kuo  & Justin R. Ellis

The violent and contested overpolicing of LGBTQI+ communities at Sydney’s Gay and Lesbian Mardi Gras has a long and visible history which has been amplified through intensified drug policing over the last two decades. This article scrutinises police practices during Sydney WorldPride events in February and March 2023, which included Mardi Gras events. It draws on a unique data set drawn from the NSW Police Force and an independent legal observer initiative, ‘Fair Play’, that provided support for policed people at WorldPride. We ask: What do police practices tell us about the exercise of police power over LGBTQI+ people at WorldPride? Our study found intensive and aggressive high-visibility policing characterised by invasive questioning and drug detection dog patrols, and humiliating and potentially unlawful searches. The impacts illustrate how policing criminalises and gatekeeps belonging to sexual and gender-diverse communities.

Current Issues in Criminal Justice, 1–17.2024.

By Loch K. Johnson

Recent years have seen numerous books about the looming threat posed to Western society by biological and chemical terrorism, by narcoterrorists, and by the unpredictable leaders of rogue nations. Some of these works have been alarmist. Some have been sensible and measured. But none has been by Loch Johnson.

Johnson, author of the acclaimed Secret Agencies and "an experienced overseer of intelligence" (Foreign Affairs), here examines the present state and future challenges of American strategic intelligence. Written in his trademark style--dubbed "highly readable" by Publishers Weekly--and drawing on dozens of personal interviews and contacts, Johnson takes advantage of his insider access to explore how America today aspires to achieve nothing less than "global transparency," ferreting out information on potential dangers in every corner of the world.

And yet the American security establishment, for all its formidable resources, technology, and networks, currently remains a loose federation of individual fortresses, rather than a well integrated "community" of agencies working together to provide the President with accurate information on foreign threats and opportunities. Intelligence failure, like the misidentified Chinese embassy in Belgrade accidentally bombed by a NATO pilot, is the inevitable outcome when the nation's thirteen secret agencies steadfastly resist the need for central coordination.

Ranging widely and boldly over such controversial topics as the intelligence role of the United Nations (which Johnson believes should be expanded) and whether assassination should be a part of America's foreign policy (an option he rejects for fear that the U.S. would then be cast not only as global policeman but also as global godfather), Loch K. Johnson here maps out a critical and prescriptive vision of the future of American intelligence.

New York; London: NYU Press, 2002. 298p.

By Luis A. Fernandez , Amory Starr and Christian Scholl

Recently, a wall was built in eastern Germany. Made of steel and cement blocks, topped with razor barbed wire, and reinforced with video monitors and movement sensors, this wall was not put up to protect a prison or a military base, but rather to guard a three-day meeting of the finance ministers of the Group of Eight (G8). The wall manifested a level of security that is increasingly commonplace at meetings regarding the global economy. The authors of Shutting Down the Streets have directly observed and participated in more than 20 mass actions against global in North America and Europe, beginning with the watershed 1999 WTO meetings in Seattle and including the 2007 G8 protests in Heiligendamm. Shutting Down the Streets is the first book to conceptualize the social control of dissent in the era of alter globalization. Based on direct observation of more than 20 global summits, the book demonstrates that social control is not only global, but also preemptive, and that it relegates dissent to the realm of criminality. The charge is insurrection, but the accused have no weapons. The authors document in detail how social control forecloses the spaces through which social movements nurture the development of dissent and effect disruptive challenges.

New York; London: NYU Press, 2011. 224p.