By David Bruce

The South African per-capita murder rate has steadily escalated since 2011/12, when it was at its lowest since 1994. The 2022/23 rate of 45 per 100 000 is the highest in 20 years. But focusing on national murder trends is misleading as trends vary greatly across the nine provinces. The current high per-capita murder rate is driven by high rates in the Eastern Cape, KwaZulu-Natal, the Western Cape and Gauteng. Key findings: South African murder trends vary considerably across provinces. The Eastern Cape, KwaZulu-Natal, the Western Cape and Gauteng have the highest per-capita murder rates. In 2022/23, the Eastern Cape had the highest murder rate (71 per 100 000), followed by KwaZulu-Natal and the Western Cape, both with annual murder rates of 56. The four provinces with the most murders have also recorded the highest per-capita murder rate increases in the last 10 years. Since 2011/12, rates have increased most dramatically in KwaZulu-Natal and the Eastern Cape. The increase has been greatest from 2017/18 to 2022/23. The per-capita murder rate in the Western Cape decreased over the last five years. Recommendations The government and society must prioritise reducing murder rates, which are high and increasing. The collection of data about murder, and the analysis thereof, must be improved. ‘One-size-fits-all’ approaches to addressing murder are unlikely to be effective. Responses should be adapted to respond to the drivers of murder focusing on high-murder localities. Priority should be given to understanding and addressing murder in the four provinces with the highest per-capita murder rates. KwaZulu-Natal and, to a lesser degree, Gauteng experienced major surges in murder in 2021/22, with increases continuing in 2022/23. These have taken them well above their rates in the year before the COVID-19 pandemic and national lockdown. Deaths during the July 2021 unrest were not a major contributor to the increases in murder in KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng in 2021/22. Many experts believe that the entrenchment and growth of organised crime has played a major role in the increasing number of murders. More in-depth provincially focused research and analysis is required to better understand the factors and circumstances driving murder trends. 

Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, 2023. 12p.

By David C. Brotherton, and Follow Rafael Gude

Since 2007, the Ecuadorian approach to crime control has emphasized efforts to reach higher levels of social control based on policies of social inclusion and innovations in criminal justice and police reform. One innovative aspect of this approach was the decision to legalize a number of street gangs in 2007. The government claims the success of these policies can be seen in homicide rates that have fallen from 15.35 per 100,000 in 2011 to 5 per 100,000 in 2017. However, little is understood about the factors and their combination that have produced this outcome. To explore this phenomenon, we developed a research project focusing on the impact of street gangs involved in processes of social inclusion on violence reduction. From April to October 2017, we collected multiple data sets including 60 face-to-face interviews with members from four different street subcultures in several field sites, field observations and archival materials to answer two primary questions: How has the relationship between street groups and state agencies changed in the past 10 years? How has this changed relationship contributed to a hitherto unexamined role in the homicide reduction phenomenon of Ecuador? We found that legalization helped reduce violence and criminality drastically while providing a space, both culturally and legally, to transform the social capital of the gang into effective vehicles of behavioral change. In policy terms, we argue that the social inclusion approach to street gangs should be continued and highlighted as a model of best practices of the state.

Washington, DC: IDB, 2018.

By Mafalda Pardal, Elle Wadsworth, Beau Kilmer

Potent synthetic opioids, illegally produced, are starting to emerge in Europe. Considering the damaging harms caused by the opioid crisis in North America, which has led to a substantial surge in overdose deaths, it is crucial that European leaders understand the challenges associated with synthetic opioids. In this Perspective, we present and discuss the current situation in Europe concerning synthetic opioids, and draw on earlier and ongoing crises involving this group of substances to reflect on likely challenges ahead and ways to improve preparedness.

Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2024. 20p.

European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA)

Availability remains high across the main drugs used in Europe, evidenced by the large and in some cases increasing quantities that continue to be seized in the European Union. In addition, the market for illicit drugs is characterised by the diversification of consumer products and the widespread availability of a broader range of drugs, including new psychoactive substances, often of high potency or purity. Specialised equipment may be required to meet the detection and monitoring challenges posed by this diversification.

The recent emergence of highly potent opioids, particularly benzimidazoles (nitazenes), poses a particularly complex threat to public health due to their increased risk of life-threatening poisoning. The potential emergence of new patterns of consumption in Europe is also a key threat, due to the availability of cheap and highly potent or pure drugs. This is particularly the case for cocaine, which has seen unprecedented levels of availability

European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA), 2024. 39p.

By A&A Multiprime

As part of our commitment to contribute to loss prevention in Colombia and across the region, our team regularly engages in meetings with representatives of the Colombian Highest Maritime Authority (DIMAR) and the officers in charge of anti-narcotic policies in the ports. We gather updated informa tion about new practices and precautions to be aware of, as well as relevant recommendations and measures to adopt while visiting any of our ports. This ongoing engagement has culminated in our 2024 report, which reflects the latest insights and strategies in combating the challenges faced by the maritime industry

Recent events highlight the ongoing challenges in countering cocaine trafficking. For example, on February 8, 2024, British authorities announced a historic seizure of over 12,500 pounds of cocaine concealed in a banana shipment from the Port of Turbo, Colombia, to Southampton. This incident, marking the largest single drug seizure in UK history, emphasizes the advanced techniques used by cartels to transport substantial drug quantities into Europe and the UK, thereby confirming the global impact of Colombian narcotics. This report results from our efforts and experience over the last years, successfully assisting in several drug smuggling-related incidents and administrative investigations for breaches of shipping regulations, including the ISPS Code. We trust that this report will serve as a valuable resource for all P&I Clubs, their Members, the Masters and crews, and, in general, the entire marine industry with an interest in Colombian ports to mitigate incidents associated with drug smuggling activities

Bogota: A&A Multiprime. 2024. 18p.

By Colleen King

In December 2023, the United States Coast Guard (USCG) offloaded approximately 18,219 pounds of cocaine from the USCG Cutter Waesche. The estimated street value of the cocaine was more than $239 million. The offload occurred as a result of six separate maritime interdictions, performed by separate cutters, taking place over a 17-day period off the coasts of Mexico and Central and South America. The interdictions were performed as part of the USCG’s counternarcotics mission. While interdictions of this size may seem out of the ordinary, the USCG routinely interdicts a variety of vessels, including Go-Fast Vessels and semi submersibles, with massive amounts of drugs (usually cocaine), moving from the Pacific and Caribbean coasts of South America northward to Mexico, the Caribbean, and eventually the United States. One can imagine that prosecuting interdictions like these may raise a variety of questions: could the United States assert jurisdiction over the suspected traffickers; would the maritime location of the interdiction matter; and would it make a difference if the ship carrying the contraband was flagged—registered—by another country? What about the transit time to a U.S. court for an initial appearance where the interdiction occurred over a thousand miles from the United States? The dizzying array of issues confronting a federal prosecutor following a high seas interdiction may not be typical of land-based legal challenges. Fortunately, a body of both federal law and international authorities is instructive on these questions. The Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA) is the United States’ principal statute addressing high seas drug trafficking and has supported thousands of prosecutions for decades. The MDLEA, as it re lates to controlled substances,5 prohibits the distribution, manufacture, or possession with intent to distribute or manufacture, controlled sub stances aboard a “covered vessel.” Its prohibitions apply “outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States,” and include both attempt and conspiracy liability. And, where an interdiction occurs outside of the United States, venue may be appropriate in your district. This article is intended to serve as an MDLEA primer. It will provide a brief his tory of the MDLEA, identify the MDLEA’s core definitional provisions, discuss its key criminal prohibition, detail its jurisdiction and venue pro vision, describe the MDLEA’s position on the use of international law as a defense, and finally, address its sentencing provisions.

March 2024 DOJ Journal of Federal Law and Practice

David H. Ucko, Thomas A. Marks

Organized crime both preys upon and caters to human need. It is corrosive and exploitative, but also empowering, and therefore pervasive. Indeed, though often out of sight, organized crime is everywhere: wherever governments draw the line, criminal actors find profitable ways of crossing it; wherever governments fail to deliver on human need, criminal actors capitalize on unmet desire or despair. For those excluded from the political economy, from patronage systems or elite bargains, organized crime can offer opportunity, possibly also protection.

PRISM, Vol. 10, No. 3 (2023), pp. 92-117 (26 pages)

By David H. Ucko and Thomas A. Marks

Organised crime is not going well. According to the 2021 Global Organized Crime index, ‘the global illicit economy simply continue[s] along the upward trajectory it has followed over the past 20 years, posing an ever-increasing threat to security, development and justice – the pillars of democracy’ (Global Initiative, 2021, p. 8). Wherever governments seek to draw the line, criminal actors find profitable ways of crossing it; wherever governments fail to deliver on human need, criminal actors capitalise on citizens’ desire or despair. As of now, more than three-quarters of the world’s population ‘live in countries with high levels of criminality, and in countries with low resilience to organized crime’ (Global Initiative, 2021, p. 12). On aggregate, the associated activity amounts to an illicit form of governance, furnishing alternative services to a wide range of clients, be they the vulnerable and weak or a covetous elite. The breadth of organised crime, its clandestine nature, and its blending of creative and destructive effects make it difficult to counter. In past SOC ACE research, we argued that the response to organised crime often shares certain pitfalls with counterterrorism, at least since 9/11 (Ucko & Marks, 2022c). Both efforts have been stymied by 1) conceptual uncertainty of the problem at hand; 2) an urge to address the scourge head on (be it violence or crime), without acknowledging its socioeconomic-political context; and, therefore, 3) unquestioned pursuit of strategies that miss the point, whose progress is difficult to measure, and which may even be counterproductive. This convergence is based on the common features of the two phenomena, which are both concerned with i) collective actors, who ii) use violence and coercion among other methods; and who have iii) corrupting, or outright destructive effects on society. Though organised crime is not consciously political in its ideological motivation, it is – like terrorism – deeply political in its origins, activities, and effects. Given the conceptual overlap, and the common pathologies that undermine response, the lessons from countering terrorism are relevant also to the countering of organised crime. Focusing on the concept of ‘irregular warfare’, our past research identified six key lessons, touching upon 1) the socio-political embeddedness of the problem, 2) the tendency to militarise the response, 3) the mirror-imaging of state assistance programmes, 4) the invaluable role of community mobilisation, 5) the dearth of strategy, and 6) the need to engage more closely with questions of political will. As argued elsewhere, these challenges point to a need for greater strategic competence both in assessing the problem of organised crime and in designing a response (Ucko & Marks, 2022c).

To generate this strategic competence, this follow-on report sets out an analytical toolkit to assist planners and policymakers with the crafting of strategy. This ‘Framework of Analysis and Action’ builds upon lessons – negative and positive – learned via years of experience with irregular warfare, defined by the Department of Defense as ‘a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s)’ (U.S. Department of Defense, 2007, p. 1).1 It is a framework that finds its origins within the U.S. National Defense University’s College of International Security Affairs (CISA), where for two decades it has been used to teach strategic planning for complex and intensely political challenges (Ucko & Marks, 2022a). The framework consists of two parts: the Strategic Estimate of the Situation (which maps the problem, explores its drivers, frames, and methods, and critiques the current response) and the Course of Action (which uses the strategic estimate to design an appropriate strategy, guided by a theory of success). The framework is in this report adapted for organised crime, to enable the mapping of relevant actors and the crafting, thereby, of a viable response. By design, the framework responds to the six key lessons identified in our earlier work. This report goes through the framework and explains its adaptation to organised crime. Appendix A provides a summation of the toolkit, a ‘user’s guide’, that will facilitate application of the framework. Testing to date suggests great potential and we look forward to sustaining a dialogue with those engaged with countering organised crime to further evolve this toolkit. Indeed, since the beginning, this framework has been a living product, enriched by theoretical application in the classroom and practical use in the field.

SOC ACE Research Paper No. 19. Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham, 2023. 45p.

By Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime’s Observatory of Illicit Economies in South Eastern Europe.

In this issue, we focus on three cases where criminal groups from the region have been active in recent years: the Netherlands, Ecuador and parts of Africa.

These examples illustrate the growing involvement of Balkan criminal groups in some of the world’s hotspots for illicit activity. Research for these articles is facilitated by the Global Initiative’s network of contacts with local investigative journalists, as well as close cooperation between regional observatories of illicit economies, namely South Eastern Europe, West Africa and Latin America.

As part of the GI-TOC’s analysis of the risks of firearms trafficking from Ukraine, in this issue we show that the Western Balkans remain the main source of illegal weapons in Europe. At present, weapons are still cheap and plentiful in the region, and stockpiles have been augmented by inflows from Turkey via Bulgaria, particularly of gas and alarm guns. More on this topic can be found in a forthcoming GI-TOC report on trends in arms trafficking from the Ukraine conflict.

In this issue, we also report on a major crackdown by Serbian authorities in late 2023 on increasingly violent smugglers operating along the border between Serbia and Hungary, and examine how this has displaced migration flows towards Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Risk Bulletin No. 18. Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2024. 25p.

By Amir Rotami

In this policy brief, based on published and forthcoming studies, author Amir Rostami outlines the changing nature of crime in Sweden, with a focus on organised crime, specifically lethal violence and fraud. What are the lessons learned from the Swedish crime paradox, namely the rise in organised crime, but not an equivalent rise in general crime, and what needs to be implemented to counter organised crime? The reaction to the question can be divided into two components: local and global/

European Liberal Forum Policy Paper . Brussels: European Liberal Forum, 2021. 19p.

By Vlado Vivoda, Ghaleb Krame and Martin Spraggon

Oil theft refers to the exploitation of crude oil or refined petroleum products for criminal purposes. In Mexico, oil theft—referred to as huachicolero—is endemic and widespread. By framing it within the energy security and transition context, this paper offers a new perspective on the problem of oil theft in Mexico. Focusing on crude oil and refined petroleum, the paper demonstrates that Mexico’s energy security—as framed around the 4As (availability, accessibility, affordability, and acceptance)—has deteriorated over the past decade. Application of the 4As framework in the Mexican context shows that the increasing frequency of oil theft has contributed to this deterioration. The proposed solution to the energy security and oil theft problems is centred on Mexico moving from gasoline and diesel to electrification in the transportation sector. The paper demonstrates that, while transport electrification in Mexico has been lagging behind other countries, recent developments in the country point to growing momentum among the country’s political and business elites, in tandem with US partners, in support for the energy transition. Areas where further emphasis should be placed to accelerate Mexico’s energy transition in the transportation sector are identified. Finally, the feasibility of and potential limitations associated with implementing the transition are evaluated.

Resources 2023, 12(2), 30; https://doi.org/10.3390/resources12020030

By  James B. Jacobs and Kerry T. Cooperman

In 1988, Manhattan U.S. Attorney Rudy Giuliani brought a massive civil racketeering suit against the leadership of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT), at the time possibly the most corrupt union in the world. The lawsuit charged that the mafia had operated the IBT as a racketeering enterprise for decades, systematically violating the rights of members and furthering the interests of organized crime. On the eve of trial, the parties settled the case, and twenty years later, the trustees are still on the job.

Breaking the Devil’s Pact is an in-depth study of the U.S. v. IBT, beginning with Giuliani’s lawsuit and the politics surrounding it, and continuing with an incisive analysis of the controversial nature of the ongoing trusteeship. James B. Jacobs and Kerry T. Cooperman address the larger question of the limits of legal reform in the American labor movement and the appropriate level of government involvement.

New York; London: NYU Press, 2011. 320p.

By Ian Tennant and Prem Mahadevan

Summary This briefing note summarises the GI-TOC’s research and experiences in engaging with and supporting civil society responses to organised crime. This is provided in the context of the ongoing threats and shrinking space for civil society, and a need for policymakers and officials to understand civil society’s role, value and potential. It is hoped that this briefing note can provide researchers and officials with a background briefing that could enable improved policy responses aimed at supporting civil society as part of whole-of-society efforts to prevent and counter organised crime.

Briefing Note 27

The Hague: Serious Organised Crime & Anti-Corruption Evidence (SOC ACE) 2024. 10p.

By Ana Paula Oliveira

Summary As a global challenge, organised crime is increasingly threatening the safety and security of citizens. Despite the real-world impact, there is an apparent disconnection between international human rights laws and policies, and responses to transnational organized crime. Even though the regulatory frameworks may have different objectives and scopes, human rights and responses to organised crime are not concepts at odds. Without aiming to provide an exhaustive or comprehensive account of all human rights issues deriving from the workings of organised crime, this briefing note identifies four areas that justify greater attention to the fundamental rights of natural persons, and convergence in the human rights and crime agendas. It draws on a review of Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC)’s research and programming, and the author’s own experience as a lawyer working on organised crime issues for the past five years.

Briefing Note 29

The Hague: Serious Organised Crime & Anti-Corruption Evidence (SOC ACE) , 2024. 10[p.

By Reynell Badill and Víctor M. Mijares

Why do criminal groups decide to adopt political discourses? We argue that an armed group's discursive politicisation (the public declaration of political motivations) is more likely when the state declares the organisation to be an existential threat, militarises the fight against it (securitisation), and when the leaders of the armed group have had political training. This discourse aims to reduce the state's military actions against them and gain civilian support. This argument is demonstrated through a qualitative comparative analysis of six Latin American cases: Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia and Los Rastrojos (Colombia), Militarizado Partido Comunista del Perú (Peru), Primeiro Comando da Capital (Brazil), Tren de Aragua (Venezuela), and Cartel de Sinaloa (Mexico). Three of them adopted a political discourse, and the others did not. We provide an analytical framework for criminal actors who do not necessarily fit into insurgent, paramilitary or simple criminal group typology.

October 2021Global Crime 22(4):312-335

By The United Nations Office on Drug and Crime (UNODC)

Cocaine, cannabis resin and pharmaceutical opioids are the internationally trafficked drugs most seized in the Sahel. In terms of quantity, cannabis herb is actually the most commonly seized drug in the Sahel countries, but it seems to be produced locally and trafficked mostly for local consumption. Cannabis is also the principal substance for which people seek treatment in the region. The geographical location of West Africa renders it a natural stopover point for cocaine produced in South America en route to Europe, one of the largest consumer markets for cocaine after North America. In a context of increasing cocaine production in South America and increasing demand for the drug in Europe, flows of cocaine trafficked through West Africa have intensified. The re-emergence of large cocaine seizures since 2019 suggests a surge in large shipments of the drug to the coastal countries of West Africa, with 9.5 tons being seized in Cabo Verde. Although the majority of the cocaine reaching West Africa typically continues northwards towards North Africa and Europe via maritime routes along the African coast, an increasing number of significant cocaine seizures involving Sahel countries has provided evidence of large-scale cocaine trafficking through the region. From an average of 13 kg per year in the period 2015–2020, the quantity of cocaine seized in the Sahel countries increased to 41 kg in 2021 and 1,466 kg in 2022, with the bulk reported by Burkina Faso, Mali and the Niger. Annual estimates were not available for 2023, but at the time of writing over 2.3 tons of cocaine had already been seized in Mauritania in 2023.

Cannabis resin is the second most seized drug in the Sahel countries after cannabis herb, with 24.8 tons seized in the period 2021–2022. Representing over 52.6 per cent of the total quantity of cannabis resin seized in West and Central Africa in the same period, this illustrates the importance of the Sahel route for cannabis resin trafficking. According to data from the Sahel countries, the cannabis resin trafficked in the region generally originates in Morocco, where an increase in cannabis resin production has been reported, reaching an estimated 901 tons in 2022. It is typically destined for countries in Western Europe and North Africa. Aside from the direct trafficking route between Spain and Morocco, cannabis resin is typically trafficked overland from Morocco to Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, the Niger and Chad, then onwards to Algeria, Libya and Egypt. Since 2020, the Sahel countries have reported that cannabis resin is being transported by sea via an alternative maritime route, mostly from Morocco down the coast of West Africa to ports on the Gulf of Guinea, in Benin and Togo in particular, before being transported north to the Niger and then on to North Africa. The reconfiguration of the cannabis resin trafficking routes in West Africa is likely to have an effect on the drug distribution networks operating between North Africa, the Gulf of Guinea and the Sahel. For example, Moroccan drug traffickers are likely to become less reliant on Malian organized crime groups, while traffickers in the Gulf of Guinea are likely to be increasingly exposed to cannabis resin, enabling them to diversify their trade and the markets to which they have access. Between 2011 and 2021, the annual prevalence of opioid use (including opiates) increased from 0.33 to 1.24 per cent in Africa. The non-medical use of pharmaceutical opioids appears to have grown considerably, from just two countries (the Niger and Togo) citing tramadol as the principal drug of concern by people entering drug treatment in 2017, to five countries (Burkina Faso, Liberia, Mali, the Niger and Sierra Leone) in 2019. Indeed, the non-medical use of tramadol remains a threat in North, West and Central Africa in particular. Tramadol is the most used opioid for non-medical purposes in Burkina Faso, Mauritania, the Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. Moreover, in 2022, Tramadol was the second most common drug for which female patients sought treatment in Mali and Mauritania etc.

Vienna: UNODC, 2023. 40p.

By Mathijs Kros, Tjeerd W. Piersma & Karin A. Beijersbergen

This paper investigates criminal career characteristics and trajectories of domestic burglars, residential and commercial robbers, and street robbers in the Netherlands. We used longitudinal data which includes the criminal cases from 1997 until 2020 for all people of 12 years or older. We studied all 89,062 offenders that had at least one criminal case in the period between 2002 and 2004. Semiparametric group trajectory models were used to cluster these offenders into groups with similar criminal careers. Our results suggest that in order to predict who will follow the career path of a life-course persistent offender, it is important to distinguish between specific groups of offenders. Life-course persistent offenders are found amongst domestic burglars, residential and commercial robbers, and street robbers, but not amongst offenders of other types of crime. Furthermore, the size of the group of life-course persistent offenders varies between the domestic burglars, residential and commercial robbers, and street robbers and is largest for domestic burglars. Other criminal career characteristics, such as age of onset, age of termination, duration, and specialisation, are also compared between offender groups.

J Dev Life Course Criminology 9, 379–403 (2023).

By Peng Chen and Justin Kurland

“Strike Hard” is an enhanced law-enforcement strategy in China that aims to suppress crime, but measurement of the crime-reducing effect and potential changes in the spatiotemporal concentration of crime associated with “Strike Hard” remains unknown. This paper seeks to examine the impact, if any, of “Strike Hard” on the spatiotemporal clustering of burglary incidents. Two and half years of residential burglary incidents from Chaoyang, Beijing is used to examine repeat and near-repeat burglary incidents before, during, and after the “Strike Hard” intervention and a new technique that enables the comparison of repeat and near repeat patterns across di erent temporal periods is introduced to achieve this. The results demonstrate the intervention disrupted the repeat pattern during the “Strike Hard” period reducing the observed ratio of single-day repeat burglaries by 155%; however, these same single-day repeat burglary events increased by 41% after the cessation of the intervention. Findings with respect to near repeats are less remarkable with nominal evidence to support that the intervention produced a significant decrease, but coupled with other results, suggest that spatiotemporal displacement may have been an undesired by-product of “Strike Hard”. This study from a non-Western setting provides further evidence of the generalizability of findings related to repeat and near-repeat patterns of burglary and further highlights the limited preventative effects that the “Strike Hard” enhanced law enforcement campaign had on burglary

ISPRS Int. J. Geo-Inf. 2020, 9, 150

By Marcial A. G. Suarez, Luís Antônio Francisco de Souza, Carlos Henrique Aguiar Serra

This paper discusses the deadly use of violence as a public security agenda, focusing on police lethality and military interventions. Through a literature review to understanding concepts – such as “war,” for example – used in public security policy agendas, the study seeks to frame the notion of political violence, mainly referring to the policies designed to combat violence in Brazil. The objective is to problematize the public security policy based on the idea of confrontation, which adopts the logic of war and the notion of “enemy”. The paper is divided into three parts. The first is a conceptual approach to violence and war, and the second is the analysis of the dynamic of deadly use of force. Finally, the third part is a contextual analysis of violence in Rio de Janeiro, its characteristics, and central actors, using official statistics on violence in the region.

Brazil: Oñati Socio-Legal Series, 2021. 22p.

By Reynell Badillo-Sarmiento & Luis Fernando Trejos-Rosero 

This article explores how organized criminal organizations exercise criminal governance over other organized and non-organized criminals using public messaging, lethal and extra-lethal violence. Drawing on extensive fieldwork, over 350 press reports, and an original database on inter-criminal lethal violence, we show, in line with recent literature on organized crime, that while these organizations use violence to build their reputation as actors willing to use force, they also provide benefits to other criminals such as financing and protection from state and competitors. This article contributes to the literature on criminal governance by elaborating on the mechanisms shown in recent work and by detailing an unexplored case study in Barranquilla (Colombia).

Colombia: Trends in Organized Crime, 2023. 27p.