By Shawn Davies, Garoun Engström, Therése Pettersson and Magnus Öberg

This article examines trends in organized violence based on new data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). In 2023, fatalities from organized violence decreased for the first time since the rapid increase observed in 2020, dropping from 310,000 in 2022 to 154,000 in 2023. Despite this decline, these figures represent some of the highest fatality rates recorded since the Rwandan genocide in 1994, surpassed only by those of 2022 and 2021. The decrease was primarily attributed to the end of the conflict in Ethiopia’s Tigray region, which accounted for about 60% of battle-related deaths in both 2022 and 2021. Despite this positive development, the number of active state-based armed conflicts increased by three in 2023, reaching the highest level ever recorded by the UCDP, totaling 59. Non-state conflicts and one-sided violence decreased in 2023 when compared to 2022, evident in both the reduction of the active conflicts/actors and the decrease in fatalities attributed to these forms of violence. However, despite this overall decrease, fatalities resulting from non-state conflicts remained at historically high levels in 2023. Analysis of non-state conflict data spanning the past decade reveals that it comprises the ten most violent years on record. Organized crime groups have predominantly fueled this escalation. Unlike rebel groups, organized crime groups typically lack political goals and are primarily motivated by economic gain. Conflicts between these groups tend to intensify around drug smuggling routes and in urban areas, driven by shifts in alliances and leadership dynamics among the actors.

Journal of Peace ResearchVolume 61, Issue 4, July 2024, Pages 673-693

By Peter Leasure, Maria M. Orsini and Dexter Ridgway

The current paper builds upon previous research and seeks to estimate the likelihood of a drug arrest/violation across race/ethnicity and gender using data from the Ohio State Highway Patrol. Research seeking to identify disparities is important as appropriate policy interventions to address concerns about inequities can only be soundly explored after the identification of any disparities. This paper begins with a discussion of the data and analytic strategy. In the subsequent section, results are presented. It is critical for readers to understand that this study only seeks to identify if racial/ethnic disparities in drug arrests/violations exist and does not seek to identify the underlying causes of any disparities. Therefore, any results of this study should not be used to imply that the enforcement practices of the Ohio State Highway Patrol are discriminatory in any way. 

Ohio State Legal Studies Research Paper No. 880, Drug Enforcement and Policy Center, September 2024, 

By Meghan M. O'Neil and Peter Leasure

This study explored, among persons undergoing drug treatment, whether one’s likelihood of possessing any felony charge differed depending upon their primary drug of choice. The results showed that individuals in drug treatment who reported cocaine or heroin/opioids as their primary drug of choice had significantly higher probabilities of having a felony charge than those who reported alcohol as their primary drug of choice.

Ohio State Legal Studies Research Paper No. 878,

By Sherry, Suzanna

Last October, progressive Jews were shocked by the raw antisemitism displayed by their erstwhile allies on the political left. After Hamas terrorists tortured, raped, or murdered more than 1200 Israeli civilians and took some 200 civilians hostage, some progressives – especially on college campuses – celebrated. They chanted the Palestinian mantra “from the river to the sea,” seeking to erase Israel (and Jews) from the face of the earth. The number of antisemitic incidents on campus soared, coming from both students and faculty. A Stanford lecturer forced Jewish students to the back of the classroom and labeled them “colonizers.” Jewish students had to barricade themselves inside a library at Cooper Union, and Jewish students at MIT were told by faculty to avoid the university’s main lobby for their own safety. Many university presidents who had previously sent out campus-wide emails condemning the murder of George Floyd, the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the overruling of Roe v. Wade, and countless other world events suddenly discovered the Kalven Principles and claimed it would be inappropriate for them to take sides, or issued weak statements about how the situation in the Middle East was complicated. This double standard continued as some universities responded to student calls for genocide of Jews by invoking principles of free speech, principles that had been notably ignored when the speech in question was directed at other groups. Most campus DEI (diversity, equity, and inclusion) offices, especially at the most elite universities, had nothing to say about the surging antisemitism. This essay explains why no one should have been shocked, or even mildly surprised, by the progressive response to the massacre. Progressive or “woke” culture –as exemplified by critical race theory, anti-racism of the Ibram X. Kendi variety, and, especially on college campuses, the DEI juggernaut – is necessarily and inevitably antisemitic at its core. That these related movements have now exposed their antisemitism publicly is no surprise: antisemitism is bred in their bones.

FIU Law Review from Vol. 25 to Vol. 19, Vanderbilt Law Research Paper No. 24-4, 2024. 

By Rupert Horsley

This report details the key trends and developments in human smuggling in Libya in 2023. In large degree, the year was one of continuity with the patterns seen in 2022. Over the course of the year, for example, 77 470 migrants departed the Libyan coast, only marginally higher than 2022’s figure of 75 500.1 Furthermore, hybrid migration, in which migrants travel to Libya regularly or semi-regularly before attempting the sea crossing to Europe, accounted for an estimated 75% of these departures, also roughly similar to the proportion recorded in 2022. Many of the migrants involved in hybrid journeys first arrived in Libya at Benina airport in the east of the country. This indicates the increasing importance of eastern Libya to human smuggling writ large. In addition to the migrant arrivals at Benina airport, eastern Libya also saw a dramatic rise in departures from the coastal areas in and around Tobruk in 2023, with some 40% of sea crossings in the first half of the year taking place from there. Some, though not all, of the migrants leaving from the east coast had arrived in Benina. While heightened enforcement by the Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF) suppressed departures from the Tobruk hub in the second half of 2023, the body reportedly continued to allow Benina to be used as the main air travel arrival point for hybrid migration for the rest of the year. Thus, the LAAF clearly emerged as one of the main actors influencing hybrid migration in Libya in 2023. Following the shutdown of the Tobruk system, hybrid migration sea crossings were displaced to the west coast. By August, departures from this area had increased significantly and there were reports of migrants accumulating in warehouses in several hubs. In October, a notably large series of departures from Zuwara occurred at a remarkable rate. Increased departures from the west coast indicate that entrenched smuggling networks remain ready to seize opportunities. Given the political and security fragmentation of the region, these networks are likely to underpin the resilience of human smuggling in Libya for the foreseeable future. A notable element that remained marginal in 2023 was trans-Saharan smuggling through Libya. This was once a major route for migrants departing from Libya, but has declined significantly since 2017/18 due to insecurity and migrant abuse in Libya and law enforcement action in downstream countries. One of the few significant developments was the relatively moderate but growing number of Sudanese refugees fleeing the civil war in that country. However, this was not substantial enough to drive systematic changes in the dynamics of overland human smuggling. Similarly, Sudanese nationals did not leave the Libyan coast in large numbers. This is the latest GI-TOC monitoring report on human smuggling in Libya. It builds on the series of annual reports that has been issued since 2017, tracking the evolution of human smuggling in Libya, as well as the political, security and economic dynamics that influence it.2   

Geneva, SWIT: The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2024. 36p.

By Mark McMullen

Although it is particularly pronounced in Oregon, there is no question that the fentanyl epidemic is imposing severe economic costs across the nation. The current report quantifies some of these costs and describes the state policy environment. Public policy regarding drug use is evolving rapidly in Oregon as we speak. As with all CSI does, the primary goal of this report is to educate and inform Oregonians on policy issues such as this that impact their lives. Key Findings • The economic cost of Oregon’s fentanyl crisis is more than $31 billion annually, up from $5.88 billion in 2017. • Enough fentanyl was seized last year to kill every Oregonian more than 20 times over. • Most western states have seen above-average growth in fentanyl use during recent years. Even so, Oregon’s experience stands out relative to its neighbors. Since the pandemic began, fentanyl-related overdose deaths in Oregon have increased by over 1,000%, more than in any other state. Alaska’s experience is the only one that even comes close. • Although Oregon’s decriminalization experiment cannot be blamed for all the disproportionate local impact of the fentanyl epidemic, it is clearly playing a role. When decriminalization went into effect in February 2021, Oregon ranked 38th out of 48 states with available data in the rate of fentanyl related overdose deaths. By January 2024, Oregon’s rank rose to 13th. • Many voters and policymakers quickly experienced regrets associated with the decriminalization effort and are making some efforts to improve the law. During the 2023 legislative session, legislators enacted House Bill 4002, which created a new misdemeanor for simple drug possession. The new law gives leeway to counties on how to implement it locally, and we are likely to learn much as the different programs evolve.

Greenwood Village, CO: Common  Sense Institute 2024. 

By Shiying Zhang, Ao Huang

There have been numerous debates regarding the educational practice of grade retention and social promotion. This study analyzes the effect of an exogenous policy reform in China that abolishes grade retention during the compulsory education period. We exploit the staggered introduction of the reform across provinces and estimate a flexible difference-in-differences model that can capture the effect of exposure to the reform in different grades. The results indicate that abolishing grade retention significantly decreases the probability of junior high school completion, and most of these negative impacts are concentrated among students exposed to the reform in early grades. Moreover, rural children and boys are more likely to be negatively affected by the reform. Finally, we find that the reform increases the likelihood of later criminal behavior in early adulthood.

Unpublished paper, 2024.

By Fredrik Kärrholm, Peter Neyroud & John Smaaland

Research Question -  Which method for deriving a Crime Harm Index (Policing 10:171 183, 2016) for Sweden from criminal justice sources offers the best evidence for providing a sensitive indicator of differences in harm levels across offence categories? Data The number of days of imprisonment for each offence category associated with five different kinds of scales were extracted and compared: consensus by an expert panel of judges, the statutory maximum penalties, statutory minimum penalties, the average of maximum and minimum penalties and the average of actual sentences imposed in a recent time period for each crime type. Unlike the UK, for which the Cambridge Crime Harm Index draws on sentencing guidelines, Sweden has no such guidelines to offer. Methods - The data were compared for sensitivity defined as the difference in length of imprisonment days between high and low severity crimes, as well as other characteristics of the data sources. Findings - Given the available alternatives, the sentencing data average of actual sentences handed down by crime type provided the greatest reliability and sensitivity across the penalties for offences of high and low severity. Applying that method to both crime trends and crime mapping produces substantially different results from counting all crimes with equal weight and can be used by police and others to allocate resources with greater precision in relation to harm prevention. Conclusions - On both empirical and normative grounds, the average sentences in a recent time period for each crime category provides the most sensitive and democratic method for establishing an officially recognized Swedish Crime Harm Index.  

Cambridge Journal of Evidence-Based Policing 4(1): 15–33. 2021.  

By Jo‑Anne Kramer,  Arjan A. J. Blokland, ·Edward R. Kleemans, Melvin R. J. Soudijn

In order to launder large amounts of money, (drug) criminals can seek help from financial facilitators. According to the FATF, these facilitators are operating increasingly business like and even participate in professional money laundering networks. This study examines the extent to which financial facilitators in the Netherlands exhibit business-like charac teristics and the extent to which they organize themselves in money laundering networks. We further examine the relationship between business-like behavior and individual money launderers’ position in the social network. Using police intelligence data, we were able to analyze the contacts of 198 financial facilitators who were active in the Netherlands in the period 2016–2020, all having worked for drug criminals. Based on social network analysis, this research shows that financial facilitators in the Netherlands can be linked in extensive money laundering networks. Based on the facilitators’ area of expertise, roughly two main types of professional money laundering networks can be discerned. Some subnetworks operate in the real estate sector, while others primarily engage in underground banking. Furthermore, the application of regression models to predict business-like behavior using individual network measures shows that facilitators with more central positions in the net work and those who collaborate with financial facilitators from varying expertise groups tend to behave more business-like than other financial facilitators

Kramer JA, Blokland AAJ, Kleemans ER & Soudijn MRJ 2023. Money laundering as a service: Investigating business-like behavior in money laundering networks in the Netherlands. Trends in Organized Crime.

By Peter Gerbrands, Brigitte Unger, Michael Getzner & Joras Ferwerda 

Aim

There is a growing literature analyzing money laundering and the policies to fight it, but the overall effectiveness of anti-money laundering policies is still unclear. This paper investigates whether anti-money laundering policies affect the behavior of money launderers and their networks.

Method

With an algorithm to match clusters over time, we build a unique dataset of multi-mode, undirected, binary, dynamic networks of natural and legal persons. The data includes ownership and employment relations and associated financial ties and is enriched with criminal records and police-related activities. The networks of money launderers, other criminals, and non-criminal individuals are analyzed and compared with temporal social network analysis techniques and panel data regressions on centrality measures, transitivity and assortativity indicators, and levels of constraint.

Findings

We find that after the announcement of the fourth EU anti-money laundering directive in 2015, money laundering networks show a significant increase in the use of foreigners and corporate structures. At the individual level, money launderers become more dominant in criminal clusters (increased closeness centrality). This paper shows that (the announcement of) anti-money laundering policies can affect criminal networks and how such effects can be tested.

EPJ Data Science, 11(1), [15]

By Joras Ferwerda, Alexander van Saase, Brigitte Unger & Michael Getzner

 It is important to understand the amounts and types of money laundering flows, since they have very different effects and, therefore, need different enforcement strategies. Countries that mainly deal with criminals laundering their proceeds locally, need other measures than countries that mainly deal with foreign illegal investments or dirty money just flowing through the country. This paper has two main contributions. First, we unveil the country preferences of money launderers empirically in a systematic way. Former money laundering estimates used assumptions on which country characteristics money launderers are looking for when deciding where to send their ill‑gotten gains. Thanks to a unique dataset of transactions suspicious of money laundering, provided by the Dutch Institute infobox Criminal and Unexplained Wealth (iCOV), we can empirically test these assumptions with an econometric gravity model estimation. We use this information for our second contribution: iteratively simulating all money laundering flows around the world. This allows us, for the first time, to provide estimates that distinguish between three different policy challenges: the laundering of domestic crime proceeds, international investment of dirty money and money just flowing through a country  

Ferwerda J, van Saase A, Unger B & Getzner M 2020. Estimating money laundering flows with a gravity model-based simulation. Scientific Reports 10(1).

By Renato Molina, Juan Carlos Villaseñor-Derbez, Gavin McDonald, Grant McDermott

Maritime transport has been historically susceptible to piracy. While broad assessments suggest the impact of modern piracy causes large economic losses, the literature lacks quantification of the magnitude of the costs and the behavioral responses that underpin them. Here, we combine theory and a unique geospatial dataset combining more than 25 million shipping voyages and thousands of pirate encounters across the globe to find that pirate encounters lead to significant and costly avoidance measures. Shippers modify their path along a route to avoid locations with known pirate encounters. This increases voyage distance and duration, which lead to significant increases in fuel and labor costs estimated to be over US$1.5 billion/year. Additionally, emission of CO2, NOx, and SOx due to increased fuel consumption results in environmental damages valued at US$5.1 billion per year. Together, our results provide the first global estimates linking the presence of pirates to individual behaviour and aggregate transportation cost, as well as its environmental impact, with major implications for the shipping industry and maritime security at a global scale.

CESifo Working Paper No. 11077, Munich: Munich Society for the Promotion of Economic Research - CESifo , 2024. 72p.

By Ingri Bøe Buer

This article reconsiders peace and security from the perspectives of community leaders, educators and activists in favelas in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in 2019–2020. Through a critical lens, it argues that the urban violence in Rio de Janeiro resembles a form of new wars where the state is a major producer of insecurity. It questions the meaning of peace and top-down pacification processes in a city where the favelas, since their origin, have been considered dangerous areas needing to be pacified and controlled. The article introduces favela peace formation as a concept to describe alternative processes working to reduce the inter-sectional forms of violence in these communities: non-violent, locally legitimate peace processes working to slowly construct a positive, sustainable peace. To conclude, it discusses how favela peace formation presents a way of imagining peace as ‘care’ instead of ‘order’ in response to the state’s violent peace as ‘control’

Peacebuilding, DOI: 10.1080/21647259.2024.2354083

 By The Idaho Statistical Analysis Center

In 2022, the overall crime rate in Idaho, as measured by offenses reported to the Idaho Incident-Based Reporting System (IIBRS), was at its lowest in years. The overall offense rate in 2022 was 55.2 offenses per 1,000 residents (compared to 97.4 in 2005, a 43% decrease and the lowest in that span). However, the rate of society crimes, which includes drug offenses, increased 47% in the same period. Additionally, drug offenses accounted for a quarter (25%) of all offenses reported in 2022, compared to 9% in 2005. This research brief takes a closer look at substance-related crime in Idaho between 2013 and 2022, the most recent 10-year period for which data is available. 10-year Offense Trend Drug and Alcohol Offense Rates Between 2013 and 2022, the total rate of drug and alcohol offenses increased by just 3.4% (from 17.6 offenses per 1,000 residents to 18.2), remaining relatively stable compared to the overall crime trends noted above. However, this stability is due to diverging trends in drug offenses (drug/narcotic violations, drug equipment violations) versus alcohol offenses (driving under the influence, or DUI1; drunkenness; liquor law violations). The drug offense rate increased 31% between 2013 and 2022 (from 10.3 to 13.5), while the alcohol offense rate decreased 36% (from 7.3 to 4.7). 

Meridian, ID: Idaho Statistical Analysis Center, 2024. 22p.

By Pinedo M  , Montero-Zamora P , Pasch KE , Schwartz SJ 

Background: The role of immigration policies as political determinants of health among US-born Latinos is signifi- cantly understudied. Immigration policies can produce immigration-related stressors that have ‘spill over’ effects on the health behaviors of US-born Latinos. However, less is known about how immigration-related stressors relate to substance misuse among US-born Latinos. Methods: 1,784 US-born Latinos were recruited via web-panels in September 2021 to complete an online ques- tionnaire. Inclusion criteria included: (1) self-identifying as Latino; (2) born in the US; and (3) being 18 years of age or older. Participants were asked 14-items related to immigration-related stressors and past-year substance use behaviors. Dependent variables included past-year: heavy drinking, high intensity drinking, illicit drug use, prescription drug misuse, cannabis use, cocaine use, methamphetamine use, prescription sedative misuse, and prescription opioid misuse. Two separate multivariable logistic regression models were conducted for each out- come to investigate associations between (1) specific immigration-related stressors and substance misuse; and (2) experiencing greater (vs. fewer) number of immigration-related stressors and substance misuse. Results: On average, US-born Latinos reported experiencing 3 immigration-related stressors. In multivariable analyses, being fearful or worried about being detained for immigration reasons was associated with increased odds of engaging in heavy drinking, high intensity drinking, and illicit drug use. Having ever feared or worried about being potentially deported for immigration reasons and having ever witnessed or experienced an immi- gration raid was associated with high intensity drinking. Parental detentions and deportations in childhood were independently associated with high intensity drinking, illicit drug use, and prescription drug misuse. Notably, greater number of immigration-related stressor experiences increased the odds of substance misuse. Conclusion: Punitive immigration and enforcement policies give rise to multiple stressors that may render US- born Latinos vulnerable to misusing substances as a way of coping. Policies and public health interventions aimed at preventing and treating substance misuse should consider how immigration policies impact the behaviors of US-born Latinos.

International Journal of Drug Policy, 106, 2022

By Safer Communities Directorate

Executive Summary

• There is an ongoing cost of living crisis in Scotland, and the rest of the United Kingdom, which is characterised by higher energy costs, higher food and other household costs and real term pay decreases. This paper focuses on the relationship between this cost crisis and crime in Scotland.

• The academic evidence is by no means conclusive in favour of a certain economic variable having a relationship with overall or total crime. This is an important finding as it dispels the idea that worsening economic conditions will inevitably result in a rise in crime.

• Unlike the recessions of the 1980s, the 1990s and 2008 which brought periods of higher unemployment and decreasing inflation, the current cost crisis is characterised by increasing levels of inflation, combined with low levels of unemployment. Therefore, whilst the existing literature helps us to understand how previous economic shifts have impacted upon crime in the past, any attempts to use this literature to predict the impact of the cost crisis on crime is methodologically unadvisable. We must rely on present day data to monitor crime trends during this current period of cost crisis in Scotland.

• Gross Domestic Product is too broad a measure when it comes to determining the impact of the economy on crime. Therefore, we must specify and explore how changes in specific economic variables impacts upon crime.

• For example, analysis undertaken by Scottish Government statisticians explored the relationship between levels of unemployment in Scotland, all recorded crime, and some specific crime types from 1971 until the present day. The analysis found a strong positive linear correlation between unemployment and overall recorded crime, housebreaking and, theft of a motor vehicle. Considering forecasted increases in unemployment, this relationship is noteworthy.

• We know from the academic evidence that relative falls in the wages of low wage workers increases rates of property and violent crime. This finding has present-day relevance given recent real-term falls in wages as a result of the cost crisis.

• The academic evidence also tells us that increases in inequality and poverty rates increase the rates of property crime and violent crime. However, it is not yet clear how these two economic variables are being affected by the cost crisis and therefore if, and how, they may impact upon crime.

• Non-economic factors play a significant role with regard to fluctuations in overall crime rates as well as rates of specific crime types and are impossible to precisely disentangle from the economic factors that impact upon crime. Such factors include the COVID-19 pandemic, the number of police officers, and population demographics.

• For example, analysis undertaken by Scottish Government statisticians found a strong, positive, linear correlation between the proportion of young men (16-24) in the population and overall recorded crimes of housebreaking and theft of a motor vehicle. Population forecasts tell us that over the next 10 years the size of this group is projected to steadily increase.

• This paper's case study on housebreaking further explores this phenomenon of economic and non-economic factors impacting upon the rates of specific crimes. The case study suggests that housebreaking, an acquisitive crime, may not be susceptible to the cost crisis. This contrasts with findings from the academic evidence review and suggests the presence of non-economic factors that are acting to limit any rise in housebreaking.

• That being said, analysis demonstrates a rise in overall recorded crime and Crimes of Dishonesty that may be the result of cost crisis pressures. It is unclear, however, whether crime is simply returning to pre-pandemic levels. Of particular note is the large uplift in shoplifting, which increased by 21% in the year ending June 2023, when compared to the previous year.

• With regard to next steps, a second occasional paper will be published in 2024 which will draw on the latest Police Recorded crime data and the Scottish Crime and Justice Survey data and will focus on the impact of the cost crisis on violent crime and domestic abuse in addition to revisiting the crime types identified in this paper.

Edinburgh: Scottish Government, Social Research, 2023. 28p.

By Nicholas Barnes

How Do Organized criminal groups (OCGs) respond to military interventions intended to weaken and subdue them? In many cases, such crackdowns have proven counterproductive as OCGs militarize, engage in violence, and confront state forces directly. Existing studies have pointed to several explanations: inter-criminal competition, unconditional militarized approaches, and existing criminal governance arrangements. Much of this work, however, has focused on national, regional, or even municipal level variation and explanations. This article takes a micro-comparative approach based on 18 months of ethnographic research in a group of Rio de Janeiro favelas (impoverished and informal neighborhoods) divided between three drug trafficking gangs and occupied by the Brazilian military from 2014 to 2015. It argues that an active territorial threat from a rival is the primary mechanism leading OCGs to respond violently to military intervention. It also demonstrates that geographic patterns of recruitment play an important role in where OCG rivalries turn violent during intervention.

Comparative Political Studies 2022, Vol. 55(5) 789–831

By Jamie Bergin

People with disabilities having to pay carers to carry them within health facilities. + Local leaders selecting undeserving service users for social protection support, at the expense of poor families who need it. + Officials colluding to put non-existent “ghost teachers” on the books of rural schools, to siphon off already scarce resources. + Women students being coerced into giving sexual favours to pass the next class, with no repercussions for the perpetrator. marginalised communities, Transparency International’s national chapters in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Ghana, Madagascar, Rwanda and Zimbabwe conducted corruption risk assessments in these sectors as part of the Inclusive Service Delivery for Africa project. Each chapter selected and studied different functions within the two sectors, largely with an eye to services and operational areas that most impact women, girls and groups at risk of discrimination. What do all these examples have in common? The answer is an abuse of power for private gain, that is exclusionary of marginalised groups and deprives them of education and health care they are entitled to. Corruption undermines the equal access to quality education and health services. The result is the failure of states to uphold fundamental rights and meet basic needs – with women, girls and groups at risk of discrimination shouldering the impacts most severely. Corrupt practices and associated abuses of power deprive millions of people of the opportunities that well-functioning education and health institutions can provide. While this is clearly a human rights issue at the individual level, the aggregate impact on socio-economic development can be ruinous for societies straining to escape the traps of poverty. At the same time, corruption widens the equality gap faced by marginalised groups, and aggravates social exclusion. To better understand how in practice corruption obstructs access to health care and education for These national-level findings revealed stark common trends, pointing to a multitude of corruption risks occurring across the entire service delivery cycle.   

Berlin: Transparency International, 2024. 62p

By Liam Michaud a b, Gillian Kolla c d, Katherine Rudzinski e, Adrian Guta 

The ongoing overdose and drug toxicity crisis in North America has contributed momentum to the emergence of safer supply prescribing and programs in Canada as a means of providing an alternative to the highly volatile unregulated drug supply. The implementation and scale-up of safer supply have been met with a vocal reaction on the part of news media commentators, conservative politicians, recovery industry representatives, and some prominent addiction medicine physicians. This reaction has largely converged around several narratives, based on unsubstantiated claims and anecdotal evidence, alleging that safer supply programs are generating a “new opioid epidemic”, reflecting an emerging alignment among key institutional and political actors. Employing situational analysis method, and drawing on the policy studies and social science scholarship on moral panics, this essay examines news media coverage from January to July 2023, bringing this into dialogue with other existing empirical sources on safer supply (e.g. Coroner's reports, program evaluations, debates among experts in medical journals). We employ eight previously established criteria delineating moral panics to critically appraise public dialogue regarding safer supply, diverted medication, and claims of increased youth initiation to drug use and youth overdose. In detailing the emergence of a moral panic regarding safer supply, we trace historic continuities with earlier drug scares in Canadian history mobilized as tools of racialized poverty governance, as well as previous backlashes towards healthcare interventions for people who use drugs (PWUD). The essay assesses the claims of moral entrepreneurs against the current landscape of opioid use, diversion, and overdose among youth, notes the key role played by medical expertise in this and previous moral panics, and identifies what the convergence of these narratives materialize for PWUD and healthcare access, as well as the broader policy responses such narratives activate.

International Journal of Drug Policy Volume 127, May 2024, 104423

By Romi Sigsworth 

Artificial intelligence (AI) offers innovative solutions for addressing a range of illegal activities that impact Africa’s environment. This report explores how AI is being used in Africa to provide intelligence on organised environmental crime, craft tools to assess its impact, and develop methods to detect and prevent environmental criminal activities. It discusses the challenges and opportunities AI poses for policing environmental crime in Africa, and proposes recommendations that would allow AI-powered policing to make a real difference on the continent. Recommendations • African governments and organisations should invest in gathering large, local data sets to allow AI models to produce appropriate and relevant solutions. • Investments in digital and communication infrastructure need to be made across Africa to improve and expand access to and affordability of AI solutions. • Police forces across Africa should include technology and AI skills capacity building into their basic and professional development training curricula. • Guardrails should be established through legislation to protect data, ensure privacy where necessary, and regulate the use of AI. • Public-private partnerships must be strengthened for law enforcement agencies across Africa to receive the technology and training they need to effectively embed AI tools into their methodologies to combat environmental (and other) organised crime

Enact Africa 2024. 28p.